REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AS CENTRAL EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

István Tarrósy, M.Sc. & Mag. Gerald Rosskogler (eds.)

Pécs, Hungary
2005

Regional Co-operation as Central European Perspective
Proceedings of the 1st DRC Summer School, Pécs 2004

Published by the Europe Centre Regional European Information and Education Centre PBC and the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) under the intellectual sponsorship of the Danube Rectors' Conference (DRC).

NATIONAL SZÉCHENYI LIBRARY OF HUNGARY, BUDAPEST

EDITORS:

István Tarrósy, M.Sc., managing director, Europe Centre PBC (Hungary)
Mag. Gerald Rosskogler, research assistant, Institut für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa (Austria)

Assistant to the initiators of the Summer School: Ildikó Tropa
Translation of pages 86-99: Daniella Csizmadia
Proof-reading: Andrew C. Rouse
Cover: Balázs Vendler
Design and Layout: Viktor Glied, MarkCon Bt. www.markcon.hu
Photos: Balázs Schmelczer, Gerald Rosskogler
Printed by: Molnár Nyomda és Kiadó Kft., Pécs

ISBN 963 217 931 5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE OF THE EDITORS

The Danube Rectors' Conference Summer School on Regional Co-operation was organised for the first time from 8 to 14 August 2004. The event was hosted by the Regional European Information and Education Centre PBC in Pécs, Hungary, in co-operation with the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, Vienna, Austria. 21 young scientists from 10 Central and Eastern European countries took use of the opportunity to discuss the perspectives of regional co-operation in Central Europe.

The aims of the Summer School project were:

- to enhance the awareness for the significance and possibilities of regional co-operation;
- to discuss and to develop strategies for the improvement of co-operation in the region;
- to bring young scientists from the countries of the Danube Region and Central Europe together to establish a regional scientific network within the European Research Area;
- to foster the relations between the partner universities of the Danube Rectors' Conference and with other regional actors;
- to prepare a sustainable series of events in the framework of the EU Marie Curie Programme to be able to meet the tasks mentioned above.

The initiators of the project are István Tarrósy, M.Sc. (Regional European Information and Education Centre PBC, Pécs) and Mag. Gerald Rosskogler (Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, Vienna).

The programme of the Summer School "The Europe of Regions for the Regions of Europe - Regional Co-operation as Central European Perspective" comprised lectures by 16 high-level scientists and other experts (politicians, civil servants, representatives of regional organisations, NGOs, EU officials), the presentation of best practice projects, an excursion to the UNESCO World Heritage sites in Pécs, the Danube-Drava National Park and the presentation and discussion of papers prepared by the participants in three parallel workshops on the items "Regional Co-operation among EU Member States,

Regional Organisations and Initiatives", "Co-operation between the Border Regions" and "The Role of Civil Society, Education and Science".

We have chosen to deal with the challenging task of regional co-operation to find an explanation for the mushrooming of regional initiatives, to characterise their structures and functionality, and to get informed on their operability.

It is not easy to find a comprehensive definition of the term "regional co-operation" as it may take place on different levels:

1) Co-operation between states within a bigger geographic or historic region, like Benelux, the Nordic dimension, Visegrad 4, the Central European Initiative or the Danube Co-operation Process.

   These intergovernmental structures are very different in their character. Some of them are highly institutionalised, others do not even dispose over a secretariat. While most of the above-mentioned initiatives are deeling with general political issues, there are also specialised institutions like the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) or the Danube Commission which deals with navigation-related issues only.

   Key problems of intergovernmental initiatives are their overlapping competences and the lack of communication among them. The Danube Co-operation Process was founded especially to co-ordinate the activities of the numerous different organisations.

2) Co-operation between regions: In this context, "region" means a unit within a state. Many border-crossing bi- and multilateral Euroregions have been founded in the Central and Eastern European area to establish networks between neighbouring regions. Their main problem is the different structure and administrative competence of regions being part of different states. More extended initiatives comprising regions from several countries are e.g. the Working Community of Danubian Regions or the Future Region project.

3) Local and civil society co-operation: In this case, not the central or regional authorities are co-ordinating the activities, but cities and municipalities, universities and schools, NGOs co-operate with each other on a contractual basis or ad hoc.

In this volume, we present the results of our discussions, based on the definitions and problems stated above.

The success of the First DRC Summer School on Regional Co-operation was ensured through the support of numerous institutions. We kindly thank our co-organisers, the Danube Rectors' Conference and the University of Pécs - Faculty of Humanities, and the supporters Aktion Österreich-Ungarn, Burgenland, Lower Austria, Styria, Upper Austria, Vienna, Hanns Seidel Foundation (Munich), City of Graz, City of Pécs and Erste Bank.

The Summer School project will be continued in 2005, firstly, based upon the success of the first event; secondly, taking into account the evident need on behalf of the students and young scientists; thirdly, due to the commitment of the two co-ordinating institutions, i.e. the Europe Centre PBC in Pécs and the IDM in Vienna.

As for the venue, Eisenstadt, the capital of Burgenland is foreseen. The 2nd DRC Summer School on regional co-operation is planned to be held from 4 to 12 July 2005, and will be dedicated to the theme "Social, Economic and Political Cohesion in the Danube Region in Light of EU Enlargement."

This proceedings volume includes 14 papers organised into two major chapters. Chapter 1 embraces a couple of concise analyses ranging from Zuzsanna Trón's overview of regional policy-making and some of its significant theoretical background to Valeriu Frunzaru's discussion over the issue of social exclusion watched from a cross-border co-operation point of view. Chapter 2 offers more practical examples of regional co-operation. Đorđe Tomić exposes Vojvodina from a political angle, while Kamil Markiewicz takes a closer look at the Baltic States from the dimension of German policies. Brigitte Krech presents a project proposal on sustainable development in Macedonia, and Inez Koller touches upon the possibilities and potential role of national and ethnic minorities in regionalisation providing local examples from the city of Pécs. The book also keeps record of the first summer school by presenting its full programme and some photos, the main organising institutions and the list of sponsors without whose support and contribution it would have been much more difficult to launch such a valuable network of young social scientists in the region. As the summer school itself, the volume is the first in a series that will follow and keep the work of the members of the network alive, and hopefully it will be a useful reference for future purposes.

István Tarrósy, M.Sc.
tarrosy@interhouse.hu

Mag. Gerald Rosskogler
g.rosskogler@idm.at

GREETING

Dear Colleagues, Dear Readers,

I warmly greet you as former president of the Danube Rectors' Conference. I am convinced that summer schools and similar activities can strengthen in real terms any regional thinking, co-operation or common action, and their follow-up is highly respected for future purposes.

In today's interdependent, globalising world, everybody is part of "the global game". As Zbigniew Brzezinski put it, the world is a "grand chessboard". I think there are stronger and less strong players on this board; for instance, the Pacific concentration around the United States, or a bit closer to our homes, the European Union. When we say we want a unified Europe it is important to note, however, that we cannot generalise about it. In Europe there are continental regions that have developed in the course of history. To have a union functioning properly, we need to safeguard that these regions function well. In light of this idea, as a person engaged with regional research, I especially deem it important to create and maintain networks among regions. Therefore, I think that the DRC can be considered as a key player in the development of common way of thinking and strategy formation. Obviously, individual institutions are required to be the motors of any networking, and from this point of view, I am proud of Pécs and my university. In the last few years we have been playing a central role, together with colleagues from Vienna and Bratislava in developing the network. I can just hope that with the flow of summer schools and winter seminars our efforts will be fruitful, and others will take over. I do wish that the initiators of the DRC Summer School can continue co-operating and will come up with other great projects.

To all of you, finally, let me wish that you will have developed an interest in getting engaged more with regional thinking and co-operation by the time you finish this book, in which you will surely find a number of interesting and useful papers mainly of young social scientists. Enjoy and learn from them, and take part in the next editions of the summer school!

Prof. Dr. József Tóth
Rector Emeritus

CHAPTER 1

POLICY, GOVERNANCE, REGIONALISM OVERARCHING BORDERS IN EUROPE

NEED FOR REGIONAL POLICY AND SOME THEORETICAL BASIS

Zsuzsanna Trón

Debates about structural spending and its distribution always flare up whenever a new budgetary period is discussed in the European Union. While poorer countries reason for the increase of Structural Funds, the countries paying net contribution emphasise that the underdeveloped regions hardly seem to have worked off any of their disadvantage, despite relatively high spending and structural support. The current paper summarises the basic theoretical approaches of the two parties and tries to detect these approaches in the formation of Brussels' policies. The first part of the study is devoted to the need of regional policies and its theoretical basis, including the theories of convergence and divergence. Next, the conflicting interests and driving forces shaping regional policies are examined. Finally, the author asks whether spending by the Structural Funds can be justified at all in the light of the highlighted processes and achieved results.

The Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (EC 2004), published at the end of February 2004, confirmed the same as the previous ones had, i.e. the income disparities among member states were increasingly narrow, but they remained constant among the regions of the European Union. Although the 'cohesion countries'[1] had been gradually working off their disadvantage (resulting in a decrease in disparity among the member states), regional disparities stagnated, even showing some increase in the member states in 2000. The regions with the lowest and highest per capita GDP (Ipeiros in Greece and Inner London in Britain) had 47% and 241% of the EU average, respectively (see also the table in EC 2003: 12). The income disparities in the most and least developed regions did not change at all between 1990 and 2000. It is worth giving a second thought as regional spending has permanently amounted to one third of the total spending since 1994, which will correspond to a total of €213 billion between 2000 and 2006 (EC 1999a).

According to the Commission, the results justify the need for continuing the balanced regional policies in all of the regions of the EU (EC 1999a:8). Others

[1] 'Cohesion countries' are Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal

(Boldrin-Canova), however, ask whether these transfers can be justified and are right at all or if they are just political issues. It may make one meditate whether these transfers should be further increased[2], continued in a similar or different fashion (Hervé 1999; Midelfart-Knarvik – Overman 2002) or if this kind of regional policy should be discontinued.

The paper reveals interests playing a role in the formation of regional policies and examines the Structural Funds, the main method of the common redistribution policy of the European Union. It provides a summary of the relevant literature and emerging problems thus laying the grounds of a study examining the Structural Funds in which the Funds are analysed as high amount fiscal transfers from the point of view of macroeconomic efficiency.

NEED FOR A REGIONAL POLICY

The European Union, which is a deepened form of integration, is simply expected to contribute to our economic growth and development through establishing a single market and introducing the Euro. According to economics, bringing down the different barriers will result in the intensification of positive economic effects through efficiency, and resources will find their way to the most cost-effective investments. This is how economic welfare will improve everywhere. It should be noted, however, that profits resulting from efficiency are not evenly distributed among the participants in freely competing markets. As early as the mid-1970s, it was clear in the Union, too, that the newly entering countries with different conditions were 'rewarded' with different profits (quite often losses) by the integration. The resulting profit inequities may induce economically favourable structural changes (i.e. in location and component factors) supposing different macroeconomic conditions, i.e. prospering markets and a free flow of factors. But if the conditions are not given (or too short time is available to correct for structural adjustment) structural changes will yield different results in the economies in question. In the EU, a supranational integration, a remedy for the emerging social problems is expected to come from sources from the common budget.

[2] Barnes (1995) The Enlarged European Union. Longman London, quoted by Kengyel (1999) p.139.

Owing to the above, two policies have been given increasingly strong emphasis in the Union. One of them is competitive policy, the importance of controlling state support by which independent national interventions can inhibit structural adjustment and, as a result, state support will function as a commercial barrier again. On the other hand, the advantages of structural changes are distributed unevenly among the member states. Uneven distribution, however, may directly work against cohesion, i.e. the goal of the Union. That is why regional policy is so important.

Let us see what the goal of the regional policy of the Union is. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome was aimed at strengthening the economic units of the Community and ensuring their harmonic development. After regional problems had emerged, the inclusion of provisions 130a-e in the Single European Act in 1988 (provisions 158-162 according to the current nomenclature) dealt with structural policy as part of corporate policy. The provisions say that the Community develops and continues its activities aimed at strengthening social cohesion in order to promote harmonic development in the whole of the community (quoted by Fazekas 2000:142). Therefore, the aim of regional policy is to help achieve the primary goal set by the Community. This statement will be of special importance later in the paper.

Cohesion, i.e. the development of community spirit is an idea difficult to interpret. Basically it means a 'distance' between individual regional or social groups, which is still acceptable from the moral and social, and, in the first place, political points of view. One of the most important tasks of economics in this field can be the study of these differences and the elabouration of appropriate tools to handle them, in addition to the follow-up of existing tools.

It is interesting to review what Hungarian researchers of this field think the aims and tasks of regional policy are. Gyula Horváth (1998:17) puts his ideas as follows: "The aim of regional policy lies in the reduction of negative features induced by economic processes on the one hand, and regional policy is also aimed at lifting the barriers interfering with the spread of innovative economic activities on the other hand." In Rechnitzer's opinion (1998:21) the aim is "…to ensure the effective utilisation of resources, equalise the differences in regional structures, thus ensuring nearly identical conditions for life or at least the chance for them." As Ákos Kengyel (1999:67) wrote in his book, "Regional

policy means the intervention in economic activities, made in the interest of reducing social and economic differences between the regions." These 'aims' reflect different theoretical approaches.

Boldrin and Canova (2001:213-217) wrote a brief summary of the theories serving as the basis of Brussels policies concerning economic growth and trade. Following their logic and including minor modifications two main streams are distinguished: the theories of convergence and divergence.

Theories of Convergence

Models developed from Heckscher-Ohlin's traditional neoclassical theory[3] have come to the conclusion that factor returns come closer to each other by abolishing duties and establishing common markets. Of course, this model is true in traditional cases, i.e. it requires perfectly functioning markets and an unlimited flow of factors. Presuming exogenous technological progress, a well formalised, single-sector neoclassical theory of growth predicts straightforward convergence; it is considered as the strong hypothesis of the theories of convergence. In addition to the traditional theory (including the capital, work, productivity of all factors) these models also contain human resources, natural factors, public goods and effects of political stability. According to the weak hypothesis of the theory of convergence, socio-political conditions may inhibit technological adaptation, but at least hinder it. So it appears that convergence can be promoted by supporting competition and free trade, i.e. via widespread technology, in the first place. Keeping the goals in mind, the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome included similar ideas but the goals of cohesion and the Hungarian experts in question talk about more than just that.

Theories of Divergence

The new theories contradict the theories of convergence, mainly because they are based on the bitter experience of developing countries. In this approach, the basis for growth is provided by beneficial externalities and, at the aggregate level, the resulting increasing returns. This induces competition among the regions, i.e. instead of resulting in convergence, it results in divergence. This is called the strong version of the theory of divergence. The source for growth is ensured

[3] Based on Krugman-Obstfeld (2003).

by high fixed costs, all-pervasive increasing returns and externals, comparative advantages or the competitive situation only serving as secondary factors. Krugman and Venables (1996) call attention to forces of agglomeration and expectations in the first place. The force of agglomeration urges companies to become geographically concentrated as a result of localised external economies of scale. Expectations sometimes lead to the following situation: If Country A offers better prospects in terms of salary and profit than Country B, capital and work will start flowing from B to A, which further deepens the differences between the two countries.

These theories predict different outcomes. While some forces are against governmental development (as this would result in the fast mobility of the most productive factors)[4], others emphasise the initiative roles of the government due to the high fixed costs and beneficial externalities, as these projects can only be profitable if the number of projects amounts to a critical mass. This can justify EU support and allowances allocated to companies and projects in poorer regions. But it only applies if the aim is sustainable growth and not economic efficiency in the whole of the Union.

However, the weak hypothesis of the theories of non-convergence only claims that inputs (human capital, R&D activities, accumulation of minimum stocks of physical capital and infrastructure) resulting in externalities should reach certain threshold levels. If there is no political intervention, or if the intervention is inadequate, the regions become clustered and the clusters will be determined on the basis of the initial state of factor supply. This is the so-called 'club-convergence' (Boldrin-Canova 2001:215).

It is also worth examining what results individual theories predict concerning the choice of premises and relocation of different industrial sectors. Table 1 shows the possible results of profound integration, depending upon the mobility of factors and forces of agglomeration.

[4] E.g. the best skilled would leave the underdeveloped region, which would worsen the chances of growth in that region.

Table 1. *Possible results of European integration*

Agglomeration gains / Mobility	Small	Large, but only on the industry level	Large, across industries
Low	Geographical dispersion	Localization	
Labour: Low, Capital and firms: High	Specialisation and factor price equalization	Industry "black holes"	Polarization
High			One black hole

Source: Midelfart-Knarvik, K.H. & Overman, H.G. (2002: 327)

The mobility of factors keeps growing as we proceed downwards in the lines, while proceeding from left to right in the columns we can see increasing advantages of agglomeration, and the nature of agglomeration also changes. The first column may belong to the theories of convergence, which do not count upon the results of agglomeration. At low factor mobility, companies will settle near the factors of production, suppliers or, possibly, the market; unlimited mobility of the capital, work and companies leads to specialisation and the equalisation of factor prices.

If agglomeration forces are considered (theories of divergence also do so), in a way in which connections between industrial sectors are regarded close, the concentration of certain industrial factors can be expected ('industry black holes').[5] If the connections between the sectors are strong, a large industrial centre or cluster results in one of the central regions ('one black hole'). But what happens when the connections of companies in the different industrial sectors are strong but the workforce is immobile? Even in this case it is possible that a widespread geographical agglomeration of industrial activities is seen. This cluster seems similar to the one when the workforce was still mobile, but welfare results reflect great differences. In the case of a mobile workforce, people move to the central region, and so everyone profits from the integration. But in our example industrial and capital owners move, but the workforce does not follow

[5] A welfare problem, i.e. the settling of industrial clusters in certain regions or countries, bringing higher profits to these regions than others, may emerge here. The settling of high-tech industries can serve as an example.

them. This is suggestive of the polarisation of welfare elements; disparities between central and peripheral regions grow.

REASONS FOR COMMUNITY INTERVENTION

In real life, the functioning of the economy and the market is characterised by overflows and information disorders; that is, the failures of the markets themselves. Factors outside economic considerations, i.e. social factors are also important. Traditionally, governments try to intervene for two reasons: in the name of efficiency and equity (Stiglitz 2000).

Considering efficiency, community interventions try to correct for the functioning of the market. According to the traditional economic approach these measures should destroy the barriers and points of friction in free trade in order to let effective resource allocation take place. Aggregate welfare will grow owing to the fact that these formerly misused factors are utilised in a better position in production.

Equity is based on the idea that it is morally unacceptable when certain layers or groups of the population fall behind or if income disparity is too striking; decreasing the differences between the different social groups will improve social welfare (the feeling of the total utility). Such governmental interventions can be well illustrated by the general level of public wealth (e.g. drinking water supply) in every area, central transfers for the poorer regions or the introduction of uniform safety and welfare standards in the social area, affecting the employees, and also the introduction of social security systems (old-age pension, unemployment benefit).

As far as efficiency is considered, the aforementioned industrial clusters may have undesired results in case agglomeration forces do not strengthen but, on the contrary, counteract comparative advantages. National empirical results provided by Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) justify the gradual development of industrial clusters in the European Union. If there is any explanation at all for EU interventions, it may be as follows: (1) the industrial clusters have developed in the 'wrong' place, therefore they delay the efficiency of resource allocation, or (2) market forces distribute the more valuable industrial clusters unequally among the countries (Midelfart-Knarvik – Overman, 2002:328).

These two ideas concerning the reasons of intervention do not exactly define the rate of redistribution. It should always be based on precise calculations, although it is mostly decided by political compromise.[6]

Mention must be made here of the criticism of governmental intervention, too. Should efficiency be the issue, governmental activities are always criticised by economists. Stiglitz (2000) called attention to both the failures of market mechanisms and an increased moral risk owing to transfers.

Do results justify the efficiency of intervention by the Union?

Hervé (1999) denied the statement by the European Committee claiming that the regional financial transfers coming from the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund might successfully contribute to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain approaching the average per capita GDP in the Union, if a collective budget policy is applied. The claim by the Committee was merely based on ex ante macroeconomic simulation models. These models basically presume that EU transfers result in a rise of growth-stimulating budgetary spending, which is at least as much as the transfer itself. In the case of Ireland, Portugal and Spain, the analysis, covering 20 years, could not disprove the hypothesis that EU regional transfers had no positive effect on the growth-stimulating budgetary spending. In the majority of the cases, transfers resulted in a rise of budgetary spending not having a stimulating effect on growth (Hervé 1999).

Although examining polarisation on the regional level and looking at 'equity'-based distribution of clusters Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) found community interventions justified, but they do not think the current policy is right.

Artner (2002) emphasised that there were necessary and adequate conditions to effectively exploit the potentials in the regional policy of the EU. The conditions include the liberalisation of the donor country, increase in productivity (especially work productivity), technological development and macroeconomic stability. But the efficiency of structural policy is also affected

[6] In a 1977 report by MacDougal, the necessity for interregional transfers amounting to 22.5% of the aggregate GDP of the member states was proposed. According to the calculations by Barnes, at the request of the Committee in 1995, transfers amounting to 1% of the GDP would significantly decrease regional differences (Kengyel 1999).

by factors such as the initial state of the economy, degree of exploiting funds, the system of goals and resources and the learning process accompanying it.

On examining the efficiency of interventions[7] Boldrin and Canova (2001) first wanted to clarify what the goal of the EU was. They gave their conclusions as follows: If the aim of the EU is to maximise aggregate economic growth in the EU15, the current policy is not adequate and has to be changed according to the model initiated by the Committee's own report. These changes should support the strengthening of agglomeration and divergence. On the other hand, even if the aim of the EU is to support poor regions and help convergence and promote convergence, the policy represented be the Committee cannot be justified despite the highly authentic statistical means.

This is not an easy situation. But how can one easily give his opinion of a regional policy in which transfers and support programmes, unable to hold their original grounds, have become stable. Why is it that policy making in the EU implies that, in the case of decreasing support, donor countries have to present new reasons to get transfers from Brussels at all, instead of simply reducing the existing ones? This question may be answered if one examines the power to enforce interest within the community.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS

There are two approaches to explain why Structural Funds exist and what their functioning and development are influenced by. According to some authors (e.g. Allen 2000) their existence is merely explained by a high level international deal which was arranged between the governments of the member states and the European Committee. This approach does not put emphasis on the interests of the regional parties.

According to the other view, the foundation of the Structural Funds presents a challenge to the autonomy of the governments of the member states. They may feel threatened 'from above', owing to the supranational power of the Committee on the one hand, and 'from below', from regional level, on the other one. Supporters of regionalism and the concept of the 'Europe of the Regions' presume the Structural Funds and their institutions are driving

[7] Many economists suggest a management approach to the Structural Funds during efficiency investigations and monitoring (Sauerborn & Tischer 2001, Bauer 2001)

forces of regionalism (Keating 1997). Regional organisations have had an increasingly greater role in the community policies.[8] The followers of this idea have introduced the term 'multi-level governance' and examined the division of tasks at regional, national, community, decision-making and executive levels (Sturm 1998). An interesting study has been devoted to the role and headway of the regions of member states, with different domestic constitutional structure, in the regional policies of the Union. Börzel (2001) highlighted that although the federalised Germany and the regionalised Spain started their journey at different points on the path of enforcing their regional interests, they were able to successfully and flexibly introduce institutional changes solely via a regional strategy, in strong co-operation at governmental level.

It is worth looking at some of the continually changing lines of interest and areas of conflict within the European Union disregarding completeness for the moment being (based on Forman 2001). A member state can be either the net beneficiary or loser of a concerted agricultural policy (France and Denmark, and Great Britain and Sweden, respectively). Certain countries, e.g. the Netherlands, signed, while some others, e.g. Great Britain, refused to sign the Schengen Agreement. Some other groups are based upon whether a country also belongs to the EMU (the Netherlands, Ireland) or has decided not to join this organisation (Denmark, Great Britain); rely on nuclear energy (France, Belgium, Great Britain) or do not make use of it (Germany, Sweden), let alone the ones which do not even want to hear about it (Austria, Italy). Lines of interest have formed on the grounds whether a country is scared by the prospect of workforce overflowing the Union after the eastern extension of the EU (Germany, Austria) or not (the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden). What could be most interesting for us is whether a country acts as a net contributor to the common budget (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden) or if the country is a beneficiary (Italy), or if a country is a donor (Spain, Greece) or financer of the Structural Funds.

Several reviews have been published about the regional policy of the EU, even in Hungarian (Horváth 1998, Kengyel 1999, Forman 2000).

[8] A statement, having prevailed especially since the reforms of 1988.2. Haselsteiner, IDM-Info 3/1996

CONCLUSION, OR WHAT MAY THE FUTURE BRING?

The aforementioned views do not help much in foreseeing the future. 'Scenarios' by Illés (2002) may help us with researching the future. He also thinks that the system of decision making and 'side-payments' lie in the core of the problem. Concentration should be enforced and priorities should be decreased. But the institutional conditions of the candidate states should also be considered, for as they are regionally still poor they will be able to meet the requirements by the union slowly and with difficulty.

Parallel to these conditions there is another vision of the future in which intervention by the Union will continue according to the old rules. In that case, only a few of the regions in the candidate states will be excluded (Prague, Bratislava, Central Hungary) but a significant part of the cohesion countries, the area of the former GDR, will also be excluded. The workload of administration will increase and 90-100 underdeveloped regions will have to be considered instead of 55.

According to the 'differential' approach by Illés, different systems would apply to the old and new members. But this would drift the task of regional development into a politically sensitive area. He suggests a variety, in which support will be restricted to the poorest regions only and the circular flow of money will stop. The danger in this case, however, is that many countries would lose interest in maintaining the system.

A 'horizontal' approach might lead to renationalisation. Brussels will lose its role, or it will be restricted to enforcing the basic rules alone. Support by the Union will become more differentiated, but, at the same time, it will be integrated into the national systems of support and central regionalisation will come to an end. In the author's opinion, if uniform policy is discontinued the differences are more likely to increase (Illés 2002).

It is up to Europe to choose from the possibilities. And she must choose! Therefore it should be decided whether the goal is sustainable development or economic effectiveness in the whole of the Union. The Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (EC 2004) can help to analyse this, but that would be another study to write.

References

Artner A. (2002). Az EU struktúrapolitikájában rejlő lehetőségek tagországi tapasztalatok alapján, különös tekintettel Írországra és Görögországra. MTA VKI. *Kihívások*. Vol. 153. April. pp. 1-14.

Allen, D. (2000). Cohesion and the Structural Funds. In: Wallace H.-Wallace W. (ed.) (2000). *Policy Making in the European Union*. Oxford University Press. pp. 243-265.

Bauer, M. (2001). *A Creeping Transformation?*. Dordrecht – Boston-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Boldrin, M. & Canova, F. (2001). Inequality and convergence in Europe's regions: Reconsidering European regional policies. *Economic Policy*. Vol. 32. April. pp. 207-245.

Börzel, T. (2001). Europeanization and Domestic Institutional Change: Toward Cooperative Regionalism, In: Green, C., Caporaso, J. & Risse, T. (eds.). *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*. Ithaca – London: Cornell University Press. pp. 137-158.

EC (1999a). Presidency Conclusions. Berlin. European Council 24 and 25 March 1999.

EC (2003). Second Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. Commission of the European Communities. Brussels.

EC (2004). Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels. http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion3/cohesion3_en.htm. Downloaded on 2004-02-25.

Fazekas, J. (ed.) (2000). *Az európai integráció alapszerződései*. Budapest: KJK-Kerszöv.

Forman, B. (2000). *Regionális politika az Európai Unióban*. Budapest: VÁTI.

Forman, B. (2001). *Az Európai Unió strukturális és előcsatlakozási alapjai*. Budapest: Európai Bizottság Magyarországi Delegációja.

Hervé, Y. (1999). EU regional transfers and macroeconomic fiscal reaction in the cohesion countries: An empirical analysis. Prsentation at the World Bank. Washington. (University of Saarland). pp. 1-29.

Horváth, Gy. (1998). *Európai regionális politika*. Budapest-Pécs.: Dialóg Campus.

Illés, I. (2002). *Közép és Délkelet-Európa az ezredfordulón*. Budapest-Pécs.: Dialóg Campus.

Keating, M. (1997). *The Political Economy of Regionalism*. In: Keating, M.& Loughlin, J. (eds.) (1997). *The Political Economy of Regionalism*. London: FrankCass. pp. 17-40.

Kengyel, Á. (1999). *Az Európai Unió regionális politikája*. Budapest: Aula Kiadó.

Krugman, P. & Obstfeld, M. (2003). *Nemzetközi gazdaságtan*. Budapest: Panem.

Krugman, P. & Venables, A. (1996). Integration, Specialisation, and Adjusment. *European Economic Review*. Vol. 40. pp. 959-967.

Midelfart-Knarvik, K. H. & Overman, H. G. (2002). Delocation and European Integration: is Structural Spending Justified? *Economic Policy*. Vol. 35. October. pp. 323-359.

Rechnitzer, J. (1998). *A területi stratégiák*. Budapest-Pécs: Dialóg Campus.

Sauerborn, K. & Tischer, M. (2001). Evaluierung und Monitoring der europäischen Strukturförderung als Qualitätmanagement zur Förderung einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung. Informationen zur Raumentwicklung. 6/7. pp. 409-421.

Stiglitz, J. E. (2000). *A kormányzati szektor gazdaságtana*. Budapest: KJK-Kerszöv.

Sturm, R. (1998). Multi-level Politics of Regional Development in Germany. *European Planning Studies*. Vol. 6, No. 5. pp. 525-536.

Wallace H. & Wallace W. (eds.) (2000). Policy Making in the European Union. Oxford University Press.

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN THE EU

Marko Trnski

European integration over the past decade has been a policy—creating as well as market—deepening process. Most obviously the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1993) are part of a process of market regulation in which a wide variety of non-tariff barriers have been reduced or eliminated. Second, perhaps less obviously, these institutional reforms have led to a single policy—a system of multi-level governance that encompasses a variety of authoritative institutions at supranational, national and subnational levels of decision making.

Multi-level governance initially described a "system of continuous negotiation among governments at several territorial tiers-supranational, national, regional and local" that was distinctive of EU structural policy (Marks 1993, Hooghe 1996) but the term is now applied to the EU more generally (Hooghe and Marks 2001, Bache and Flinders 2004). The multi-level governance perspective is a recent addition to the theoretical attempts to understand the EU, although its roots are found in earlier neofunctionalist theories in the works of Ernst De Haas (1958) and Leon Linbreg (1963) (Hooghe 1995, Marks et al. 1996). Multi-level governance suggests that a new form of policy-making is developing in the EU. According to this perspective, central governments remain vitally important to this policy-making, but they do not have a monopoly of decision-making power. Instead, policy-making responsibility is now shared among a variety of actors at European, national and subnational levels. 'The emerging picture is that of a polity with multiple, interlocked arenas for political contest.' (Hooghe 1995).

This perspective argues that European institutions (such as the Commission and The European Parliament (EP) can be influential, independent actors in EU policymaking. It also suggests that subnational actors are increasingly affected by developments at the EU level and as a result have mobilized to participate in policy-making at that level. One of the most obvious ways in which this has occurred is through the opening of subnational lobbying offices in Brussels. In

this perspective, subnational actors are sometimes as important to EU policy-making as central governments and EU institutions. Each level of actors holds important resources, such as information, political power, expertise and prestige, and all are engaged in a bargaining relationship. Subnational actors, therefore, do not necessarily have their role in the EU mediated by central governments. They may still use domestic channels to access the EU, but these are not the only channels open to them. Central governments are not always able to act as 'gatekeepers' between the EU and subnational actors. It is worth repeating that the multi-level governance perspective acknowledges the continued importance of central governments in EU policy-making. Subnational and European actors have nowhere replaced the central governments as authoritative decision-makers. Multi-level governance also suggests that some subnational actors (such as the German Länder) are more influential than others, in part because of their financial and political power at the domestic level. Finally, advocates of the multi-level governance perspective indicate that it has greater significance in some policy sectors at some policy-making stages than in others. It has been argued, for example, that bargaining among EU, national and subnational actors is particularly important in relation to the structural funds, and, within this sector, at the implementation stage rather than when treaty revisions are being drafted.

Intergovernmental perspectives paint a markedly different picture of policymaking in the EU (Moravscik 1993, 1995). In this view, central governments remain the most important actors in the EU and decisions result from bargaining among these governments. The European institutions, on the other hand, are of only limited significance. They are unable to drive decision-making further than is acceptable to the central governments, and their main purpose is to facilitate intergovernmental bargaining by reducing transaction costs. Subnational actors are also marginal to EU decision making. If they are able to exert any influence over decision-making, this comes through their capacity to influence their central government. Even when subnational actors are present in EU policy-making, their capacity for independent action is severely constrained by the central governments (although the extent of the constraint to some extent depends upon the domestic constitutional structure). In direct contrast to the claim made by multi-level governance, therefore, intergovernmental perspectives assert that central governments are able to act

as 'gatekeepers' controlling subnational participation in EU policy-making. This is claimed to apply even with respect to policy sectors, such as the structural funds, that most directly concern subnational actors.

INTRODUCTION

There are two basic alternative conceptions to analyse developments in the European integration process:

State-centric governance The core assumption of the state-centric governance (or Intergovernmental) approach is that European integration does not challenge the autonomy of nation-states but strengthens it. No government has to integrate more than it desires because the bargains rest on the lowest common denominator of the participating Member States. Thus, the sovereignty of the state is not harmed.

Multi-level governance state executive and state arenas remain the most important pieces of the European puzzle. However, the European integration is a polity creating process in which authority and policy-making influences are shared across multiple levels of government; subnational, national and supranational. In other words, the states 'pay' a price in their sovereignty and their national competencies in order to gain achievements in other fields.

TWO MODELS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

What would be the main arguments of each approach on the National States-EU authority division?

State-centrism

- The overall direction of policy-making is consistent with state control
- State decision-makers respond to political pressures that are nested within each state
- There is a clear separation between domestic and international politics.
- "The unique institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to national governments only insofar as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals otherwise unachievable"-Moravscik, 1993.

Multi-level governance

- European integration has diminished the prerogatives of the state
- The state no longer monopolizes European level policy-making or the aggregation of domestic interests
- Decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by state executives. Supranational Institutions have independent influence in policy-making and their role of must be taken into account in order to explain European policy-making.
- Collective decision-making among states involves a significant loss of control for individual state executives.
- States do not solely monopolize the links between domestic and European actors: subnational actors operate in both national and supranational arenas, creating transnational associations in the process.

