REGIME CHANGE AND TRANSITIONS ACROSS THE DANUBIAN REGION: 1989–2009

István Tarrósy – Susan Milford (eds.)

Pécs, Hungary
2009

Regime Change and Transitions across the Danubian Region: 1989–2009
Proceedings of the 6th DRC Summer School, Budapest, 2009.

Published by IDResearch Ltd. and the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) under the intellectual sponsorship of the Danube Rectors' Conference (DRC).

NATIONAL SZÉCHENYI LIBRARY OF HUNGARY, BUDAPEST

Editors:
István Tarrósy, managing director, IDResearch Ltd. (Hungary)
Susan Milford, managing director, Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe – IDM (Austria)

Technical editor:
Zoltán Vörös, project manager, IDResearch Ltd. (Hungary)

English language consultant: Andrew C. Rouse
Cover, Design and Layout: Viktor Glied, IDResearch Ltd.
Printed by: Bornus, Pécs

ISBN 978-963-88505-6-0

Support for the book is provided by the Central European Initiative.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

Most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are still in transition. Although regime changes across the Danubian regions occurred already around the end of the 1980s, resulting in economies transferred from centrally-planned into liberal market-oriented approaches, in most of the populations in these regions the real mind shift is still to be achieved. As Dahrendorf in 1990 rightly pointed out: "It will take six months to reform the political systems, six years to change the economic systems, and sixty years to effect a revolution in the peoples' hearts and minds."

Twenty years have passed since the first system changes in Central Europe took place. The sixth regional summer school of the Danube Rectors' Conference had the intention to address the very issues of 'change' and 'transformation' while looking back at the past two decades and thinking ahead for the coming ones. As usual, the sixth edition was organised in the way that the event could host bright minds from countries of the Danube and beyond. The ideal venue for the school happened to be one of the centres of major changes and transformations in the Central European socio-economic space, that is the City of Budapest, capital of the Republic of Hungary, one of the decisive contributors to the fall of the Communist regime in the former Eastern Bloc.

The sixth summer school, therefore, set a number of key themes to be discussed in detail: (1) Revolutionary Changes and Their Political Impacts on Europe; (2) Economic and Social Perspectives of Democratic Change; (3) 1989 as Impetus for Regional Co-operation with Special Focus on Science and Research and for Development of Civil Society in CEE; (4) New Geopolitical Era for CEECs? – The Danubian Region in International Relations 20 Years after the Fall of the Iron Curtain. Speakers included former ministers, members of parliament, acting ambassadors, social scientists, researchers and NGO representatives, most of who were actually taking part in changing their countries.

Participants represented a wide range of political cultures coming from eight countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Kosovo, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine) and an even wider range of scientific disciplines. Their invaluable contributions undoubtedly further strengthened the aspirations of the organisers, i.e. to establish a regional scientific network within the European Research Area, via which it is

possible to enhance the awareness for the significance and possibilities of regional co-operation.

The present volume includes thirteen interesting papers with challenging topics and issues, all related to regime change and transitions across the Danubian Region.

We, as organisers of the school and editors of the proceedings would like to extend our wholehearted thanks to our partners for their involvement in the successful implementation of the 6th DRC Summer School. First of all, we thank for the generous support: the Danube Rectors' Conference (DRC), Eötvös Loránd University Budapest (ELTE), the University of Pécs, Faculty of Humanities, the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Working Community of Danubian Regions, the Austrian provinces Lower Austria, Upper Austria, the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the ERSTE Foundation and the Erste Group.

Dr. István Tarrósy
Managing Director, IDResearch Ltd.
tarrosy@idresearch.hu

Dr. Susan Milford
Managing Director, IDM
s.milford@idm.at

EXPLAINING TWO DECADES OF POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION

APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES TO THE GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES IN THE DANUBIAN REGION 1989-2009

Ivan Dimitrov

INTRODUCTION

There is a common conception in Eastern Europe that conventional laws of politics or economics are not valid in the region and that many Western thinkers or theoreticians do not understand local developments of events because too many of their underlying assumptions are incorrect. In Eastern Europe, the driving forces are not enterprise and long-term planning, but rather the whims self-interested government leaders and/or imperial Great Powers—forces beyond the consensus of a majority or the preferences of rational consumers. However, this phenomenon could itself be considered rational. In this article, I endeavor to elucidate how "Western" theories of international relations contribute to the explanation of the geopolitical changes of the recent past in the Danubian region, using empirical and theoretical analysis.

I focus mostly on common post-communist trans-national trends, on international relations theories, and on foreign affairs. This means that the following analysis is bound to oversimplify, to overlook many domestic factors, and may not go deeply enough into each individual case. Of course, the transitions to a post-communist society have been different in each country, depending on the alternatives it has faced at the time. In some countries, citizen movements called for pluralism based on a Western European model, whereas in other places more authoritarian forms of government emerged. In my discussion, I will certainly generalize, knowing that such an approach may be simplifying the real complexity of events, but this tactic will be of use in my analysis. Furthermore, I do not focus on either the Baltics or other former USSR member states. I focus on the Danube river region, including

Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria. The region is comprised of countries of similar experience. All of these countries used to be behind the Iron Curtain and therefore in the Soviet sphere of influence, but since 1989 have become more closely associated and linked to Western Europe. Since 1989, the Danube region has been in the process of post-communist transformation. Finally, one must keep in mind that all international relations theories have their proponents and critics —these are theories that may never fully explain behavior because they do not take into account all factors.

Geopolitics is a field of study that has been defined in many ways, especially after the emergence of critical geopolitics since the 1990s. In this paper, I will try to avoid a discussion on the many possible meanings of this term. By geopolitics, I refer to the relationship between changes in a country's political, geographic, strategic, economic, and cultural aspects and alterations in its foreign policy, shifts in its strategic alliances, and changes in its economic trade patterns.

At the outset, we need to have an understanding of the general trends of what has been happening. In the last twenty years since 1989, there have been transformational changes in Central and Eastern Europe. This is a widely used phrase. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 heralded a new era of geopolitics in much of Europe, within and beyond the borders of Germany. But in spite of the revolutionary spirit in all of Eastern Europe, the last two decades are better described as a long and gradual transition process.

In Eastern Europe, "transition" is defined in a rather interesting way. Many people seem to believe that transition begins with the deterioration of life and (partly because of this) with the weakening of autocratic rule. However, some people understand the end of transition in a different way. For Eastern Europeans, the end of the transition process does not come when democratic institutions are established and the first competitive elections held. The transition ends when these institutions start working properly and standards of living increase dramatically. By this definition, many people joke that their country's transition is not over, and will last at least 10-20 more years. With the disappearance of the Cold War, nevertheless, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe have shifted their economic and political models and orientation. This did not occur overnight after the 1989 "turning point", but is mostly a complete, gradual, and irreversible process.