SOURCES OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE

The state, as an entity is based upon an actor-centred approach. The key actors are the elected politicians in the central state executive.

One may ask the basic questions, which are the following: Why would states allow competencies to be shifted out of their own hands to supranational institutions? Why would states allow their own sovereignty to be weakened? Why would states tolerate European integration if it threatened their own political & domestic control?

First, the correct question is not "why do states give up sovereignty in the process of European integration," but rather "why do particular actors shift competences to the European Union?" Institutions influence the goals of those who hold positions of power within them, but it is unlikely that political actors will define their own preferences solely in terms of "what will benefit the institution?" Preserving the institutions is one factor out of many others.

Secondly & historically, the creation of nation-states in Western Europe enabled rulers to mobilize and enhance their resource base. State building was a more effective means to war making, control over the national market, a larger economic base and a better instrument for taxes collection. A different shape of the state, which will serve the governance and citizens in a better way, can be an option, even if it reduces the state's prerogatives.

Why would government leaders wish to shift decision-making to the supranational level?

- The political benefits may outweigh the costs of losing political control
- There may be intrinsic benefits to do with shifting responsibility for unpopular decisions or insulating decision-making from domestic or other pressures.
- Tenure in government requires electoral success. Many political leaders might pursue policy goals not derived from strengthening state executive control but from benefiting one sector (for example, agricultural).

Limits on Collective State Executive Control

If we try to examine the EU system through a principals and agents division, we will find inherent limits on the collective state executive control over the EU agenda:

1) There are inherent weaknesses in a system of multiple principals (the states) control over a supranational agent (council, commission etc.). The principals' are prone to competition, mistrust and conflict among themselves. Furthermore, the basic ambiguousness of the treaties of the EU provides ample room for interpretations by both principals and agents
2) Thanks to the requirement of unanimity, a supranational agent needs only to gain the approval of one of the various principals in order to prevent the approval of any unwanted change in the principal/agent relationship. Practically, however, it is not as simple as that.
3) Information: Due to its vast capability to gather information and competencies which are not available to the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, a more EU oriented body has developed a very powerful source of independency & influence.
4) Mutual mistrust leads state executives into highly detailed mandates to the European Commission. This way the Commission is able to build very specialised policy networks of technical experts designing detailed regulations enhancing its influence/independence vis-à-vis the Council;
5) State executives do not possess the ability to forecast precisely the effects of their own collective actions.

POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

If we want to answer the question 'who decides what in European Union policy-making?' we should decompose the policy making process to its components. By analyzing who is the 'main player' in every stage we would be able to determine if the State-executive are those in power-in accordance to the state-centric approach. On the other hand, if we will find that the State-executive (in the form of the council or another) are one, even if an eminent, player among many, this will strengthen the multi-level governance approach. We will divide the policy making process to four aspects:

1. Policy Initiation

The European Commission alone has the formal power to initiate and draft legislation according to the TEC. However, a closer look highlights that regulatory initiative at the European level is demand-driven rather than the product of an autonomous supranational action. What is the role of the council of ministers in the policy initiation stage?

Article 208 of the TEC determines that "the council may request the Commission to undertake any studies the council considers desirable for the attainment of the common objectives, and to submit to it any appropriate proposals". The political weight of the council is such that the commission is bound to pay close attention to the ministers' wishes. Furthermore, the increasingly developed council's machinery creates many new ideas and initiations that enable the council to influence policy directions and priorities.

The states find some aspects easier for co-operation when there is no binding EU law (like where there are big national differences). These non-legal agreements do not have to be initiated by the commission and often they are easier to agree upon at ministerial level. State-centric advocates can find strengths in these arguments as they show that the state representatives, in the council and outside of it, have a key role in the policy initiation stage.

Yet it is important to remember that these demands don't come exclusively from governmental leaders gathered in the council of ministers or in the European Council. A significant number of initiatives originate in the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, local subnational authorities and private groups with various interests. The commission is a critical actor in

the policy initiation phase, whether one looks at formal rules or at the practice. It is definitely not merely an agent of state executives as some State-Centric advocates might suggest.

The council is not the only decisive actor, as it is part of a system of multi-level governance involving competition and interdependence among the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, each of which dispose of impressive resources in policy initiation. Hence, from a multi-level governance point of view it seems that the power of agenda-setting has increasingly become a shared and contested competence among the European institutions.

2. Decision-Making

According to the Treaties, the main legislative body of the EU is the Council of Ministers. It is the most important in that that it holds the final decision-making power. As this might sound coherent with the State-centric approach, the reality is that the council relies on the other EU bodies in order to perform its function in the policy making process. State executive dominance is eroded in the decision-making process by the legislative power of the European Parliament and the efforts of interest groups to influence outcomes in the European arena.

The qualified majority vote and the co-decision/co-operation processes

The Single European Act established qualified majority voting in the legislative process. The member state agreement introduced the co-operation procedure that gave the EP a second reading on legislative proposals concerned with internal markets, regional development, social policy and research. The co-operation procedure encouraged a greater dialogue between the two bodies and restricted the council's room for manoeuvre, although it hasn't altered its position as the final decision-maker. This encouraged the states to agree to the co-decision procedure that introduced three readings to the EP on proposals in a number of areas. Furthermore, the EP was given the right to reject the council's common position and in such a case a conciliation committee will be formed to find a resolution.

Collective state control exercised through the Council has diminished and that of the European Parliament has increased proportionally. The progressive extension of qualified majority voting has been the most transparent blow to

state sovereignty. Even the Luxemburg veto power has increasingly diminished. First, the use is stipulated in a risk to a substantial national interest. Practically, the veto right was used not more than 12 times between 1966 and 1985 (which was also the year of the last successful attempt) and even less frequently ever since. A state-centric point of view might claim that sensitive areas (such as security/defence matters, foreign policy etc.) remain subject to unanimity and hence to national veto. Even if this is true, the fact that there are a growing number of subjects that were decided by consensus and are now being decided by the qualified majority voting, reflects a process in formation.

From a multi-level governance point of view EU decision-making can be characterised as one of multiple, intermeshing competencies, complementary policy functions, and variable lines of authority. The council is definitely the main player, but in a multi-player game.

3. Implementation

Multi-level governance is prominent in the implementation stage. In practice, both the Commission and national governments share the competencies of formal executive power and implementation. National governments monitor the executive powers of the Commission, in conjunction with subnational governments and societal actors. On the other hand the Commission has become involved in daily implementation and has contacted subnational authorities and interest groups.

Since the 1980s the Council and individual national governments have become intimately involved and have participated in Commission decisions. As part of the process, state executives have lost exclusive control in a range of policy areas, especially competition control within their borders, aid to national firms autonomously conduct trade negotiations. As in the previous stages, we see that the implementation stage, although still mainly controlled by the state, is shared in authorities and in practice by EU bodies other then the Commission.

4. Adjudication

Throughout the history of European integration the ECJ has constitutionalized European law and expanded European authority towards new policy areas by stating that these were necessary to serve the goals of the Treaties. In practice,

most of the cases that involve interpretation of the Community law business are being transferred, as EU law determines, from national courts to the European Court of Justice. This, along with the other examples, demonstrates another field in which state authority is exchanged with that of an EU institution.

CONCLUSION

European Union Member States are being melded gently into a multi-level polity by their leaders and the actions of numerous subnational and supranational actors. There are different reasons for the shift of competencies from the nation states to the European Union institutions.

The first set of reasons relates to the structure, size and interrelations between the EU bodies. The growing number of states, decisions and areas covered by the agenda and the specialisation of the permanent EU bodies/committees results in a decreased ability in the state leaders represented in the council to achieve their desired goals easily. In addition, the growing competencies of the EP and the commission and the complexity of their relations with the council make the task of keeping all authorities within the nation state more and more difficult.

The second set of reasons might relate to domestic and political benefit. Shifting competencies and also responsibilities to the EU level might credit important points or votes to the state's executives and they are using this tool occasionally.

And last, as the EU process is growing and expanding, the ability of one state representative in the council, to impose his will even if he belongs to one of the strongest states, is declining. The growing fracture in the habit of consensual decisions in the form of qualified majority voting and the number of participants around the table that is about to grow dramatically strengthen the EU as a multi-level governance polity.

References

Bache, I. (1998). *The politics of EU regional policy; multi level governance or flexible gatekeeping?*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.

Bache, I. & Flinders, M. (eds.) (2004). *Multi-level governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hooghe, L. (ed.) (1996). *Cohesion policy and European integration: building multi-level governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marks, G. (1993). Structural policy and multi-level governance in the EC. In: Cafruny, A. & Rosenthal, G. (eds.) *State of European community* vol.2. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner and London: Logman. pp. 391-410.

Marks, G., Nielsen, F., Ray, L. & Salk, J. (1996) Conflict, cracks and conflicts: regional mobilization in the EU. In: Marks, G., Scharpf, F., Schmitter, P. & Streeck, W. (eds.) *Governance in the EU*. London: Sage. pp. 40-63.

Marks, G. & Hooghe, L. (2001). *Multi-level governance and European integration*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach. *Journal of common market studies*. Vol. 34, No. 4. pp. 473-524.

Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca (New York): Cornell University Press.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND SUB-REGIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE

Selcen Öner

Contemporarily the 'nation-state' is facing challenges both from within itself by sub-national regions and from above, the European Union (EU). As power becomes more centralised under the EU, existing borders will become less significant and demands to control local matters will generally increase.[1] In this atmosphere local authorities feel that they can manage their affairs better than distant bureaucracies, either of national capitals or Brussels. They mostly believe that they can cope with issues like crime, drug trafficking and immigration better than the national authorities.[2]

From a functional perspective, the strengthening of sub-national regions was a response to overload in central government and the need to decentralise the delivery of public goods. From the perspective of democracy theory, it is argued that by reducing the distance between citizens and the central state, the conditions for participatory democracy are enhanced.[3]

Regional and local governments have started to play a role as partners of development and operate as one of the important actors in the European integration process. Especially regional elites are among the most active supporters of further integration in many areas of the Union.[4] On the other hand, regions have an important source of influence on European policy-

1 Steele, S. The Desire To Go It Alone. *Maclean's*. Vol. 105, No. 11. 03.16.1992.

2 Newhouse, J. Europe's Rising Regionalism. *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 76, No. 1. New York. Jan/Feb 1997. p.67.

3 Christiansen, T. Regionalism and Supranationalism in Western Europe. EUI Seminar paper, March 1992 in Laffan, B. *Nations and Regions in Western Europe*. Retrieved on February 6, 2001 on the http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/2blattan.htm

4 Leonardi, R. Cohesion in The European Community: Illusion or Reality?. *West European Politics*. Vol. 16, No. 4., October 1993. p. 514.

making because most European policies were implemented by them.[5] Also sub-national governments increasingly use the context of the EU to extend their powers within their nation-states.[6]

According to one point of view, if national governments can maintain their control over these processes, they may use them to strengthen their own power by ensuring that Community institutions will remain intergovernmental.[7] From another point of view, a new political structure is created in which nation-states may disappear in favour of a 'Europe of The Regions'.[8]

In some cases the growth of sub-national regional political consciousness within the nation-states has affected the structures of member states.[9] In some states, to accommodate to the decentralisation trends, national governments have to rearrange their political structures.

Some people see the enhancement of EU initiatives on behalf of the sub-national regions as the possible erosion of nation-state sovereignty. According to this point of view, Europe may provide an external support system for sub-national communities which try to escape from the control of their central government.[10] From the perspective of some sub-national authorities, generally there is no difference between responding to European or national legislation.[11] So they mostly see both of them as superior controlling bodies over themselves.

Consequently, with the introduction of a new level of governance into the centre-periphery relations within the nation-state, the new political structure can be generally defined as a 'triangular relationship of Europe'. This relationship

---

[5] Borzel, T. A. From Competitive Regionalism to Cooperative Federalism: The Europeanization of the Spanish State of The Autonomies. *Publius*. Vol. 30, No. 2. Philadelphia, Spring 2000. pp. 18-19.

[6] Guyomarch, A., Machin, H. & Ritchie, E. (1998). *France in the EU*. London: Macmillan Press. p. 190.

[7] Keating, M. (1995). Europeanism and Regionalism. In: Jones, B. & Keating, M. (eds.). *The European Union and the Regions*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 10.

[8] Keating, M. Regional Autonomy in the Changing State Order: A Framework of Analysis. Regional Politics and Policy. 2/3 1992. In: Keating, M. *Europeanism and Regionalism*. pp. 10-12.

[9] Laffan, B. Nations and Regions in Western Europe. Retrieved on February 6, 2001 on http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/2blattan.htm

[10] Cardus, S. Identidad cultural, legitimidad politica e interes economic. In: Keating, M. *Europeanism and Regionalism*. p. 8.

[11] John, P. The Europeanisation of Sub-National Governance. *Urban Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 5/6. Edinburgh, May 2000. p. 878.

includes the levels of EU, the nation-state and sub-national regions. The effects of EU and sub-national regions have increased in some nation-states and institutional linkages have begun to emerge between them.[12] This may be also defined as 'triangular politics'. The final structure of this relationship between these three levels can not be foreseen by now, it will continue its transformation process and can be understood better after some a time.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND THE SUB-NATIONAL REGIONS

At the beginning, the EC did not seem very important for sub-national regions, because it concentrated on few policy areas.[13] But as the integration process of the EU accelerates, the sub-national regions will have to be involved more in this process.

Sub-national regionalism has accelerated in Europe as a response to reassertions of cultural and historical identity and to pressure for democratization. In addition to these, the development of the EC has accelerated sub-national regionalism, with the effect of economic integration, because in the peripheral regions of Europe there are fears about the negative effects of the more integrated market by increasing the economic disparities among them.[14]

Especially from the 1980s, many of the legislative measures of the EU institutions have affected local and regional governments, like the changes in planning regimes, vocational and professional training, local transport, environment, trading standards, health and consumer protection.[15] For this reason, sub-national regions need to take information about these new measures while at the same time they are trying to influence these developments on behalf of themselves.

The sub-national regions have mostly started to become the institutions responsible for implementing the growing EU legislation, especially in fields

[12] Allum, P. *State and Society in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1995. p. 455.
[13] John, P. The Europeanisation of Sub-National Governance. pp. 878-879.
[14] Keating, M. The Continental Meso: Regions in the European Community. In: L.J. Sharpe (ed.), The Rise of Meso Government in Europe, Modern Politics Series, Vol. 32, London :SAGE Pub., 1993. pp. 296-297.
[15] John, P. The Europeanisation of Sub-national Governance. p. 879.

like environmental protection, common standards and transport. They have thereby started to become more effective actors in European policy networks,[16] although they are mostly active in the implementation process of EU policies, rather than the decision-making process.

Sub-national regions have generally acted in two ways. One of them can be called rejectionist regionalism, which opposes European integration with the fear of further loss of democratic control and the superiority of market principles. Since the 1980s, the opposition of the sub-national regions has started to be transformed into more positive attitudes and engagement of them in the EU by different means. They have started to use the mechanisms of the EU on their behalf. The EU has been mostly started to be seen by them as a source of material support for economic development, especially through structural funds. From a political perspective, they have used Europe as a framework for the international projection of the region and, in some cases, as a source of support for regional cultures and languages.[17] So the sub-national regions of Europe have started to see European integration as providing a Pan-European roof under which they can assert their identity and extend their autonomy.[18]

The EU provides different alternatives of access through national governments, the Parliament and lobbying. But there is still a lack of institutions for representation of sub-national governments in the EU process.[19] In order to affect the decisions which are taken in Brussels, the sub-national regions have to improve their contacts with the EU.

On the other hand, the regional policy directorate of the Commission and sub-central authorities have promoted contacts to improve their information flow. They have a common interest in promoting contacts and exchange information. Some regional and local governments have tried to form direct links with the EU by opening offices in Brussels. Despite the opposition of national governments this kind of linkage has spread, which includes all the

[16] Guyomarch, A. Machin, H. & Ritchie, E. France in the European Union, p. 190.

[17] Keating, M. The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub., 1998. p. 163.

[18] Laffan, B. Nations and Regions in Western Europe. Retrieved on February, 06.2001 on http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/2blattan.htm

[19] Keating & Hooghe, 1995 in Keating, M. Nations Against The State, -The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland , London: Macmillan Press, 1996. p. 225.

German länder, six French regions and two departments, some Italian regions, four Spanish regions and four British local authorities. The main aim of establishing these offices is to monitor developments in the Commission and put pressure on national governments.[20] They provide information for sub-national regions on upcoming initiatives. They also have a symbolic role in projecting regions in the European arena and in presenting them as participants in the policy process. On the other hand, they also provide information about regional views to Commission officials, who otherwise only depend on national governments for information. But these offices have been mostly effective when they work in co-operation with their national governments.[21]

Sub-national authorities do not simply set up offices for the amount of resources potentially available; instead of this the political factors are more effective.[22] The first office was opened in 1984. By December 1995, the total number reached more than 140 offices.[23] Some of these offices represent one region, some represent consortia of regions and some of them represent municipal governments.[24] These offices also inform regions about the availability of different kinds of Community funds. On the other hand, there has been a huge increase in the number of visits to Brussels by regional and local delegations for taking information and improving relations. Commission officials welcome the visits but state that they are ineffective in providing extra funds to regions, because these are given under rules and procedures.[25]

Sub-national regions are therefore very active in trying to influence EU policy-making through a network of contacts, lobbies and partnerships. This situation is also beneficial for the EU because it tries to find regional partners

[20] Allum, P. State and Society in Western Europe. pp. 455-456.

[21] Keating, M. The New Regionalism in Western Europe. p. 170.

[22] John, P. The Europeanisation of Sub-national Governance. p. 886.

[23] Hooghe, 1995. p.22; Scottish Enterprise, 1995. In: Charlie Jeffery, "Regional Information Offices in Brussels and Multi-Level Governance in the EU: A UK-German Comparison" in Charlie Jeffery(ed.), The Regional Dimension of the European Union- Towards a Third Level in Europe?, London: Frank Cass Pub. 1997. p. 183.

[24] Keating, M. & Hooghe, L. By-passing The Nation-State? Regions and The EU Policy Process", in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), European Union - Power and Policy Making, London: Routledge Press, 1996. pp. 221-222.

[25] Keating, M. "The Continental Meso: Regions in the European Community. p. 306.

for the formulation and implementation of its regional policies.[26] Most lobbying has concentrated on the Commission, with the formation of delegations and the establishment of offices in Brussels.[27] The Commission encourages lobbying by sub-national groups to obtain sources of information and to strengthen the *communautaire* spirit.[28] However, the Commission could not develop continuous direct links with all sub-national authorities because it has a small bureaucracy. For this reason, its main links are still with member states.[29]

On the other hand, if regional interests are more effectively integrated into the national policy-making system, they will be better dealt with in Brussels. They may also be more effective if they provide links with powerful sectoral interests. [30]

Generally there is not much exact evidence that sub-national activities have influenced EU decision-makers; rather, EU decision-makers have used the lobbies during implementation of these policies or to legitimate policies. On the other hand, sub-national authorities mostly have to follow the agenda of their nation-states. Sub-national influence can be seen when expert lobbies pass information to the Commission, so that it can manipulate the national government.[31]

On the other hand, the sub-national regions do not have common interests, because sub-national regionalisms differ in their character and their strength according to the conditions of different societies and the impact of national and international forces on them. It is not possible to explain all of them with a single model.[32] They differ in their population, area, economic capacity, cultural background, institutional structure, political capacity, strength of their business, social networks and civic cultures. Because of the differences among them, it is really hard for the sub-national regions to prepare a common policy to defend and improve

[26] Hooghe and Keating, 1994. In: Keating, M. Nations Against The State. p. 51.

[27] Serignan, M. L'Evolution des relations entre la CEE et les Collectivites territoriales", Apres-demain, 314-15(1989), 4-7. In: Keating, M. Europeanism and Regionalism. p. 14.

[28] Keating, M. The Continental Meso: Regions in the European Community. p. 307.

[29] Anderson, J. Skeptical Refections of a 'Europe of the Regions': Britain, West Germany and the European Regional Development Fund. Paper to the American Political Science Association annual meeting, San Francisco, 1990 In: Keating, M. The Continental Meso: Regions in the European Community. p. 307.

[30] Keating M. & Hooghe, L. By-passing the nation-state? Regions and the EU policy process. pp. 220-222.

[31] John, P. The Europeanisation of Sub-national Governance. pp. 887-888.

[32] Keating, M. *Europeanism and Regionalism*. p. 9.

their position. In addition to these, completion of the internal market, monetary union and global capital mobility will probably increase interregional competition.[33]

We can generally classify the sub-national regions of the EU member states in four different categories: Group 1 involves regions with wide-ranging powers such as an elected regional parliament, with a right to levy taxes, budgetary and legislative powers. German länder and Belgian provinces can be given as examples of this group. Group 2 involves regions with advanced powers, such as an elected regional parliament, a limited right to levy taxes and limited budgetary powers. Spanish autonomous communities and Italian regions can be given as examples of this group. Group 3, involves regions with limited powers. French regions, Dutch provinces, Scotland and Wales can be given as examples of this group. Lastly, Group 4 involves regions with no powers, no elected regional parliament, no right to levy taxes, no budgetary and legislative power and all of its financial resources are transferred by central government. Greek nomoi, Portuguese planning regions, Irish and English counties can be given as examples of this group.[34]

The effectiveness of sub-national regions mostly depends on the quality of their institutional infrastructure and their ability to take action. Some sub-national regions only enforce legislation of the EU applicable to them, without being able to influence the formulation and implementation of relevant Community policies.[35]

Generally there are two main reactions of the sub-national regions by the EU. The first group sees European integration as an opportunity to escape from the authority of their nation-state. The second group of regions comprise those that adopt the 'internal colonialism' thesis and oppose Europe because they see it as a 'rich man's club'.[36]

In some sub-national regions, especially in the ones that can be defined as stateless nations, there are powerful autonomist or separatist movements which mostly see the EU as a way to by-pass the nation-state.[37] They think that accelerating direct relations with the EU will probably positively affect their autonomy.

---

[33] Keating, M. *Europeanism and Regionalism*. pp. 20-21.

[34] Wiehler F. & Stumm, T. *The Powers of Regional and Local Authorities and Their Role in the European Union*. p. 246.

[35] Ibid., p.251.

[36] Lafont. La Revolution Regşonaliste. In: John Loughlin. Europe of the Regions and the Federalization of Europe. *Publius*, Vol. 26, No. 4, Philadelphia, Fall 1996, p. 143.

[37] Keating, M. *Europeanism and Regionalism*. p. 21

COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (COR)

The Maastricht Treaty introduced the COR in 1992 as a consultative body to the Commission with the same status as the Economic and Social Committee. It came into existence in 1994.[38] With the COR, there is an official recognition of the sub-national territories.[39] But the COR is only a consultative body and do es not have effective powers.

The setting up of the COR is an important change in the institutional architecture of the EU, because with the COR the representation of the sub-national level was permitted for the first time.[40] However, it is still distant from the ideals of some of the more radical regionalists, who want a regionally based second chamber of the EP.[41]

One of the main aims of establishing the COR was to strengthen economic and social cohesion of the member states. On the other hand, the COR contributes to making the European integration process more democratic and giving reality to European citizenship. It aims to work towards an ever closer EU of citizens. To achieve this aim, it organises conferences and seminars in the various regions of the member states.[42] Generally we can say that the COR acts as a spokesperson and gives information about the European institutions to the sub-national regions of Europe,[43] essaying to build a bridge between the EU institutions and its people.

The COR can issue opinions upon request or on its own initiative. But the Council and the Commission can ignore its comments. It does not have access to the European Court of Justice. Because of this, the COR has been dissatisfied with its role .[44]

---

[38] Ibid.,p.15.

[39] Loughlin, J. Representing Regions in Europe: The Committee of the Regions. In: Charlie Jeffery (ed.). *The Regional Dimension of the European Union - Towards a Third Level in Europe?*. London: Frank Cass Pub. 1997. p. 163.

[40] Loughlin, J. Representing Regions in Europe: The Committee of the Regions. Ibid., p. 157.

[41] Keating, M. *Europeanism and Regionalism.* p. 15.

[42] "The Committee of The Regions-Five Questions, Five Answers", European Union Committee of the Regions official website, Retrieved on January 4, 2001 on http: //www.cor.eu.int/5q5a/5q_en_intro.html

[43] Website of the COR, "Bringing the Union Closer to the Public", Retrieved on April 15, 2001 on http://www.cor.eu.int/presentation/prxro100_en.htm

[44] Website of the COR, "Trends and Policy Issues", Retrieved on December 16, 2000 on http://www.du.edu/~kbording/pag8.htm

On the other hand, different member states define sub-national regions within themselves differently and they have different regional administrative arrangements. Moreover, there is the question of representing regional or local levels of government or both at the COR.[45] So the difficult question to answer is which kind of regions should be represented and how they can be selected. At Maastricht, it was decided that both regions and local authorities would be represented at the COR. The choice of who would represent the regions and local authorities was left to the national governments.[46]

Representation in the COR is based on population size. It has 222 members in total. Germany, France, the UK and Italy have 24 members in the COR each and Luxembourg has the smallest number, 6.[47] But numbers were changed with the eastern enlargement of 10 new member states in May 2004. These representatives have mainly two functions; to defend their interests in the EU policy-making process and secondly to inform their regions about all EU activities. They are independent . They stay in their regions, close to the citizens. Plenary sessions are held in Brussels five times a year. It may also meet on its own initiative.[48] By staying in their regions, its members have a chance to know what is going on in their regions.

On the other hand, the COR's status is only advisory although the Commission has to consult it about the following issues; the framework of EU policy on education, culture and public health, while defining guidelines concerning the establishment of trans-European networks, policy on economic and social cohesion and regulations which provide the coordination of the structural funds.[49] In addition to these, when the Council and the Parliament are drafting legislation or an action programme which has a regional aspect, they consult the COR and it asks one of its commissions to prepare a draft opinion.[50]

[45] Newman, M. (1996). *Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union*. New York: St. Martin's Press. p. 129.

[46] Loughlin, J. Representing Regions in Europe: The Committee of the Regions. p. 157.

[47] Krause, A. A Europe of Regions Becoming Reality. *Europe*. No. 335. April 1994. p. 22.

[48] "The Committee of The Regions-Five Questions, Five Answers", European Union Committee of the Regions official website, Retrieved on January 4, 2001 on http: //www.cor.eu.int/5q5a/5q_en_intro.html

[49] Gray, C. The Committee of the Regions. In: Brouwer, Lintner and Newman, op.cit., p. 104. In: Newman, M. *Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union*. p. 122.

[50] Website of the COR, "The Mandate of the COR", Retrieved on April 15, 2001 on http://www.cor.eu.int/presentation/prxo100_en.htm

Before the Amsterdam Treaty, the COR's advisory function was restricted. But today the COR's responsibilities include a wide range of areas: transport policy, guidelines of employment policy, incentives to promote co-operation between member states in the employment field , social provisions, implementing decisions concerning the European Social Fund, support measures in the field of general training and youth, cultural field, health sector, definition of guidelines for the construction and expansion of trans-European networks, definition of the objectives and general rules of the Structural Funds, setting up of the Cohesion Fund, implementing decisions in respect of the European Regional Development Fund and environment policy. [51]

The COR has eight commissions. These deal with regional policy, structural funds, economic and social cohesion, cross-border and inter-regional co-operation (commission 1); agricultural and rural development and fisheries (com.2), trans-European networks, transport and information society (com.3), urban issues, energy and environment (com.4), social policy, public health, consumer protection, research and tourism (com.5), employment, economic policy, single market, industry and SMEs (com.6), education, vocational training, culture, youth, sport and citizens' rights (com.7), and the commission for institutional affairs (com.8). These commissions examine documents issued by the Council, the Commission or the Parliament and prepare 'draft opinions'. These opinions have to be adopted by all the members during the plenary sessions. Then the draft becomes an 'opinion'. These opinions of the COR are forwarded to the Commission, the Council and the EP.[52]

So the COR reflects one of the institutional reactions to the ongoing processes of decentralisation.[53] It is an institutional indicator of increasing importance of sub-national regions within the EU.

[51] "The Committee of The Regions-Five Questions, Five Answers", European Union Committee of the Regions official website, Retrieved on January 4, 2001 on http: //www.cor.eu.int/5q5a/5q_en_intro.html

[52] The Committee of The Regions-Five Questions, Five Answers", European Union Committee of the Regions official website, Retrieved on January 4, 2001 on http: //www.cor.eu.int/5q5a/5q_en_intro.html

[53] Hesse, J. J. & Wright, V. (eds.) (1996). *Federalizing Europe*. Oxford University Press. pp. 393-394.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT SUB-NATIONAL REGIONS OF EUROPE

The greater permeability of political boundaries with the creation of the EU has led to increasing territorial contacts between related sub-national groups such as the Catalans of France and Spain, or the Celts of Brittany, Ireland and Great Britain, which helps to enlarge their field of action.[54] These sub-national regions compete for market share, investments and technology, on the other hand they try to provide opportunities for co-operation.[55] Co-operation between sub-national regions dates back to the early 1970s. The co-operation is motivated by the identification of common problems and interests.[56] The economic reasons for co-operation are search for investment, technology transfers and markets for their exports.[57]

Generally there are two kinds of co-operation among the sub-national regions of Europe. One of them is cross-regional European area agreements, which are mostly among geographically adjoined regions. The Atlantic arc, which includes twenty-two coastal regions in the EU, and the Saarland-Lorraine-Luxembourg-Trier/Westphalia Euro district can be given as examples of this kind of co-operation. Another is cross-regional motors of development agreements which are mostly among regions that have common interests or future prospects. The Four Motors agreement can be given as an example of this type, which includes the regions of Rhône-Alpes, Lombardy, Catalonia and Baden-Württemberg.[58] Wales also joined this initiative in 1990 but not as a full partner because at that time it did not have a regional assembly. Co-operation fields include economic co-operation, student exchange, environmental information, research results and technical transfer. In addition to these, the 'Four Motors' group has been to the forefront in the promotion of a 'Europe of

[54] Safran, W. The French State and Ethnic Minority Cultures: Policy Dimensions and Problems. In: Thompson, R. J. & Rudolph, J. R. (eds.) (1989). *Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy and the Western World*. Boulder: Lynee Rienner Pub. p. 119.

[55] Keating, M. Is There a Regional Level of Government in Europe?. In: Gales, P. Le & Lequesne, C. *Regions in Europe*. p. 25.

[56] Weyand, S. Inter-Regional Associations and the European Integration Process. In: Jeffrey, C. (ed.). *The Regional Dimension of the European Union - Towards a Third Level in Europe*. pp. 166-167.

[57] Keating, M. *Is There a Regional Level of Government in Europe?*. p. 25 .

[58] Newman, M. *Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union*. p. 115.

the Regions'.[59] The main idea was that the four regions would together become an engine for European growth.

Cross-border co-operation is more likely to further the integration process than co-operation between sub-national regions which are geographically far apart.[60] A lot of investment in large projects has been done at the regional level, mostly in co-operation with neighbouring regions.[61] On the other hand, in contrast to ad-hoc contacts between the sub-national regions, institutionalised, regular forms of co-operation are more advantageous in terms of continuity.[62]

Some regional organisations that try to influence the policy-making process of the EU are the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, the Association of European Frontier Regions, the Working Group of Traditional Industrial Regions and three Alpine groups.[63] The Atlantic Arc brings together the maritime regions of France, the UK, Portugal and Spain. Quartiers en Crise is an association of towns with inner city problems. There are some other sectoral organisations such as RETI (Régions Européennes de Technologie Industrielle).[64]

The International Union of Local Authorities and the Council of Communes and Regions of Europe have been closely associated with the Council of Europe, which they persuaded to establish a Permanent Conference of Local and Regional Authorities. In 1986 they opened a joint office to deal with the EC.[65] The main aim of the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe is the promotion of local democracy. It has adopted several charters and conventions on local self-government, transfrontier co-operation, participation of foreigners in local public life, regional languages, urban issues and young people. The Assembly of European Regions was founded in 1985. It played an important role especially in formulating a regional input to the negotiations leading to

[59] Harvie, 1993. pp. 60-63. In: Laffan, B. Nations and Regions in Western Europe. Retrieved on February 6, 2001 on http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/2blattan.htm

[60] Weyand, S. *Inter-Regional Associations and the European Integration Process*. p. 180.

[61] Newhouse, J. Europe's Rising Regionalism. *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 76, No. 1. New York. Jan/Feb 1997. p. 67.

[62] Weyand, S. *Inter-Regional Associations and the European Integration Process*. p. 180.

[63] Keating, M. *The Continental Meso: Regions in the European Community*. p. 307.

[64] Guyomarch, A. Machin, H. & Ritchie, E. *France in the EU*. p. 212.

[65] Chauvet, J.-P. Participation des collcetivites territoriales aux decisions europeenes: Le Role des lobbies locaux et regionaux. Apres-demain, 314-15(1989), 9-12. In: Keating, M. *Europeanism and Regionalism*. p. 15.

the Maastricht Treaty. Its responsibility in institutional development has been taken over to some degree by the COR but it still plays a role in regional matters, especially in lobbying on policy issues. It has been weakened by its heterogeneous membership, particularly by the division between strong and weak regions.[66]

On the other hand, there are transnational networks which are based on common interests. These networks may have formal arrangements and take on the characteristics of a lobbying group. Other initiatives are based on functional interests like the MILAN network, which is based on motor interests. Not all of them are bottom-up networks which are sponsored by the Commission to connect together the participants in Community Initiatives, such as the RECITE (Regions and Cities in Europe) programme which was started in 1991. Some bottom-up networks are greatly influenced by the Commission, like the European Regions of Industrial Technology.[67] Another network among sub-national regions of Europe is Dionysos, which includes ten French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese wine-growing regions that organise the transfer of technology to the least-developed regions.[68]

Some functions of this kind of organisation are to help promote trade, to provide information for the Commission or for the EP, to help to set the agenda and have an input in new programmes. In addition to these, they collect information about current developments in the EU for their members.[69] Some people give important symbolic significance to inter-regional co-operations. But they accept that they face great difficulties in practice because of the different administrative systems in different states and they also compete for investment and markets.[70]

Important differences in economic potential between the sub-national regions may also have a negative effect on co-operation.[71] Moreover, if there has been limited solidarity between sub-national regions within the nation-states, there will probably be less between advantaged and disadvantaged regions of

[66] Keating, M. *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*. pp. 178-179.
[67] John, P. *The Europeanisation of Sub-national Governance*. pp. 886-887.
[68] Keating M. & Hooghe, L. *By-passing the nation-state? Regions and the EU policy process*. p. 226.
[69] Guyomarch, A. Machin, H. & Ritchie, E. *France in the EU*. p. 212.
[70] Keating, M. *Nations Against the State*. pp. 157-158.
[71] Weyand, S. *Inter-Regional Associations and the European Integration Process*. p. 180.

different nation-states. It also seems that the wealthier regions have taken most of the benefits from inter-regional co-operation.[72]

As a general rule, cross-border and interregional co-operation positively affect further deepening of the integration process. But this is closely related to the national governments' willingness to transfer the necessary competencies to the authorities of the sub-national regions.[73]

The promotion of co-operation between the sub-national regions would also be in the interests of the EU, because acceptance of EU policy by EU citizens could be increased if EU initiatives helped sub-national regions to solve their problems autonomously, by cooperating with the other regions across the border. [74] With funding programmes like INTERREG or LEADER, the sub-national regions enter into partnership arrangements with their equivalents in other member states.[75]

As we can see, inter-regional co-operation could positively affect the idea of a 'Europe of Regions' and also a 'Europe of Citizens' in which "decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen" as stated in the Maastricht Treaty.[76]

CONCLUSION

The political structures of the member states of the EU are not similar, varying from centralised unitary states to federal states, and relations between sub-national regions and their central governments may differ according to the political and administrative structure of their nation-state.

Generally, there are two hypotheses about the possible future relationship between nation-states and the EU. One of them is that nation-states would adapt to the new challenges and would continue to control many areas of policy-making. The other is that European integration and sub-national regionalism would weaken nation-states both from above and below. This would lead to multi-level governance and even, for some, to a 'Europe of Regions'.[77] It implies that national institutions and powers will weaken under the growing power of

[72] Newman, M. *Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union*. pp. 133-134.
[73] Weyand, S. *Inter-Regional Associations and the European Integration Process*. p. 180.
[74] Ibid., p.181.
[75] Guyomarch, A. Machin, H. & Ritchie, E. *France in the EU*. pp. 211-212.
[76] Weyand, S. *Inter-Regional Associations and the European Integration process*. p. 181.
[77] Guyomarch, A. Machin, H. & Ritchie, E. *France in the EU*. p. 190.

the EU and regions and cities would take their place, with direct access to the European policy-making process.[78]

So the idea of 'Europe of Regions', in its most radical understanding, implies the dissolution of the nation-state and most of the central government functions are started to be carried out by the EU and regional and local authorities. From a more flexible point of view, the regions should supplement nation-states in the EU decision-making process instead of replacing them. This point of view is sometimes defined as 'co-operative regionalism'.[79]

So we cannot simply expect a 'Europe of Regions' as a new political structure of Europe. But the intergovernmental vision of the EU is not sufficient either to explain the current political structure.[80] Sub-national regions are not mostly seen as alternatives to the nation-states. Moreover, sub-national regions rarely try to displace states or take over state functions.[81] But some of them want to replace the existing Union with a federation of regions and small nations, which is the policy of the many Basque nationalist groups. On the other hand, some sub-national regionalisms see European integration as a process that reduces the cost of their independence. The others, which are more pragmatic, see Europe as an arena in which their nationalist aspriations can be expressed and legitimated and they also try to influence the EU on available matters. The Catalan CİU party can be given as an example of this group, which has been very active in promoting a 'Europe of Regions'.[82]

So the notion of the 'Europe of Regions' still remains highly questionable for the foreseeable future. Another important question is whether a 'Europe of Regions' would assist in enhancing cohesion in Europe, or would strengthen or weaken solidarity within states and across states.[83] On the other hand, it still has a long way to go in winning support from EU governments, which try to defend their centralised government.[84] So the transformation of the EU, into a 'Europe

[78] John, P. *The Europeanisation of Sub-national Governance*. p. 882.
[79] Newman, M. *Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union*. p. 117 .
[80] Keating, M. *Nations Against the State*. p. 51.
[81] Keating, M. *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*. p. 11.
[82] Ibid, pp. 163-164.
[83] Harvie, 1993. p. 72. In: B. Laffan. Nations and Regions in Western Europe. Retrieved on February 6, 2001 on http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/2blattan.htm
[84] Krause, A. A Europe of Regions Becoming Reality. *Europe*. No. 335, April 1994. p. 22.

of Regions' still remains an utopia, but reflects the important trends towards decentralisation and Europeanisation.

On the other hand, continuation of the enlargement process makes the decision-making process more complex, because a greater number of states with greater diversities have to be accommodated. If each member state decentralises internally and regional representation becomes increasingly reflected in EU policy-making, it will be too hard for the EU to protect its cohesion.[85]

So we can say that the possibility of the idea of a 'Europe of Regions' does not seem possible in the foreseeable future, but the beginning of discussions about this idea shows that there has been an increase in the importance and influence of sub-national regions in Europe. According to Keating, "European politics is regionalized, regional politics is Europeanised, while national politics is both Europeanised and regionalised."[86]

The EU still seems to be dominated by nation-states, and sub-national regions follow to a large extent the agenda of the nation-states. A new Europe is emerging, that is neither a federal Europe, which is based on the notion of a 'Europe of Regions', nor an intergovernmental Europe, which is based on the primacy of the nation-state.[87] So the general structure of the EU has not been finalised yet. It is still going through an evolutionary process.

[85] Newman, M. *Democracy, Sovereignty and The European Union*. p. 136.
[86] Keating, M. *Is There a Regional Level of Government in Europe?*. p. 25.
[87] Loughlin, J. *Europe of the Regions and the Federalization of Europe*. p. 153.

REGIONALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM

Rafał Riedel

Every discussion about regionalism in general should start by stating the fact that one third of the world's trade takes place in the framework of trading blocks called Regional Integration Agreements (RIA). Of course not all regional initiatives are of a purely economic nature. Their structure and characteristics vary hugely. Only the economic ones at the simplest stage just remove tariffs from intrablock trade, at their deepest they have the objective of an economic union, and construct shared executive, judicial and legislative institutions. Sometimes they also share ideas for common policies and a common future.

The renaissance of regionalism is one of the most important arguments, proving that globalisation is not the only tendency in the developments of today's world. At this point I would not like to pause at the discursive issue of whether regionalism is a part of the globalisation process or a form of opposition to it, but let me start with the notion that (by many authors) Europe is described as a continent of regional identities. Region has become a key part of the discussion about the European Union. Regionalism, whether within or across national borders is Europe's current and future dynamic.

Facing the complexity of the definition of the problematic terms region and regionalism we must be aware of the fact that there are estimated to be more than 100 definitions and even more typologies of those. My ambition is not to examine all of them, but just to touch the issue of different perspectives of understanding the region. (Not to mention the related terms like border, culture, ethnicity and many others.)

Regions are, for some, ethnic and cultural units, for others, economic or geographical ones, and for yet others nothing more than simple political subdivisions of the nation – state. A region can be described as a relatively defined area, characterised by the concentration of interrelated things and phenomena. Sometimes it can be heard that it is satisfactory to say that regions are spatially defined and historically developed social worlds. All of the definitions share

a common denominator. It can be stated in conclusion that places are not automatic contexts for collective life.

Usually, in everyday communication, when we use the word 'region' we mean a part of our country that is close to our experience, sometimes in comparison/opposition to the state/country. But in the language of international relations there is also other understanding of the word region, which is a grouping of countries that can be characterised by sharing similar historical, ethnical and religious experiences, or cultural heritages-sometimes language similarities-or aiming for the same goal.

After "struggling" with the definition of the word region it is much easier to understand the term of regionalism. Regionalism is a tendency in international relations characterised by the intensification of co-operation through the increase of institutional and non-institutional, formal and informal interrelations among countries belonging to some geographical area.

Before World War II, the terms "region" and "regionalism" were associated with separatist movements. They had negative connotations, especially in comparison with the term "state," which was having its renaissance then. And "region," with all its ambitions, was perceived then as a potential source of conflict and weakness of the state. Today – after the experiences of the 20th century – region and regionalism have taken contrary positions as elements constituting civic society and a more participative concept of democracy.

Processeses of regionalism have different dynamics and characteristics. Researchers have identified some features that are the most common stages, being criticised by others for being too idealistic and not sticking to reality. The stages are the following:

- regional identity among societies (or at least the elite)
- appearance of visions of future co-operation
- increasing relations, contacts and influences
- adoption of legal or institutional norms (e.g. periodical consultations, legal regulations binding for the members, common secretariat)
- integration of the region

In the discussion of the sources of regionalism and its place in the context of other significant processes, one should consider putting this regional solidarity as a part of globalisation in general. Some claim that it stays in opposition

to global processes, some claim it is just a phase of globalisation. Here the question of perspective reveals different approaches. If you perceive regional formation as a final stage of integration in some sectoral policy, you may say it stays in opposition to the concept of a world as one place. Seeing things in a wider perspective, it is difficult to ignore the fact that shifting the accent to the supranational level is a step forward. This may or may not be in accordance with localism – this depends largely on state attitudes and the nature and ambitions of regional organisation.

Hyper-localism is tied with hyper-globalism. Let me cite Umberto Eco (at the Venetian Film Festival in 1973): "Transmitted by radio or television, information about the facts and figures coming from the other part of the town are equal (in perception) to those coming from the other part of the globe." This phenomenon shows a good context of regional development and its place in wider processes. A growing co-operation among the wealthiest and strongest regions is one of the well-established phenomena. Toffler describes this as a process of "creating new centres of influence and power." "Region" (together with international private companies, expansive religions, NGOs) forms a new form where concentration of power equals with sovereignty.

Does today's regionalism stay in opposition to the nation-state? In the era of political correctness you will never hear an explicit answer from the political elite. But at some phase of its development the answer is 'yes'.

Regionalism has also been perceived as a form of opposition towards "internal colonisation". The example of such a relation in the literature is characterised by the UK and within it, Scotland and Wales. But an awareness of inequality or degradation was not the only building factor for regional identity. There was also an awareness of more developed (and prosperous) regions being afraid of losing their position, or of exploitation by the state, distributing its prosperity among weaker, poorer parts of one state's organism. A kind of opposition to playing the role of the good uncle is the example of Catalonia in Spain or Lombardy in Italy. The issue is not so much that nations have been bigger and stronger, but that written history established itself as making legitimacy for nation-states. Historians wrote about the past of their nations, unity of their nations, etc., consequently devaluating the regions.

This brings us to a very important question of sovereignty and its distribution. The context – especially in the phase of EU enlargement – was clear for, with the historical experience (of the newcomers) it was one of the discussion points when debating accession. But we affiliate sovereignty with the national state and therefore argue on losing it, or at least sharing it. Whereas the approach towards this question should be how we, the voters (who are the holders of sovereignty) are going to distribute it. Different countries have different experiences and systems, but usually in Central Europe we were used to a monopoly national state sovereignty. It is a strange phenomenon that in the era in which state institutions (and public policies) are under crushing criticism, in Poland for instance, the public opinion on state institutions is extremely negative.

According to democratic rules the power belongs to the people/voters/tax payers, (in constitutions: the people, Bevolkerung, citizens) just because for purely technical reasons they cannot govern themselves. Maybe in the future the representative concept of democracy will develop into the participative one. But we, the people can share our power with the self-government at a local level, regional authorities, state's administration, and last but not least international or supranational organisation.

Somehow, psychologically (for historical, emotional and many other reasons) we are tied to understanding sovereignty as the state's attribute. This is why the argument of losing sovereignty to Brussels was so much present in the pre-accession debate.

The greatest part of sovereignty is still being in charge of the state. And what is even more important, the state holds the monopoly on decisions regarding how to distribute it. It is the national parliament and government who decide on the organisational structures of regional and self-government on a local scale. It is the state that participates to the largest extent in policy-making at a supranational level. My point is not that sovereignty should be taken from the state. There are a number of policies that should effectively be carried on by the state and no one else (police, judiciary, etc.). When we talk about the Galileo navigation system, let's do it at the continental level, but when we talk about decisions on house renovation, then the local structures are appropriate. But when it comes to issues that could be better coped with at the lower than the

upper level, the state usually gets "jealous". According to the subsidiarity rule it should go exactly like this. The practice is sometimes extremely different.

Europe's nation-states are being challenged from above by the growing powers of the supranational European Union, but also from below by increasingly assertive *regions*. Some theorists talk of a new layering of power in *Europe*. Where does the EU fit into this back-and-forth struggle? Many European regionalists have long seen it as a natural ally against the centralism of nation-states. But the Commission dare not overtly encourage regionalist ambitions, for fear of antagonising powerful member governments. The political debate is about whether Europe should take the one step forward and become a federation of states, or stay at the present stage (a Europe of mother- and fatherlands). On the semantic level these two concepts are very close.

Many claim that the answer to the challenges of the future is a Europe of federalised regions. In 1967 Valery Giscard d'Estaign proposed the formation of a European senate, which would consist of every nation's representatives in the first phase and then, in the second, of regions' representative. This initiative was undertaken later on (at the beginning of the 1990) by Helmut Kohl, the German Chancellor, who at the Maastricht summit proposed again a senate in the form of the German Bundesrat, but as we know it ended up as the Committee of the Regions.

During 1970 we observed the increasing process of reforming the organisational structures of the countries. Let's just mention the most significant ones, i.e. Belgium and Spain. Edmund Stoiber (CSU) is convinced that bringing more competence to the regions would be a positive element in fighting the "discouragement of Europe" as this would bring Europe closer to its citizens.

Some claim that a "Europe of Regions" is a great model for the future in which a tolerant, cosmopolitan and warm, personal localism emerge gradually in a stable complementarity, a view that is confronted with pessimists' visions of separatists, disintegration and decline. Apparently there is still a lot of conceptual work to be done.

Regionalists' movements are a positive element in building a civic society; they articulate group interests, usually in the pattern of decentralisation and strengthening local governments. Of course such an approach is rather visionary, but beginning from the times of the great French Revolution, we do not need

to think about the central unit (no matter whether it is a king, authoritarian regime or democratically chosen government) as the one and only exclusive holder of sovereignty. Some authors even claim that the "Europe of Regions" is unrealistic. A Europe with Regions is a more adequate term. Regions are the third level of European integration but so far with the least power.

WHY A CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY FOR EUROPE?

Andrea Antal

"Treaties are almost always faits accomplis which the people's representatives can only approve (preferably tacitly) or reject, but cannot change." (Robles Piquier Report [1])

The name "Constitutional Treaty" itself sounds interesting and unique, and might awaken scepticism, as well as curiosity: What is this supposed to mean? Not a Treaty, not a Constitution, but a combination of the two. However, this weird "discovery" is very matching, carrying a symbolic meaning which reflects the in-between status of the European Union itself: more than an international organisation, which would require simply an international treaty, but not yet a state, a strong political community, asking for a constitution. Therefore the Constitutional Treaty for Europe embodies a perfect compromise: it is something in-between; it is a little bit of both. On the one hand, it is a Constitution indeed, in terms of creating a clear political community with equal citizens, listing their fundamental rights, common values and objectives. On the other hand, as an international treaty, it gives sovereignty and decisive power to the member states. As such, this treaty-like document does not create an independent, sovereign European state.

As we all know, the European Union, in its latest form today, is the result of a vision of the post – 2nd World War period and of everyday political reality. One could briefly say, a dream of a few brave, "unlimited" minds of the 1950s has come true. The European Union's name, character, structure, form, even its objectives have been changed along with global and European historical developments, but its main goal has stayed the same and has been almost achieved: the continent is peacefully integrated and today it represents an important global player in the game of the balance of power. Hölderlin once said, "Man is a God when he dreams, but a beggar when he thinks". In order to push our diverse "European Machine" forward, we need both gods and beggars.

[1] http://www.eurolegal.org/yurp/europarl.html, the Democratic Deficit

Over the past 15 years, the history of the EU has been marked by a series of changes to the European Treaties. Each of them was prepared by an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which brought together the representatives of the Member States' governments. These changes were necessary/required because of both internal (within the integration process itself) and external (the radical changes of the global and European political environment) politico-economic realities.

One of the most important internal measures consisted of the Single European Act in the year of 1986, which has created the Single Market and established on its territory freedom of movement for people, goods capital and services. As a continuation of this document, the Maastricht Treaty from 1991 brought up some significant reforms enabling the Union to move forward in a number of areas, such as the introduction of a single currency, common foreign policy and the institutionalisation of co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs.

Parallel to the above-mentioned internal measures, the fall of the Berlin wall, representing the end of a bipolar world order and of the politico-economic schism of Europe, as an external factor, has strongly contributed to highlighting the necessity of a new 'action plan' for European integration. Through the willingness to join the European Union announced by most of the Central and Eastern European former communist countries, shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the fact became obvious that the European model designed for 12/15 both economically and politically more or less similar states (sharing the same values) needed to be reshuffled.

After Maastricht, however, the further development of the European political Union seemed to lose its momentum. The two IGCs, which led to the signing of the Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001) Treaties, even though moderately successful, were characterised by weaker political resolutions and many highly important institutional questions remained unanswered, such as the following:

- how to ensure the smooth running of an EU-25 or more,
- how to guarantee the legitimacy of the institutions representing the states and citizens of Europe.

The Nice European Council in December 2000 with the 15 Heads of State and Government of the 15 Member States provided a stimulus for the revision of the Treaties. They felt the need to pursue an institutional reform. To this end,

the European Council has launched a broader and more comprehensive debate on the future of the Union.

A year later, the European Council met in Laeken and, on December 15th 2001, adopted the Declaration on the Future of the European Union, foreseeing for the Union a future in which it would become more democratic, more transparent and more effective, as well as preparing the way for a Constitution according to the expectations of the people of Europe.

The method used so far to revise the treaties has been heavily criticized. All major changes in the EU's development have been decided behind closed doors at Intergovernmental Conferences, involving only the leaders of the Member States. European integration should become a matter of all European citizens. As such, in order to prepare the next IGC according to the people's expectations, as transparent and as wide-ranging as possible, the European Council decided to set up a Convention bringing together the main stakeholders of the debate including representatives of the governments from the 15 Member States and 13 candidate countries, representatives of their national parliaments, representatives of the European Parliament and of the European Commission, 13 observers from the Committee of the Regions and of the European Economic and Social Committee, as well as representatives of the European social partners and the European Ombudsman. The Laeken European Council set the mandate of the Convention as being to provide to provide answers to important questions on the future of Europe. The first session of the Convention was held on February 28th 2002.

After more than a year of debates, the Convention reached a consensus to forward a draft Constitution to the European Council. The results of the work of the Convention have been presented to the Thessaloniki European Council on June 2003. The draft constitutional Treaty prepared by the Convention marked a historic step forward in the effort to complete European integration. The final draft Constitution was submitted to the Presidency of the European Council in Rome on July 18th 2003. This text version served as a basis for the work of the Intergovernmental Conference, which brought together the representatives of the current 25 Member States, the European Commission and the European Parliament, as well as representatives of the three candidate countries, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

The IGC met several times from October 2003 onwards. At the European Council in Brussels on June 17th-18th, 2004, the IGC finalised its work after eight month of negotiations and an agreement/a compromise was reached between the governments of the 25 Member States. Having been adopted and signed (on October 29th, 2004 in Rome) by the 15 Heads of States and Government, the Constitutional Treaty will be ratified by each Member State in line with its own constitutional arrangements. The Constitution will not take effect until the 25 member states have ratified it.

After 18 months of Convention proceedings and one year of IGC negotiations, the new Constitutional Treaty is the maximum that could have been achieved politically, representing a consensus/compromise reached by the 25 Member States, and, as such, it should be valued and supported. A further challenge is to win the hearts and minds of voters, and mobilize them to rally around this renewed political project for the Union.

In this context, the nature of the new constitutional Treaty has indeed been changed, and, especially in countries where the ratification will be a matter of referendum, the citizens of Europe can feel closer to this version than they could have ever felt to any European treaty or document. Probably not close enough, though…

THE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON REGIONAL/ COHESION POLICY AND ITS REFORMS - BRIEF HISTORY

Why a common Regional/Cohesion Policy?

The answer to this questions is logical and simple: the more extended/enlarged the European Union gets, the bigger the disparities in living standards and levels of economic & social developments between its Member States, even between regions within one state. All 10 new member states from Eastern Europe have a per capita GDP below the EU average and even below the least developed older member states. The differences between the applicant countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Turkey) are greater than ever before. The new member states and the candidate countries, once members of the Union, are all net recipients of the common budget. With the latest enlargement, the population of the EU increased with 20%, whereas the GNP of the EU grew by hardly 5%.

The average GDP per capita at the EU level, on the other hand, decreased by 12%. Instead of the EU-15's 84 Million citizens living in disadvantaged or less developed regions, the EU-25 has to deal with 123 Million of those.[2] In the old EU-15, the income ratio between the richest 10% of regions and the poorest 10% was 2.6, whereas in the EU-25 it shows 4.4. [3]

Economic restructuring in central and Eastern Europe, where many people are employed in agriculture and basic industries, will continue. As a consequence, many of the new Member States passed the Lisbon employment targets some year ago, unfortunately in the opposite direction: Employment rates have fallen over the past decade and now reached, on average, 56% in the new Member States compared to that of 64% at old Member States level, which is still way behind of the 70% set by the Lisbon Strategy. Thus, enlargement certainly means a major increase in the demand for structural and cohesion funds.

Therefore, solidarity will become more important than ever in achieving the major goal of reducing disparities in levels of development explicitly set by Article 130a of the Constitutional Treaty.[4] As such, an effective regional policy is crucial to the development of an integrated EU, since it is unacceptable for citizens in different parts of the Union to be subject to significantly different standards. This is why regional policy is supposed to become the instrument of solidarity at European level.[5] However, the most important argument in favour of an EU regional policy is the necessity of having an active strategy/device by which the welfare benefits of economic integration are spread within the European Union. If market forces are allowed to operate freely, there is no

---

[2] Rede des Praesidenten des Ausschusses der Regionan Peter Straub beim Forum zur Kohaesionspolitik am 10 Mai 2004 in Bruessel, on www.europa.eu.int/comm./regional_policy/debate/forcom2004-en.htm

[3] Huebner, D. Regional Policy in the enlarged EU: how much reform do we need?, Speech given by the Commissioner for Regional Policy at the Centre for European Reform, Hilton Hotel, Brussels, 09 December 2004, on http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/speech_hubner_9dec04.html

[4] Kengyel, Á. The EU's Regiona l Policy and its Extension to the New Members, Discussion Paper C 76/2000, Zentrum fuer Europaeische Integrationsforschung, Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms-Universitaet, Bonn, p. 3, on http://www.zei.de

[5] Balázs, P. Broad Political guidelines of the reform of Regional Policy after 2006, Speech delivered at OPEN DAYS Opening Session, Brussels, September 27th 2004, www.europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/421&FORMA…

guarantee that this will be achieved; on the contrary, the opposite effect might result and development would become even more concentrated in the centre/ core of the EU, letting behind/less developed the periphery.

Although nowadays the importance of regional policy is well known and acknowledged, and its objective to achieve economic and social cohesion is clearly defined in unique terms within the Constitutional Treaty "…as reducing disparities between the various regions…", it was not always like this. Regions have been trying to modify Europe's political architecture since the mid 1980's. In this direction their first achievement dates back to the Maastricht Treaty (1991), when they managed to break the traditional duopoly of Member States and European institutions. However, it took them 20 years to press for a fuller role in EU policy-making.

The Union seeks to use regional policy to help lagging regions to catch up, restructure declining industrial regions, diversify the economies of rural areas with declining agriculture, and revitalize disadvantageous neighborhoods in the cities, in other words, solve the following types of regional problems:

- Regional imbalances/ disparities within a country, where there are a significant size of insufficiently developed regions in comparison to the internal average, such as Southern Italy, Corsica, or some of the Greek islands
- Rural underdevelopment, which descries territories characterised by poor land, low average income and/or unemployment, no/poor technology, such as in the case of Southern countries or in some of the New Member States.
- Declining zones, as a result of industrial restructuring. This represents regions where the disappearing industrial field used to be a vital, main source of income.
- Cross-border regions, where after the abolishing of borders and trade barriers a structural reorientation is needed.

Although all these disparities of a core-periphery nature have been omnipresent in the European Union's history, the importance of their common resolution, the reduction of the disparities on community level was not recognised for a long time.

THE BEGINNINGS

The original version of the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, speaks about a harmonious development, about reducing the gap between different regions with a view to supporting the underdeveloped ones. However, there are no concrete

measures on how to fulfill this task, it is mentioned "nearby" in the document's Preamble. It makes no mention of Structural Funds, or of a community regional policy. On the institutional level, though, there was a step forward: the Treaty of Rome prescribed for the European Investment Bank to accord loans for development projects foreseen to assist less developed regions. Nevertheless, at the end of the 1950s, regional development as a common European policy did not exist. The reduction of any type of regional disparity was obviously a subject of national politics. As such, states used to promote regional development within their own borders by different national tools, such as aids, subsidies, release from taxes, cheap credits accorded to businesses that would settle to disadvantaged regions, or those far away from core areas, as well as public expenditure.

It was not until the community was faced with its first enlargement (1973) and the economic crises of the 1970s that its attention was seriously turned to the problems facing the regions and proposals were raised for developing a policy in order to overcome them. As such, European politicians have recognised the necessity of introducing 'interventionist' policies at an European level. They have set measures which will provide the basis for common regional policies. Their objective has been, on the one hand, to co-ordinate existing national policies and, on the other hand, to co-ordinate different financial policies and instruments of the European Community in such a way as to make them contribute positively to European regional development, so that they would not interfere with the national politics of this area. Of course, interventionist policies require financial support in order to finance productive enterprises and an infrastructure.

However, what the Treaty of Rome did provide in this sense was the establishment of two funds which now form part of the so called Structural Funds and assist in implementing the EU's regional policy.

The first Structural Fund was the European Social Fund (ESF), as provided for in Articles 123-126.[6] Set up in 1960, it aimed to promote employment and increase geographical and occupational mobility of workers within the Union.

The second Structural Fund was the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). This was set up in 1970,

[6] Church, C.H. & Pinnemore, D. (1994). *European Union and European Community. A Handbook and Commentary on the post-Maastricht Treaties*. Harvester Wheatsheaf. p. 194-195.

in accordance with Article 40(4)[7], once the EU's common agricultural policy was in operation. Although both have gradually developed a clear emphasis on promoting assistance to the less developed areas of the EU, it was not until 1975 that a fund was created with the specific aim of reducing the economic and social disparities between various regions of the EU. This Fund, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), did not emerge out of the Treaty of Rome. Instead, as a response to the economic difficulties of the 1970s and as an attempt to provide some form of assistance to the declining industrial regions of the United Kingdom, the Community established the fund through Article 235[8] in order to distribute aid to its struggling and less developed regions.

Although the establishment of the ERDF announced the emergence of an EU regional policy, only the second and third enlargement wave of the EU in 1981 and 1986 respectively, as well as the adoption of the internal market programme as part of the Single European Act (SEA), have managed to raise its importance among other policies/activities on EU level. More than that, the aim of increasing economic and social cohesion within the EU as a counter to the possible economic implications of the internal market on the less developed regions was firmly established as a policy objective of the EU.

ON THE RIGHT TRACK…

In 1988, the Council approved this reform of the Structural Funds, as well as the formulation of specific regional policy objectives.[9] The funds needed a reform so that instead of each having its own rules and objectives they would be based on four shared principles:

- Concentration (= the collective use of the funds in areas of greatest need)

---

[7] Idem, p.98

[8] "If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provide the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures." Article 235, Treaty of Rome, in Church , C. H. / Phinnemore, D.: European Union and European Community, p. 340.

[9] Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2052/88, Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 185, Volume 15, July 1988, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4253/88, No. 4255/88, No. 4256/88, Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 374, 31 December 1988.

- Programming (= medium-term projects for regional development, rather than projects)
- Partnership (= shared responsibility between the Commission, national governments, and sub-national bodies)
- Additional projects (co-financed by the EU and appropriate national bodies)[10]

The above-mentioned reform set up five priority objectives for the Structural Funds out of which Objective 1, 2 and 5b were dealing with specifically regional issues, including measures restricted to certain eligible regions. The definition of eligibility under the reform categorized regions in three types, adopted by the EU as objectives:

- Objective 1 promotes development and structural adjustment in those regions which were lagging behind; in other words, those with GDP per capita below 75% of the EU average.
- Objective 2 promotes the conversion of areas affected by industrial decline, those with a relatively high unemployment rate.
- Objective 5b is aimed to help/assist rural areas affected by problems of structural adjustment linked to the decline of agriculture.

In this context, a new reform of the provisions followed in July 1993[11] according to which a fourth structural fund, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), has been created for fisheries policy.

In 1995 the new objective no. 6 was added, which promotes regions with outstandingly low population density, below 8 inhabitants / square kilometer.[12]

It became obvious that regional policy needed to follow the rhythm dictated by the Economic and Monetary Union on the way to its establishment and speak about promoting equal/harmonious development for the EC as a whole, about actions aiming the strengthening of social and economic cohesion and the reducing of the gap between different developmental levels of European regions.

[10] Kengyel, Á. The EU's Regional Policy and its Extension to the New Members, Discussion Paper C 76/2000, Zentrum fuer Europaeische Integrationsforschung, Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms-Universitaet, Bonn, p. 7, on http://www.zei.de

[11] Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93, No 2082/93, No 2083/93, No 2084/93, No 2085/93, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 193, Volume 36, 31 July 1993. pp. 5-47.

[12] Decision of the Council of the European Union (95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC) Official Journal of the European Communities, L 1, Volume 38, 1 January 1995. p. 11.

However, despite the significant increase in the levels of funding available since 1994, the steps being taken by the EU to achieve economic and social cohesion were still very cautious at that time. Overall levels of funding for regional development remain low in comparison with the levels of spending in the individual states.

In order to prepare the Structural Funds to meet the challenges facing the EU in the year 2000 and beyond, including enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, the Commission proposed a radical reform of the Structural Funds covering the years 2000-2006. In July 1997, after the agreement on the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Commission presented Agenda 2000. This represented the Commission's detailed strategy for strengthening and widening the Union in the early years of the 21st century. Strengthening economic and social cohesion implied making European regional policy more effective and transparent. According to Agenda 2000, the common principles of the reform were set as follows: concentration, efficiency and simplification, having in view also the strengthening of the partnership—and decentralisation principles. In this context, enlargement played a far greater role in Agenda 2000 than in any of the large financial packages of the past because of the number of applicant countries, as well the differences between them, which were greater than ever before with a view that they all will become net recipients of the common budget.

As for the Structural Funds, the Commission suggested that their efficiency would be higher if the number of its objectives were reduced to three. Objective 1 remained the same, whereas a new objective 2 and 3 have been added:

- Objective 2, devoted to economic and social restructuring, brings together measures for other regions suffering from structural problems, such as regions undergoing economic change in industry and services, declining rural areas, crisis hit areas dependent on the fishing industry or urban areas in difficulty[13]
- Objective 3 was introduced for regions not covered by objectives 1 and 2, it aimed to help member states to adapt and modernize their systems of education, training and employment.[14]

As one can see, the EU has become more open to the involvement/role of the regions.

[13] Agenda 2000, p. 19.
[14] Ibid

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Laeken European Council (15 December 2001) set the mandate of the Convention, bringing together the main stakeholders of the debate on the future of the EU, committing the Union to becoming more democratic, more transparent, and more effective, and especially, to paving the way towards a Constitution for Europe. The Convention has given the regional dimension additional and perhaps unexpected impetus. Regional issues were a low priority on the Convention's agenda. Few regional representatives could participate in its discussions. However, the draft Constitution has potentially carved out a bigger role for regions to play in the future Europe.

What did the Convention recognise? It recognised the regions' role in European decision-making, as essential components of member states: regional/local governments across all member states are important and often main actors in implementing EU laws. Because of this function of implementers and law-makers, regions have strong demands for fuller involvement in EU decision-making in sense of applying their practical experience in implementation in order to raise the quality of EU laws, as well as compensating for any limitation of their own legislative autonomy as the goal/target of EU law expands. This is the reason why regions are seen as a bridge/linkage between the EU and its citizens, as important elements in the "fight" against the so-called "democratic deficit" phenomenon, defined by M. J. Braun as "The growing gap between the power and authority of the EU institutions.[15] Regional/local governments are elected by citizens to carry out public tasks. As such, they have a direct relationship to voters; more than that, the services they provide have a real impact on citizens' daily lives. If their work is constrained by EU laws, they can become disconnected from citizens' concerns and their work less transparent to ordinary people. Therefore, the Laeken Declaration underlined the need for the EU to "be brought closer to its citizens' and repeatedly stressed Europe's regional dimension.

As for the support for anchoring regions more explicitly in the new Constitution, the six observers sent to the Convention by the Committee of the Regions played a very efficient role. One of the results is the creation of a new

[15] Braun, M. J. An Imperfect Union. p. 86, on www.courseworkbank.uk/democratic_deficit_the_eu_2606

regional pressure group, the "Regions with Legislative Power", or the so-called "RegLeg", which brings together the EU's strongest regions, those responsible for policy and laws across extended fields of domestic politics in Germany, Belgium, Austria, Spain, Italy and the UK.[16]

Regarding regional issues, the Convention succeeded in including in the draft Constitution a few concrete achievements, as follow:

- The clarification of the different types of Union competences (Art. I-11) and of the principle of conferral.[17] Limiting the reach of the EU competences vis-à-vis the member state implicitly limits the reach of the EU vis-à-vis the competences of regions – especially those with legislative powers – within the member states.[18]
- The recognition of regional and local governments as some of the fundamental structures expressing national identity, which the Union must respect (Art.I-5)
- Recognition of the value of cultural and linguistic diversity (representing the basis of regional identities in a number of member states. (Art. I-3)
- Recognition of the principle of territorial cohesion as an object of the solidarity expressed by membership of the Union (Art. I-3)
- And last but not least, from the regional perspective, a much more satisfactory understanding and handling/managing of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality

  (Art. I-9 and the new Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality).[19]

The new definition/perception of subsidiarity and proportionality are major achievements of the Convention. According to this, the principle of subsidiarity refers explicitly to the regional and local levels for the first time

[16] Jeffrey, C. Regions and the Future of Europe. EU – Member States – Region: Finding the Right Architecture, on www.eu-reform.de, Reform Spotlight, 2003/2, the website of Applied Policy Research and the Bertelsmann Foundation

[17] = the Union can only act where there is specific authorization in the Constitution. (Art I-9)

[18] = thanks to the pressure of the German Laender on the Greman national Government at Nice

[19] The Convention's Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome, 18 July 2003, on http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf

in the main constitutional text. The Commission must take into account the regional and local dimension under its obligation to consult widely before proposing legislation. The Committee of Regions (CoR) will have the job of organising regular forums through which the Commission will consult associations of regional or local governments. Another very important success of the Convention was the fact that the CoR wins the right for the first time to bring actions before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) if it feels that the principle of subsidiarity has been infringed in any of the fields on which it has to be consulted. The CoR can also go to the ECJ if it feels it has not been properly consulted the Commission, Council or Parliament.