WHAT CHANGES (DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL) HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE DANUBE REGION IN THE LAST TWENTY YEARS?

The transition from communism to post-communism was rapid, and strict control over society did not allow well-organized political opposition movements to develop. Due to the excitement of the population for change, the short period in which elections were held, and the dominant position of the old elites in negotiations, many of the people involved in the communist circles before the collapse of the Eastern bloc became involved in both the new socialist and opposition democratic parties. For instance, in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Socialist Party won national elections in 1990, 1995, and 2005. In Hungary, the Hungarian Socialist Party was back in power in the 1994 elections. Popular and fair elections were held, but many of the same political figures remained in power, under different party names. This return of communist political leaders caused many worries for Western observers regarding what would emerge in post-communist countries.

Even with ex-communists at their head at present, the Danubian countries have distanced themselves from communism. Countries such as Bulgaria have a democratization process that has a stable and irreversible character—supposedly guaranteed by establishing new institutions and separating the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. This is a result of the new processes initiated after the events in 1989-1990. I place these developments into three broad categories: Westernization of foreign policy, democratization of domestic politics and economic liberalization.

On the international arena, the countries of the Danube region shifted their primary allegiance and foreign policy from a close relation to the Soviet Union to a bold integration with Western European countries. While Latin America adopted anti-American rhetoric, in Eastern Europe both government and opposition embraced anti-Russian rhetoric. Politicians began promising to turn towards Europe, to gain independence from Moscow, and so on. This resulted in many political initiatives for cooperation, such as the CEFTA Free Trade Agreement preceding WTO membership, a political initiative for Visegrád cooperation since 1991, the Central European Initiative, and the South East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) since 1992. Hungary joined the European Union (EU) together with Slovakia and five other countries in 2004, while Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007. In addition, today all these countries are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the last election campaign in Bulgaria, the main arguments of the Bulgarian Socialist

Party were that they had had two great successes: they had successfully completed membership accession procedures for the EU and NATO.

Many domestic political and economic reforms within these countries resulted in the establishment of pluralist parliamentary democracies based on the rule of law and of market economies, which superseded the one-party systems and command economies. All countries hold free and fair elections, and political life is based on the principle of political pluralism. Over the last years, there has been a growing understanding of human rights and both the state and society are promoting and protecting human rights. This is very important, as many politicians concede that the protection of human rights and freedoms is essential to building a just society based on the rule of law and democratic institutions (and also a prosperous economy). For example, by 1999 the death penalty had been abolished in virtually all of Europe (except Russia, Belarus, and Latvia).

The "third wave of democracy" (to borrow Huntington's term) of the 1989 revolutions was followed by a second series of revolutions in the late 1990s (1997-2003). With exceptions, these were mostly non-violent but nationwide protests and demonstrations. The civic protests were against the new abuses of power. Examples include the storming of parliament in Bulgaria in 1997 leading to an end of Videnov's socialist regime, the Otpor movement in Serbia and the accompanying bulldozer revolution that brought down the rule of Milosevic, and Slovakia's OK'98 campaign that promoted democratic rule. We can generalize that in 1989 people demanded any democracy, and in 1999 people demanded real democracy.

In the 1990s, economic life was based on one broad, common ever-present strategy —privatization. Although deals were usually done through uncompetitive, secret, and questionable auctions or sales, most if not all state-owned enterprises, factories, and properties were sold out to either domestic businesses or to foreign companies and individuals. There are no more Five Year plans, no one is required to produce according to the government mandates, there has been an explosion of many small- and medium-sized businesses, and there is a migration from rural to urban areas. The share of services as a percent of GDP has increased, and economies of the region start looking like their Western counterparts. Although it may take longer to found a business in Bulgaria, Serbia, or Croatia, for example, than in Denmark or Portugal, we may say that the "invisible hand" is allowed to operate in society.

In the last twenty years since 1989, Eastern Europe has undoubtedly changed. The picture of the region today is radically different from what it was twenty years ago, when all of Eastern Europe was either part of the Soviet Union or satellite states that were ruled by one-party regimes, determined to hold on to power by any means, including repression, and dictating the states' command economies. It is even very different from the picture of 1995-6 when the old elites were back in government and the region looked poised to turn into chaos. Social sciences did not predict the rapid and total collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. But after 1990, there have been some big distinguishing trends that can be explained by some theories of international relations, and I focus precisely on the three outlined above – Westernization of foreign policy, democratization of domestic politics, and liberalization of the economy.

REALISM

Realpolitik or political realism is a traditional, dominant paradigm in the field of international relations, especially throughout the post-World War II era. Its principles were first fully formulated by Hans Morgenthau. Realism assumes that states are independent and rational actors whose decisions are taken to best advance their national interests within their material capabilities. The bare minimum the states seek is to survive, meaning to maintain political autonomy and integrity. When the states' existence is not threatened, they seek to maximize power relative to other states, through which they can accomplish other goals—influence over resources, capabilities, outcomes, events, issues, and so on. These assumptions lead to the conclusion that because states operate in an anarchical world (without world government) there would be no eternal allies and enemies and that states will always try to do anything to maximize power through coalition formation and balance of power. But to understand the specific actions of states, we need to know more about their goals, capabilities, and strategies.

According to realism, the strong powers do what they want, and the weak ones suffer what they must, a truth formulated long ago in the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides' depiction of the Peloponnesian War. The distribution of capabilities within the system before 1989 was divided in two power centers—the Soviet Union and the US—that were commanding others what to do. When the USSR dissolved, it created a power vacuum that was filled by the US and its allies, setting foot permanently and deeply into the region, and beginning to be the new great power

to dictate events. This has led to the regional countries accepting the new dominant power of the US and Western Europe and adjusting accordingly.

Many political scientists are engaged in debates as to whether a bipolar or a multi-polar world would be more stable or war-prone. Two things seem to be beyond doubt. First, the Cold War world was bipolar, centered at the US and the Soviet Union; and second, such a bipolar world is more rigid and gives little room for state-level maneuvering. This means that before 1989, all of Eastern Europe was a part of the communist world. If a country wanted to break out of the regional power's influence, such as Hungary or Czechoslovakia, they encountered rolling tanks. In addition, for these countries the West presented a danger to their existence, and there could be no bargaining with that part of the world. The way to increase power was to stay within the Soviet sphere of influence and be more servile. The other option was to try to become neutral (i.e. independent), risking isolation. The collapse of communism provided an opening for all these states to shift their foreign policy. After 1989, the world was not seen any more as a final battle between communism and capitalism, and states could be flexible with their choices.