- Some regions can also claim a role in policing the subsidiarity principle through the new "early warning system" (EWS) on subsidiarity devised for national parliaments.

This additional access route of the "early warning system" is especially interesting. It gives national parliaments early sight of Commission legislative proposals and allows them to give reasoned opinions if they feel the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. If a third of the national parliaments are not satisfied with the Commission's re-thinking, they can ultimately take the issue to the ECJ. Although the Convention's contribution to the improvement of the common cohesion policy is very valuable, there are some important issues "missed out". The Convention did not recognise all the demands made by regional actors. The CoR was given more power, it was still not listed among the EU's full institutions, it has "only" the function of an advisory body.

Another general demand of the RegLeg regions—to recognise a special constitutional status for legislative regions—was not met. The RegLeg regions wanted recognition of the law-making role that distinguishes them from other regions and local authorities and would give them a qualitatively different relationship to their citizens.[20] The reason why the RegLeg group was asking for a special status can be explained by the fact that the CoR, which provides collective representation for all regional and local governments in the EU, is incapable of meeting their concerns.

[20] Jeffrey, C. Regions and the Future of Europe. EU – Member States – Region: Finding the Right Architecture, on www.eu-reform.de, Reform Spotlight, 2003/2, p. 4, the website of Applied Policy Research and the Bertelsmann Foundation

THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

How does the New Constitutional Treaty (CT) contribute to all these? Concretely, there are two key elements which need to be mentioned. The most important though, is a mentality—change-like one: the fact that the CT adds territorial cohesion to the objective of economic and social cohesion. This can be explained by a shift in perception of "helping" the less developed regions to catch up. The EU recognised that the transfer of funds alone does not solve the problem of modernization. A clear integration strategy, well-defined regional development programmes, policies and regional institutions are indispensable national components of the catching-up process. As the experience of the less-developed EU member states has shown, external resources may prove important supportive factors of well-defined domestic policies[21]. As a consequence, the CT talks not only about disparities, but also about reducing disparities in the level of development. Regional policy is "not about hand-outs to underdeveloped areas. It is not a question of charity,"[22] but about raising the long-term growth potential of regions, increasing their ability to attain a permanently higher level of development. In other words, cohesion policy means from now on investing in regional competitiveness and jobs in the local/indigenous growth potential of regions. It is also a policy in which knowledge, technology and "best practices" are exchanged, and cooperative networks are developed within Europe. It is a co-ordinated policy that encourages and strengthens initiatives.

The second important change is that the new Treaty, unlike its predecessors, explicitly sets out the EU's competences, seeking to make the division of powers between the EU and the member states more transparent. It divides the competences into three categories:

- Those where the EU may only complement or support the actions of member-states (such as education);
- Where the EU and the member states share the power to act (internal market and agriculture)

[21] Kengyel, Á. The EU's Regional Policy and its Extension to the New Members, Discussion Paper C 76/2000 , Zentrum fuer Europaeische Integrationsforschung, Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms-Universitaet, Bonn, p. 22, on http://www.zei.de

[22] Huebner, D. Regional Policy in the Enlarged EU: how much reform do we need? on http://www.cer.uk/articles/speech_hubner_9dec04.html

- Where the EU has exclusive competence (five competition rules within the single market, monetary policy for the euro-zone members, trade policy, customs union, and conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy).

We have already noted the strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity, which restricts the EU's ability to acquire new competences,[23] although strictly related to the better demarcation of competences by the Constitutional Treaty, and so it is worth mentioning again.

Although, over the years—confirmed also by the CT—regional policy has become one of the EU's main activities, accounting for around one third of the total budget, or EURO 213 billion over the period 2000-2006, EU officials are discussing a new reform of the regional policy. In July 2004 the former Commission adopted a proposal for a reformed EU cohesion policy, which is currently being discussed by the Council, along with the future financial perspectives for 2007-2013.

CONCLUSIONS

The EU has 254 regions, yet Europe is a small continent. As such, it cannot afford to waste resources. It cannot afford to leave behind even the smallest region. All of them should contribute to raising the European Union's growth and competitiveness on a global scale as a "more than international institution" and according to the goals set by the Lisbon Agenda.

The new Constitutional Treaty, however, makes it clear that the EU is not a state. The EU derives its existence and competences from the member-states and not the other way around. The member-states, of course, have sovereign powers not depending on whether the EU exists or not. This fundamental principle lies behind a new treaty clause that, for the first time, provides an explicit exit procedure in case a country wishes to leave the Union. Besides, only the member-states can change the treaty. Hence, its text should correctly be described as a constitutional treaty, a rulebook organising the relationship between member-states, and not as a constitution, which governs the relationship between a state and its citizens.

[23] Centre for European Reform: The CER Guide to the EU's Constitutional Treaty, Policy Brief – July 2004, p.4 , on www.cer.org.uk

All in all, the treaty does something to improve the EU's efficiency and enhance its legitimacy. It also increases the EU's flexibility by making it much easier for small groups of EU countries to work together on policy initiatives. The simple fact that some provisions will not take effect until 2014 shows that the probability of further radical reform is out of the member-states consideration in the near future. But do the citizens of the EU know enough about its content in order to want to change it soon?

Based on a survey's second wave conducted by Gallup (Eurobarometer) in June-July 2004, the citizens of the European Union still consider that they are poorly informed about the European Constitution, although the majority of the respondents think that the Constitution is essential for the Institutions to function smoothly. Concerning knowledge of its content, a majority of the subjects seemed to know that the Constitution provides for a minister of Foreign Affairs for the European Union, whereas only a minority seemed informed about the possibility for one million citizens to invite the European Commission to submit a proposal.[24]

Having in mind all these, one might ask whether the opening quotation of this paper from the Piquier Report is right. Is the Constitutional Treaty a *faits accomplis* as well, which is going to be ratified or rejected by the citizens of the EU without knowing exactly what it is all about, without being able or wanting to change it? Does the CT represent an element of Dahrendorf's "Sonntagseuropa,"[25] something very formal and distant from the people, which appears rarely in their everyday life, without causal, comprehensible impacts? (versus "Alltagseuropa"[26], an everyday reality, a tangible evidence of efficient EU policies).

Can we talk about an 'Alltagseuropa' in the case of regional/cohesion policy? Is regionalism closer to the European people? In today's divers Europe there are examples of very different approaches. On the one hand, in countries with a federal tradition and strong regional identities such as Germany, Belgium, Holland, and Austria there are several well-functioning Euro-regions (Euregio

[24] The European Commission's Flash Eurobarometer: The future European Constitution (Wave 2), survey requested by the Secretariat General and co-ordinated by Directorate General Press and Communication, conducted in June-July 2004, published in July 2004, on http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl159_2en.pdf

[25] = Europe of Sundays

[26] = an everyday, casual, weekday Europe

Rhein-Waal; Saar Lor-Lux; Rhein-Maas-Nord; Maas-Rhein etc.)[27] with concrete results in regional development.

In the group of the new member states (including candidate countries) there are some examples of good regional initiatives, theoretically working and well-organised transnational/cross-border co-operations in forms of Euro-regions, yet with little concrete/practical outcomes: Euro-region Neisse, Danube-Cris-Mures-Tisa, etc. In the majority of cases, their less efficient activity derives from multiple causes, like the lack of resources, the more heterogeneous character of the actors, wounds from the past, centralised state orders etc.

On the other hand, however, there are candidate countries without federal traditions, with strong and still influential leftovers of communist centralism, which first need a large-scale mentality change in order to understand the role of the regions within the EU, although at the level of the political elite there is already fair support towards regional ideas.

Can the above-mentioned three levels of regional development look more homogeneous, with fewer disparities in the post-2007 European Union? Do we need a multi-speed Europe?

And how about the controversial/paradox nature of the cohesion policy issue? On the one side, we have the nation states/national parliaments claiming for more competence in EU policy-making, having in view a more transparent functioning of the Union. On the other side, there is the EU acquiring new competences for its institutions (especially for the European Parliament in order to overcome the democratic deficit) on the way towards strengthening its status as global player.

The debate on the future of Europe is far from over; it is actually very much alive. The question of whether the European Constitution "rang the bell" last year and the alarm for solution finding is continued by the preparation of the accession of Romania and Bulgaria on January 1, 2007 and by the commencement of accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey. The equation sounds familiar

[27] Groß, N. C. Neztwerkbildung in der EU als regionale Standpolitik? Nordrhein-Westfalen und die transnationalen Beziehungen zu Regionen im Benelux-Raum sowie in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Diacussion Paper C134 2004, Zentrum fuer Europaeische Integrationsforschung, Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms Universitaet Bonn, p. 9-10 on http://www.zei.de

already: enlargement = need for more economic and social cohesion = need for adequate regional policy.

Although a little bit utopian and with each enlargement wave harder to achieve, the motto of the Union, "United in diversity", probably represents the long-term answer to most of the questions.

References

Balázs, P. (2004). Broad Political Guidelines of the Reform of Regional Policy after 2006, speech delivered at Open Days Opening Session – Centre Borschette Brussels, 27 September 2004.

Birsan, M. (1995). Integrare Economica Europeana, Introducere in teorie si practica. Vol. 1. Editura Carpatica, Cluj-Napoca.

Bonde, J.P. The EU Constitution. Reader-friendly Edition. on www.euabc.com/upload/rfConstitution_en.pdf

Centre for European Reform. (2004). *The CER Guide to the EU's Constitutional Treaty.* Policy Brief – July 2004, www.cer.org.uk

Church, C.H. & Phinnemore, D. (1994). *European Union and European Community. A Handbook and Commentary on the post-Maastricht Treaties.* Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93, No 2082/93, No 2083/93, No 2084/93, No 2085/93, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 193, Vol. 36, 31 July 1993

Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2052/88, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No. L 185, Vol. 15, July 1988, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4253/88, No. 4255/88, No. 4256/88, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No. L 374, 31 December 1988

Decision of the Council of the European Union (95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 1, Vol. 38, 1 January 1995

Forman, B. (2003). *Az Európai Unió strukturális és előcsatlakozási alapjai.* Delegation of the European Union to Hungary. 2nd edition. Budapest: Interpress.

Hübner, D. *Regional Policy in the Enlarged EU: how much reform do we need?* on http://www.cer.uk on

Jeffrey, C. (2003) *Regions and the Future of Europe. EU – Member States – Region: Finding the Right Architecture.* on www.eu-reform.de. Reform Spotlight. 2003/2. from the website of Applied Policy Research and the Bertelsmann Foundation.

Kengyel, Á. (2002). *Az Európai Unió Regionális Politikája.* Budapesti Közgazdaságtudományi és Államigazgatási Egyetem. Budapest: Aula Kiadó.

Kengyel, Á. *The EU's Regional Policy and its Extension to the New Members,* Discussion Paper C 76/2000. Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms-Universität. Bonn. http://www.zei.de

Proiect de Tratat de instituire a unei Constitutii pentru Europa. Oficiul pentru Publicatii al Comunitatilor Europene. Luxemburg 2003.

Straub, P. *Die europäische Verfassung erkennt die Rolle der Regionen und Städte im europäischen Aufbauwerk*. Mitteilung des Präsidenten des Ausschusses der Regionen. on http: //www.cor.eu.int/de

Straub, P. *Rede des Präsidenten des Ausschusses der Regionen beim* Forum zur Kohäsionspolitik am 10 Mai 2004 in Brüssel. on www.europa.eu.int/comm./regional_policy/

The European Commission's Flash Eurobarometer: *The future European Constitution (Wave 2)*, survey requested by the Secretariat General and co-ordinated by Directorate General Press and Communication, conducted in June-July 2004, published in July 2004

CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION AGAINST SOCIAL EXCLUSION

Valeriu Frunzaru

In this article I would like to underline the role of cross-border co-operation in the field of social policy within the European Union in the fight against social exclusion.

The concept of socil exclusion is very difficult to define. It is a relatively new concept and it is very strongly connected with the national and regional social reality. The mobility and the relative definition are great challenges within the EU, which wants to become an economic and social cohesive structure. If we broadly define this concept as not being an active part of the economic, social and political life of the community, we can see the important place that the regional policy has (or should have) in general and cross-border co-operation in particular in the battle against social exclusion.

The article is structured in two parts. The first part tries to take a critical approach to the concept of social exclusion. Unfortunately, too often ideological language is used by academics or researchers even if it is understandable that this concept is very vulnerable to the ideological temptation. The second part stresses the role of cross-border co-operation in the building up of an EU with socially included citizens. I would like to start from the Lisbon goals as a main direction of EU development and extension.

LISBON GOALS

It is well-known that according to the conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, from March 2000 the EU has formulated as a strategic goal for the first decade of the third millennium "to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of a sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion". It is a very daring goal with strong effects in many fields, social policy being one of the most important of them, taking into account the strong tradition of European

welfare states. Within this general goal, social policy, employment policy and economic policy are seen as strongly tied in an interdependent relationship. A modern social policy, adapted to the economic, social and demographic challenges, is accredited as a source of economic growth. And all these efforts have as a final goal the socially included European citizen, who is (or should be) an active part of the EU horizontal and vertical extension.

We can say that the implications in the social policy field of the Lisbon goals are:

a) life-long learning
b) full employment and better jobs
c) poverty release
d) social inclusion.

The EU cannot become "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world" without stressing the role of life-long learning. We are living in a global world with drastic and sudden technological changes. The European economy needs skilled employment with a high level of education in order to meet the global economy competition challenge. At the EU employee's level, life-long learning is very important because it is very difficult to cope with sudden technological changes during an ever-longer active life. The older age of retreat and the EU goal according to which the level of the older workers in employment (persons with the age between 55 and 64) in 2010 should be at least 50% are two very important arguments for stressing the role of life-long learning in the current and future EU. The high levels of education and skills are also important conditions for obtaining a well paid and better job. It is scientifically proven that there is a positive strong correlation between the lack of skills and the risk of poverty.

Full employment (100%) in the democratic world is an utopia. We remember very well the employment policy in the communist regime when a jobless (not unemployed) person was regarded as a criminal. Now, even if we want to eliminate unemployment, regarded as a bad thing, in the real world we can see that this is impossible. Even in countries like Luxembourg and Sweden there was a small level of unemployment in the golden era before the oil crisis of the 1970s. We also have to take into account the argument that a rigid employment policy can be an important obstacle in coping with economic global competition. On the other hand, we have to acknowledge that the increase in the employment

rate will decrease the burden of the welfare state, positively correlate with poverty release and will finally help accomplish social inclusion.

So far we can see the interdependence between life-long learning, full employment and better jobs and poverty release, as well as between all these and social inclusion. But to go further it is necessary to deeply analyse the concept of social inclusion (or exclusion) in the light of EU social policy.

Scheme no. 1.



SOCIAL INCLUSION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

First of all, let's start drawing a general definition of social inclusion. The socially included citizen is a dynamic member of society, who takes part in the economic, political, social and cultural activity of the community where s/he lives. So far we have seen the strong upward connection between social inclusion and other dimensions of social policy, including poverty release. In order the better to understand this concept I propose that answers should be found to the following two questions:

1) Why "social inclusion" now?

2) Why "social inclusion" in the EU (and not in the USA)?

1) In 1974 the book *Les exlus. Un français sur dix* was published, in which, for the first time, excluded citizens were discussed. Its author, René Lenoir, stressed the fact that in France, the third wealthiest country in the world at that time, one French citizen out of five was physically, mentally and socially inadaptive and one out of ten was socially ill-adaptable[1]. Lenoir emphasised the fact that there is no cause to effect relation between extreme poverty and social ill-adaptability, but there is a correlation between these two phenomena. It means that even if a person is not poor, s/he can be socially ill-adaptable. The presence of "the

[1] Lenoir, R. (1974). *Les exclus. Un français sur dix*. Édtition du Seuil. p. 33.

other France" shows that "the deadly danger is not anymore represented by the Russian rackets, but the social disintegration, the consequences of a society without human purpose". Of course, Lenoir's approach is strongly ideological, but it shows that even in a wealthy society the social exclusion risk is very high.

Let's go back to the first question: why social inclusion now? To this question we can give at least three answers: post-industrial society, changes in representative democracy and post-materialist values.

Post-industrial society means that dirty workers coming out of heavy industries is now just a memory, at least in developed countries. In 1997 the share of the total working age population in the EU was 3.0% in agriculture, 17.8% in industry, 39.7% in the services and 39.5% non-employed (unemployed jobseekers and citizens outside the labour market). In USA the situation of employment by sector was better: 2.0% in agriculture, 17.7% in industry, 54.3% in the services and 26.0% were non-employed. Two things become obvious. First, the share of people working in the services represents from a distance the biggest rate from the working age population. Second, we have to see the great distance between the EU and the USA regarding the rate of population which is working in the services and not employed. The Lisbon targets for 2010 are 70% for total employment rate, more than 60% for female employment rate and 50% for older workers employment. The 2001 figures were 64.1%, 55.0%, 38.8%[2] respectively. There are some groups with special difficulties on the labour market in getting jobs: disabled persons, women, older persons, long-term unemployed persons, young people, and ethnic minorities. The difference between women and men regarding the employment rate in some countries reaches around 20%. So the problem of equality between men and women is not just a humanistic one. It is about the big risk for women to be poor in active life, as well as after retreat, taking into account the trend of the individualisation of the pension scheme. Providing better jobs requiring a high level of education is one of the main challenges of the EU in the present post-industrial society.

In *Citizens and the State* Han-Dieter Klingeman and Dieter Fucks (eds.) are talking about the change of representative democracy in the western capitalistic

[2] Adequate and sustainable pensions, Joint report by the Commission and the Council, European Commission, 2003, p. 42.

countries[3]. Societal modernisation determined individual modernisation which at its turn determined a change of values and the increase of personal qualification. By societal modernisation Inkeles understands the change to a well-informed citizen, independent as to the sources of information, ready for new experiences and ideas. Inkeles talks about a change from mainly materialistic values to post-materialistic values, which are focused on psychical safety, a stronger accent on the membership feeling, self-expression and the quality of life. At the political level the effect is the decrease of citizens' confidence in central government and old political actors (parties) instead of an increase in confidence in local government and new political actors (local organisations or new social movements). This change can be very important for the construction of the EU, for the problems of regionalization, local communities, and the deficit of democracy within the EU.

In conclusion we can say that the new concept of social inclusion was an outcome of the economic, social and cultural changes.

2) There is an opinion that this new concept has been such a success because it sounds better to say that in the EU there is a high level of socially excluded citizens instead of the "poor citizens" expression. Maybe this is a valid argument, but it is not a sine qua non condition of the active presence of this concept. I think that the main argument for using it is the fact that it is impossible to build a socially cohesive EU community with citizens who are not an active part of the EU horizontal and vertical extension. This is why outside the EU and before the Treaty of Maastricht in the European Community the concept of social inclusion was not used or at least not as much as today. This concept was used for the first time in Maastricht in the Treaty of the European Union. "Social inclusion" comes to fill the economic, social and cultural gaps within the EU.

I was discussing earlier the change that happened in the relationship between the political actors and the citizens. A more positive attitude to the local community, respectively to local political actors on the one hand and the diminution of the positive attachment to central government on the other hand can be a social argument that legitimates regionalism as an ideology and a practical implementation. In a Europe of centralised national states it is very difficult for the power from Brussels to lead this new social and economic body. According

[3] Klingeman, H-D. & Fuchs, D. (1995). *Citizens and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

to the new social and political values on the one hand and to the principle of subsidiarity on the other, the regionalism comes to meet what was called the deficit of democracy in the EU. Of course this is not the only way to deal with this challenge. Nevertheless, the last EU parliamentary elections showed that there is a big gap between population interest in national elections and EU elections. Even Romano Prodi recognised that the 2004 candidates of regions for the European Parliament had a national (and we can add that sometimes it was nationalistic) rhetoric. A participative political culture implies a cognitive, affective, and evaluative active orientation. A socially included person can be an active person who overcomes the deficit of democracy. Of course an active position is not enough; there is also the need for institutions and legitimate policies.

In the second half of the 19th century in Romanian history there was a big dispute between the liberals and the conservative regarding the new ideas that came from the French Revolution. The liberals were in favour of important changes, new laws and new institutions while the conservative were against all of these "forms without content". By "content" they understood values, attitudes, and elements of social, economic, cultural, and political reality which had to correspond to the new forms. This theory of forms without content can be an argument for eurosceptics. Emmanuel Todd wrote a book called L'invention de l'Europe (The invention of Europe) in the foreword of which he writes that "the Treaty of Maastricht is a piece of work done by amateurs and persons ignorant of history and the life of the societies[4]". So there are attitudes and arguments pro and against the EU in general and the regions in particular.

But what is a region? According to the European Parliament, "a development region means a territory that forms, from the geographical point of view, a net unity or a similar assembly of territories in which there is a continuity, in which the population has some common elements and wants to keep the specificity so resulted, and to develop it in order to stimulate the cultural, social and economic progress"[5]. Nuts II is maybe the most important regional division of the European space. Is it really a form with content? Maybe it is not, but there are a lot of arguments that it can become so.

[4] Todd, E. (2002). Inventarea Europei. Edited by Amarcord. Timişoara. p. 9.

[5] Preda, M. & Chassard, Y. (2001). Politici de dezvoltare regională. Edited by European Institut from Romania. p. 11.

REGIONAL POLICY AND CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION AGAINST SOCIAL EXCLUSION

It is a common thing that in the EU there are big economic disparities. This happens not just between EU Member States but also within member states. There are big differences between the South and the North of Italy and Portugal, between the East and West of Germany and between Ile de France and the French overseas territories. These disparities have increased, starting with the EU extension from 1 May 2004 and will further increase in 2007 with the joining of Romania and Bulgaria.

Table no. 1. *GDP per capita in Central European candidate countries and in the EU15 in 1998 with regard to EU average.*

	Central European candidate countries				European Union			
	The 10 highest		The 10 lowest		The 10 highest		The 10 lowest	
1	Praha (CZ)	114	Yuzhen Tsentralen (BG)	22	Inner London (UK)	243	Ipeiros (EL)	42
2	Bratislavský (SK)	99	Nord-Est (RO)	22	Hamburg (D)	186	Réunion (F)	50
3	Közép Magyarország (HU)	72	Severoiztochen (BG)	22	Luxembourg (L)	176	Extermadura (E)	50
4	Slovenija (SI)	69	Severen Tsentralen (BG)	22	Bruxelles-Capitale (B)	169	Guadeloupe (F)	52
5	Jihozápad (CZ)	57	Yugozapaden (BG)	22	Wien (A)	163	Acores (P)	52
6	Ostravsko (CZ)	57	Severozapaden (BG)	23	Oberbayren (D)	161	Dytiki Ellada (EL)	53
7	Nyugat-Dunántúl (HU)	54	Yugoiztochen (BG)	24	Darmstadt (D)	154	Peloponnisos (EL)	53
8	Jihovýchod (CZ)	53	Sud (RO)	25	Ile de France (F)	152	Guyane (F)	53
9	Severozápad (CZ)	53	Nord-Vest (RO)	26	Bremen (D)	144	Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki (EL)	55
10	Mazowieckie	53	Lubelskie (PL)	26	Utrecht	142	Ionia Nisia (EL)	56

Source: Eurostat (2001)

The regional policies through the redistribution of Structural Funds have an important function in the accomplishment of a cohesive economic and social EU. The economic gaps between the European regions can be an important source of

tensions and also obstacles for the creation of a strong and competitive entity in global society. The history of European structural policies shows us that the poor class—rich class report at the national state level has been replaced by the poor country (region)—rich country (region) report at the EU level. Moreover, what was called the trans-class alliance between the capital and the workforce of a certain geographical region creates an economic and social gap between the European regions which represents an additional argument for supporting regions in difficulty.

Cross-border co-operation has a very important place within regional policy, for a number of reasons, the first of them being the demographic one. Because of the geographical position and size of the new Member State countries, roughly 62% of the population of the new Member States plus Bulgaria and Romania live in border regions compared with 15% within the EU15. This means that cross-border co-operation can cover an important part of new Member States populations with possible tremendous effects.

Another argument for the importance of cross-border co-operation emerges from the goals of the Strand A within the Community Initiative INTERREG III. Regarding social policy and social inclusion, Strand A has the following types of operation:

1) creation of an integrated labour market and promotion of social inclusion;
2) co-operation on research, technological development, culture, education, health, and civil protection;
3) co-operation in legal and administrative fields;
4) co-operation between citizens and institutions;

Of course, strictly regarding social inclusion the first type of operation is the only one having as a direct goal promotion of social inclusion, but if we look carefully at the other points we can see that the first item is impossible without the others. The first item stresses what is the core of EU social policy: equal rights within the EU of workers and their families regardless of the Member State where they are or the Member State where they work. The free movement of the labour force supposes equality of rights and mutual recognition of diplomas. It produces what is called a spillover effect. Free movement of labour has important effects in other fields, for instance in education, engineering, culture and administration. Creating a common labour market in the border regions has beyond creating an integrated labour and promoting social inclusion important effects on the other entire field.

Among other things, the accession strategy implies increasing the institutional and administrative capability of these countries so that they can apply the acquis and bring their firms in line with Community standards. The joint work of firms from the EU and new accession countries implies not just a transfer of know-how in the engineering field but also in the quality of work and ecological standards.

Maybe it is not so obvious that general co-operation and cultural co-operation in particular are very important for psychological gaps between countries. In many moments of our history we have been in antagonistic positions. If we look too much at our history instead of working together to create a new way of living together it is not easy to deal with the courageous aim that is the EU. Of course, in our common history many good things have happened but in the social memory there still exists a negative social representation. Working, learning and living together are the best ways to overcome these challenges. And what can affect this best if not cross-border co-operation?

Almost in every Strand A programme we can find as a priority the qualification and development the labour market. Encouragements are made to promote co-operation between all labour market actors (social partners, administration, training centres), cross-border transparency for the labour market and exchange information and co-operation in the training programmes. Also, these programmes try to deal with the problems related to social dumping, brain drain, cultural and communicational obstacles.

These very well-oriented programmes that have to fix the dysfunctions of the regions (not just EU regions) will create nets which if they are stable and well-maintained will be able to have more important structural effects in the future than the strictly oriented programmes.

CONCLUSIONS

Social inclusion is a complex and a mobile concept which strongly emerged in the last decade in Europe because of the need of the EU to be built by economic, social and political active citizens. The gaps within the EU can be filled through active policies against social exclusion. In this direction, cross-border co-operation can have an important role in building up programmes in the social, economic, and cultural fields. The Lisbon goals which currently are the most important answers to the question of what we want to build up through the EU can be achieved

together with other means through regional policy and cross-border co-operation. The complex interdependence between Lisbon goals, social inclusion and regional, economic and employment policy can be represented as in Scheme no. 2.

Considering all the above, we can say that cross-border co-operation will have a great role in the struggle against social exclusion in the new member states.

Scheme no. 2.



References

Almond, A. G. & Verba, S. (1996). *Cultura civica*. Bucharest: Du Style.

Andresen, G. E., Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A. & Myles, J. (2002). *Why We Need a New Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Atkinson, T., Cantillon, B., Marlier, E. & Nolau, B. (2002). *Social Indicators. The EU and Social Inclusion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

El-Agraa, A. (2004). M. *The European Union. Economics and policies*. Prentice Hall. pp. 401-420.

Ferrera, M., Matsaganis, M. & Sacchi, S. (2002). Open co-ordination against poverty: the new EU social inclusion process. *Journal of European Social Policy*. Vol. 12, No. 3.

Lenoir, R. (1974). *Les exclus. Un français sur dix*. Édtition du Seuil.

Marshall, T. H. (1950). *Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mishra, R. (1996). *Social Policy in the Postmodern World. New perspectives on the welfare state in Europe*. Edited by Catherine Jones.

Preda, M. & Chassard, Y. (2001). *Politici de dezvoltare regională,* European Institute from Romania.

Todd, E. (2002). Inventarea Europei. Timişoara: Amarcord,

Adequate and sustainable pensions. Joint report by the Commission and the Council. European Commission. 2003. www.infoeuropa.ro

CHAPTER 2

POLICIES, INITIATIVES, EXAMPLES FOR CO-OPERATION IN PRACTICE

HUNGARIAN REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN LIGHT OF THE VISEGRAD CO-OPERATION (1990-1994)

TAMÁS KERN

CHALLENGES FOR THE SECURITY OF THE REGION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1990s

The changed geopolitical situation and the new sources of danger in the region

By the end of the 1980s the political, ideological, security and military system collapsed which actually had guaranteed peace on the European continent since the end of the Second World War. The bipolar system functioned well for a long period, nevertheless it is true that it also carried those disastrous effects within itself, which can still be felt today (primarily it is the region's national conflict which is meant here). So it cannot be denied that this security structure was based on mutual determent and it was loaded with dangers and crises.

About 10-15 years ago the international relations took a totally new shape. The Warsaw Pact collapsed (1991), so did COMECON (1991) and the Soviet Union (1991). Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, struggling with national and ethnic problems began to disintegrate, while the two German states found each other again. The integration of a united Germany into the European security structure (primarily into NATO) seemed to be natural; however, the situation of Central Eastern European states could not be described as or hoped to be so simple.

Central and Eastern Europe in this period could be regarded as a continuous crisis zone. Each country – although in different ways and to a different extent – was in an overall political, economic, social and cultural crisis, which was due to the failure of the Soviet model of modernisation on the one hand, and on the other, to the uncertainty sidelining the current reforms. The disintegration of each allied country was a particular source of danger in the region, and in

Yugoslavia there was soon a war to break out. Above all, the co-operation system among the countries of the region completely fell apart, and the new one to replace it evolved only slowly (for example the Visegrad co-operation). Besides, there was another factor pointing in the direction of disintegration, e.g. the uncertainty of the "post-bipolar situation", which followed the bipolar world order. It was unclear how intense the attitude of the United States would be towards a changed Europe, likewise how Western Europe would face the uncertainty factors in Central and Eastern Europe.

According to a large number of military experts, it was due to these factors that a security vacuum appeared in the region. Nevertheless, uncertainty in the region was not new, it was mostly the result of the peace system which had ended the two world wars, and as it has been mentioned earlier, the Warsaw Pact itself did not bring automatic security into the region.

Some were afraid that alongside a security vacuum there would also appear a power vacuum, which would again lead to giving up the sovereignty of the countries in the region, including Hungary. Those who were of this opinion believed that a security vacuum would appear in situations where a certain disintegrated guarantee system is replaced by a new, threatening power factor, and efforts against this, which aim at searching security, do not easily find a solution. We think that this was not the case in the Central European region. These opinions were not justified by time. The view, according to which the uncertainty situation of the region can be derived from the lack of institutions, and which does not reckon with any kind of power vacuum, stands closer to the truth.

According to Péter Deák, a known expert of the topic, "… we have to declare that there is a vacuum in the region, which is a vacuum of guarantee. It is not a power vacuum, it is not a defunct security, but it is the vacuum of those institutions and legal structures which each country can hold onto."[1]

The guarantees which developed after the Second World War, and which were inseparable from the block system, collapsed. The block system itself had expressed the protection of real or imaginary security interests against the threats created by the blocks. The institutions of this ambiguous guarantee system did not exist in the Central and Eastern Europe of that time, and the

[1] Deák, P. Security and guarantee in Central and Eastern Europe. *Hadtudományi Tájékoztató*, 1994/1. p. 105.

need for new ones were at the conception stage. In such a situation it is natural for countries to have a high need for guarantee: they intended to establish new institutions and enter into contracts (e.g. regarding the borders).

However, according to Péter Deák, it is also true that as a result of certain processes, the guarantee vacuums normally become filled after a while. Let us think of the recruitment of Germany and its growing influence in the region (primarily economically), or of those power centres (EC, NATO, CSCE) which, after a short hesitation, did not have an interest in further destabilisation.

During the existence of the bipolar world the main danger was the possibility of the outbreak of a total (nuclear) war between the two alliances. At the same time—as has already been referred to—it was due to the mutual deterrence and the huge accumulated nuclear arsenal, that one could be sure that the source of danger was a real threat only on the level of propaganda. In his book, Mikhail Gorbachev wrote about this distinctly and in a modern way, "…the main principal of the new political thinking is simple: the nuclear war cannot be a tool for reaching political, economic, ideological or any other kind of goal. This conclusion is literally revolutionary, because it means a radical break from the traditional ideas about war and peace. There would not be any winners or losers in a global nuclear conflict, but the world civilisation would inevitably be destroyed. In fact, this is not war in a traditional sense, but a suicide." [2] For more than four centuries, humanity lived in fear of a possible nuclear war, and this has probably not ceased even today. However, we can state that in Europe politicians and experts do not expect a deliberate outbreak of a nuclear war any more[3].

Based on these facts, one can state that after the collapse of the bipolar security system there emerged some new sources of danger, of another nature, which became conspicuous. The most important of these are touched upon in the following part of this study.

Since 1988, the situation and the social structure of the individual countries have drastically changed, and as a consequence, so has their relation to each other. The biggest source of danger originated from the difficulties of the democratic transition. Its factors were agricultural backwardness, the

[2] Gorbachev, M. *Reform and a new way of thinking.* Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1987, pp. 132-133.

[3] Bognár, K. About the changing historic role of war. *Társadalmi Szemle*, 1992/6.

insufficient development of the democratic institutions, the lack of law and order and political and social instability.

The most serious of the outer sources of danger which threatened the security of Hungary, was the tragic changes which occurred in the surrounding countries. The protracted internal crisis, the accumulation of unsolved ethnic and territorial problems of the succession states, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, resulted in military conflicts in the region on several occasions. The social eruption and the uncontrollable armed forces increased the risk of the spread of military actions to Hungarian territories.

The tensions among the Central Eastern European states were destabilising factors which occurred mostly due to the problems of ethnic minorities. The abuse of the rights of the Hungarian minorities living in the surrounding countries made it more difficult to establish a bilateral political and economic co-operation, which was necessary with respect to security policy. In the most cases, the problem in Eastern and Central Europe was not an independent conflict-producing phenomenon. It was expected to intensify wherever it appeared alongside other factors. As an example, in Yugoslavia it was linked to the need for a democratic change, and in the ex-Soviet zone it appeared as concomitant to economic bankruptcy and mass pauperism. Dávid Meiszter described this process in the following way: "In Europe, the old Berlin wall has fallen down, but a new one has appeared: e.g. the wall of poverty. This is the real security threat. Internal discontent makes way for the emergence of extreme right and left wing powers, and that makes it possible to sell the aggressive nationalism to a wide audience."[4]

The immense flood of refugees could also be regarded as a source of danger. It was primarily the inpouring migration from the ex-Soviet Union and the Balkan region which raised real fears, and the internationalising crime in the region gave a good reason to worry.

[4] Bognár, K. About the changing historical role of war. *Társadalmi Szemle*, 1992/6.

Modern security policy

In earlier periods of history the military factor was a basic element of the individual countries' security policy, thus the states considered maintaining an ever larger military power to be the main guarantee of their security. However, experience has shown that at the end of the 20th century there was no state, which would be able to warrant its complete security merely by military power. One can logically conclude that the security of a country can be assured only by applying different factors simultaneously. Modern security policy thrives to achieve security in a complex way, by means of political (diplomatic), economic, humanitarian (human rights-), cultural and other factors.

In the last fifty years of our history the elabouration of an independent Hungarian security policy could not take place, since the country had no sovereignty. The "security" of Hungary was guaranteed by the German Empire and later by the Soviet Union, with the known consequences.

The possibility and the necessity of shaping an independent security policy could be considered only after the political changes, since there had been no chance for that until the country gained actual sovereignty. It was the first democratically elected Hungarian government who had to prepare and realise all that.

The essence of modern security policy is that the state behaves in such a way—both in its internal and external affairs—which is not regarded as offensive by its surrounding neighbours and also by other, more remote regions. "It is our elemental national interest not to get in the ring of suspicious groups of countries. If this happens once again, it would be the irreparable sin of Hungarian external affairs, therefore Hungary should not hinder, but promote its neighbours' integration into Europe. Without any intention at the back of the mind, in a way which is clear for them, too."[5]

Thus, even though one is shaping the country's security, emphasis has to be laid on the interests of the partners, too, when choosing our actions. This is the only way to arouse a "country-friendly" reaction.[6]

[5] Kiss, T. *Népszabadság*, 12 November 1992.

[6] Considering the interests of our partners does not mean giving up our own interests. The realistic practise of security policy advances along the way of a continuous search for compromise, in order to achieve its aim.

In 1990 Hungary faced a new challenge: it had to work out a long-term national strategy. Besides the democratic political system and establishing of a market economy, it was the change of orientation in external and security policy which was the base of the strategy. Based on the above, the Hungarian government regarded the following points to be key issues in the country's security policy:

- Shaping a security partnership with the neighbouring countries (political, economic, cultural, military and other relations), including problems arising from ethnic conflicts (concerning Hungarians beyond the borders)
- Developing the Hungarian government's role in regional institutions (Visegrad co-operation, CEI, etc.)
- The promotion of the country's accession to the European and the Atlantic security systems
- Maintaining sufficient military power for self-defence.[7]

A FEW WORDS ABOUT REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE REGION

According to the foregoing history of international relations, the connection between states was traditionally characterised by bilateral relationships versus multilateral ones. One of the main reasons for that is perhaps the fact that countries which are geographically distant from each other have only rarely maintained intense relationships. This becomes true even more for the Central and Eastern European region.

Before the political changes there were three multilateral (or similar) kinds of co-operations altogether which evolved in the region. The first one was the Small Entente, established in 1920-21. The second one was the political and economic co-operation among the communist countries in the second half of the century, and the third one was less significant co-operation, which appeared along with the movement of civil rights activists (such as the Charta 77 or Solidarity). In the process of the change in the political system, it became evident that neither of these co-operations could serve as a base of any kind of regional co-operation in the future. So in Central and Eastern Europe there

[7] When summarising the key issues, I used István Gyarmati's division. Gyarmati, I. The development of Hungary's security policy environment in 1990. *Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve*, 1991.

were no patterns for regional co-operation to be found, which would give a direction to the different co-operative forms under the changed political and economic circumstances.

The analysis of Péter Miletics reveals that establishing co-operation in the region was not easy, among other matters because the two world wars had destroyed the state- and the political systems in the region, and a large number of ethnic offences continue to have an effect even today. But the co-operation was further rendered difficult by the fact that the traditional perception of enemy and friend did not always overlap.[8]

For the region's elite, further problems were caused by the lack of such regional co-operations (even in Western Europe) that could have served as an example – except for the activity of the Benelux co-operation and the Scandinavian co-operation within the frame of the Northern Council, primarily in the field of harmonising economy and trade policy.[9]

Security policy experts divide security problems into groups in many different ways. Barry Buzen, a British expert, separates the security of individuals, states and the international system, as opposed to American thinkers (e.g. Richard Schultz, Ted Greenwood), who divide security problems into four groups: national, international, regional and global security.[10]

The need for strengthening regional security—motivated by the perception of the security vacuum and the fear from the Soviet Union—gave a strong impetus for regional organisations in Central Europe (e.g. Visegrad co-operation, Central European Free Trade Association, Central European Initiative). Although these organisations cannot be regarded as primary security co-operations, the political, economic, cultural and environmental co-operations within these organisations obviously had a positive effect on the security of the region and on Europe as a whole.

---

[8] Miletics, P. Eastern-Central Europe int he changing geopolitical space. In: *Konfliktus, konszenzus, kooperáció*, Pécs, 1996-1997.

[9] Kégler, Á. *Countries of the Visegrad region on the eve of the EU accession*. In: Bayer, J. & Kiss, B. (eds.). *Trendváltozások*, MTA PTI, Budapest, 2003.

[10] Matus, J. Az európai biztonság jövője. In: Varga, Cs. & Tibori, T. *A mai világ és a jövő forgatókönyvei* (Nemzeti Stratégia Könyvek I.), Budapest, 1997.

THE VISEGRAD CO-OPERATION

The emergence and the fall of the organisation

In 1335, rulers of Poland, Bohemia and Hungary agreed on deepening the commercial and political co-operation among their countries.[11] This meeting was the first trilateral interstate agreement. In the process of the change of regime the three countries of the region found each other once again; however, it is remarkable that the establishment of the co-operation was problematic from the start.

Knowing how the Warsaw Pact and COMECON functioned, the negative attitude of the region's states towards political, economic and any other type of co-operation among the Central European countries seemed to be a natural reaction after the fall of socialism. Non of these countries intended to take measures resembling the forced co-operations of the era before the political changes. In addition, since the socialist version of integration was opposed by the inhabitants of the region, the breakdown of the relations among the communist elites led to the deterioration of the co-operation among the affected states.

However, it soon turned out that the USA and Western Europe treated the Central European region as one unit, and they had no interest in dealing with each country individually. It was partly this thought which motivated the formation of the Visegrad group and the start of co-operations.

The establishment and the strengthening of the co-operation was facilitated by the common historical background (Christianity, the memory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the negative effect of the Yalta-system), as well as the recognition of security risks appearing in the region (fear of the Soviet Union). The break up of the bipolar world led to chaos in the region, and not even the "West" was prepared for the short- and long-term effects of the disintegration. At least the Visegrad co-operation offered a framework for preparation.

Before the establishment of the organisation, the co-operation of the three countries was focused on the field of external relations. The co-operation was indirectly furthered by the Paris Charter, ratified on 19th November 1990, which laid down new European principles and aims. József Antall, Hungarian Prime

[11] Kádár, B. The spirit of Visegrad. *Európai Szemle*, 1992/2.

Minister, made a suggestion to the Polish and Czechoslovak Prime Ministers to meet in Visegrad in the following year. [12]

After the preparatory meeting of the foreign ministers in January, the first summit was held on 14th-15th February 1991. József Antall, Lech Walęsa and Václav Havel expressed their common intention in a comprehensive agreement: "….the endeavours for framing co-operation and a close connection with the European institutions are to be harmonised according to the interests of each state."[13]
Besides the co-operation facilitating the integration to the European institutions, the parties made plans to harmonise their policies aiming at the termination of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON [14], furthermore

- they would improve their market-based economic co-operations in order to promote the flow of capital and labour
- they would encourage the mutually advantageous trade of goods and services
- and finally, they would create favourable conditions for direct company co-operation, and for foreign capital investment, to increase economic effectiveness.[15]

The above mentioned economic co-operation was further developed by the Krakow Declaration, signed at the 5-6 October summit. In this communiqué, besides declaring their common wish to join the political and security institutions, the parties expressed their need for integration into the European economic structures, and their wish to increase economic co-operation among the individual countries.[16]

At the May 1992 summit in Prague, the parties envisioned the future of the Visegrad co-operation in three accentuated fields. The first one was the improvement of the relations with the Western institutions, the second one

[12] Jeszenszky, G. The Visegrad idea and the Euro-Atlantic integration. *Magyar Szemle*, August, 1998.
[13] Declaration about the co-operation of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary, on the way to European integration. Visegrad, 15 February 1991.
[14] They also declared that they would not form organisations to take the place of teh Warsaw Pact and the COMECON
[15] The Chronicle of the 20th century, Officina Nova, Budapest, 1995. p. 1353.
[16] The Polish-Czechoslovakian interstate contract was signed here. Next day the Hungarian-Polish agreement was signed.

was the deepening of the economic co-operation, and the third one was the harmonisation of the opinions concerning economic and political world events.

In the meantime, at the meeting of ministers of foreign trade on 17th April 1992, the Central European Co-operative Committee was established, which was to be a regular forum for consultations about economy policy. The climax of the economy policy co-operation was the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), signed in Krakow on 21st December 1992. The agreement came into force on provision on 1st March 1993, and then became fully effective from 1st July 1994. With this agreement, the economic co-operation among the countries of the region was institutionalised.

The Visegrad co-operation started to deteriorate after 1992. The goal to make the co-operation into an experimental terrain where the Visegrad countries could test in practise the co-operation forms prevalent within the EU, was not reached.[17]

The alienation can be traced back to several reasons. The most important cause was the split of Czechoslovakia.[18] The two newly formed countries eagerly tried to stress their sovereignty. The established Czech Republic considered the co-operation as remnants of the past, and made it clear that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the Soviet-Russian troops, it had even become redundant. Prague decided that further possibilities only existed in economic co-operation. Furthermore, the Czech leadership declared that it had got rid of the underdeveloped and ethnically diverse Slovak area, and in terms of economy politics, it had moved from an unstable Eastern Europe to a stable Western Europe. The Czech head of state, Václav Klaus, tried to keep the co-operation on a laid-back, consultative level.[19] Behind this practical politicising there lay the vision that a well-prepared state can join the Euro-Atlantic structure more easily by itself.

In the meanwhile, some anti-democratic signs appeared in the Slovak home affairs, in addition, serious tension emerged between Slovakia and Hungary concerning the Hungarian minority.

---

[17] Kégler, Á. the quoted work

[18] The Slovakian National Council accepted a declaration of independence on 17th July 1992, as a result of which Czechoslovakia split into two parts on 1st January 1993.

[19] Somos, P. Vysehradnak nem kell Visegrád. *Beszélő,* 30 January 1993.

Nevertheless, one can say that it was not only the Czech and Slovak mentalities, which caused the fall of the Visegrad spirit, but rather the change of the conditions in Central Europe in the field of economy and security policy.[20]

Poland and Hungary have done their best to maintain this institutionalised co-operation. A good example of this is that the two countries applied for membership to the European Union at the same time.[21]

Co-operation in the field of security policy[22]

As was pointed out above, the Visegrad co-operation cannot be considered an institution that would offer absolute guarantee for its states, but it is certain that it had prepared the accession of the Central Europeans to the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic integration. In the first years the three countries co-operated successfully in the field of external relations and security. Behind this, the reason is clear, namely that there was an accordance to harmonise a common policy against the Soviet Union.

In the early stage of co-operation the Soviet Union still existed, which caused a high level of fear in the region. Among the events conducive to co-operation, it was outstanding that the Soviet domestic forces violently acted against the forces demanding independence in Lithuania in January 1991. The August 1991 coup d'etat attempt rose serious concerns in the states of the region. If one considers that the Soviet-Russian troops were still stationed in the territory of these states, then the acceleration of the co-operation seems natural.

It is the merit of the Antall government that well before the establishment of the organisation it had made significant steps towards the termination of the Warsaw Pact. On 7th June 1990 in Moscow, the Hungarian Prime Minister initiated the termination of the military alliance, which happened relatively shortly afterwards.

In the period of the Moscow meeting, the Central European states did not have a common standpoint concerning their security policy. Because of the

[20] After a temporary fall, the Visegrad relation system was reconstructed based on new foundations from 1998-1999. Since then, the co-operation of the four countries has been characterised by minor or major recoveries and declines. The partial eclipse of the co-operation was furthered by the four countries' current membership in NATO and te EU.

[21] Jeszenszky, G. quoted work

[22] This study, due to a shortage of space, does not deal with the role NATO had in this case

unified Germany and the presence of the Soviet troops, Poland had a rather reserved policy, while Czechoslovakia refused to take "radical" steps because of the free elections. Thus the Hungarian diplomacy was left alone, but showing its dedication, it established contacts with NATO in Brussels on 16 June.

The co-operation of the three countries in the field of military policy became more intense from the beginning of 1991, and this period lasted until the middle-end of 1992. At the beginning of 1991, bilateral military agreements were signed,[23] and in August the parties organised a summit of the defence ministers in Krakow. The meeting concluded in an agreement on the co-ordinated defence co-operation. At the summit in Krakow in October 1991 the political leaders declared their intention to join NATO. The co-operation culminated at the Prague summit in May 1992, when leaders of the Visegrad countries, addressing the G7 countries, the EU and NATO, declared their wish to join the Euro-Atlantic structure as soon as possible.

So the military and security co-operation in this period proved to be important. It included the trilateral talks on military reform, the preparation for NATO accession, the organisation of civil guards, and in some cases, the intention to shape a common standpoint on security policy.

There were reasons for maintaining the co-operation: within the defence sector, it had become necessary for each state to work out new, national security and defence strategies, and in addition, the civil control of the armed forces and the defence sector had to be established in these states. Due to the similarity of the situations, the co-operation was supported by the obligation of each country to consider duties stemming from the CFE agreement.

The establishment of regional co-operation did not only contribute to the increase of the sense of security, but it also helped these countries to assert their pursuit for independence from the SU, and it helped them to reach their goals aiming at the integration into the "West", although later on this relation system was characterised by a competitive spirit.[24]

[23] In August 1991 the Czechoslovak-Hungarian military agreement was signed, in February the Czech-Polish agreement and in March the Hungarian-Polish agreement was signed

[24] Tolnay, L. NATO and East-Central Europe. In: *Kelet-Közép Európa az ezredfordulón*. Magyar Atlanti Tanács, Budapest, 1999.

Thus, although the Visegrad countries agreed on further co-operation in many respects, they interpreted the implementation and the individual roles in different ways. Yet, it was soon recognised, although it had a somewhat damaging effect on the co-operation, that these states could not guarantee the security in Central Europe, neither collectively, nor individually. Therefore, from 1991 and 1992 full NATO membership became the declared goal for each member of the group.[25] Consequently, some of the countries (primarily the Czech Republic and later Hungary) did not plan to advance the Euro-Atlantic integration within the frameworks of the Visegrad co-operation.[26]

Further problems arose when Slovakia became more independent. In the web of relations between Hungary and Slovakia, conflicts intensified, moreover, the policy of the Mečiar government, which differed from the European norms, made further co-operation impossible. The participation of Slovakia in the co-operation was dubious because of the country's intense relations with Russia, the non-democratic way of governing and to some extent a questioning of Western values.[27]

CONCLUSIONS

The Visegrad group, established in 1991 as a regional co-operation—during the observed period—could not properly further the normalisation of relations, and the aims have not been fully achieved. As a partial success, it should be noted that by establishing CEFTA, economic co-operation accelerated and negotiations started—at least in the first period—in connection with the accession to the Euro-Atlantic organisations. However, it should be stated that what the countries achieved on their way to integration was predominantly due to their individual connections and their individual assessment, and not to a negotiated co-operation.

With the Hungarian lead, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON was successfully deleted from among the international organisations, yet at the same time, after

[25] The majority of the Polish, Czech and Hungarian political elite did not even consider otheralternatives for security policy

[26] Brussels reaffirmed this standpoint by declaring the concept of individual assessment

[27] The Slovakian government in power – opposing the goals of the Visegrad co-operation – stregthened its connections to Russia. In the spring of 1993 the Slovak-Russian Basic Agreement was signed

the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the negotiated co-operations towards the East ceased to exist among the Visegrad countries.

The countries did not succeed in strengthening solidarity towards each other, which can also be traced back to historical reasons. The bilateral connections also failed to live up to expectations; co-operation was mainly hindered by the loaded Hungarian-Slovak relationships.[28]

The effectiveness of the co-operation was decreased by the fact that the institutional system of the organisation had not been established, which would have made it possible to have a better co-ordination for attaining goals.

Finally, one can say that between 1990 and 1994, despite the start (the disintegration of the WP), security did not become an articulated question in the view structure of the new organisation. The co-operation never had the intention to establish an independent, regional security policy organisation.

References

Csabai, Gy. The Security Strategy of the Polish Republic. *Hadtudomány*. Vol. 2, No.10.

Gazdag, F. (2001). Hungarian Security Policy 1990-2000. *Új Honvédségi Szemle*. 2001/12.

Nagy, L. (1991). The Security Concepts, Similarities, Differences of the Visegrad countries. *Új Honvédségi Szemle*. 1991/1.

Nagy, L. & Tálas, P. (1997). The Security Policy of Poland. *Új Honvédségi Szemle*. 1997/12.

Tálas, P. (1997). The Visegrad countries and NATO. In: *Az észak-atlanti szerződés szervezete*. Budapest: SVKI.

[28] Tálas, P. The possibilities and limitations of the midpower role in Central Europe – a Polish case. *Védelmi Tanulmányok*, No. 40., SVKI, Budapest, 2000.

VOJVODINA – THE POLITICAL ASPECT

REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND INITIATIVES IN VOJVODINA

Đorđe Tomić

VOJVODINA – A REGION BETWEEN MIDDLE EUROPE AND THE BALKANS

The plain stretching throughout the edge of the Pannonian plain in the north of Serbia, which comprises more than 21,506 km² of land and has more than two million inhabitants, is called Vojvodina. It is today an Autonomous Province within the Republic of Serbia with its Parliament, Government and courts of law. The capital town is Novi Sad.

People speak and study in six native languages, which also represent the six administrative languages of Vojvodina: Serbian, Hungarian, Croatian, Romanian, Slovak and Ruthenian, and also members of numerous nations and nationalities inhabit this territory. According to the newest statistics, there are 27 ethnical groups in Vojvodina. Those ethnical groups with the largest number of individuals have the status of a national minority. Living together for centuries people have developed friendly relations.

The fertility of this plain attracted many tribes and nations since the Roman times. Hence, Vojvodina represents a treasury of cultures whose material and spiritual remains lead back to a past more than 50,000 years old.

Present settlements are mostly from the eighteenth century; however, a considerable number of settlements were founded in the period of the Illyrians, Celts and Romans and were at that time exceptionally important military, economic and cultural centres. It is also a fact that the shortest roads from Central Europe to the Middle East have always crossed this territory. Therefore Vojvodina may be considered a cultural fusion of both dominant civilization forms and traditions – the European and Oriental one. According to this, we

may certainly say that Vojvodina is sui generis a multinational and, even more importantly, a multicultural region.

POPULATION – LAND OF CONSTANT ETHNOGRAPHIC CHANGES

The peoples living on this territory preserved a lot of their original traditions and customs although throughout time Vojvodina has been changing in many different ways.

Until the end of the 17th century Vojvodina was more or less a huge swamp. Except for smaller villages and monasteries in the hills of Fruška gora there were no inhabited places in it.

At the end of the 17th century a great migration of Serbs took place. Serbs, led by Arsenije Čarnojević, the Serbian patriarch came fleeing from Turks, mostly from today's Kosovo in Vojvodina. Under the reign of Maria Theresa the Austrian Empress, other large migrations took place during the 18th century. Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, Ruthenians and many other ethnic groups entered the plains of Srem, Banat and Bačka, as well as Baranja, regions within Vojvodina back then, the first three belonging to Vojvodina today, while Baranja is a part of today's Croatia.

This is how Vojvodina was practically created. This complexity of its ethnical and confessional structure makes Vojvodina a unique place in Europe. Today there are 27 ethnical groups in Vojvodina. The majority are the Serbs (ca. 75%) and the biggest minorities are the Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, Ruthenians and Romany. However, in Vojvodina we are accustomed to saying that we have 27 ethnic majorities.

HISTORY – BEYOND THE GLORIOUS PAST AND MYTHICAL HEROISM

The first time the name of Vojvodina was used administratively was in 1848/49 after the Revolution, when in Sremski Karlovci, a small but culturally important town near Novi Sad, today's capital of Vojvodina, Serbian Vojvodina was declared, an autonomous region within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By helping the Austrian Emperor, Serbs received all of those privileges which

actually made possible the creation of Vojvodina as unit and later the creation of a regional, Vojvodinian identity.

After the First World War Vojvodina became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and until 1974 it remained without greater political importance as a region. After the Constitution of Yugoslavia in 1974 Vojvodina became an Autonomous Province within the Republic of Serbia, having the status similar to that of a German "bundesland". That means that Vojvodina had all the three domains – the legislative, executive and the judicative under its own jurisdiction.

THE MURDER OF VOJVODINA BY SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ

The whole falling apart of former Yugoslavia practically began with the withdrawal of constitutional rights from Vojvodina's administration, as part of the plan of Slobodan Milošević, all in order to "solve" the Kosovo problem. Since 1988 Vojvodina has had no real influence on the Serbian politics, which came about during the nineties.

Being held hostage by Milošević's politics for ten years, Vojvodina, as the economically most developed part of former Yugoslavia took part in all the wars as provider of food and other, even human resources for a dictator's policy of destruction. Novi Sad, the capital city of Vojvodina was also an important target on the bombing map of NATO in 1999.

Throughout those ten years there was of course a strong oppositional front of political parties in Vojvodina, one of the most important being the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, led by Mr. Nenad Čanak. He and his party, the League of Social democrats of Vojvodina, a party created in order to represent the interests of Vojvodina's citizens created a political campaign, which was to be realised partially ten years later. The programme was completed in 1999 and it was often used by nationalists in Serbia as an argument against any regional initiative in Vojvodina. The campaign referred to a so-called Republic of Vojvodina. The reason for demanding a Republic instead of an Autonomous Province was the idea of this autonomy. Its shapes and values were defined by Milošević himself. This formal autonomy given by Milošević had to be replaced with a real autonomy, which according to Milošević's vision of it could only be called a republic.

THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT

There is no community on the territory of the European continent that is more complex and composite than the one found in Vojvodina. It is difficult to find even one similar region where, through history, national, economic and state interests have been mixed to such an extent as is the case with contemporary Vojvodina, bordered with rivers and national states.

Migrations on the territory of Vojvodina have made it and continue making it the community that possesses all European and Balkan traditions. The quality of life is defined in clear legal and civilisation frameworks without any traces of clan and tribe relations.

Vojvodina is not only a multinational or multiconfessional community. It is, among other things, such a community as well, but it is also a "multi-homeland" community. This specific characteristics contained in the fact that people who are representatives of the same nation and religion, but of different homeland origin, culture and customs live here, makes Vojvodina even more complex and national communities even more diverse and wealthier within themselves.

Therefore, the main opinion of all regional initiatives in Vojvodina is that Vojvodina cannot be considered as an anonymous part of this or that national, or a state based on national principle, neither it can be singled out of the total heritage of all different national and other communities that live on its territory.

Constitutional-legal solutions of the status of Vojvodina have to take into consideration all the above-mentioned specific characteristics and express its complexity.

Vojvodina is at its turning point today. Its past is not finished yet, and its future has yet to begin.

The past of Vojvodina is burdened with the remaining unsolved status of the federal unit and the autonomous province in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The traces of the Trianon Agreement from 1918 are still present today. The current position of Vojvodina is the one characterised by the non-existence of any subjectivity within the illegal and illegitimate Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or today's Serbia and Montenegro. This state has already been in existence for ten years and faces numerous contradictions and conflicts, not only that it has not solved any of its problems, but that it also does not even have defined borders.

The post-communist and nationalist political concept of Slobodan Milošević constantly avoided setting up a long-term basis for the political functioning of these territories. It is responsible for the fact that seven (out of eight) federal units of former Yugoslavia became the battlefields of more or less severe conflicts of centralistic oriented quasi-representatives of certain national groups. These conflicts were not, as it was presented, any form of "national liberation" or "protection of national interests", but were only the struggles for reconstruction of the balance of strength, power and influence over resources. The catastrophe in Bosnia is the result of the primary goal—transformation of nationally and religiously diverse territory into three national states—that has caused severe mutilations of the possibility to develop Bosnia on a multinational and multicultural basis.

In contrast to all other federal units of the former SFRY, such a form of "solving" the provoked national conflicts is not possible in Vojvodina.

Vojvodina does not have clear national enclaves. Ethnic mixture of population is not exclusively characteristic of the cities, but also of 95% of the rural settlements (villages) the populations of which hava a mixed national structure. It is wrong, superficial and most often malicious to compare the problem of Vojvodina with any other that has been opened on the territory of former Yugoslavia up to now.

THE ROLE OF THE LEAGUE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATS OF VOJVODINA IN SAVING WHAT IS LEFT TO SAVE

Eventual solutions to all of the problems mentioned above were offered by the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina back in 1999. An excerpt referring to these possible solutions. This plan was almost totally implemented into the plan of the Parliament of Vojvodina beginning on October 5th 2000 and was fully accepted by all the parliamentary political parties. Even today, after the latest elections in October 2004, some of the points of this programme still play an important guideline in the regional politics of Vojvodina.

[…]

Vojvodina has to have a legal framework made on the basis of absolute respect for the principle, of the right of an individual to be different, which is to be considered as the highest. This right is to be limited only and exclusively

by the right of other individuals to be different. Complete equality, physical, proprietary and legal security has to be guaranteed to all citizens of Vojvodina, no matter of what national, religious, homeland, race or sex affiliation.

Neither the individual nor the group can acquire their position on the basis of unwilling differences, namely those differences that are not the consequence of a free choice. The citizens of Vojvodina have to be granted the right and freedom to make links with others the organisation of which is in order to promote and protect collective rights and enjoy collective freedoms. Only rights and freedoms of other groups limit rights and freedoms of any group.

This is why the representational legislative body of Vojvodina, its Parliament, should have two Houses—The House of Citizens and House of Nations.

The House of Citizens would be elected by direct, free and secret voting at periodical elections. The elected members of Parliament would represent the will of the citizens of Vojvodina in bringing all the laws that are of significance for the life and functioning of Vojvodina as a whole. All adults of legal age who are citizens of Vojvodina have the rights to elect and be elected. The House of Nations would be the representing body that would be made of representatives of the Serbs, Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, Ruthenians and other organised national, religious and other groups. This House would decide on matters related to culture, education and information necessary to maintain and cherish the lingual, national, religious, homeland and other specific collective characteristics. The decisions would be brought unanimously.

The Constitution of Vojvodina that would be brought by the Constitutional Assembly of Vojvodina would regulate the work of Vojvodina Parliament. This would be the only task of this Assembly after the free elections.

The Constitution would define, apart from the above-mentioned principles, the relations with the Serbian state, or with a wider state community within which Vojvodina would find itself. It would also regulate the matter of utilisation of soldiers from Vojvodina outside its territory.

Vojvodina has to be the constitutive element of any federal community it may be the part of.

The strategic branches of the economy are the agricultural industry, petrochemicals and trade. The Vojvodina Parliament would be the highest body which would determine the routes of economic development directed towards

the closest possible co-operation with all neighbours, but based on market principles that would prevent the outflow of natural and newly acquired wealth from the territory of Vojvodina, which used to be the case during the course of the whole 20th century.

Market principles would also include links with countries of the European Union and they would favour those economic branches and activities that could be complementary to European economic resources and potentials, all in accordance with the highest standards of environmental protection.

The relations with the Republic of Serbia would have to be regulated on the basis of a principle of equality and upon necessary changes in its internal organisation.

Centralistic, quasi-national strategy from Belgrade split the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia itself, through exclusion of Kosovo out of its constitutional-legal organisation. It is not a partner of Vojvodina.

We see Serbia as a democratic federal state composed of federal units having a higher or lower level of autonomy. The responsibility for the fate of this state would be taken over by federal units of the approximately same size with about 2,000,000 inhabitants each and with defined economic, political and historical interests.

This is how Serbia could be stabilised in the political, economic and national sense and constituted as a modern European state. It is our opinion that the federal units should comprise Vojvodina, Šumadija, Southeast Serbia, Belgrade with its surroundings, Sandžak (the region of Raška) and Kosovo.

Democratic federal Serbia would have a Parliament with two Houses—The House of Citizens and House of Federal Units. The House of Presidents would represent the state.

Federal units would express their interests through the House of Federal Units that would decide on the strategic, political and development goals of Serbia.

The Government of the state of Serbia would decide on matters of national defence, foreign policy and monetary policy and it would propose basic principles of macro-economic programme. The House of Citizens would vote on these proposals.

The House of Citizens would also have the function of monitoring the functioning of state bodies of federal units and control the constitutionality of their work.

Vojvodina has to have the status of a republic within such a federal state. This is what historical experience leads to, as well as the fact that the autonomous province proposed as a solution is not stable enough and does not give the adequate guarantee for the stability of constitutional organisation. This could be seen after the putsch in 1988 and anti-constitutional abolition of autonomy in Vojvodina.

Within a state organisation defined in such a way Vojvodina would have, in the sphere of foreign policy, the sovereign right to establish trans-regional relations with other European regions. Should Serbia enter wider integration, the decision about that would have to be brought by consensus reached in the House of Federal Units, with the clearly defined status of Vojvodina within new circumstances.

Federalisation of Serbia and the Republic of Vojvodina would be a large step towards stabilisation of the Serbian state and would remove at the very foundation all separatist aspirations on the territory of Serbia.

The Republic of Vojvodina would also be the framework for expression of specific characteristics of all national and other communities in Vojvodina and it would be the warrantor of a long-term democracy in Serbia. The return of Vojvodina to the status defined by the Constitution from 1974 does not satisfy these demands. The Constitution from 1974 was created within different circumstances—in a one-party system and while the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia existed as a warrantor of its implementation.

Republic administration of Vojvodina would cost far less than the current "provincial" administration. The existing infrastructure would be used and the economic power of Vojvodina would be significantly increased. The Republic of Vojvodina would also have to be decentralised by lowering the responsibility for economic development onto all three traditional Vojvodina regions (districts) —Srem, Banat and Backa, then onto Vojvodina cities and all up to the level of municipalities.

The Republic of Vojvodina would guarantee the right of citizenship to all its citizens, no matter what their national, religious or homeland affiliation, as well as dual citizenship should the need for it occur.

The Republic of Vojvodina would have its own flag, anthem and coat of arms. They would be displayed in public in accordance with Vojvodina law, together with the flag, anthem and coat of arms of the state of Serbia.

[…]

The efforts of the League of Social Democrats among other democratic, pro-European political initiatives to preserve a peaceful common life of tolerance for all citizens of Vojvodina during the nineties resulted in "October 5th". Together with the Belgrade oppositional forces the Vojvodinian political parties took part in the small revolution after the elections in September 2000 in which Milošević tried to transform into his new strategic forgery. Finally, on October 5th 2000 Milošević and some of his political vassals—unfortunately not all of them—had to leave their positions and the DOS (Democrat Opposition of Serbia) came into power in Serbia.

REGIONAL INITIATIVES IN VOJVODINA TODAY

Right after the October 5th "revolution" the Government and the Parliament of Vojvodina started again representing the will of Vojvodina's citizens and they have until the present day a big role in the reformative processes Serbia is going through on its way to the European Union.

After strenuous efforts to present Vojvodina in the European context the Vojvodinian Parliament with its boards and working groups for international and interregional co-operation has managed to bring at least one part of Serbia among other countries and regions of Europe. On November 27th 2002, Vojvodina became a full member of the Assembly of European Regions, an organisation on whose initiative all the other commissions and boards of the European Union were founded.

Becoming a member of DKMT Euro-region even under Milošević, Vojvodina started acting and functioning fully within this co-operation after 2001. A year later Vojvodina chaired this Euro-region. The importance of this interregional co-operation became great after May this year because now this Euro-region is a region, which comprises districts, and regions both from a

EU country and from non-EU countries. This co-operation at the border of the EU is an important step to a further integration of Serbia into European structures.

During the last four years the Parliament of Vojvodina also regained contacts to many regions from the former Yugoslavia, as well as from other EU countries. A series of meetings and conferences took place, in Novi Sad and abroad, where politicians from Vojvodina had conversations with politicians from other regions.

The most important goals achieved by Vojvodina's administration are the following:

- Defining a strategy of representing Vojvodina in an international and interregional context
- Creating and supporting the Commission for international and interregional co-operation
- Creating a team of councillors which are to co-ordinate the co-operation with the Assembly of European regions – their efforts resulted with the representative role of Vojvodina which was selected as the European region of the year 2006
- Supporting the co-operation of Vojvodina's economical representatives with other neighbouring regions within the Euro-region DKMT
- Regaining good relationship with regions from former Yugoslavia
- Supporting and distributing contacts to all of the important institutions in Vojvodina – the University of Novi Sad, the Chamber of Commerce of Vojvodina etc.

An important first step was the regaining of trust in our immediate neighborhood. This is why treaties and parliamentary contracts of co-operation were signed with the Vukovar and the Osijek districts in Croatia. This was an important element of reconciliation, which is in progress between Serbia and Croatia. Vojvodina also made an agreement with the Croatian region of Istra.

Furthermore, the city of Novi Sad has established good co-operation with the city of Tuzla in Bosnia, a co-operation that brought a healthy relationship between the University of Tuzla and the University in Novi Sad.