In 1991, military structures (the Warsaw Pact) and economic structures (Comecon) were dissolved. The new military alliance shift—NATO enlargement—offered greater influence of the US in European affairs, but also greater security for all new members. NATO enlargement clearly brings benefits to the US. It is the only international organization in Europe of which the United States is a member. When NATO includes new members, it promptly increases the US's direct influence in these places. With the last rounds of expansion, NATO has a stronger base, positioned in more strategic places (the Baltic states, Central Europe, and the Balkans). What is more, the European states actually want NATO. European countries, even those that have joined the EU, lack any coherent foreign or military policy. A fundamental reason is that decisions are taken with unanimous consent, which is very difficult for these countries to obtain on most issues. NATO thus serves a vital function of unity and prevents a potential security competition between EU states. Potential members see NATO membership as a valuable security guarantee that may help them reduce military budgets, and even more importantly put them on the road to acceptance in other Western institutions, i.e. the EU.

In this framework of thinking, we may look at the changes after 1989 as a process in which states have sought to ally with a stronger emerging power (Western Europe)

and thus trying to avoid a gradual downfall associated with the Soviet Union, which was losing power. But this logic is not strong enough. Furthermore, one of the corollaries of political realism is its specific prediction that balancing occurs all the time. This means that states are interested in their power relative to others, and thus seek security. Therefore, if there is one emerging state with greater power, the others will balance against it in an effort to limit its future actions and safeguard their existence. During the Cold War, most countries sided either with the Soviet Union or with the US, in effect balancing the two camps. The US and Russia periodically tried to use China against the other side. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union most states that sought independence have tried to bandwagon with the United States. Realism fails to explain this trend, but this is where neo-realism sets in.

NEO-REALISM

The states in the Danube region were as much concerned with gaining power as with ensuring their security. And neo-realism places an emphasis precisely upon security. It is a theory that identifies a different blame for the existence of wars—it is not the international system (anarchy), but human nature that causes us to fight against each other. Neo-realists further point out that sometimes too much power can be bad for your relative power position because everyone will be against you. Therefore, neo-realists argue that states are most primarily concerned with their security, not power.

The decision to expand eastward by the EU and NATO indicates two very important trends in the reconfiguration of the European security equation. First, the European security vision includes the whole of Europe, i.e. the former Soviet sphere of influence, hence the EU original members' willingness to enlarge and include the less economically developed Central and East European (CEE) states. Second, the security issue most important to former communist countries was the desire to keep Russia's influence and possible threat to a minimum while securing and deepening democratization processes introduced after 1989. NATO's enlargement was introduced with very similar goals in mind: providing security for the newly democratizing CEE states while not upsetting Russia's national interests.

Realism understands interstate relations as competitive interactions in which states seek relative gains and seize opportunities. Therefore, there is limited genuine international cooperation, and if there is (in the case of an expanding NATO), it serves

only temporary goals. For the US, it is expanded power in the region, while for the Danube countries it serves the role of a security guarantee.

LIBERALISM

Liberalism utilizes some assumptions contrary to realism. It assumes that states are not unitary actors, and that within them powerful lobbies of social groups, NGOs, businesses, and others participate in shaping state behavior. Even more importantly, political liberalists assert that international politics is not a zero-sum game and that countries can have compatible interests and may seek absolute gains. Absolute gains means that as long as a treaty benefits two countries in some way, no matter which gets the relative advantage, both would be willing to enter into such an agreement. Therefore, countries can and actually do cooperate.

There are two popular trends of liberalism theories: institutional liberalism and commercial liberalism. Institutional liberalism puts the emphasis on trans-national actors and the fact that alliances and institutions promote all states' interests and they increase the power and security of all participants (if not the relative power among them). This naturally explains the tendency of Danubian countries to seek to join and become involved with as many regional and international institutions as possible. In this sense, integration with Western Europe is seen as creating collective security arrangements that diffuse conflict. The other option was to follow an independent path in a very unstable region and time. Liberalists also point out that the joining of institutions results in predictability and transparency in successive interactions. Thus, the joining of OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO, the EU, and other organisations by Danubian countries appeared to be beneficial for all by providing necessary stability.

Commercial liberalism explores the role of trade and economic processes, which make war more costly. Thus, according to liberalism, growing institutions, trade, and in general any common activity reduce the probability of war and increase cooperation between states. Countries of the Danubian region have engaged in more trade with Western Europe than in the past and less so with Russia. In the 1990s, much of the former trade with Russia was disrupted, the flow of goods interrupted, and economic activity slumped. During the subsequent recovery, Western European businesses, banks, and other entities played a greater role than Russia in shaping the new economic environments. While this does not mean that states will be less hostile

to the outer world, commercial liberalism supports the notion that countries in the Danubian region would be more friendly towards their new trade partners.

The resulting interaction is caused by common security, economic, or other interests and results in new institutions, increased trade, and generally greater interdependence. If after 1989, the countries of the Danube region found compatible interests with Western Europe, then this would naturally explain the ongoing trends.

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism is a theory that places emphasis not only on the material reality, but also on the ideas, beliefs, and expectations of states about their own and others' behavior. By placing rules and restraints in international agreements, states create norms of behavior that they become subject to. These norms become in turn widespread and shape and constrain future behavior by obligating states to observe these norms. For example, a state may initially adopt human rights norms only to enhance its international prestige or to improve trade relations. However, this will necessarily lead to some domestic structural and societal change, which will set in motion the process of identity transformation, and then the state will maintain these human rights norms because of a new-found belief and identity, not just for face value.

Since the Cold War, there has been an emerging norm to use multi-national and supra-national institutions, as most such organizations expanded in membership and scope of activities. Thus countries in Europe have sought to bandwagon in alliances. Furthermore, there have been emerging norms to affirm human rights, to defend national minorities, and to hold elections. The importance of human rights in contemporary European affairs can be illustrated by the creation of the Council of Europe and the adoption of the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. These norms are what has become acceptable behavior.