Although this co-operation with regions from Former Yugoslavia still mostly represents co-operation based upon projects of cultural exchange, it is a

very big and important step towards the full reconciliation of these regions with Serbia as a state.

The work on interregional communication and parliamentary contacts in the last three years brought up several agreements and also led to better relationships with German and Austrian lands. I would mention only the most important contacts—these are the contacts with Baden-Württemberg, Bayern and Rheinland-Pfalz in Germany and Oberösterreich and the land of Vienna in Austria.

The co-operation between Vojvodina and these regions exists on several levels and in different domains—there are contacts between the officials of those lands, between their cities on an administrative level on the one hand, and within different projects in economy, culture and education on the other hand.

An important issue in the regional, as well as in international communication is the aim to search for common elements within different states, cultures etc.

DANUBE – RIVER OF COMMON INTEREST

A common element for many European countries is the river Danube. The Danube states, as they are called, have organised themselves in different kinds of associations and institutions. So we have an international Conference of Danube Cities, just to give an example. By entering some of these institutions Vojvodina has came again one step closer to the European Union, through this bringing to the whole Serbia a small piece of land closer to the common goal—the EU.

An important event for Vojvodina was the founding of the Danube office – donau.büro in Novi Sad. The original donau.büro.ulm from Ulm, Baden-Württemberg, Germany was founded two years ago in co-operation with the Chamber of industry and commerce of Ulm and represents one of the most important institutions which are involved in the interregional co-operation along the Danube.

Today there are Danube offices in Bratislava, Budapest, Baja, Novi Sad, Vidin, Tulcea etc. and there are more to be founded. All these offices co-operate on a variety of projects, a couple of years ago mostly cultural, but today more and more concerning the economy and administrative issues.

One of the interesting projects Vojvodina took part on was the presentation of Vojvodina at the 4th International Danube festival in Ulm in June this year. For the first time, visitors from all over the Danube countries could enjoy an interesting presentation of Vojvodina's music, arts and history, but also learn something about Vojvodina's economy and tourist sights. Judging from the beautiful mood of the entire festival and positive reports in the local media this presentation was a full success.

The Danube was an eternal inspiration for the people who have been living along it for centuries. Today this river is being seen as a one which brings people from different places together. It is more and more likely that the Danube is to take over the role which the river Rhine had after World War II. A river of separation is becoming every day rather a river of healthy co-existence and co-operation among the people who live along it. The spirit of a good common life, tolerance and mutual respect among people is a characteristic of Vojvodina. That is why Vojvodina could so rapidly join all the other cities, regions and countries in this growing-together process.

NGOs AND STUDENT INITIATIVES AS PLATFORMS OF REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

Guided by subsidiarity in its politics Vojvodina has been perfect ground for development of a great number of NGOs. I would like to give just one example of how NGOs participate in this common spirit of co-operation with other regions.

The NGO "World and Danube" from Novi Sad took part on a project which had the aim to establish new contacts between NGOs in cities along the Danube. This was to be realised through hosting the participants of the "Tour International Danubien", an international regatta, which every year brings together people from different Danube countries who row along the Danube from Ingolstadt in Germany to Silistra in Bulgaria. On their way they stop in different cities. In 2000, for the first time after many years, they made their stop in Novi Sad. The NGO "World and Danube", which also publishes the magazine "Saint Danube", created a team of young people called "the Danubians" to organise the accommodation for the group of rowers. Apart from excellent accommodation, the team also offered them a sightseeing tour of Novi Sad and the Fruška gora monasteries. A year later this event was widely reported

by local media and two years later the whole event was organised by the official Tourist association of Vojvodina and sponsored by the officials of Vojvodina.

A far larger project, that of putting together the broken mosaic of Former Yugoslavia is the EXIT festival. The festival was for the first time organised in 2000 in Novi Sad, where it has taken place every summer ever since. It is a musical but also a cultural festival organised by and for young people. The concept of this festival was developed by students, members of the largest students' organisation of Vojvodina and Serbia, the Students' Union of the University of Novi Sad. Today the EXIT Team functions as an NGO. Every summer the EXIT festival brings hundreds of thousands young people from all over the world, but mostly from former Yugoslav republics. With such guests as the famous artists and artistic groups as Iggy Pop, Ronny Size, Morcheeba, Kosheen, Massive Attack, Cypress Hill, Asian Dub Foundation, Stereo MC's, Chumba Wamba and other artists from all parts of former Yugoslavia, the festival represents the largest festival of this kind in South Eastern Europe.

The Students' Union of Novi Sad itself is an NGO-like organisation and member of the ESIB, the European students' union and belongs to the founders of the Balkans Students' union.

Beside this regional networking, changing and reforming the existing manner of study as well as providing better conditions for students are the main goals of the Students' Union. Students have the opportunity to develop their own ideas through several projects. Some of these projects also deal with the question of regional co-operation between different regions and their universities.

THE PRESENT SITUATION – A VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN CONCLUSION

In the hope that interregional co-operation will continue to exist in this form in Vojvodina in the future and that it will widen out to more regions in Europe I will try to slightly cast light upon the very much complex present political situation in Vojvodina.

Before the regional elections in Vojvodina, which unfortunately showed how everything still depends on politics—as complex as in any transition state —in our country, there were different expectations concerning the results and their consequences.

Both pro-reformist and nationalistic political parties in Vojvodina aired their policies for these elections, which were considered an internal political issue, regardless of eventual changes in the present concept of Vojvodina's politics possibly leading to a new isolation of our region in an international frame.

As predicted, the elections were a new step backwards into the centralist and nationalist political environment, which is somehow appearing to be immortal in Serbia. The Serbian radical party, a product of Milošević's regime, as consequence of the fact that only approximately 30% of the voters actually did vote, gained over 30% of votes for the Parliament of Vojvodina.

Fortunately, a coalition was made of the Democratic Party, the League of Social Democrats and the Union of Vojvodinian Hungarians, a coalition of parties out of which the old Parliament mainly consisted. Through this political compromise the Parliament of Vojvodina assured a regionally oriented politics of Vojvodina for the next four years, a period of time which is to bring several important changes on the political scene in Serbia.

For all the regional initiatives in Vojvodina this means four more years to strengthen good relations with existing partners and to create new contacts with other regions of Europe. The effective determination of Vojvodina's administration to keep on developing its regional co-operation is also to be seen in the latest plans of the actual president of the Parliament of Vojvodina, Mr. Bojan Kostreš. After his visit to Vienna on November 24th he agreed with the general secretary of the Assembly of European Regions Mr. Klaus Klipp upon an international conference on regionalism, which is to be held in Novi Sad at the beginning of 2005. Guests at this conference should also be representatives of international institutions like the Council of Europe and others.

In spite of all predictions of decreasing democratic initiative in Vojvodina my personal opinion on the topic is that something like this is not going to happen, exactly because of all the relationships Vojvodina has made or renewed with other regions in the last couple of years, but there is always this certain fear of the well-known political scenario distributed throughout all the transition states, which predicts the return of a regressive political regime after a short period of reforms.

However, this is just one reason more for individuals and NGOs in Vojvodina to continue believing in the best concept of an united Europe—the Europe

of Regions—and to keep on working on this concept, by communicating, travelling, meeting people, supporting the exchange of ideas, the transfer of thoughts and spreading the spirit of tolerance and mutual respect.

The concept of Europe as a Europe of regions is at least in this form and this interpretation perhaps the only concept which could replace the negative nationalist concept of all states of the former so-called Eastern bloc.

AN AUSTRIAN INITIATIVE: THE REGIONAL PARTNERSHIP[1]

JOSEF OBERGER

On regional partnership in general there are three aspects which I will try to cover: first attempts in regional co-operation in Europe in the past, second the Austrian initiative *Regional Partnership* and third some considerations of the future of the Regional Partnership. At the end I try to draw some conclusions.

ATTEMPTS IN REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE PAST

Regional co-operation seems to be such a "natural" thing that it has been attempted in different ways many times and by nearly all regional nations in Europe. So co-operation on the regional level in Central and Eastern Europe is neither a new nor an exclusively Austrian way of working together. I shall try to illustrate this by some examples through the history:

Already in the 13th century, King Premysl Ottokar II of Bohemia had tried to create a kind of "dynastic regional partnership" reaching from Kaliningrad to the Mediterranean Sea.

Afterwards the French House of Anjou-Naples united Hungary and Poland and did something similar to a "dynastic regional partnership". Later the House of Luxemburg succeeded in creating a "partnership" including the Holy Roman Empire and more closely Hungary, Bohemia and Brandenburg.

The German King Albert II did it the "Austrian Way" by marrying the daughter of Emperor Sigismund of Luxemburg. By doing this he initiated the first Austrian "regional partnership" between Bohemia, Hungary and Austria in 1438.

The famous Matthias Corvinus Hunyadi created a Hungarian type of "regional partnership" by uniting his kingdom of Hungary with Bohemia and large parts of Austria.

[1] Ehrlich W., Cf. Regional Partnership: An Austrian Initiative. In: Luif P. (Ed.), Regional Partnership and the future of the European Union, Vienna 2002.
cf. speeches and interviews of Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner about the Regional Partnership on www.bmaa.gv.at/.

Then, it was the turn of the Jagiellons, the House of the Grand Princes of Lithuania. They created maybe the largest "regional partnership" by uniting Bohemia and Hungary as well as Poland, large parts of today's Ukraine and Belarus with Lithuania.

Finally, the House of Habsburgs did it again the "Austrian Way." Archduke Ferdinand, the later emperor Ferdinand I married the sister of the king of Bohemia and Hungary. This king died in the battle of Mohács in 1526 and because of this Ferdinand inherited Bohemia and Hungary. Later generations of the Habsburger enlarged the "partnership" temporarily by other domains such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Galicia, Lombardy and Venice.

But possibly the most durable informal "regional partnership" can be seen in the common efforts to defend "Europe" against the expansion of the Ottoman Empire over the centuries. This created a strong regional solidarity among a lot of regions in Europe.

The examples above show that regional partnership and co-operation is a kind of "common heritage" belonging to all regional nations, regions and partners.

In the 20th century after the Second World War many attempts were made to bridge the new divide between Western and Eastern Europe and to re-establish co-operation and regional partnership. In Austria, for example, farsighted statesmen like Alois Mock and Erhard Busek took several initiatives to create institutions such as the "Commission of the Danube." Besides this scientific foundations and organisations also contributed in building the basis for a new free and democratic partnership on the continent like the "Austrian Institute of East and South-East European Studies" and the "Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe." The "Central European Initiative" comprising Central, Eastern and South Eastern European countries is one of the most developed organisations for regional partnership and co-operation. There has also been a proliferation of regional initiatives such as organisations like the "Stability Pact for South-East Europe". Of course there can never be too much support for improving regional political understanding but there is however a danger of confusion and of parallel and as a result of this wasted efforts, which should be avoided.

DIE REGIONALE PARTNERSCHAFT - AN AUSTRIAN INITIATIVE

This initiative was launched from the Austrian Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Benita Ferrero-Waldner. Her proposal to create a *Regional Partnership* is a specific one and a step to overcome Europe's borders, as she stated in her speech at the first meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the five partner countries at the Wiener Hofburg in Vienna on 6 June 2001. This partnership is directed at four of Austria's immediate neighbours, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, and Poland which is considered to be a "cultural neighbour" of Austria. At the time of their establishment in 2001 these states were first-line candidates for European Union (EU) membership. This Austrian initiative was conceived as a forum for political dialogue with the aim of intensifying cross-border co-operation, notably in areas of particular significance for the approaching entrance of the five countries into the EU. In general, the *Regional Partnership* has two phases: in the first one the regional co-operation had to be intensified under the perspective of the ongoing negotiations of the five EU accession candidates with the Union. In the second, new, and decisive phase a contributing process takes place to define common goals within the EU, to safeguard shared interests, and to implement these shared interests inside the Union.

As major challenges have to be met the *Regional Partnership* is a crucial one; in the perspective from 2001 this especially meant that:

- The populations of all the six countries had to be prepared for the dramatic changes after EU-membership and for the new quality of neighbourliness inside the Union.
- Austria should help to clear the way of the first-line candidates towards negotiating, adopting and implementing the Acquis of the EU.
- Common roots have to be rediscovered and common interests have to be defined because decades of isolation have led to separation.

The *Regional Partnership* was seen as a very timely in 2001 because:

- Not much time was left to finish the difficult negotiations with the EU.
- Not much time is left either to eliminate some unsolved historical heritage through friendly co-operation as well as mutual misconceptions and misunderstandings.

To conclude, the main aims of the initiative were and are:

- To facilitate the ongoing negotiations between the EU and the candidate states.
- To create a basis for a permanent regional co-operation and for synchronisation of joint procedures in the EU similar to the Benelux states, in order to safeguard shared interests inside the Union if sufficient support by other partner countries can be reached.
- To create a partnership based on the targeted deepening of co-operation in those areas which are of particular relevance to the partner countries without creating additional and new structures.
- To contribute to the definition of common goals within the EU. Specific areas of shared interests include internal security, border control, asylum and consular matters, co-operation in the fields of culture, high tech and infrastructure, as well as the future development of the European institutions.
- To increase the mutual understanding and friendship among these six countries.
- To strengthen the awareness about the common interests of the partners.

At their first conference in Vienna on 6 June 2001 the Foreign Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia agreed on the usefulness of the Regional Partnership as well as on the necessity to develop this co-operation and to expand it to other ministries and eventually to other relevant administrations.

That was the basis for conferences on which other ministers followed the initiative: The Ministers of Economy and Labour met in Salzburg on 27 and 28 August 2001 and signed several initiatives on improving economic relations, on implementation of the Acquis of the EU as well as on labour and employment policy. Also the Ministers of the Interior met there on 27 August 2001 and adopted the "Salzburg Declaration" on security partnership to combat international crime, prevent illegal migration, protect borders, and to improve information on the security policy of the EU. The Ministers of Transport met in Vienna on 3 September 2001 as well as the Ministers of Agriculture in Ried (Upper-Austria) on 4 September 2001. It can be concluded that the idea of the *Regional Partnership* has widened from the Foreign Ministers to other Ministers.

A second meeting of the Foreign Ministers has been chaired by Slovakia and took place in Bratislava in November 2001. There, as a first symbolic step, a "Central European Cultural Platform" was created as all members of the *Regional Partnership* have deep common cultural roots which are key elements of their mutual understanding as Central European countries.

At the third meeting, held in Portoroz (Slovenia) on 14 October 2002 the Foreign Ministers of the partner states agreed to stimulate their activities launched by means of a joint action plan and by the establishment of "focal points" in their respective ministries.

At the fourth conference of the Foreign Ministers of the *Regional Partnership* countries in Buchlovice in the Czech Republic on 4 July 2003 the Ministers discussed topical European policy issues and perspectives, cross-border security issues as well as issues regarding the "Platform for Central European International Cultural Policy".

THE FUTURE OF THE REGIONAL PARTNERSHIP

The future of the logical and useful instrument of the Regional Partnership seems to be assured. However, its final success depends on several points:

The most important criterion is enduring usefulness for all partners during the negotiations with the EU as well as after the entrance into the EU. So the Regional Partnership will prosper as long as all participating countries are convinced that this co-operation was not only a useful instrument to ease the way into the EU but is also important to improve mutual relations on the basis for creating a permanent regional caucus of co-operation inside the Union. From a realistic and professional point of view the countries would check carefully what kind of advantages they get from co-operating among each other, including after entrance into the EU. The success of this initiative is by no means granted but will need a lot of effort and the co-operation on all sides.

On the Austrian side one difficulty of the task becomes evident when we are thinking about some key issues such as "Beneš", "Temelin", "Avnoy" and road signs in Carinthia. A constructive solution to these problems would boost the chances of success of the Regional Partnership.

Also from an Austrian perspective it is clear that Austria is not the only country to be interested in good co-operation and friendship with the other

partners. For example, Germany is certainly a very attractive partner for some countries like the Czech Republic and Poland. There are also other options for the countries such as a co-operation between the Visegrád countries.

A final strategic aim of the Regional Partnership can be the creation of understanding, sympathy and community of interests to such a degree that the solidarity is strong enough to defend interests of the partners in Brussels even in cases where no proper national interests are involved. This kind of solidarity requires very strong foundations anchored in political constellations and -maybe even more importantly—has to be deeply rooted in the majority of the people of all the countries involved.

To bring this Austrian initiative to success and to make it strong enough to achieve its final aim some measures have to be considered, such as the *Regional Partnership* having to be an official and permanent priority of Austrian foreign, economic and infrastructure policies. In addition, budgetary means are needed to organise political, cultural, historical and economical symposia and for projects of high symbolic value (e.g. exchange programmes, bridges, highway connections, railway connections etc.). Co-operation on the level of regional and local authorities should be intensified by enhancing existing and creating new co-operations between the regions using funds of the EU. In general, several meetings of specialised Ministers should be organised in a systematic way and therefore meetings of officials should be used to prepare and to implement the decisions of the Ministers. The meetings of the Foreign Ministers should be intensively prepared in close co-operation with the presiding country as they decide on general policy and on actions to be taken. The basis of these should be a general concept to develop the co-operation in all essential issues.

After the entrance of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland into the EU other Central, South Eastern and Eastern European countries are standing at the border of the Union. These countries are now the regional partners as they will participate in the next rounds of joining the EU. Now it is time to help them to build bridges to the Union, otherwise a new split will emerge in Europe. To prevent such a development there an excellent instrument has been created: the "Central European Initiative" which comprises all Central, South-Eastern and Eastern European countries.

CONCLUSIONS

All the above shows that the Austrian initiative *Regional Partnership* has so far been a very successful. Of course there never can be too much help and support for improving mutual understanding, friendship and sympathy between regions as well as regional political and economical standards. As it can be seen at the beginning of this article, regional co-operation has been a very natural and necessary thing and will continue to be in the future as well. It can be concluded that it is part of the historic and geographic heritage, where every country had its place in the past and will have its part in the future. Because of this the launching of a successful Regional Partnership is however not only a logical necessity but also a demanding task. The reach of its strategic aim would require enduring and substantial efforts to all member countries. Even if such massive efforts would not be the result this initiative they will still have a very useful role to play, because the certain benefit of all will be concerned by co-operation, improving knowledge and understanding, and sympathy between six regional countries. Regional co-operation is visible and tangible for the people in this region.

GERMAN POLICY TOWARD ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA SINCE 1991

AS AN ELEMENT OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION-BUILDING

Kamil Markiewicz

INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE

The Baltic Sea Region has been growing together since the end of the East-West-conflict as a political, economic and cultural entity. One of the pre-conditions of this process was the fall of the Communist system and thus a new political structure of the region. The unification of Germany in 1990 resulted in the emerging of a major European power. In 1991 the independence of Estonia (EST), Latvia (LV) and Lithuania (LT) (also called the Baltic States) from the USSR was internationally recognised. The successor of the Soviet Union, Russia, retained only small strips of the coast around Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, but nevertheless it has remained a key player on the Baltic Sea.

The fact that political division in the Baltic was overcome was the main precondition for the substantial development of a co-operation of regional actors. The shift in the geographical location of Germany made the country become more attentive to the issues of the Baltic region. The mere fact one more coastal region (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) was created heightened German interest in co-operation with other littoral states in such fields as economics, energy, transport and ecology. The chances and risks of the region became to a larger extent chances and risks for Germany and its society.

The paper tries to sketch the German policy toward the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as an element of regional-oriented policy. It will focus on the activity of the Federal government and those of the German Bundesländer, but it will mention activities of non-state actors as well, who often act in fields not 'covered' sufficiently by the policy of the Federal government.

Two levels of the German policy will find consideration:

1) Germany's 'interregional' activity in order to integrate new democracies of the Baltic Sea Region into political, economical and military European and transatlantic structures
2) German participation in the regional co-operation of littoral states

However, for the understanding of the motives and operational context of these activities it is necessary to outline both historical and actual political premises of the relations between Germany and the three Baltic states.

PREMISES OF GERMAN POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES

The 20th century history of German-Baltic relations does not give an idyllic picture.[1] The 'Hitler-Stalin-pact', dividing north-eastern Europe between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union put an end to the 20-year period of independence for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The occupation[2] of the three countries since 1940 by the USSR was temporarily replaced by German occupation in 1941-44. As a result of the war and post-war period, the three republics lost between 25% and 33% of their population.

In spite of its non-recognition of the Soviet annexation after 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany did not undertake concrete measures in favour of the three republics, e.g. in the assembly of the United Nations (which corresponded with the position of most Western states). The ambivalence of the German policy toward the Baltic republics became apparent in the late 1980s during the Baltic struggle for independence: priority was given to good relationships with USSR whose attitude was of crucial importance for the success of Germany's reunification process. Germany recognised formally the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania only after Russian (secessionist) president Yeltsin did so at the end of August 1991.

[1] Apart of that, there is a long history of German involvement in the Baltic rim, esp. on the area of today's Latvia and Estonia. From the 13th century until the World War I, the provinces of Kurlandia, Livonia and Estonia were governed by the Baltic Germans executing political, economical and social power over the native population (Lithuania didn't experience a significant German influence). Therefore, Nazi policy can be seen (although there were obvious differences) as certain reference to the former history.

[2] International lawyers are divided on the issue if the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the USSR, proclaimed 1940, was at any time legalised.

Conscious of that not always glorious past, in the following period Germany declared support for the independence of the three States as well as their integration in the Western structures as an expression of a certain moral obligation. The realisation of these objectives was, however, also in the interest of a unified Germany.

The development of the three states was perceived by German politicians as one of key factors determining the situation of the region. Political, economic and social instability could have had a negative spill-over effect in the form of floods of migrants, organised criminality and ecological disasters; special concerns aroused about the tensioned relations of the three states with Russia, e.g. on the status of Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia. It was feared the strong neighbour would wage a military intervention on the pretext of minorities protection.[3] A solution to these problems and a successful transformation in the Baltic states could in turn positively influence the situation of the Baltic regions of Russia and the overall Russian policy toward the region.

Germany as the major state of the region (with corresponding economic power, decentralised structure enabling activities of sub-regional actors and with an established network of NGOs) seemed predestined to take the role of a 'gravitational centre' for the small states in the East. The following analysis will try to give an answer to what extent this scenario could be realised.

INTEGRATION OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION INTO WESTERN STRUCTURES

Objectives of the policy of German federal government toward Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 1990s can be summarised as follows:

- to secure on a long-term basis the independence and territorial integrity of the Baltic states
- to support the Baltic states in the transformation process
- to stabilise a co-operative and constructive Baltic-Russian relationship
- to strengthen stability and security as well as democratic and market-economic development in the entire Baltic region (Ischinger 2000: 100)

[3] Russia declared itself 'responsible' for the fate of compatriots in the so called 'Near Abroad', i.e. on the territory of the former USSR (see doctrine of the Russian foreign policy from 1993). This approach was explained with the attempt to preserve political control over the area.

The German policy perceived the inclusion of the Baltic states into a 'co-operative security architecture' of the Baltic rim as essential. It avoided the bilateral approach and attempted to integrate its support for the three States into activities of multilateral integration and security institutions. They seemed suitable in this context because of their proven capability to stabilise the international environment.

As the structure of major importance in this context the German government considered the European Community/European Union because it stand not only for economic prosperity but also for democratic stability and peaceful relationship between states. Clear support for the (gradual) integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania can be already found in the declarations on bilateral relationships from 1993.

The German attitude was vital for the three countries, as Germany was not only an influential EU member, but also its major net payer. Berlin's enthusiasm toward the accession temporarily cooled off, however, after budgetary problems became evident in the late 1990s. It is mainly due to the Finnish initiative that Latvia and Lithuania could join the accession negotiations in early 2000 (Estonia had entered into the first group in 1998).

Nevertheless, Berlin actively took part in the pre-accession strategy of the Baltic states, which can be seen in the participation of the Federal and Länder governments in the PHARE Twinning programme of institutional partnership.[4] And in the end, it was the German Chancellor Schröder at the Copenhagen summit in December 2002 whose attitude was decisive in the successful conclusion of the accession negotiations.

Regarding the security status of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the countries' main objective was to join NATO—primarily because it would secure them against the perceived threat from a militarily dominant Russia. In contrast to the EU enlargement, German diplomacy was very reserved because of the foreseen negative impact on the relationship with Russia (which, of course, resulted in irritation of the Baltic partners). The need of co-operation in the security field was, however, perceived quite well, according to Berlin's strategy of stabilising the environment by networks of multilateral activities. Berlin advocated the

[4] The federal structure of Germany enabled the involvement of regional actors in the EU pre-accession strategy for the Baltic States.

extension of NATO co-operation policies on the one hand, and the development of the European security policy within the West European Union (WEU) and the EU, extended on the Central and Eastern European states, on the other.[5]

Only the pragmatic turn in Russian foreign policy under President Putin enabled the Western states to decide in favour of NATO enlargement in the three Baltic states. German diplomacy was rather reactive in this case although it unrestrictedly supported the US-led initiative. In this way, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became Alliance members in April 2004.

Multilateral forums should also provide a framework for solving specific Baltic-Russian problems (as minority or border issues), which could deprive them of their 'explosiveness', which was particularly evident in the first half of the 1990s. The German government supported addressing specific Baltic-Russian issues mainly by pan-European institutions in which the Baltic States and Russia possessed equal status.[6] It was not least German pressure which made Latvia and Estonia invite missions of the Council of Europe and OSCE in order to monitor the observing of rights of large Russian-speaking minorities.[7]

BALTIC SEA REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

From the German point of view, regional co-operation is a way to strengthen stability and development along the Baltic Sea coast by addressing 'soft security' issues and promoting co-operation in different fields. In Baltic regional institutions, EU member states, aspirants to the EU as well as the 'outs' (Russia, Belarus, but also Norway) come together, so that a sense of regional identity and regional approach to the problems can be preserved after the enlargement of the EU.

As an important task on which this co-operation should focus, the German government saw overcoming social and economic disparities between the Northern and the Western part of the region on the one hand and the Eastern

[5] The first Western organisation which granted the Baltic states a partner status was, on the German initiative, the WEU.

[6] In contrary to the EU which announced the accession of the Baltic states and offered Russia only a partner status.

[7] This group of makes up approximately 40% of population in Latvia and 30% in Estonia.

on the other, and included aid for the new democracies in their transformation process and strengthening of the civil society (Heimsoeth 2002: 292).

The intergovernmental structure providing a framework for activities of different actors in the region is the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The German-Danish initiative leading to its establishment in 1992 resulted among other matters in concerns for the stability of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which had regained their independence only few months earlier. The CBSS excluded from the very beginning 'hard security' issues from its agenda, focussing on humanitarian, economic, ecological and cultural problems—acting mainly as co-ordinator of the activities of non-state actors and a 'mouthpiece' of interests of the littoral states toward international organisations, especially the EU.[8]

Interestingly, Germany opposed a far-reaching institutionalisation of the CBSS with the argument that co-operation should be maintained flexible. It can be, however, explained with the fear of certain 'regionalisation' within the EU, which would favour the 'Nordic' integration model rather than the French-German federal conceptions. Berlin was also for a long time not very active in efforts for more participation of the EU Commission (as its formal member) in the Council's activities until it became one of the priorities of the German presidency in the CBSS 2000/2001.

Among the projects launched by the Council, infrastructure projects such as *Via Baltica* and *Baltic Electricity Ring* were of concrete importance for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as they would strengthen their links with the developed industrial states and help to overcome their partly peripheral position. Problems of the three republics with organised criminality are addressed by the activity of the Council's 'Task Force on Organised Crime'. The German-led initiative of Eurofaculty, supporting the education of EU law and economy specialisations at the Baltic universities, is also worth of mention.

The CBSS provides an 'umbrella' for transnational activities of different sub—and non-state actors. Some Bundesländer established a co-operation with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the area of their competencies (esp. economy, education and police). Northern regions in particular, facing a relative economic

[8] An example is a plan of regional priorities and projects by the CBSS regarding the implementation of the Northern Dimension of the EU, presented to the EU Minister Conference in April 2001.

crisis, saw in the co-operation a chance to improve their competitive position both within Germany as well as in the region. It regards trade relations, but also projects in fields such as education or tourism.

The Baltic rim has been an area of a substantial activity of German non-state actors, such as municipalities, trade associations, universities and 'classical' NGOs[9], esp. in the fields not covered sufficiently by the states' policy (esp. ecology and culture). Governmental or international structures provide frameworks for their co-ordination and support, but most initiatives in the region come 'from the bottom'. Projects implemented within Community Initiative INTERREG II and III can be given as an example until 2004 directed to 'old' EU member states, but often with the participation of partners from the associated EU members from Central and Eastern Europe.[10]

NGOs and other non-state organisation have succeeded in building up Baltic-wide networks in order to exchange information and resources as well as lobby for their interests at the regional and European level (Siefkes 2002: 20 n.). German diplomacy supports these 'people-to-people' activities as an element of the strengthening the stability and prosperous development of the region. During the German presidency of the CBSS, the first large forum of NGOs from the region was organised in Lübeck, Schleswig-Holstein. However, in some fields of co-operation German non-state actors lag behind the organisations from the Nordic states, which are very active also in the support for societies of the three Baltic countries.

CONCLUSIONS

Since the early 1990s, Germany has consequently supported the independence and Western integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Co-operation on different levels (states, subregions, NGOs) was developed; this approach resulted not as much from the feeling of a moral obligation from the past as from the perceived necessity to secure the stable development of the three Baltic states.

[9] As 'Classical' NGOs I understand independent from the state sphere and pursuing 'altruistic' interests (see Erik Hundewadt, The Role of Voluntary Associations (NGOs) in a Democratic Society, in: Jürgen Schramm (ed.), The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in the New European Order, Baden-Baden 1995. pp. 13-24).

[10] E.g. the German-Swedish-Polish-Lettonian project High Quality Tourism for development of 'ecological' tourism (Scherrer 2002: 248).

The specific interests of each actor involved (as e.g. the competitive efforts of the Bundesländer) were certainly also of importance. Independent from the motives, the co-operation with a major Western state was of great importance for their transformation process of the Baltic states.

The German policy on the national level showed reservation toward bilateral actions and tried to act within the framework of multilateral structures. These activities should positively impact on the overall relationships on the Baltic rim. Regarding tensions in Baltic-Russian relations, this approach posed limits on German (especially military) co-operation with the Baltic states, but on the other hand it contributed to promotion of the Baltic-Russian dialogue. In general it can be said that not least thanks to this strategy, 'hard' (military etc.) security risks could be removed in the Baltic, and the actors in the region could focus on 'soft' risks (criminality, illegal migration, ecological problems) (Heimsoeth 2002: 283).

Deficits in the German policy cannot, however, be overlooked. In spite of declarations, the Baltic Sea region is for the federal government (but also for the industry) of second importance, even if the interest is decidedly greater than before 1991. German activities in the regional co-operation stay behind those of the Nordic states. Certainly, Germany fears a too active policy in the region because of its past and latent suspicions of its hegemonic ambitions. But it seems Germany as the largest state of the region could more actively promote the interests of the region on the EU level so that it would became an integral part of EU policy in comparison with the Mediterranean region (Walter 1998 : 53).[11] So far, as the Finnish initiative of the Northern Dimension shows, such attempts are undertaken primarily by the Nordic states.

References

Föhrenbach, G. (2000). *Die Westbindung der baltischen Staaten. Zur Integration Estlands, Lettland und Litauens in die bi- und multilateralen europäischen und transatlantischen Sicherheitsstrukturen während der 1990er Jahre*. Baden-Baden.

[11] Cf. article by Palmowski where the author argues such a policy has at least been already formulated, Tadeusz Palmowski, „Wymiar północny" Unii Europejskiej, Stosunki międzynarodowe nr 1-2 (t. 29) 2004: 25-41.

Heimsöth, H-J. Die deutsche Ostseepräsidentschaft. In: Detlef, J. & Werz, N. (eds.) (2002). *Politische Systeme und Beziehungen im Ostseeraum*. München. pp. 282-293.

Ischinger, W. Nicht gegen Rußland. Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit im Ostsee-Raum, *Internationale Politik*. Vol. 53, No. 2. pp. 35-40.

Ischinger, W. The Future of the Baltic States: A German Perspective. In: Arnswald, S. & Wenig, M. (eds.) (2000). *German and American Policies Towards the Baltic States*. Baden-Baden. pp. 99-103.

Kosmider, R. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und der Ostseeraum. In: Detlef, J. & Werz, N. (eds.) (2002). *Politische Systeme und Beziehungen im Ostseeraum*. München. pp. 259-281.

Krohn, A. Germany's Security Policy in the Baltic Sea Region. In: Knudsen, O.F. (ed.) (1999). *Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region*. London et al. pp. 113-128.

Lange, P.H. Successes, Failures and Challenges in Europe's Northeast. In: Arnswald, S. & Wenig, M. (eds.) (2000). *German and American Policies Towards the Baltic States*, Baden-Baden. pp. 69-77.

Maeder-Metcalf, B. Russische Minderheiten in den baltischen Staaten. Das Engagement der OSZE. *Internationale Politik*. Vol. 52, No. 10. pp. 39-44.

Nowiak, W. (2000). Północny wymiar współpracy europejskiej – Rada Państw Morza Baltyckiego. *Przegląd Zachodni* 3/2000. pp. 95-109.

Scherrer, S. Grenzenloses Meer? Transnationale Kooperation im Ostseeraum am Beispiel von INTERREG II C. In: Detlef, J. & Werz, N. (eds.) (2002). *Politische Systeme und Beziehungen im Ostseeraum*, München. pp. 244-256.

Siefkes, J. (2002). *NGOs und andere nicht-staatliche Organisationen im Ostseeraum* (M.A. thesis). Berlin.

Voigt, K.D. Die baltischen Staaten in die NATO? Plädoyer für die Mitgliedsperspektive. *Internationale Politik*. Vol. 53, No. 7. pp. 39-40.

Walter, G. Ostsee-Kooperation – eine Erfolgsgeschichte. *Internationale Politik*. Vol. 53, No. 2. pp. 47-53.

TERRITORIAL MARKETING AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN MORAVIAN-SILESIAN TOWNS

JAN MALINOVSKÝ AND JAN SUCHÁČEK

The article deals with the results of the research on territorial marketing and its implementation in Moravian-Silesian towns. As is shown, in spite of many current problems, territorial marketing represents an inseparable and indispensable part of the coming regional and municipal management. At the same time, the necessity of future common activities of private, public and civil sectors has become apparent. The research should therefore be directed towards the examination of networks, embeddedness, trust, innovations and ability to learn.