Finally, apart from emerging norms, constructivism is an emerging broad international relations theory that looks at shifting identities. The theory may have great explanatory power. In the 19th century, the Danube was largely under the control of the Ottoman sultan. Such historic developments have created feelings both in the West and East that these regions of Europe differ considerably and can form their own civilizations. In the 20th century, the fault line was at approximately the same place but the divider was different—the Soviet project. After East and West Germany were unified and the Soviet Union dissolved, the intense ideological rivalry between

the USA and the Soviet Union was abated, and the division of Europe between pro-US West and pro-Communist East was obsolete. Subsequently, there is a new emerging definition of Europe and European identity that includes broader regions than before. This has allowed for the expansion of the EU, and even to the proposal of common European symbols—a flag and an anthem. This has been a process on both sides. On one side, in Danube region countries, people have begun to talk about themselves as modern Europeans, while in the past it was common to say that "we" were still not in Europe. On the other side, Western Europeans (although not fully) have actually started to think of Eastern Europe as a part of the European continent and Western civilization. The stereotype of the backwardness and orientalism of the Balkans is still present, but it is shaken. That may explain why we see this close cooperation between the Danube region and Western Europe. It is unlikely that anyone in the region will ever deliberately adopt a communist ideology and try to establish a command economy because no one identifies with it.

CONCLUSION

The difference between the geopolitical situation in 1989 and 2009 is also quite obvious by comparing the behavior of Russia towards the Danubian region and its neighboring countries. For example, today it seems unlikely that Russia may have significant direct influence on events in Hungary or Bulgaria, whereas it still has an aggressive stance and a strong position in Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia. This is a function of geographical position, but also of the much smaller pace of change in respect to shifting military and economic interests and identity.

Danubian countries have become more like their Western partners in domestic affairs and economic life. People in both the East and West have begun to reconsider old boundaries and identity stereotypes, as they feel to belong to one common union. Although still in embryonic state, a new European identity is in the making. Finally, there has been considerable security, economic, and political integration of the Danube region to Western Europe. According to the outline above, many political theories support the behavior and new reality of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Today Europe looks more united than twenty years ago. What is more, this new atmosphere is conductive to unprecedented regional partnership and security cooperation.

BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT WITHIN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Dr. Georgeta Chirleşan*

SUMMARY

Regarding the strategies of the 27 EU countries, one cannot speak yet about standardization, in the sense that only a few countries have security documents named security strategy, the rest of them designing their instruments and means of assuring the security through fundamental, official documents bearing names like White Paper, National Security Concept, Military Strategy, Defence Doctrine, etc.

The countries representing the object of our research are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Of course no rigorous analysis can be performed without searching for eventual correlations and non-synchronisms with the European Security Strategy, upon which our study also focuses.

The premises in choosing from among the EU27 countries Romania on the one hand, and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia on the other,, with a view to performing a comparative analysis of the security strategies, were the academic intention of achieving a comparative analysis and of positioning Romania in relation with the countries in its proximity—countries determining the afferent regional security environment—but at the same time the fact that the series of countries on which we focus on is characterised by other representative elements as well (affiliation to the Visegrad Group, to the Black Sea area, to the Partnership for Peace).

The security strategies play an important role in shaping foreign affairs, in defining the level of interaction between different strategic actors, in understanding the security environment and especially in forecasting its particular trends and evolution. Which are the national values and interests of the states? what threats, risks and challenges could exist?—with afferent levels of imminence, which objectives and tasks do the countries have to deal with? what are the implementation instruments

* University of Piteşti, Târgu din Vale, no. 1, Piteşti – 110040, Romania

that they can use?—all these are elements to be analysed within a demarche of comparative analysis of the national security strategies.

A comparative analysis of the security strategies of Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland may lead to the identification of some similarities, differences and particularities regarding their structure and content—useful elements in pointing out the way in which these national strategies are framed within the context of the European Union security strategy and within the understanding of the current regional security environment in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on that, evolutions and trends between the regional security and the Euro-Atlantic security may be identified.

These are the aspects which we have tried to identify in the present paper.

INTRODUCTION

Before starting to analyse the security strategies of the targeted countries, we consider it necessary to present the *arguments* for developing such a topic.

Thus, we may emphasize:

- the characteristic situation held by Romania as a country geographically positioned at the Eastern boundary of the European Union and hence the role played by it in assuring regional stability and security;
- the fact that Romania is at the culmination of a process of transition, evolution and transformation of its national security system (Romania elaborated and approved its first security strategy in 2004 and the second one in 2007, while the third national security strategy is currently under construction), a system which cannot be stand alone: on the contrary, we appreciate that it is determined by the regional and global security environment, thus an analysis of this security environment and also a comparative analysis of the security strategies of the neighbour states and/or of those with which Romania has cooperation relations (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland) would allow consequent adjustments and adaptations to the regional security context more rapidly and feasibly;
- the rights and obligations which Romania has regarding the regional and global security in which it is inscribed (the security of the Central and Eastern Europe, of the Black Sea Region, etc.) as the result of a new statute, acquired by joining

the EU and by obtaining the membership in NATO, OSCE, the Partnership for Peace.

- the obvious impossibility of playing independently within the arena of the regional and global security and hence the necessity of correlating the Security Strategy, the Military Strategy, the Defence Policy etc. with those of other actors, correlation which we consider must be achieved by comparative analyses and studies that are meant to identify common interests; to discover the risks, threats and the common viable solutions for managing crises and conflicts, and the desiderata to make possible the assurance of the security and stability in the long term (by minimizing and if possible by eliminating the initiation of war situations, of terrorism and acts of mass destruction).
- a (relatively) poor representation within the specialist works of some studies and researches focused on the case of the Romanian security strategy in inter-relation with the strategies of the other countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland), upon which the present study focuses.

The main *objectives* we focused on in our demarche were: (a) describing the current environment of regional security in Central and Eastern Europe, (b) establishing the analysis units, (c) performing the content quantitative analysis of the security strategies of the envisaged countries, (d) formulating and presenting the conclusions.

As regards the *work hypotheses* of our research, we have tried to present them in a synthetic manner in the following lines.

NATO and OSCE have created and developed new security mechanisms and new policies for crisis management, proving their importance as stability factors in the European and global security system.

In the post-Cold War security environment a new European security actor—the European Union—was consolidated, whose military dimension was developed by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Assuring Romania's national security represents a continuing and complex process, extended upon a large spectrum of domains, relations and interdependencies, meant to promote the security interests and objectives of the state, society and citizen.

The launch of the security sector reform was achieved under the conditions of a double dynamic at the internal level: the process of political democratization and the transition to the market economy principles and mechanisms.

Romania's role at a worldwide level is circumscribed to its new statute as EU and NATO member, as well as to some other commitments and policies established by the partnerships developed with other states, defining common modalities for acting and promoting certain mutually shared security interests..

The complexity and the importance of the proposed topic caused our research to require a construction based not only on a single central hypothesis but on an ensemble of such hypotheses.

The *ex-ante evaluation* of the current geopolitical sphere represented one of the sources generating the hypotheses of our study. In this way we could formulate *central hypotheses* with a high level of generalization, like the ones rendered below:

- The world financial crisis affects both directly and indirectly the security environment, the effects being (possibly) reflected within the national security strategies of the states and within other specific documents (White Paper, Military Strategy, Strategic Concept, etc.)
- There are signs of trends of a return to bipolarity (even to multi-polarity, eventually) due to the ascension of the emergent powers which reconfigure the global power balance—and we refer here, for example, to the spectacular developments in the area of the Russian Federation, of China and of India[1].
- The re-equilibration of power relations at regional and global level (by the trend, existing nowadays, of setting up certain new power centres at these levels) involves and implicitly determines the conceptual redefinition of Central and Eastern Europe.

The development theories have represented another scientific source which we used in formulating some general hypotheses connected to our research, like those stating that "the economic, political and social development is influenced by the type and structure of the political system", "the modernization of the post-communist

[1] Mitchell W., director of research at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), Washington D.C., affirmed in the interview made in the "Review 22" of 9th December 2008: "…the global balance of power (…) is reconfiguring. We are now, in fact, between structural moments – somewhere between unipolarity and multipolarity. (…) we have a unipolar interpretation grid, a set of bipolar instruments, on the background of a multipolar world."

societies is determined preponderantly by external factors[2]", "for Romania the way out of the transition state can be achieved only through modernization, meaning *through a profound and radical transformation of the social structures and relations built during these transitional years and through a firm correction of certain evolutions which, otherwise, tend to continue*"[3].

Besides the general hypotheses previously emphasized, we also proposed *specific hypotheses*, assumptions with a lower level of generalization, either strictly envisaging the situation of Romania, or future strategies of some of the international actors of the global security environment. Thus, we deducted that:

- Obtaining membership to the European Union and Romania's joining process have direct effects upon its national security strategy, among which we may emphasize the demarches of securing the Eastern boundary according to EU standards and strengthening Romania's active role within the Black Sea region (fighting against trafficking in humans and weapons, economic and financial criminality, organised crime networks and illegal migration, protecting energy resources, ensuring a climate of peace and security).
- The change in the USA's strategic vision (or what we call "the Obama effect") by actions and measures targeting:
  - the change of strategy regarding Afghanistan;
  - the withdrawal of Russia's strategic missiles from Kaliningrad;
  - the withdrawal of the USA from Iraq;
  - brokering peace in the Middle East through the diplomatic approach;
  - the "softening of the tone of voice" in foreign affairs;

will lead to a re-configuration of strategic cooperation relations, of the security environment and of diplomatic relations in general and specifically at the regional level.

The end of the single-pole moment and the transition towards a multi-polar world requires a radical strategic re-evaluation of the USA's position as actor on the international arena. In order for the external American policy to function, the main objective in front of USA is now to understand in an adequate manner its role and

[2] Vlăsceanu L., in Politics and development. Romania where to?, p. 36, claims that For the theory of modernisation, both the model and the sources of the development are external for the countries in course of development: the external aid and imitating the already established model would generate internal transformations on the way of development".

[3] V. Pasti, , M. Miroiu, C. Codiță, Romania. Mater of facts, vol. 1: Society, p210.

position within the new structure of global power, an understanding to generate that specific doctrine of the Obama administration which is capable of guiding America within the process of transition towards an environment marked by multi-polarity.

The creation of some partnerships between the great powers (USA - Russia, Russia —China, etc.) which is outlined as a possible efficient solution in managing different crises in the world, represent another reason which unavoidably imposes the change of USA's strategic vision, an idea pointed out in the above lines.

CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS

A univoque and universal definition of the security environment cannot be introduced. The concept is definable through the sum of the approaches and theoretical developments associated with the political sciences, especially with the field of international relations. Thus, we believe that we may understand *the security environment* as the ensemble definable by the existence or non-existence (absence) of security threats, in whose framework the international actors (states, nations, supra-nations, etc.) manifest and inter-correlate with each other from a governmental, political, military, economic and social point of view.

In the view of some analysts, *the security environment* represents the syntagm defined by the totality of the factors, conditions and relations existing in the fundamental domains of human society and the international community, at a certain moment in time, over a certain reference geographical area[4]. Because it depends on the geographic factor, the delimitation of the security environment may be realised at a global, continental, regional, zonal or national level. In a different classification, the security environment can be international or internal.

There is a set of domains of international life (political, diplomatic, economic, military, social, ecological, juridical, informational, etc.) which are taken into consideration when determining the content of the security environment. Characterisation of the security environment refers to specification of the nature, quality and dimension of the the relations established and developed between the actors participating in the international life domains.

As even the name suggests, the international security environment is generated by the inclusion of the continental, regional, zonal and national security environments.

[4] David I., Romania and the evolutions of the European security environment, Review ComuniQue, 2008, p1.

The internal security environment refers strictly to the security environment of a state. Most often, although not always in an explicit way, the international security environment is assimilated to the global security environment.

Today, the notion of *security* goes far beyond the strictly military dimension. The new targets are the population, political symbols and economic infrastructure. The present threats to security as well as the challenges are much more complex. Within the security environment, non-statal and parastatal actors are participating besides the statal actors. The necessity of integrating states within political-military and political-economical alliances is an obvious safe way to provide an adequate and flexible answer to all the current challenges addressed to security.

One frequently speaks about *security and safety*, the concepts being defined one through the other. "*Security represents a state where the individual and the human groups, but also a state or a union of states may live and act freely and without any disturbance, pursuing their way of development, voluntarily and consciously chosen. Safety constitutes the certainty the individuals and human communities have that they are in complete security. In fact, the two terms, which reflect the reality, reciprocally presume each other, meaning there cannot be security without safety and vice versa. In their turn, these two are in a close correlation with the country's affiliation to a political-military alliance, strong and recognised by all the other states of the world*"[5].

Apart from the concept of *security environment*, that of *security strategy* bears a correlated interest, being a concept without whose epistemological, comprehensive understanding our research would lose its object and content.

By *security strategy* one understands a document of attitude—usually synthetic and accessible—which, starting from the identification of the essential elements of a nation's identity, establishes the following: its main interests and objectives over a long term; the priority actions meant to lead to the respective objectives and also the principles fundamental to those actions; the threats and risks (current or those to come) which can affect opportunities to attain the objectives and the main methods to neutralize them, correlated with the available resources or with those available to be mobilized[6].

[5] Moştoflei C., The national security, Euro-Atlantic and European integration (III) Strategic Colloquium no. 6, 2004.