INTRODUCTION OR A COUPLE OF WORDS ABOUT DEPARTMENT OF REGIONAL ECONOMICS

The Department of Regional Economics at the Faculty of Economics, VŠB-Technical University of Ostrava guarantees the mediation of the knowledge from spatial, regional, environmental, sociological and economic disciplines. Regional economics, environmental policy or human geography represent subjects typicaly provided by the Department. Regional economics is profiled by considerations about the location of economic subjects, about their mutual relations and interactions of localities in the framework of spatial economic structures. This domain is formed also by the problems of regional development or regional policy including co-ordinating tasks of municipalities and regions. Contemporary ecological trends, utilisation of natural resources and the ways of performance of environmental management are monitored in the framework of the analyses of environmental problems. The geographical niche of the Department concentrates primarily on the study of socio-economic structures as well as on specific features of world regions or particular Czech regions and

demographical processes. Regional sociology that examines the development of social structures as well as spatial behaviour of the population constitutes the fourth major specialisation of the Department.

The Department of Regional Economics provides a Master's programme in Regional Development. Research activities of the Department focus on economic and ecological aspects of the processes of transformation of industrial regions, further on trans-border co-operation with Polish borderland and on both methodological and practical creation of strategic documents for regions and municipalities.

CHANGING NATURE OF URBAN AND REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Regional and urban environments are currently exposed to innumerable social, economic, cultural and other factors and phenomena[1]. These processes are very often of transnational or global character and influence the regions and localities both directly and indirectly. Not surprisingly, current circumstances are frequently characterised as hardly predictable, quickly changing and turbulent. However, there are still some 'certainties' that apply to Central Europe and essentially all developed countries. This concerns demographical factors, income changes as well as widely perceived global processes. The extent to which they take place is unprecedented, and therefore we are unable to utilise any foregoing experience.

Decreasing birth rate and growing proportion of people in post-productive age can be nowadays observed in many regions. These demographical trends are accompanied by intense changes in the distribution of incomes, which subsequently creates new challenges for services or the way of spending one's leisure time. At the same time, we can contemplate the increasing role of education and skills. Regional and local responses to the global technological and organisational changes are currently dependent primarily on the flexibility, reflexivity, adaptability and social capital of local/regional actors.

[1] Maier, G. & Tödling, F.(1996): Regionálna a urbanistická ekonomika. 2. Regionálny rozvoj a regionálna politika. Bratislava, ELITA. Translated from: Regional- und Stadtökonomik. Regionalentwicklung und Regionalpolitik. Wien: Springer Verlag.

REGIONAL AND URBAN MANAGERIAL AND MARKETING APPROACH

Sufficient financial resources, well-defined developmental priorities as well as an effective integration of activities of local/regional actors constitute fundamental premises of the development of regional and urban milieu. For example, the unfavourable trends in usage of public budgets were confirmed by the Fifth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of the Regions in the Community. At the same time, public private partnership projects started to attract general attention; however, their utilisation is rather limited, mainly in transitional countries, just for the sake of distrust between the private sphere and the public sector. Nevertheless, the necessity of the involvement of the private sector into municipal or regional projects has become apparent.

While traditional industrial sectors suffer from the gradual loss of their importance, health care, education and leisure have turned out to be new and promising sectors with ample developmental potential[2]. Business concepts are increasingly applied in the public sector[3]. The principle of participation has become one of the key notions of contemporary reality. The development of a regional and urban milieu is thus influenced by three principal trends:

- Programming of the future development of particular territory,
- Communication of public, private and civil sectors,
- Increase in the application of methods and techniques commonly used by classic management and marketing.

Territorial partnership and subsidiarity principle often constitute a common denominator or intersection of extremely complicated relations and interests in the framework of the region. Territorial (i.e. municipal and regional) management and marketing are undoubtedly useful instruments for the programming of the future of the particular area, but both of them have to be applied from the very beginning of the creation of urban and regional development documents (see also Figure 1).

[2] Drucker, P. (2000): Výzvy managementu pro 21. století. Praha: Management press.

[3] Sucháček, J. (2003): Tilburg Model: Towards the Modern Local Goverment. In: Econ ´03 (selected research papers). Volume 10. Ostrava: Technical University of Ostrava, The Faculty of Economics.

MARKETING IN MORAVIAN-SILESIAN REGION

The Department of Regional Economics at the Faculty of Economics, VŠB-Technical University of Ostrava conducted the research on territorial marketing in the Moravian-Silesian region in the Czech Republic. The Moravian-Silesian (Moravskoslezský) industrial region lies in the north-east part of the Czech Republic, in the north it borders on Poland, in the east on Slovakia, in the south on the Zlínsko region and in the south-east on the region of Olomouc.

Figure 1: *Urban and regional development and its programming*



Map 1: *Location of Moravian-Silesian (Moravskoslezský) egion in the Framework of the Czech Republic.*

Figure 2: *Examined Towns in Moravian-Silesian Region*



The area of the region is 5,555 square kilometres or 7% of the Czech Republic's territory. The number of inhabitants is at about 1.3 million or 12.5% of the Czech Republic's population (see also Map 1). This NUTS II region where the examination was accomplished currently comprises 31 towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants (see also Figure 2).

Basic Results of the Research

Our research concentrated mainly on the domains that are typical for European territorial marketing, but it also tackled the spheres characteristic for specific Czech conditions[4]. The overall number of questions was 23 and they were distinguishable as follows:

- Identification data,
- Territorial marketing,
- Strategy of urban development.

Mayors, their deputies and urban managers were the respondents of this research.

1. Marketing Objectives of Moravian-Silesian Towns

The following spheres are considered to be important by our respondents:

- Perception of inhabitants, entrepreneurs and other municipal subjects as customers,
- Introduction of competition into public services,

[4] Malinovský, J. (2004): Průzkum k zavádění marketingu do správy a řízení rozvoje měst Moravskoslezského kraje. Souhrn výsledků průzkumu. Ostrava: VŠB – Technická univerzita Ostrava, Ekonomická fakulta. (forthcoming).

- Success in competition with other towns.

An image of the municipality or urban facilities constitutes the next relevant items in the life of municipalities. Figure 3 shows the most important spheres of urban life according to the respondents.

Figure 3: *Marketing Objectives of Moravian-Silesian Towns*



2. Target Groups of Marketing Activities of Moravian-Silesian Towns

The following target groups are perceived as the most important ones (see also Figure 4):

- Citizens (and their groups) and local entrepreneurs,
- Visitors and potential visitors of the town.

According to the respondents, the least important target group are the employees of the municipal office.

Figure 4: *Target Groups of Marketing Activities of Moravian-Silesian Towns*



3. Successful Spheres of the Implementation of Territorial Marketing

Where the territorial marketing was implemented, the following successes have been achieved (see also Figure 5):

- Accomplishment of concrete projects and co-operation with relevant actors,
- Improvement of the work of municipal office and improvement of public services,
- Better communication with target groups.

Strategy of Urban Development

1. Existing Strategies or Plans of Urban Developments

The research disclosed that strategic development documents:

- are elabourated in 21 towns (17 towns made these documents by themselves),
- are not elabourated in 8 towns; however, these towns are supposed to draw up the strategic development documents.

Figure 5: *Implemented/Planned Marketing Elements in Moravian—Silesian Towns*



2. Actors Engaged in the Elabouration the Development Document

The following actors have been identified as very important for the elabouration of the development strategy:

- Employees of the municipal office and the members of local governments,

- Representatives of big firms, smaller entrepreneurs,
- Representatives of civil associations.

The following groups are perceived as less important:

- Representatives of hotels, restaurants and chambers of commerce,
- Journalists and representatives of the church.

3 Forms of the Involvement of Citizens in the Elabouration of the Development Strategies

It is recommended to engage the citizens in the following phases of the development strategy:

- Formulation of the vision of the town,
- Definition of priorities of municipal development.

The least recommended stages are as follows:

- Preparation of particular policy measures,
- Control of the quality of municipal activities.

The most important ways of involving citizens in the proceeding of municipal strategy are:

- Task groups, mainly in relation with SWOT analysis, accomplishment of particular measures and projects as well as the determination of developmental priorities,
- Information provided by local media (mainly press) about the control of the implementation of the strategy.

The least recommended forms of the citizens' involvement are gatherings of citizens and questionnaires (see also Table 1):

Table 1.: *Forms of Citizens' Participation in the Elabouration of the Development Strategy*

Forms of involvement / Phase	Task groups	Meeting of citizens	Questionnaires, research	Information, local press		Scale / 0
SWOT analysis	58.6 %	6.9 %	37.9 %	31.0 %		
Formulation of the vision	44.8 %	31.0 %	34.5 %	48.3 %		
Specification of developmental priorities	51.7 %	31.0 %	31.0 %	27.6 %		
Accomplishment of particular measures and projects	55.2 %	6.9 %	17.2 %	41.4 %		60

MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESEARCH

On the basis of the accomplished research, we feel entitled to state that:

- Marketing activities are used and marketing instruments applied to the administration and management of Moravian-Silesian towns. However, up to now a low professional level is unfortunately typical for these activities and instruments.
- Introduction of effective marketing and management into the administration of municipalities is confined by the lack of financial resources as well as the low number of skilled professionals and specialised institutions.

FUTURE PLANNED DIRECTIONS OF OUR RESEARCH

In the course of the research, it became apparent that current socio-economic discrepancies among towns and regions can be accounted for by new theoretical streams of regional development that stress the importance of networks and widely perceived innovations as well as the ability to learn.

The existence of the networks of contacts with different quality and different measure of trust creates the context, in which socio-economic transactions take place. Personal relations, mutual trust and contacts as a form of the social integration of the region become a new means of socio-economic analysis. They provide truly useful instrument for the illumination of the lowest rank of social and economic processes. Subsequently, one can find out the immediate causes of the differences in economic performance of towns and regions.

It is worth analysing not only the form of the arrangement of the relations among regional actors, but also the 'content' of those relations, since not all connections are valuable and beneficial at the same measure[5]. The quality of the networks of contacts differs both in terms of actors and regions, which forms the differentiated premises for their development and for the rise of innovations.

The networks of contacts can comprise the element of power and dominance and that is why the presumptions of the development of particular region or subject depend on the position of a particular region or subject in the framework

[5] Hudson, R. (1994): Institutional change, cultural transformation, and economic regeneration: myths and realities from Europe's old industrial areas. In: Amin, A. – Thrift, N. (eds.): Globalization, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe. London: Routledge, pp. 196-216.

of the networks. Regions that are connected with networks based on distrust and hierarchical relations are no exception[6].

Although there are numerous and rather great differences among authors that examine the role of the networks of contacts and embeddedness in regional development, they strive for the clarification of the innovative capacity of some towns and regions as well as for the explanation of their ability to respond flexibly and swiftly to changing market, organisational and technological conditions.

In the course of the 1990s, the discussions about institutional characteristics of regions, the networks of contacts, embeddedness and their utilisation in regional policy crystallised into the new direction of regional development called 'learning regions'. The conception constitutes historically the youngest theoretical stream of regional science.

As is apparent from theoretical discussions from the 1990s, the source of the regional competitiveness consists in the knowledge, capacity to learn and to create the cultural setting that fosters the innovations. The problem of learning is not connected merely with advanced economic branches and the development of new technologies, but also with innovations that arise in the territory of the given municipality or region. The competitiveness is not comprehended as a price competition but as a competition based on unceasing innovations. Knowledge is perceived as the most strategic 'source' and learning as a decisive process from the perspective of competitiveness. The differences in the capacity to learn and to innovate are grasped as a key mechanism of regional differentiation and their role will most probably even augment with in the future.

Our future research will utilise precisely the fact that quality of regional programming and projects in towns and regions reflects the distinctions among aforementioned processes and categories.

[6] Amin, A. & Thrift, N. (1995): Institutional issues for the European regions: from markets and plans to socioeconomics and powers of association. Economy and Society, Vol. 24, pp. 41-66.

References

Amin, A. & Thrift, N.(1995). Institutional issues for the European regions: from markets and plans to socioeconomics and powers of association. *Economy and Society*. Vol. 24. pp. 41-66.

Drucker, P.(2000). *Výzvy managementu pro 21. století*. Praha: Management press.

Hudson, R.(1994). Institutional change, cultural transformation, and economic regeneration: myths and realities from Europe's old industrial areas. In: Amin, A. & Thrift, N. (eds.). *Globalization, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe*. London: Routledge. pp. 196-216.

Maier, G. & Tödling, F.(1996). *Regionálna a urbanistická ekonomika. 2. Regionálny rozvoj a regionálna politika*. Bratislava: ELITA. Translated from: *Regional- und Stadtökonomik. Regionalentwicklung und Regionalpolitik*. Wien: Springer Verlag.

Malinovský, J. (2004). *Průzkum k zavádění marketingu do správy a řízení rozvoje měst Moravskoslezského kraje. Souhrn výsledků průzkumu*. Ostrava: VŠB – Technická univerzita Ostrava, Ekonomická fakulta. (forthcoming).

Sucháček, J.(2003). Tilburg Model: Towards the Modern Local Goverment. *Econ '03* (selected research papers). Vol. 10. Ostrava: Technical University of Ostrava, The Faculty of Economics.

EXAMPLE FOR THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

PROJECT PROPOSAL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

Brigitte Krech

"Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." [1]

INTRODUCTION

"Finding Nemo?" - Some Thoughts on Civil Society

The activities of the Civil Society were very important during the transition process in Central Europe, Eastern Europe and South East Europe (SEE). Non-governmental organisations played and play a vital role in this respect[2]. The concept of "Civil Society" also leads to the current discussion on ethical values and the responsibility of everyone's own behaviour, e.g. in consumption. The European Commission underlined during Green Week 2003—an event organised by the DG Environment of the Commission—the concept "Changing our behaviour". With the Olympic Games in Athens in 2004, an international campaign by NGOs was launched in order to inform about the terrifying working conditions in sweatshops, where expensive sports-wear is produced by exploiting a labour force without access to basic human and working rights. The Rio World Summit in 1992 focused on the slogan "Think global, act local". Furthermore, through the phenomenon of globalisation, we have learned about, e.g. climate change, trafficking in human beings, the brain drain and sustainability, all of which cause certain regional effects.

In conclusion, everybody can be/is part of the Civil Society. Current global issues have an impact on local daily life. However, is it as difficult as "finding Nemo" to get involved in the activities of the Civil Society? Why is it difficult to

[1] See http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/index.html, download on 1 October 2004.

mobilize people? Is it possible to initiate projects on a local level without having e.g. appropriate financial resources or by overcoming other obstacles? To this end, the question arises if and how each citizen can influence our society.

Summary of the essay

The following essay will give a brief introduction to a project proposal on sustainable development in Macedonia as an example of the role and involvement of Civil Society in regional co-operation. The concept of sustainable development has intensively been discussed on a wide, global level, especially during the 2002 Johannesburg "Summit on Sustainable Development" and its follow-up activities. The regional focus in Johannesburg has been set on developing countries.

The concept will be applied to South East Europe. Sustainable development in Macedonia—with a special focus on environmental issues—will be presented.

The DRC Summer School has acted as a think tank and future projects will emerge in the mid-term.

This essay will *not* summarise the current academic or scientific discussion on sustainability and its regional impact. This paper follows a more pragmatic approach. Therefore, the essay will introduce some specific ideas on how to implement a project proposal on sustainable development in South East Europe within the framework of a social network created through the DRC Summer School.

THE QUEST OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

The idea to carry out a project on sustainable development in Macedonia was born during a trip to Macedonia and Kosovo and after meetings with representatives of the international community, NGOs and young graduates in the region, as well as after gaining working experience in the field of renewable energy sources (RES) and climate change.

The concept of sustainable development might offer opportunities to enhance the socio-economic situation in, as an example, Macedonia. Renewable energy sources (including wind and solar energy) can offer local job opportunities.

The activities of International Organisations in Macedonia are mainly based on crisis management and on political issues (regarding the ethnical situation

between Macedonians and Albanians as well as approaching European regional structures such as EU accession). It was stated by several representatives of International Organisations that there is a lack of (and demand to enhance) environmental issues. The development of a strategy on sustainable development in Macedonia could be applied in other regions of South East Europe. Macedonia is getting closer to the European Union. Therefore, sustainability will play an important role for Macedonia's politics in the near future.

Definitions

The concept of sustainable development is on the agenda of different stakeholders. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs has formed a Division for Sustainable Development. During the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, objectives and working projects were approved in the field of water, energy and sustainable development strategies. The European Union adopted a strategy for sustainable development in May 2001.

There are currently more than 70 definitions of sustainable development[3]. "Development that meets the needs of the present without comprising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs[4]" summarises the most important aspects of the concept. The European Union also states that sustainable development refers to a form of economic growth, which satisfies the needs of the society in terms of well-being in the short, medium and long-term[5].

The idea of sustainability can be examined from different perspectives:

- from an environmental point of view (key aspects include the challenge of climate change, biodiversity, water and other natural resources; the concept and measurement of the ecological footprint)

[2] For discussion on definition of Civil Society, e.g. "voluntary associations, organisations, movements and networks that live and work in the social space outside the state and the private sector", see World Watch Glossary, http://www.iisd.org/didigest/glossary.htm#C , download on 1 October 2004.

[3] Page 33, "Sustainable Development and the 2002 World Summit", Research Paper 2/55, 10 October 2002, Stephen McGinness, Patsy Richards, House of Commons Library.

[4] See http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/, download on 10 June 2004.

[5] See http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000s.htm, download on 30 July 2004.

- from an economic point of view (how we can achieve sustainable production and consumption; furthermore the question of trade policy, energy issues and the increasing use of renewable energy sources)
- from a social point of view (is it possible to generate a development, which is not comprising the ability of future generations to meet their own future needs?)

At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, the focal point was set on developing countries, especially regions without access to clean water and an electricity supply. The European Union has developed measures to integrate environmental concerns in other policies, which is essential to achieve sustainable development. The Cardiff Process in 1998 laid the foundations for these co-ordinated actions. Besides the strategies for sustainable development in May 2001, the European Commission adopted a global partnership for sustainable development in 2002.

Project proposal

This project on sustainable development in Southeast Europe aims to bring together young people from the region[6] in order to discuss and develop a strategy on sustainable development in Macedonia[7].

The concept and the conclusions of this meeting might be transferred to other regions in South East Europe. Before the meeting, a feasibility study on sustainable development (e.g. sustainability in South East Europe; environmental

[6] As well as participants who are interested in the topic and already working in this field.
[7] Map, see http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html, download on 1 October 2004.

problems in Macedonia; the activities of Civil Society in Macedonia; the ecological footprint; the use of renewable energy sources in the region) will be carried out in order to examine the current status of sustainability and to develop certain tools of assessment[8]. The current political, socio-economic and ethnical situation will be examined (e.g. the unemployment rate is one-third of the workforce with an estimated 40% of the GDP as the grey economy). This study can be done with the support of academic institutions.

During the workshop, which will be held in Ohrid/Macedonia, the following questions and topics will be raised and discussed:

- The feasibility study on sustainable development in South East Europe/ Macedonia will be summarised and evaluated.
- Examples of projects (best-practise) on sustainable development will be introduced.
- The following question will be raised: what can we do (each of us) in order to minimise the effects of our ecological footprint and to enhance the awareness of sustainability? How can these issues be communicated in a creative way?
- How can we overcome spatial or political obstacles in the region, which might harm sustainability?
- During the workshop, the participants might work on a scenario "sustainable development in the Balkans in 2010". This creative approach could be chosen in order to show the outcome of the project and follow-up activities are possible (dissemination of information to other initiatives or institutions, creation of an internet-site, follow-up meetings).
- The town of Ohrid is part of the Unesco World Heritage. Lake Ohrid is a vulnerable ecosystem. Excursions planned in order to learn more about the region will be offered as well as field work, in order to discover the landscape.
- The participants will be able to establish their own network and can exchange their experience, e.g. on fund-raising or experience how to start an NGO.

How can the workshop be financed? The project can be funded by regional organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

[8] Referring to the discussion on the ecological footprint.

(referring to the environmental dimension of the OSCE), by EU-funding schemes (e.g. the CARDS programme) or political foundations.

It is of utmost importance to have the support of an academic institution or other institution in order to benefit from the academic support and facilities.

Which obstacles might arise? There are several possible problems which will have to be taken into consideration. There might be a lack of appropriate funding. The organisational timeframe could be very tense. Reliable partners in Macedonia as well as an academic institution or "VIP", e.g. MP or MEP, are needed for the preparation or marketing of the project. It might be difficult to get in touch with participants. The aims of the projects might be too broad. In order to overcome these potential problems, an evaluation of each step of organisation needs to be taken.

CONCLUSION

Think global – act local – the challenge of regional co-operation

Regional co-operation has different aspects on different hierarchical levels:

- regional co-operation between states (e.g. EU-member states), regional organisations (e.g. International Organisations) or regional initiatives
- regional co-operation between border-regions (e.g. cross-border co-operation)
- co-operation between the civil society or co-operation in the field of education.

The project proposal provides an example for the involvement of citizens in Civil Society and for the prospect to learn more about regional co-operation and local consequences of world-wide problems.

Future perspectives of the DRC Summer School

The first DRC Summer School was held in Pécs in August 2004. It is vital to bring together young scholars, who are—almost inevitably—active members of the Civil Society and who are engaged in projects having a certain regional impact. Which perspectives can be concluded by the Summer School? It is very important to work together internationally, to exchange ideas and to create a social network.

Finally, it seems that "Nemo was discovered" in the "sea of potential regional activities" and that future ideas are developed and are going to be implemented. The first DRC Summer School was a useful starting point for projects.

References[9]

The Bulletin, Quarterly Magazine of the Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary, Volume 12, Number 1, May 2003.

The Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, at http://www.cdsee.org/, downloaded on 17-09-2004.

Choices for a greener future, The European Union and the environment, European Commission, Luxemburg, February 2002.

Climate Action Network and Central Eastern Europe, at http://www.cancee.org/, downloaded on 17-09-2004.

The European Union and the World Summit on Sustainable Development, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/wssd/index_en.html, downloaded on 17-09-2004.

Example for a "grass-root" project of Civil Society in Southeast Europe (Case Study Trip on minorities in Romania), at http://www.east-west-wg.org/cst/cst-trans/, downloaded on 16-09-2004.

German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chapter on Macedonia.

at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/laenderinfos/laender/laender_ausgabe_html?type_id=14&land_id=110, downloaded on 17-09-2004.

INFORSE, International Network for Sustainable Energy, at http://www.inforse.dk/, downloaded on 17-09-2004.

Introducing European Environmental NGOs, Their role and importance in European Union decision-making, Brussels, August 2001.

McGinness, S. & Richards, P. (2002). Sustainable Development and the 2002 World Summit. Research Paper 2/55. House of Commons Library, October 2002.

Sustainable development partnerships, at http://www.sdp.gov/initiative/31466pf.htm, downloaded on 17-09-2004.

Transformation, Industrial landscapes in the process of sustainable renewal, LMBV (Lausitzer und Mitteldeutsche Bergbau-Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbh), Germany, April 2001.

[9] Most of the information can be found in the internet.

Transport and energy infrastructure in south-eastern Europe, European Commission, Luxemburg, 2003.

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs –

Division for Sustainable Development, at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/index.html, downloaded on 17-09-2004.

The World Factbook 2004, chapter on Macedonia, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html, downloaded on 17-09-2004.

World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, at

http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/, downloaded on 17-09-2004.

WWF Danube-Carpathian Newsletter May – June 2004, at http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/where_we_work/europe/where/danube_carpathian/publication.cfm?uNewsID=14152&uLangId=1, downloaded on 17-09-2004.

WWF – ecological footprint, at http://www.panda.org/news_facts/publications/general/livingplanet/index.cfm, downloaded on 17-09-2004.

WWF, Power Switch! From Coal to Clean towards a CO2-free power sector, Switzerland, April 2003.

LEGAL AND REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
AND THE ROLE OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES IN PÉCS IN REGIONALISATION

Inez Koller

INTRODUCTION

Regionalism-the main topic of Danube Rectors' Conference Summer School 2004 in Pécs—is in the centre of political research connected towns. In Hungary, a country with a special situation concerning regionalism, we cannot speak about regionalism but regionalisation, the artificial mechanism for formulating regions. In this process the role of national and ethnic minorities appears to be increasingly important. The aim of this study is to present whether this is true, and if a change in counting on minorities still has to be waited for. Before presenting arguments on the question, however, the study tries to give an overview on international and national legislation for national and ethnic minorities to provide for a wider framework for participation. Then, it undertakes to describe legal possibilities and real-life opportunities for political participation and the role of minorities in regionalisation through the example of minorities living in Pécs.

OUTLOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION FOR NATIONAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES

1. Divergence between concepts of minority

The concept of minority has been subject of debate in the UN since 1950. The countries define the concept on different bases. For example, in France there are no officially accepted national or ethnic minorities but cultural minorities. The main question is whether minority should be treated as a person or as a community, and in this respect what kind of rights should be given to a minority? The next step is how a minority can make itself more independent. There are countries where more nationalities live together with the same rights;

these are multiethnic countries where the majority is only in relative majority like in the case of Belgium, Switzerland, Russia, the Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia. In addition, there are *nationality countries* where the rate of minorities is between 10-50% as in Slovakia, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia and Spain. Finally, in the so-called *national states* the rate of minorities is less than 10% like in Austria, Albania, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

The concept of minority is therefore rather complex. There has to be a numeral minority according to the majority on the state level, but not a politically dominant group. It has to preserve ethnical characters and promote its own culture. It has to show inner cohesion, solidarity and communal identity. It has to have communal organisation, inner division of labour, stable relation with the state (the group has tolerated rights) and loyalty. The present study will deal only with two classes, that is national and ethnic minorities. The difference between them is that the former has a native or mother country, but the latter does not, like the Romany.

2. The Role of International Organisations

The first appearance of minority protecting principles is dated after World War I. This is why only international regulations, such as Paragraph 27 of the Charter of Civic and Political Rights dealt with minority questions for a long time. Among the principles, we can find the one about settlement drawing new borderlines according to the self-determination of nations, getting the respective nations coincide with the borderlines. In Hungary 5-10% of national and ethnic minorities remained in the country and many Hungarians got over the borderline. After World War I the collective rights of minorities were accepted and the concept of national minority came into being, according to which a minority covers numeral minority which differs from the majority of the society in its culture and language.

Minorities have the right for territorial autonomy, with independent administration mostly in closed settlements and the prohibition of discrimination. A system guaranteeing minority protection was launched at an international forum by the international court of the Association of Nations. During World War II national minorities were sources of conflicts between many countries, such as between Germany and Poland, Hungary and the Czech

Republic. Following World War II minority questions were impossible even to talk about. Countries denied the collective rights of minorities and replaced them with a homogenising process that began everywhere across the continent, except for Switzerland and Belgium. Today another approach can be seen, as more and more countries think that minority rights are important. This is mostly connected with decentralisation processes.

The importance of minority rights is stressed upon at international forums of countries and by nations separately. The main role, however, has to be played by states, and international forums can only assist and support them. The Commission for Minorities started to work in 1970 in Geneva. This institution is not very effective because of the differing interests of nations and the over-representation of NGOs. The Council of Europe and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe are more effective as they have fewer members and can concentrate more on minority rights, not as just part of human rights as the UN addresses them. But they cannot do anything unless the countries involved do not ratify the required agreements and provisions.

Since its establishment the EU has treated minority questions as the problems of member states and did not define agreements as the Council of Europe did. But after Maastricht a change has occurred. Directives are prepared and prescribed as obligatory to all the member states to operate acts about sexual, intellectual and other antidiscrimination, including national and ethnic rights. These should have been regulated in the member states until 2003, but only the UK and the Netherlands completed the task in time. There is a draft on the Charter of Minority Protection and in Nice 2000 the Charter of European Human Rights was adopted, but in the constitution drafting process there was a huge disagreement on the minority question among the member states.

The Hungarian Constitution, for instance, is rather general in this respect, as it says that minorities are part of the state and they require guarantee for autonomy and political participation (in the elections and power execution, and at court), but do not regulate how exactly this should take place. Romania, Slovenia and Croatia, on the other hand, guarantee participation for ethnic minorities even in their national parliaments. Moreover minorities in Slovenia have the right of veto in questions regarding minorities. In other countries in the regions of Central and Eastern Europe minorities have no special distinct

rights to participate in the national decision-making systems, and they neither have obstacles. In Slovakia and Serbia-Montenegro, for example, minority parties could gain seats in the parliaments. Hungary they have none because of the 5% threshold, under which no party can get into the parliament. Each minority in total number consists less than 10% of the population.

Hungarian Legislation Protecting National and Ethnic Minorities

The main problem with the minority questions is that setting them straight is not in the interest of many states and the international organisations have few instruments for sanctions. Therefore, states which need guarantees for their nationalities living outside their borders, in other states, have to initiate bilateral or regional agreements with the "hosts". As long as numerous Hungarians live in neighbouring countries the Republic of Hungary have completed several of these initiatives.

Minority Act was passed first in 1867 in Hungary, but it was drafted on minimalist principles accepting only language rights. This is why Hungarians should not have been surprised when national minorities were separated in the surrounding countries after World War I. There was no minority question after the Second World War, however; and a homogenising process began; minorities were intimidated with deportation by the state and the Romany was dealt with as a social question.

In 1990 the minority approach also changed along the lines of the change of the regime. First, the Constitution reserved a general paragraph about minorities, later on, the Act for National and Ethnic Minorities was accepted in1993. But this has to be modified because of its generality and excluding character. It does not say much about how minorities can use their rights; registration is not regulated, and the act only contains 13 historical national and ethnic minorities although much more exist in present-day Hungary. In 2001 another act was adopted about Hungarians living across the borders causing a disagreement among neighbouring countries because it raised the question of state sovereignty.

LEGAL AND REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE ROLE TO BE PLAYED IN REGIONALISATION

1. History of the Nine Minorities in Pécs

Pécs has been a multinational town since its foundation. After the Turkish Occupation the number of Hungarians decreased enormously, so Germans and South-Slavic people came in and settled here. In 1695 beside the 36.5% of Hungarian inhabitants Germans constituted 14%, South-Slavic 45% of the total population. Over the three biggest nationalities 7-8 other nationalities[1] had been living in the town. Pécs became one of the centres of Hungary's significantly multinational regions. In 1839 a relative majority of the inhabitants consisted of Hungarians with their 37.9%, the biggest national minority being the Germans at that time with their 31.5%. Central governmental policy modified this ratio by attaching fully Hungarian villages to Pécs. The percentage of Hungarians became 83.7 at the time and Germans had 16.2%. This disproportionate situation was increased by the government policy of assimilation, while only German and Austrian immigration was significant because of the development of coalmines in Pécs. This is why only these minorities could maintain as a national minority with their own culture and language. The first Bulgarian settlers appeared in this period, their motivation to settle here being running away from Turkish conflicts. Most of them were horticulturists who have been traditionally accepted ever since. In 1910 half of the coal miners were of German origin. The mines attracted other nationalities such as Slovakians, Slovenians, Czechs and Moravians. The mines of Pécs also influenced the workers where to build their houses. This is well mirrored in the contemporary minority percentages of the parts of the town.

The 1918-21 Serbian occupation concerned Jews and other minorities in a negative way. The migration of minorities in general was significant at that time. The migration of the Jews was more motivated than that of the natives, as they did not have traditional roots and their main motivations to settle in Pécs was of an economic nature. Among the remaining inhabitants Germans were significant.

[1] Turkish people, Greeks, Czechs, Morvians, Armenians, Spanish people, Dalmatians, Bosnians, Jews

They concentrated in special parts of the town, which was also true for Jews but they nearly disappeared due to deportations and escapes during World War II.

In 1946-47 the national government deported several Germans, while the remaining minorities either assimilated quite perfectly or did not dare to take the responsibility to be in minority. New assimilation policy was responsible for the fact that there were not publications on the arrival of Greek and Polish people in this period. Unfortunately, they almost perfectly assimilated in the local society of Pécs during the socialist regime. Therefore not just their cultural and social inner cohesion has gone but their special political and communal characters, as well. Now they are subject to an artificial revival.

Original motivations for settling has changed and national and ethnic identity plays less role in choosing a home while financial positions dominate. Due to organising communal life and recalling cultural traditions we meet national and ethnic minorities in Pécs, who are very few but try to compensate it with co-operating with each other in the frame of minority self-governments, cultural programmes and in the field of minority research. But other things such as their financial dependency on the local government and the incompleteness of their rights hinder their activities.

2. Legal Positions

Among the Hungarian sub-national territories Baranya County is the most frequently populated area by nationalities; and this phenomenon is concentrated in Pécs the most. This does not mean, however, that national and ethnic minorities constitute a significant proportion of society. They are only 6,000 according to census polls, which means that they are 3.6% of the total polulation of the whole town - their real number is most probably higher[2]. The biggest minorities are the following: Germans 51%, Romany 25.2% and Croatians 13.9%[3]. Beside them Romanians, Serbs, Slovakians, Slovenians, Polish people, Ruthenians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Ukrainians live here, but their number is insignificant compared with the first three ones. Up until now 9 minorities have set up self-governments.

[2] This inadequate number derives from the old fears of being members of another nationality that was not tolerated in the socialist regime.

[3] Reality shows that Romanies have the bigger proportion among minorities.

Due to the Minority Act of 1993 and the Amendment of the Local Government Act in 1994 four minority self-governments (Romany, Croatian, German and Serbian) could start operating after the local elections in 1994. In 1995 after the compensation elections a Bulgarian self-government could also be formed, and in 1998 two further appeared, the Greek and the Polish. Finally, in 2002 the Ruthenians and the Ukrainian self-governments began their work.

In 1998 they formed the Council of the Association of Minority Self-governments, as the Minority Self-governments planned to take part in the decision-making of the local government with creating a Minority Committee. This attempt was supported by the Minority Act. The form of a committee, however, turned out not to be suitable as the number of an average local committee is 5 and more than half of the members have to be representatives of the local government while minority self-governments were 9. That is why a council was established with a leader from the local government to be a kind of judge or balance between the minorities. The tasks of the council are decided upon ad hoc; they mostly discuss minority questions or the correlation of the agenda of the local government and other initiatives.