[6] Report of the political analysis, Analysis of the National Security Strategy of Romania, "Ovidiu Şincai" Institute, Bucharest, 2006, p3;

Just as in the case of the security environment, the definition of the security strategy entails a multitude of forms and enunciations, depending on the developing sources. Some dictionaries define *security strategy* as "the art and science of developing, applying and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military and informational) in view of achieving the objectives contributing to national security".

The concept of national security strategy appeared with the creation of the modern nation-state. Previous to thiat moment, national security strategy constituted nothing other than "great tactics" naturally endowed with military connotations. The concept of strategy comprising different levels (including the tactical one) appeared later. At the beginning of the 20th century, strategists like Liddel-Hart[7] increasingly began to make a distinction between military strategy and the "great strategy"[8], the latter also being focused on maintaining the peace after obtaining a military victory. In accordance with the classical approach to national security and national security policy, the national security strategy was extensively equated with "*strategy*" within the military context. Hence the definition of *military strategy concerning the movement and utilisation of the resources of a nation-state or empire* atributed to the terms of "great strategy", "total strategy" or "national strategy". Although great strategy overlaps external policy, it represents first of all the military implications of politics, which are relevant in this context[9].

There is a series of common constitutive elements at the level of the countries' national security strategies[10] that makes possible their comparative analysis.

We should emphasize that the majority of the strategies present values and interests, the security environment emphasis on threats, risks, challenges, objectives and tasks; ways and mechanisms for implementing the national security strategy, sectoral strategies, security systems and actors. Naturally the structural differences of the documents to which we refer here are also identified, these bringing a surplus of originality and giving specificity to each country. Regarding the manner of further developing the strategy, the content varies from one country to another, depending

[7] A military writer and historian (1895 – 1970), he contributed in a decisive manner to the development of 20th-century strategic theories.

[8] Neologism describing the particular form of the military science which decides the movement or the utilisation of the fleet and armies of a nation-stateas a major goal.

[9] Hough M., The concept of a national security strategy: the case of the United States and South Africa, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, November, 2006, p2.

[10] We refer in the framework of this study to the EU27 countries.

on the historical past and on the former and current affiliations to regional and international institutions and organisations.

PRELIMINARIES

In the following lines we intend to make a brief description of the envisaged security strategies as a starting point in our planned research.

Romania's Security Strategy. The document "The National Security Strategy of Romania. The European Romania, the Euro-Atlantic Romania: For a Better Life in a Democratic, Safer and More Prosperous Country" was adopted by The Supreme Council for National Defence at its meeting on April 17, 2006, under Decision no. 62, and has as precursors a series of strategic documents among which we mention:

- Law no.45/1994 regarding national defence;
- Military Strategy of Romania, 2002, 2004;
- National Security Strategy of Romania, 2001;
- Law regarding defence planning, no. 473/2004;
- White Paper on Defence and National Security, 2004;
- National Security Strategy of Romania, 2004;

Of considerable length[11], the strategy is considered to be "a realistic, bold, and pragmatic national project" responding to the need and obligation to protect fundamental human rights and freedoms, vital national values and interests as basic to the existence of the Romanian state. The favourable position of Romania conferred by its quality as a NATO and EU member is highlighted, as well as regarding the acceleration of its economic and social development and its contribution to maintaining regional and global security.

Further on, the document refers to national values (democracy, freedom, equality, supremacy of the law; respect for human dignity, for the basic human rights and freedoms; national identity and civic awareness; political pluralism; guaranteed property and market economy; solidarity with the democratic nations; international

[11] The National Security Strategy of Romania, 2007, (MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html) , (25.08.2009), contains 39 pages in A4 format, being larger from this point of view than the American Security Strategy (33 A4 pages), the European Security Strategy (15A4 pages) or the Russian Security Concept (18 A4 pages), according to the report of political analysis on the National Security Strategy of Romania carried out by the "Ovidiu Şincai" Institute, Bucharest, in March 2006.

cooperation and peace; dialogue and communication between civilizations) and to national interests (promoting and protecting these values). The starting point in describing the security environment is the characterization of the global order and the dynamics of the change within the international security environment, with reference to the new international equilibrium coagulation tendencies. Globalization, the existence of tensions and conflicts, the collapse of communism as a political system in the countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the enlargement of NATO and the European Union represent factors determining the current security environment.

The presentation of risks and threats points out aspects which are emphasized in the majority of security strategies, international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and organised crime being some of them. We will come back to these in the section devoted to comparative analysis.

The National Security Strategy of Romania is an extensive document, composed of eleven chapters, which starts by presenting the premises, the manner of construction and the priorities and then develops around the European and Euro-Atlantic identity of Romania and internal security before ending by specifying the role and responsibilities that different actors have in building and providing national security.

Hungary's Security Strategy[12]. Adopted in 2002, it first presents Hungary's current security context, the foundation upon which the National Security Strategy was built and the integrated context of elaborating the connected strategies (in the military field, in legislation, economy, finance, human resources development, environment protection, the fight against terrorism, etc.).

One may say that the security strategy begins with a brief "radiography" of the country's current security environment, showing that Hungary's security situation is stable and the basic guarantee of its security is the co-operation taking place in the framework of NATO and the EU. Hungary is not threatened by military aggression, and the risk of any other traditional type of threat is also minimal.

Immediately from the preamble of the document it is stipulated that with the regime change Hungary has entered into a process of Euro-Atlantic integration[13], based on common values, democracy, protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms.

[12] The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary 2004, MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html , (25.08.2009).

[13] By mentioning "the regime change" the document refers to the collapse of communism.

The document specifies that new challenges and threats can be efficiently managed only by coordinating national efforts at governmental level, through the flexible use of available capabilities and by cooperation extended at international level.

Based on the National Security Strategy the sectoral strategies are elaborated for all the domains of interest, thereby establishing more broadly responsibilities in the field of security.

Related to the history of generating the national security strategy, in the document it is mentioned that the basis of the security and defence policy in the long term are established by Hungarian National Assembly Resolution No. 94/1998 on the "Basic Principles of the Hungarian Security and Defence Policy".

The current national security strategy was elaborated based on:

- Government Resolution no. 2144/2002;
- The Basic Principles of the Hungarian Security and Defence Policy;
- NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept;
- European Security Strategy[14].

In terms of structure the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary is composed of the following parts: values and interests; the security environment – threats, risks, challenges; objectives and tasks; instruments to implement the National Security Strategy; sectoral strategies.

Slovakia's Security Strategy. In the case of Slovakia, too, the document has a title similar to that of Hungary, namely "*Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*"[15]. Slovakia's National Security Strategy was adopted by the National Council of the Slovak Republic in 2001. The current strategy has as its source "The Military Doctrine" (1994) and the document under the title "*Basic principles and aims of national security*", adopted in 1996.

The observance of the principles of the Organization of the United Nations Charter is stated in the introduction of the document and the concept of security in the view of the Slovak Republic is defined: preserving internal security and order,

[14] A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy - 2003, MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html , (25.08.2009)

[15] The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic 2001, MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html , (25.08.2009).

sovereignty and integrity, the democratic foundations of the country and also protecting the environment.

The security environment of the Slovak Republic depends on the global and regional (Central Europe) security environment in which globalization brings permanent changes of threats and risks, thus influencing accordingly the security strategies. The role and importance of the transfer of stability through the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and through the Partnership for Peace is also underlined. It is worth noticing the issue referring to the creation of the defence policies of the European Union, which the Slovak Republic understands as *"a complementary process to the system of collective defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization"*[16]. The Slovak Republic still does not have sufficient external international institutional security guarantees based on a contractual foundation of common defence. With a view to consolidating European integration, Slovakia aims at deepening cooperation within the Visegrad group and the Central-European Free Trade Association.

The structure of the National Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic is as follows: an introduction; the security environment; interest; security challenges, risks and threats; security policy; conclusion.

The Czech Republic's Security Strategy. The document to which we refer was adopted in 1999 and bears the title, "*Security Strategy of the Czech Republic*"[17].

This represents the third version of the national security strategy elaborated since the Czech Republic became an independent state, and is a "*fundamental policy document defining security threats and ways and means of countering them*"[18]. The Czech Republic's government has decided to update the previous security strategy in the light of significant changes in the security environment and the Czech Republic's position on the international scene, in particular its upcoming full membership of the European Union.

The current security strategy had as its forerunner the "Report on the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic 1998-1999".

[16] We shall come back to the significance of this issue in the section dealing with the comparative analysis.

[17] Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=24118&ido=7567&idj=2 , (25.08.2009).

[18] As the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic shows in the introduction made on the occasion of the presentation of the third version of the security strategy, November 2003.

The basic framework for formulating and implementing the Security Strategy is provided by the Constitution of the Czech Republic and Constitutional Act No. 110/1998 concerning the security of the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic's membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is part of its international commitments.

In the context of the Czech Republic's Security Strategy, the term security means a desirable state of affairs where all risks are reduced to a minimum. The principles of the Security Policy of the Czech Republic are:

- security of the individual, the protection of life, health and property;
- the protection of institutions of the State (including their operational capability);
- indivisibility of security (the Czech Republic's security is inseparable from security in the Euro-Atlantic area and from global security.)

to which, of course, the observance of the principles of rule of law in all the fields, of the Constitution and of UN Charter are added.

The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic is structured in five chapters: introduction; principles of the security policy; the security interests; the security environment; strategy for promoting the security interests; conclusions.

Poland's Security Strategy. The document to which we refer below bears the name "*The National Security Strategy of the Polish Republic*" and has been adopted in 2007.

This represents the fourth version of the national security strategy elaborated since the Republic of Poland came out of Treaty of Warsaw influence, after those issued in 1992, 2000 and 2003 respectively. Poland's Government decided to modernize the former security strategy in the light of the major changes in the security environment and of the Republic of Poland's position on the international stage, particularly through obtaining membership in the European Union.

The "Assumptions upon Poland's Security Policy" document formed the basis of the first, 1992 version: this established the set of strategic objectives that Poland's government has since followed with consistency.

The 2003 version answered certain new challenges[19], having main coordinates such as:

- changes in the topography of the international system through its "impurification" by contact with "failed states" or "problem states", and also the existence of the transnational terrorist networks;
- new concepts for conflict and war, marked by the revigoration of ethno-nationalism, sudden impoverishment (pauperization) and trans-border conflicts leading to local states of war.

Poland's membership in NATO, EU, UN and OSCE is part of its international commitments and gives consistency and synergy to the current version (2007) of the security strategy, subscribing perfectly to the EU concept of "a secure Europe in a better world".

In the context of Poland's security strategy the term *"security"* is defined as a desirable state when the important national interests are completely secured. These interests are: "guaranteeing civilizational and economical development", "creating the conditions for the growth of a more prosperous society, for the development of science and technology", "protecting the national heritage and identity", "protecting the natural environment".

The main strategic goal of the Republic of Poland is to provide beneficial and safe conditions in which to pursue national interests by eliminating external and internal threats, reducing risks, adequately assessing challenges undertaken and skilfully taking advantage of the opportunities that arise.

Poland's national security strategy is developed on the following principles:

- to ensure independence and territorial inviolability, sovereignty in determining internal affairs, organization and political system;
- to create conditions for civilizational and economic development;
- to ensure that its citizens can exercise their constitutional freedoms, human and civil rights;
- to ensure that it is possible to actively develop relations in the international environment through ensuring an active role in defending the national interests

[19] Klich B., The New National Security Strategy of Poland: Ready to Face the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, Quarterly Journal of the Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC) of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, vol. III, no. 2, June 2004 , p9.

as well as through the implementation of Poland's commitments towards its international partners;
- to ensure that Polish citizens abroad are safe, protected and provided with assistance;
- to promote Polish entrepreneurs in the international environment;
- to protect the spiritual and material national heritage and to ensure the necessary conditions for its development;
- to protect the natural environment and to prevent disasters and man-induced catastrophes;
- to ensure wide access to information and a strong R&D potential in order to increase the competitiveness of the economy.

To these, it hardly needs to be said, are added: respecting the principles of the state of law in all domains, the principles of the country's Constitution and those of the UN Charter.

The security strategy of the Republic of Poland is structured in six chapters: introduction, national interests and strategic goals in the security area; conditions of national security; national security-sector goals and tasks; national security system; conclusions.

As His Excellency Mr. Andrzej Towpik, the Ambassador of Poland to the UN stated in January 2009[20], four great strategic challenges are now, at the beginning of the 21st century, very pertinent to Poland:
- continuing to extend NATO;
- the relation of NATO with the non-member states, especially Russia;
- developing and integrating NATO – EU relations;
- improving NATO's operationality.

[20] Ambassador Towpik, A., Shaping National Security Policy in Poland in Post-Cold War Europe, public lecture at Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies upon Poland's progress in consolidating a new national security strategy in the post-soviet era, 24 January 2007.

ROMANIA, HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA, CZECH REPUBLIC AND POLAND: ABOUT CONVERGENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES

Embarking from the previous presentations of the national security strategies of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland we performed a comparative analysis on them which followed some characteristic elements, namely:

(a) the strategies' evolution in time;

(b) their structure;

(c) their content.