Civil organisations are not obliged to registrate themselves and indicate their activity to the local government, so the list the study is based on, is maybe not perfect. According to that there are three minorities with more significant number: the Romany, the Germans and Croatians who represent themselves also in civil society. 12 German, 9 Romany, 6 Croatian, 1 Serb, 2 Slavic and 4 other minority civil organisations operate in Pécs.

3. Real Possibilities Concluded from Recent Case Studies[4]

Real possibilities for political participation can be searched for within the system of relations between national and ethnic minorities and the local government, as long as minority rights are connected to local life by several threads and local life is organised and directed by the local government. Moreover, minority self-governments as the only legal forms of political participation for minorities depend on the local government in systematic, financial terms and infrastructure-wise. On this very topic three case studies have been prepared: the first is about the public work programme of the town; the second tries to

[4] The author of this study committed all case studies.

describe the role of minorities in the EU Accession Celebration Festival on 1 May 2004; and the third investigates the Foreign Affairs Strategy of the South-Transdanubian Region.

Fortunately, the civil sector was also made involved in the public work programme of the local government (launched in 1999). In the process of competing for financial support among the civil organisations (almost 800 in town), however, four minority organisations were far the most successful; all of them being Romany organisations. The case study tried to interpret this interesting result in a few words as politics were hidden in the background. It was first the Romany organisations that realised that they could only operate successfully if they "colour" themselves into either red or orange[1]. This meant they joined one of the two major national parties on the local level, and their leaders took part in political agreements, tried to get into the local corporation and sell their votes. The leaders of the four Romany organisations were members of uncountable other organisations and of parties. Not on the same side, so at present only one of them takes the big money and the other three take less.

The research continued about how the local government let the local minority self-governments get involved in the organising process of the celebration of accessing to the EU on 1 May 2004. In short the local government made a proposal three months before the celebration on a session of the Council of Association of Minority Self-governments in which the task of the minorities was to keep in touch with local governments or civil organisations from their native countries. Following this nothing happened. For the celebration guests in large numbers were invited from neighbouring countries but local national minority representatives were not.

The third case study had a closer look at the Foreign Affairs Strategy of the South-Transdanubian Region. The Regional Planning Agency has been responsible for its realisation and they surely need partners from the regions in making the region work. The strategy focussed on local governments, universities, leaders of the economic life and minorities. The programmes already running are responsible for developing co-operation along the border

[5] Red is for Hungarian Socialist Party, Orange is for Young Democratic Alliance, the two main parties in Hungarian party system since 1998.

regions, and have the names Phare CBC, INTERREG III, the EQUAL programme and the EU 6. Framework Programme.

Among the conditions of such a regional co-operation the strategy counts on geography, too. This is why its priorities include partnerships across the border regions, transnational partnerships in which the partners and territories are in one homogeneous geographical territory which contains more national borders.

The priorities are the following:

1. Croatian-Hungarian cross-border co-operation: South-Transdanubian Region with the three neighbouring Croatian counties (Eszék-Baranya, Verőce-Drávamente, Kapronca-Krizsevác)
2. Other partnerships with Croatian territories not being neighbours with the region
3. Partnership with Slovenia
4. Partnership with Friuli-Venezia-Giulia Autonomous Province
5. Partnership with Karinthia, Burgenland
6. Partnership with Bavaria
7. Interregional co-operation with Vienna, Baden-Württemberg, Rhône-Alpes Region, Emilia-Romagna Province, Western Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
8. Relationships with international organisations and institutions of the EU (Duna-Dráva-Száva Euroregion, Alps-Adriatic Working Group, the Region of Future, Assembly of European Regions, Assembly of European Winegrowing Regions, Committee of Regions, guaranteeing the representation of the South-Transdanubian Region in Brussels)

These priorities show that national minorities could provide substantial help in strengthening and developing partnerships between the above-mentioned territories and our region as they are almost the same nationalities as the partner countries. Minority self-governments can feel and predict that this time they will be involved in the process that is outlined in the strategy. Two points from 17 of the strategy partially contain some roles for minorities. When the first draft was shown to the Council of the Association of Minority Self-governments in April 2004 it contained a number of concrete details, and the strategy-makers asked minorities to give proposals on it. The following session of local government representatives was held in September and the local assembly accepted the

strategy which proved to be one of the first steps in this process. So it is the question of future that minorities will have any chance to take part in "region-making" to make good service for society and to strengthen themselves.

CONCLUSIONS

Chances of minorities are less in strengthening themselves on the way of regionalisation or without regionalisation as such if we put the whole study in a wider context. Hungary has long had a historically homogenous administration system, no large territories, but having been divided into medium-size administrational units, the so-called counties. Territorial identity is not very characteristic for counties as most of them were created artificially, especially at the time of the two world wars.

Creating regions today is a top-down process, and it has a strong institutional character which could be equalised and completed with other components-under the western-type of definition of region-to make regionalisation a more natural process which is closer to society. That is why specialities of certain areas have great importance as they can help to differentiate between them and other territories. Surplus in economic terms can derive from special natural resources and industry can be built on them, for example, marble mining or wine-growing; from substantially similar historical traditions consisting of legends and folk customs or from special national and ethnic composition in society which is most characteristic in the South-Transdanubian Region. Keeping old traditions in the region, however, are alive in scattered, remote places of the region and are not connected with the society at large. Therefore, regional identity cannot be a basis for region-making in this sense. Nevertheless, it is to be dealt with it as a neglected factor in region-making because it gives added value to the region even though on a more local level.

Surplus from national and ethnic colourfulness was correctly recognised by the designers of the Foreign Affairs Strategy of the South-Transdanubian Region who have made an effort to include national and ethnic minorities into the process of region-making on the ground of keeping contact and traditions with partner organisations, institutions, or territorial units and regions abroad. Technocratic top institutions responsible for decision making, however, have not yet realised the importance of minorities, neither in their minority values (only

when they acted as national party politicians), nor in being able to constructively contributing to region-making. Therefore, minority life is not prohibited or prevented, but apart from support provided by law decision-makers do not maintain further contacts with minorities. Many think the present situation is a result of EU accession and due to the concomitant constraint of the state to become compatible even on regional level, but change is not yet spectacular. Some years have to pass for visible changes no matter whether they will be positive or negative.

Minorities in Pécs are in a difficult situation. They can enforce their political rights only through entering national political life to gain support from national parties, which naturally involves some dangerous elements-for example, they might loose their original aims and authenticity. Besides, they face European, national and local challenges at the same time and they can only hope that these will yield some positive results in the future. Until then they have a lot to do as regionalism can be a means of their success.

"PAST FEARS – FUTURE HOPES"
AN EXAMPLE FOR REGIONAL CO-OPERATION OUTSIDE EUROPE: FROM THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY TO AN EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION

István Tarrósy

INTRODUCTION

The paper first aims at taking an overview of the rise and fall of the East African Community (EAC) during the first decade of its existence since its establishment in the 1960s. Then, efforts to revitalise regional co-operation among the three East African states of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania since the 1990s will be introduced. The idea of the Community certainly reserves hopes and opportunities for all the three parties involved, but to be able to live up to them, a better understanding of bi- and trilateral relations, as well as the external aspirations of these states in the international arena need to be looked at. In addition, it is important to have a look at the potentials in a realistic way. In the final part of the analysis, some thoughts will be highlighted about the relations between the EAC and the European Union (EU), which is considered among the EAC members as well as across the entire African continent as an exemplary organisation of successful regional integration. Special attention will be devoted to the idea of an East African Federation, which was also stressed upon in the last communiqué of the 6th summit of the three heads of state of EAC issued in November 2004 in Arusha, Tanzania.

AFTER INDEPENDENCE: ASPIRATIONS FOR AND BENEFITS OF REGIONAL COHESION

There is no doubt about the high expectations that had been accumulated among African people on their road to freedom from colonial rule. In the course of preparing for a new type of life, i.e. one that is dependent on local needs and wants in light of free, national resources and supply, and independent from other external forces which had not gained sufficient knowledge about the necessary

cultural "localities" needed for proper power management – this cannot be proper anyhow when the given external force suppresses the local in one way or another – local oppositions had taken decisive steps towards achieving the status of independent nation-state by the early 1960s. In this respect, Tanzania's first political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) provided an example for other states across the region. It was Tanganyika that first proclaimed independence in December 1961, followed by Uganda in October 1962, then, Zanzibar and Kenya on the same day, 10 December 1963.

Among numerous factors, pan-African thinking and feelings for a regional community have always been endemic to local people and leaders on the ancient continent. In East Africa, for instance, "after Tanganyika became independent in 1961 tremendous enthusiasm was generated among the East African people for federation. In fact Tanganyika offered to postpone her independence for a year if Britain would grant independence to Kenya and Uganda at the same time" (Sebalu, 1972 #4: 347). Creating regional groupings mainly focussing on political unions had been on the minds of African politicians in the first years of independence, and even before, already in 1926, when for instance, the Conference of East African Governors was created, which later served as predecessor to the East African High Commission. As Tordoff argues, the establishment of such a regional collaboration is "understandable on several grounds … [as] they were a possible means of reducing tensions between states divided by artificial, mostly colonially imposed boundaries … [they would] therefore promote political stability … [and because] African leaders favoured African unity in principle" (Tordoff, 2002: 241).

According to Sebalu, "co-operation in East Africa has evolved as a result of historical circumstances … first Uganda and Kenya, and then Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania were under the one colonial power [which] led to the construction of a unified railway system, post office and, latter, an airline, in order to reduce the cost of the British Exchequer which was subsidising these services initially" (Sebalu, 1972: 345). These developments undoubtedly resulted in a network of closer ties and bigger mobility, in particular in the field of trade. "Nyerere saw Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania provided a unique opportunity for co-operation because the three states had a long history of co-operation dating back to the colonial period" (Msambichaka et al., 2002: 250).

The free movement of goods, capital and labour was in the heart of common efforts built upon the aforementioned historical legacy when the three parties prepared for finalising an agreement which was constructed to launch a common market for the three East African states. After both Uganda and Kenya became independent in the years following Tanganyika's proclamation, "the enthusiasm for [political] federation, at least among the leaders, waned and the leaders began equivocate" (Sebalu, 1972 #4: 348), and as a compromise step all agreed to turn their attention to economic co-operation. In 1967 – coming into force on 1 December – the three heads of state, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Milton Obote of Uganda and Julius Kambarege Nyerere of Tanzania finally signed the Treaty for East African Co-operation that created the East African Community.

Analysing the unresolved issues the treaty left together with turning attention to the potential benefits East African people believed the formalised co-operation could bring to them, first, transportation can be mentioned. As Mead underlined, "an improvement in the railway system in Kenya generally helps Uganda (or at worst leaves Uganda's welfare unchanged), and conversely" (Mead, 1969: 278-9). Other areas included the co-ordinated marketing of imports and exports and the devolution of power to national central banks in the field of financial services.

The Treaty, however, seemed to be weak in co-ordinating and controlling industrial co-operation. In this field, for instance, as Mead observed, "the East African Development Bank has an important role to play … [but without real] legislative teeth; if it helps to finance a steel mill in Uganda, there is no law against Kenya's setting up a second steel mill in competition with the first" (Mead, 1969: 284-5). In contrast to the hopes of many East Africans, this type of regional development could not result in the equity of distribution of benefits, thus the original aims of regional planning bringing maximum efficiency and full equity proved to be incompatible. Among the problems causing the disintegration and dismemberment of the EAC, the problem of rising inequalities should be mentioned first. "At the roots of its increasing difficulties was the fact that the benefits of membership went disproportionately to Kenya, which dominated the intra-regional trade in manufactured products" (Tordoff, 2002: 243). Other reasons for disintegration could be the different ideologies the three countries

had; with Tanzania "progressively 'drifting' southwards as the conflict in Southern Africa intensified … Kenya [being] firmly committed to the capitalist path to development in an area dominated by socialist-oriented states … [and] Uganda [not being able to] play the role of a moderating force" (Mugomba, 1978: 262-3). So in this respect, largely because of the lack of a common ideology, no political federation, no common economic strategy, no healthy and equal distribution of benefits meant a possible target any longer. And this led to a community becoming defunct only a decade after its establishment.

THE EAC TODAY: CHANGE OF REGIMES AND HOPES FOR RESTART

However, as long as "most African economies are too weak to stand up to global competition," (Kwarteg, 1997 #12: 29), as is the case in the states of East Africa, regional co-operation and integration is key to development bearing in mind that it offers the possibility to the optimal utilisation of assets and natural resources, thus, it is "motivated by the need for mutual economic development" (Kwarteg, 1997 #12: 29). As the essential background for any common aspiration, "even without formal agreement the peoples of this region, especially those on the borders, are in constant contact with each other" (Msambichaka et al., 2002: 253), thus, common cultural factors have a say in the future of East Africa. Analysed from a global context, East African co-operation has come back "at a time when there is renewed interest in regional integration worldwide" (Msambichaka et al., 2002: 253).

With more modest objectives the East African Co-operation was re-established in the course of the 1990s. "By this time," as Pinkney summarises, "the more polarising influences had gone. There was no military dictator in Uganda and no commitment to socialism in Tanzania. All three countries accepted competitive politics and a market economy, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm" (Pinkney, 2001: 202).

First, a new agreement was signed in 1993 with the aim of setting up the Tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation. Due to the different political and economic environments, the Commission was less concerned with defining control mechanisms for the industrial sector. The core objective was proven to be the creation of a free trade area among the three countries.

"The 1993 agreement set out such aims as equitable development, improving the quality of life, promoting the sustainable utilisation of the region's natural resources, enhancing the role of women and promoting peace, security and good neighbourliness" (Pinkney, 2001: 203). The name of the co-ordinating body, i.e. East African Co-operation, between the years 1993 and 1999 also suggested that the three states did not want to define any central authority giving orders to anybody. Also, support from the international community, especially from the European Union, pushed the co-operation forward, toward a potentially tightly integrated community. After a treaty for the establishment of a community was drafted in 1998, decisions were taken about revitalising the East African region. Inter-state co-operation was formalised in this new treaty which was finally signed by the three heads of state in November 2000. The importance of greater regional co-operation is surely recognised by all signing parties, "especially when such a philosophy is in tune with that preached in Brussels. An integrated East Africa, comparable with the EU, is … on the horizon" (Pinkney, 2001: 206).

THE EAC AND THE EU

As an introductory thought, a reference is made here to what is widely known, i.e. that the European Union is interested in and has been active in the promotion of regional co-operation and development in countries of the Third World, the so-called South. Nugent underlines that "the reasons for the EU's active engagement in development policy are a mixture of the *historical*, the *moral*, and the *economic*: the historical – some EU countries, notably France and the UK, have long established ties with some parts of the Third World as a result of their colonial past; the moral – EU governments believe, although with different degrees of enthusiasm, that something should be done about world poverty and hunger; the economic – Third World countries account for around 30 per cent of EU exports, and the EU is highly dependent on the Third World for products such as rubber, copper and uranium" (Nugent, 1994: 405-6)[1]. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) – entering into force in November 1993 – "considerably strengthens the legal basis for the Community's development policy. Articles 130u-y add to the EU Treaty a new title, 'Development co-operation', which lays down three goals: fostering economic and social

[1] Italics by István Tarrósy.

development, integration of developing countries into the world economy and the campaign against poverty" (Schmuck, 1997: 68).

After the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969 were formalising co-operation between the EU and former French and Belgian colonies, with Britain's joining the Community, "the process was taken further with the first Lomé Convention of 1975 and the creation of the ACP[2] group … what had begun as a means of granting trade preferences evolved into a structure for channelling aid and investment, and for dialogue between the European and African countries" (Pinkney, 2001: 76).

In June 2000, the four Lomé Conventions (1975-2000) were followed by the Cotonou Agreement, according to which for another twenty years the EU will take great responsibility over combating poverty in underdeveloped regions by continuing channelling aids into countries in need, as well as encouraging and increasing trade with ACP countries.

Taking a close look at the interests in the development of East Africa, there is no doubt that the EU would also like to extend its influence on the global market and become more competitive with the US, Japan and other regional trading blocs, and therefore wants to increase trade, both in terms of exports and imports, with countries of the East African region-apart from other regions in the less developed world. This particular aspect of EU support should also be thought about when speaking about any co-operation among the countries referred to.

THE DREAM OF AN EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION – CONCLUDING REMARKS

A shift towards greater regional integration is inevitable in East Africa. As a result of the re-establishment of the East African Community by the end of the 1990s, the region unquestionably has been moving towards the realisation of a common market, a monetary union and a political federation. In this process, a Customs Union was also signed at the summit of the three heads of state at the beginning of March 2004, under which, as economist Peter Kiguta said in an interview with *The East African*, "the industrial sector would be forced to invest more and improve technology to produce better quality goods for the regional

[2] ACP stands for African, Caribian and Pacific.

and international markets and adopt more aggressive marketing strategies."[3] The Customs Union is therefore an inevitable tool for boosting trade in the region and for increasing competitiveness both on the regional scale and at the global level.

As time is running out in terms of keeping power and their own fate in their hands, not allowing outside forces, especially Europe and the US to enter into the markets as well as to influence decision-making, or even dominate it, as observed by many East African people, "East Africans must act quickly to create their Republic of East Africa and move forward with determination to uplift their economy, living standards and political standing in an increasingly global state."[4] In good agreement with such feelings and expectations, the East African heads of state, i.e. President Kibaki of Kenya, President Museveni of Uganda and President Mkapa of Tanzania, at their summit on 27-29 August 2004 in Nairobi declared that they "undertook a broad review of the status of the East African Community integration process, and examined further ways and means of deepening and accelerating the process. … [and] the Summit resolved to expedite and compress the process of integration so that the ultimate goal of a Political Federation is achieved through a fast track mechanism."[5] As a next step of reaffirming commitments, the three heads of state met at another summit in November 2004, and according to the communiqué of this 6th meeting, they underlined that "the signing of the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Customs Union on 2 March 2004 marked a turning point in the evolution of East Africa towards deeper integration and faster development." They also noted the "strong desire of the people of East Africa to be at the centre of the process towards establishing the [East African] Federation."[6]

---

[3] Reported by Chhatbar, S. & Kaiza, D. (2004). Protocol is Signed. Now the Real Work Begins. *The East African*. 8 March 2004.

[4] Taken from the online version of *The East African*, 15 March 2004; opinion written by Ngemera, M.S. entitled: Why Only an Africa with Large States Will Catch the Big Fish.

[5] Joint Communiqué for the East African Heads of State Summit, Nairobi, 27-29 August 2004.

[6] Joint Communiqué of the 6th Summit of the East African Heads of State, Nairobi, 26 November 2004.

This latter again proves the very nature of any regional cohesion. Without cultural ties, common historical legacy and joint efforts in developing frameworks for lifting up the level of wealth for mutual and equitable benefits no regional grouping of countries can function well enough. As people are in the heart of all the dreams, they must be taken into account properly when planning for the future. An environment sufficiently stable and sustainable is needed for a well-functioning regional community. To achieve this in the near future, in the case of East Africa, in addition to simple political willingness, steps towards a political federation is surely desirable. And as long as interests can meet and mingle, European help and other international support can be taken with strong reservations of the necessary powers needed on the local and national levels.

References

Bayart, J-F. (2004). Commentary: Towards a New Start for Africa and Europe. African Affairs. Vol. 103, No. 412. pp. 453-458.

Brown, W. (2002). *The European Union and Africa. The Restructuring of North-South Relations*. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers. pp. 189-198.

Chhatbar, S. & Kaiza, D. (2004). Protocol is Signed. Now the Real Work Begins. *The East African*. 8 March 2004. From the Internet: www.nationmedia.com/eastafrican.

Fage, J.D. & Tordoff, W. (2004). *Afrika története*. [A History of Africa]. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó. pp. 465- 468. (based on the 4th English edition published by Routledge in 2002).

Kwarteg, C.O. (1997). *Africa and the European Challenge. Survival in a Changing World*. Aldershot: Avebury. pp. 27-64.

Lawrence, P. (2003). Rural Cooperation & the Renewal of Rural Socialism in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*. No. 96. pp. 241-248.

Mead, D.C. (July 1969). Economic Cooperation in East Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 7, No. 2. pp. 277-287.

Msambichaka, L.A., Mwamba, N.E. & Mjema, G.D. (2002). Economic Co-operation in East Africa: Lessons Learnt and Prospects for Tanzania. In: Mbelle, A., Mjema, G.D. & Kilindo, A.L. (eds.). *The Nyerere Legacy and Economic Policy Making in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press. pp. 248-261.

Mugomba, A.T. (July 1978). Regional Organisations and African Underdevelopment: The Collapse of the East African Community. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 16, No. 2. pp. 261-272.

Ngemera, M.S. (2004). Why Only an Africa with Large States Will Catch the Big Fish. *The East African*. 15 March 2004. From the Internet: www.nationmedia.com/eastafrican.

Nugent, N. (1994). *The Government and Politics of the European Union*. 3rd edition. Houndmills, Basingstoke and London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. pp. 405-408.

Pinkney, R. (2001). *The international politics of East Africa*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Schmuck, O. (1997). Development. In: Weidenfeld, W. & Wessels, W. *Europe from A to Z. Guide to European Integration*. Institut für Europäische Politik. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. pp. 67-70.

Sebalu, P. (1972). The East African Community. *Journal of African Law*. Vol. 16, No. 3. pp. 345-263.

Secretariat of the East African Community. (August 2004). Joint Communiqué for the East African Heads of State Summit. Nairobi: EAC Secretariat.

Secretariat of the East African Community. (November 2004). Joint Communiqué of the 6th Summit of the East African Heads of State. Nairobi: EAC Secretariat.

Tarrósy, I. (2003). Előre vagy hátra? A 21. századi Tanzánia a politikai és gazdasági reformok útján. [Forward or backward? The Tanzania of the 21st century on the road of political and economic development] In: S. SZABÓ, Péter (ed). *Pécsi politikai tanulmányok I.* [Pécs Political Studies I.]. Pécs: University of Pécs. Department of Political Studies. pp. 156-172.

Tarrósy, I. (September 2004). Local Society and Democratization in Modern Tanzania. *Ibadan Journal of the Social Sciences*. Ibadan. Vol. 2, No. 1. pp. 107-117.

Tordoff, W. (2002). *Government and Politics in Africa*. 4th edition. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 240-244.

CHAPTER 3

PROGRAMME, PHOTOS, SPONSORS AND AUTHORS

PROGRAMME OF THE 1ST DRC SUMMER SCHOOL

8 August

20:00 Welcome address and first meeting

9 August

from 08:30 Registration

10:00 Opening session

Moderators:

István Tarrósy, Gerald Rosskogler (co-organisers)

Prof. Fuada Stankovic, Member of the Permanent Committee of the Danube Rectors' Conference, Rector of the University of Novi Sad

Prof. József Tóth, Rector Emeritus of the University of Pécs, Former President of the Danube Rectors' Conference

Prof. László Komlósi, Vice-rector of the University of Pécs

Prof. Márta Font, Dean of the Faculty of Humanities, University of Pécs

On behalf of the City of Pécs: Mr. Zoltán Horváth, Vice-mayor

On behalf of the City of Graz: Mag. Martin Titz, Member of the Municipality Council

11:00 Keynote addresses

1.) Geographical and geopolitical overview of the Danube Region

Prof. József Tóth, Rector Emeritus of the University of Pécs, Former President of the Danube Rectors' Conference

2.) "Carpathian Basin East Central Europe"

The historical background of a European Region

Prof. Márta Font, Dean of the Faculty of Humanities, University of Pécs

13:00 Lunch

14:30 Plenary lectures
The EU policy on territorial co-operation
Esben Poulsen, European Commission, Directorate General for Regional Policy, Directorate C - Territorial Co-operation, Urban and Innovative Actions, Brussels
The chances and future of regionalisation in Hungary
Prof. Ilona Pál-Kovács, Director of the South Transdanubian, Regional Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Pécs
16:30 Coffee break
17:00 Workshop sessions
19:00 Dinner

10 August

09:00 Plenary lectures
Styria and the "Future Region"
Maria Elsser-Eibel, Department for European Affairs and External Relations, Graz, Styria
The role of Hanns Seidel Foundation as partner of civil society
Dr. Klaus Fiesinger, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Munich
11:00 Coffee break
11:15 Plenary lectures
National and ethnic minorities in Central Europe
Dr. Jenő Kaltenbach, Minority Ombudsman of the Hungarian Parliament, Budapest
CEEPUS as example for successful co-operation in education
Mag. Elisabeth Sorantin, CEEPUS, Vienna
13:15 Lunch
15:00 Excursion to the UNESCO World Heritage Site
17:30 Workshop sessions
19:30 Dinner

11 August

10:00 Plenary lectures
Interregional co-operation and the Working Community of Danubian Regions
Dr. Eugen Scherer, Lower Austria, Working Community of Danubian Regions, St. Pölten
EU Erweiterung, Regionalismus, Minderheiten / EU enlargement, regionalism, minorities
Dr. Erzsébet Sándor-Szalay, Assistant professor, Faculty of Law, Department of International Law and European Law, University of Pécs
The theoretical background of regional development
Prof. Zoltán Cséfalvay, Andrássy University, Budapest

13:15 Lunch

15:00 Plenary lecture
The concept of civil society and its significance for Central Europe
Ambassador Dr. Emil Brix, Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vienna

16:00 Workshop sessions

19:30 Dinner

12 August

09:00 Plenary lectures
The Danube Co-operation Process and Romania's role in the region
Dir. Cosmin Dinescu, Romanian Minstry for Foreign Affairs, Bucharest
CENTROPE Building a European Region
Mag. Arkan Zwick, Vienna Business Agency

11:00 Coffee break

11:15 Workshop sessions

13:15 Lunch

15:00 Excursion to Danube-Drava National Park

19:30 Dinner

13 August

10:00 Plenary lectures
The International Relations Strategy and development initiatives of the South Transdanubian Region of Hungary
Zsolt Pálmai, Regional Development Agency, Pécs
Regional co-operation projects in Burgenland
Dr. Heinrich Wedral, Burgenland, European Office, Eisenstadt

12:15 Lunch

16:00 Workshop sessions (preparation of the presentations)

18:30 Dinner

20:00 Participation in "Folkloriada" World Folk Festival

14 August

10:00 Presentation and discussion of the workshop results

13:00 Lunch

16:00 Closing session

18:30 Dinner

21:00 Farewell party

WORKSHOPS

A Regional Co-operation among EU Member States, Regional Organisations and Initiatives
Moderator: Dr. Rafal Riedel, adjunct, Polonia University in Czestochowa, Director of International Studies Centre, Kolegium Notre Dame

B Co-operation between the Border Regions
Moderator: Mag. Gerald Rosskogler, research assistant, Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, Vienna

C The Role of Civil Society, Education and Science
Moderator: István Tarrósy, Msc., managing director
Regional European Information and Education Centre PBC, Pécs

INSTITUT FÜR DEN DONAURAUM UND MITTELEUROPA (IDM)

Institut für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa (IDM)
Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe
A-1090 Wien, Hahngasse 6/1/24
Tel.: (+43 1) 319 72 58, Fax: (+43 1) 319 72 58 4
e-Mail: idm@idm.at, http://www.idm.at

50 Years of Research for the Danube Region

The IDM was founded in 1953 as the "Research Institute for Issues of the Danube Region." For years, it was the only scientific institution in Austria that dedicated itself specifically to research of the Danube region.

In 1993 the research institute now the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) received new impetus in its work and extended its activities to all of Central and Southeastern Europe under the chairmanship of Prof. Dr. Norbert Leser and his successor Dr. Erhard Busek (since 1995), Austria's former Vice Chancellor.

Today, the IDM is an Austrian scientific institution. It sees its role in carrying out research projects on current topics concerning the Danube region and Central Europe. The Institute's educational activities and events as well as its own publications serve as a means to make research knowledge available to both a specialised audience and to interested persons among the general public.

In doing so, the IDM places particular attention upon its role as the clearinghouse for all matters relating to the Danube region, Central European countries and Southeastern Europe. The Institute is funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, the Austrian Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Austrian Federal Chancellery as well as by the Austrian provinces, individual cities, by professional associations, the Austrian Nationalbank and numerous private sponsors.

Groundwork

As a think tank, the IDM performs groundwork for governmental agencies and institutions from politics, education, science, culture and business. It also

supports the Austrian commitment in the Danube region and in the rest of Central Europe.

Research

The IDM carries out research projects dealing with current political, sociological, social, economic, cultural and ethnic issues of the countries of the Danube region and Central Europe. This activity is supported by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Central European Research of Current Events established at the IDM.

Educational Activities and Events

Within the framework of internationally represented seminars, symposiums (e.g. summer schools) and the post-graduate curriculum "Interdisciplinary Balkan Studies of Vienna," the IDM also performs a function of instruction and training.

Furthermore, the Institute organises numerous specialised conferences, workshops and presentations.

Publications

- "Der Donauraum" the scientific journal of the Institute (4 times per year/ price per copy: € 9.60/subscription: € 34.50) to be obtained through the Böhlau Publishing House, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Vienna
- "Book Series of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe" to be obtained through the Böhlau Publishing House
- "IDM-Info Sonderhefte" Conference publications, EU arguments, cultural guides for Central Europe, regional publications
- "IDM Studies"
- "IDM-focus Europa" The journal for the enlargement of the EU (10 times per year)
- "IDM-Info" the newsletter of the Institute including the programme of events (6 times per year/subscription: € 15.00/for members of the Institute free of charge)

The current events programme and the publications can be found on the homepage of the Institute: http://www.idm.at

Documentation

The IDM maintains a documentation centre with publications relevant to the current developments in the countries of the Danube region and Central Europe. This documentation is supplemented by regular reports provided by country correspondents that work for the Institute on a voluntary basis.

EUROPE CENTRE - INTERNATIONAL HOUSE PÉCS

The company was founded on 3 May 1999 based upon the initiative of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Pécs-Baranya. It has been officially functioning since January 2000 with the support of its owners, i.e. the City Council of Pécs, the General Assembly of Baranya County, the University of Pécs and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Pécs-Baranya. It is non-profit company for public purposes, which is not engaged in politics and is independent from political parties. According to its mission, the institution contributes to the successful integration of the South Transdanubian Region into the European Union; it disseminates information about the EU and Europe as a whole; it brings opportunities closer to the citizens of the region by providing an intensive flow of information and organising trainings, events, cultural and educational programmes. In general "Europe Centre" supports the development of international co-operation, in particular, it helps the municipalities foster their international partnerships and achieve the goals of their IR strategies. Also, the public company has been participating in the creation of an active and responsible civil society on the local levels.

Major areas of activity:

- non-formal education, development of skills, dissemination of knowledge, culture
- European integration, transatlantic co-operation, interregional relations
- science and research

Since its foundation the public company has been responsible for and managing a building in the historic centre of Pécs (Mária str. 9.), which used to be a mining museum, then, was turned into an English Centre, later on a European House. As a consequence of the latest enlargement of the European Union in May 2004, this European House is currently undergoing a profile change. According to the common aspirations and policies of the EU, together with its diplomatic activities and efforts, Pécs has realised to widen the scope of the international relations of the city and the region. In good agreement with

this reformed way of thinking, the former European House is to be transformed into an "International House", which will not be only dealing with EU affairs, but with "the European Union and the World". The International House of Pécs hosts several important institutions of the local community, such as:

- European Information Centre of Baranya County
- European Development Office of Pécs and Baranya
- "Mobilitás" Regional European Youth Service
- "EUNet2000" IT Public Company of Pécs and Baranya
- Regional Council on Health-related Issues
- Italian Office
- Alliance Française de Pécs
- American Corner of Pécs
- Chinese Contact Office of Baranya (to be established soon)

As a result of a change in the top management of the company, a new philosophy and line of activities are to be in the making. Among the programmes for the future, conferences, training programmes, summer schools, lectures series, round-table discussions, public debates, exhibitions and film clubs are organised.

The International House is a perfect location for organising such events, and its modern technical equipment facilities offer a wide range of opportunities. In its smaller seminar room called "Sister Cities' Room" up to 40 people classes, symposia, video conferences, movie afternoons can easily be realised. The conference room on the second floor of the building is sufficient for any 120-people event, such as conferences, presentations or any fora.

"To make Pécs really international", the International House is planned to become a generator of ideas and an interactive pool for local and regional actions. A new website is being under construction, but the electronic contacts are as follows:

E-mail: titkarsag@interhouse.hu
istvan.tarrosy@interhouse.hu
www.interhouse.hu
www.americancorner.hu

PARTNERS AND SUPPORTERS

Many thanks for their important financial contribution to the following institutions:

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Zsuzsanna Trón (Hungary)
Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of Economics and
Business Administration of the University of Debrecen

Marko Trnski (Croatia)
Research assistant at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Zagreb

Selcen Öner (Turkey)
Research assistant at the Faculty of Economics of Istanbul University

Rafał Riedel, Ph.D. (Poland)
Assistant professor at Polonia University and Director of the
Department for European Studies

Andrea Antal (Romania)
Analyst at the Ministry for European Integration

Valeriu Frunzaru (Romania)
Assistant professor at the State University of Political and
Administrative Studies

Tamás Kern (Hungary)
Assistant professor at the Department of Political Studies of the
University of Pécs and research fellow at Századvég School of Politics in
Budapest

Đorđe Tomić (Serbia and Montenegro)
Postgraduate student in the Institute for German Language and
Literature of the University of Novi Sad

Josef Oberger (Austria)
Student at the Department of Political Science and
Faculty of Catholic Theology of the University of Vienna

Kamil Markiewicz (Poland)
Student at the Graduate School for Social Research of the
Polish Academy of Sciences

Jan Malinovskỳ, Ph.D. (Czech Republic)
Assistant professor at the Department of Regional Economics of VŠB-Technical University of Ostrava

Jan Suháčhek (Czech Republic)
Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Regional Economics of VŠB-Technical University of Ostrava

Brigitte Krech (Germany)
Assistant at Beobachter der Lander bei der EU in Brussels

Inez Koller (Hungary)
Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science Programme of the Interdisciplinary Doctoral School of the University of Pécs and lecturer at the Department of Political Studies

István Tarrósy (Hungary)
Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science Programme of the Interdisciplinary Doctoral School of the University of Pécs and part-time lecturer at the Department of Political Studies; managing director of Europe Centre PBC

The initiators (Gerald and István) gave the opening remarks of the 1st Summer School

The first coffee break after the opening

Prof. Fuada Stanković greets the participants on behalf of the Permanent Committee of DRC

Prof. József Tóth gives the keynote presentation

Serious work in one of the workshops

Family photo of the participants and workshop chairs in front of the venue of the Summer School (International House Pécs)