We also tried to see how these strategies are correlated with the security strategy of the European Union.

(a) Evolution in time of the strategies

We noticed the existence of some *differences of duration prior to the appearance of the first* national security strategy. Thus, Hungary had the slowest evolution: it obtained total sovereignty in 1990 and required three years to adopt relevant security documents.

Slovakia became independent in 1993 and one year later it adopted the defence doctrine. Having become independent at the same time as Slovakia, although the Czech Republic adopts its first security strategy only in 1999, it develops documents referring to the national security from an earlier stage[21].

When the opportunity arises in 1989, Poland becomes a parliamentary democracy. Similarly with Hungary, it also required quite a long period leading to the issuing of its first security strategy in 1992[22]. Poland subsequently developed the National Defence Strategy in 2000 and the White Paper on Defence in 2001[23].

Less than two years after the revolution in December 1989, the Romanian Parliament adopted the Law regarding the National Safety of Romania, while in 1994 it adopted the Law on National Defence[24] and in 2001 the first National Security Strategy.

We may also speak about *differences in the adoption moments* of national security strategies in relation to the invitation to join NATO (previous or subsequent to the invitation to join NATO):

[21] The first report on the situation of the Czech Republic's security appeared in 1994.

[22] The Security Strategies of the Republic of Poland were issued first in 1992, then in 2000, 2003, 2007.

[23] A document presenting the "Programme for the Reconstruction and Technical Modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces 2001-2006" and Poland's inclusion in the Alliance's Defence Planning System.

[24] Law no. 51/1991 regarding the National Security of Romania; Law no.45/1994 regarding national defence.

- Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland were all invited to join NATO in 1997. Subsequently, Hungary adopted the Basic Principles of the Security and Defence Policy (1998), and the Czech Republic adopted the National Security Strategy (1999). Poland joined NATO in 1999 but well before that (1992) it elaborated a first version of the national security strategy.
- Slovakia adopted the military and defence strategies a year *before* receiving the NATO invitation (2001) and still had not renewed them one year after it obtained NATO membership.
- Romania received the invitation and became a NATO member in 2004[25]. At the time it joined NATO it had already had for three years the first national security strategy (adopted in 2001), which was renewed later in 2004 and 2007, respectively.

In the table below we rendered a synthesis of these chronologies.

Table 1: Temporal landmarks of the adoption of the national security strategy for Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech republic and Poland

Romania	Hungary	Slovakia	Czech Republic	Poland
Romania's Law on National Defence (1994)	The Basic Principles of the Hungarian Security and Defence Policy (1998)	Defence doctrine (1994) Doctrine of the Armed Forces (2003) Defence strategy (2001, 2005)	National Defence strategy (1997)	National Defence Strategy (2000)
Security strategy (2001, 2004, 2007)	National security strategy (2002, 2004)	Basic principles and aims of national security (1996) Security strategy (1999, 2001, 2005)	Security strategy (1999, 2001, 2003)	Security strategy (1992, 2000, 2003, 2007)
White Paper on Defence and National Security (2004)				White paper on Defence (2001)
Military Strategy (2002, 2004)		Military strategy (2001)	Military strategy (2002, 2004, 2008)	

[25] On 1st March, 2004 the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer transmitted the official letter containing the invitation to Romania to join NATO, and on29th March in the same year Romania became at NATO member.

Studying the identified differentiations further, we can focus also on the differences of the adoption mechanisms of the documents referring to security. It is easy to notice from the table below that while in Hungary and Romania both the legislative and the executive have had at a certain moment a role in adopting the security documents, depending on their type, in the case of the other three countries, the task of adopting these reference documents belongs strictly either to the legislative or to the executive:

Table 2: Adoption mechanisms of the security strategy for Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland

Hungary	The Basic Principles of Hungarian Security and Defence Policy (1998) - adopted by Parliament National Security Strategy 2002, 2004 – adopted by the Government
Romania	Law on National Defence – adopted by Parliament Military Strategy – adopted by the Government White Paper on Defence and National Security – adopted by Parliament National Security Strategy – adopted by Parliament
Slovakia	All documents adopted by the legislative
Czech Republic	All documents adopted by the executive
Poland	All documents – adopted by the executive (Council of Ministers)

(b) Comparing the structure of the security strategy

The comparison of the security strategies' structure represented the second level of the analysis which we performed. We have summarised in the table below the result of the structures' comparison.

Table 3: The structure of the security strategy for Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland

Romania	Hungary	Slovakia	Czech Republic	Poland
Introduction	Introduction	Introduction	Introduction	Introduction
Principles and ways of actions (in Ch. II under the title, "A safe and prosperous future...")	---	---	Principles of the security policy	---
National values and interests (in Ch. I under the title, "The premise…")	Values and interests	Security interests	Security interests	National Interests and Strategic Goals

Security environment (in Ch. I under the title, "The premise…")	Security environment	Security environment	Security environment	Conditions of national security: - opportunities - challenges - risks
Priorities	Objectives and tasks	---	---	Sector goals and tasks
Building the new European and Euro-Atlantic identity	Implementation instruments	Security policy	Strategy for Promoting the Security Interests	---
Accomplishing regional security and stability based on a new political paradigm	---	---	---	---
Romania – a dynamic vector of security and prosperity in the Black Sea Region	---	---	---	---
Homeland security	---	---	Security system	Security system
Landmarks of good governance	Sectoral strategies	---	---	---
Increasing the competitiveness and high-performing character of socio-economic activity	---	---	---	---
Modernizing institutions with responsibilities in the area of national security	---	---	---	---
Developing the infrastructure	---	---	---	---
Resources and responsibilities	---	Conclusions	Conclusions	Conclusions

In this way we can observe elements common to the five analyzed countries, such as security interests and security environment (the countries define these interests even from the beginning of the document, so we may say that the *interests* represent a major common element for all the fifth analyzed countries).

But the subsequent development of the document differs in the five cases: Hungary presents objectives and tasks and defines *sectoral strategies* (this structural

element does not exist in the other four documents; Poland presents sectoral goals and tasks, but speaks about strategies only in general, under the conclusion section); but reciprocally, neither the *security system* presented within the strategy of the Czech Republic and Poland does it have a correspondent in the documents of the other three countries (in the case of Romania there is a chapter on homeland security).

We may state that the greatest deviation from a "traditional" structure of such a document appears in the security strategy of Romania, which covers 11 chapters, having atypical titles in comparison with those in the structure of the other analyzed countries: one speaks about the new paradigm of security and stability, about Romania's role in providing security in the Black Sea region, about responsibilities and resources. We may notice not only the discrepancy in structuring the document in relation with the other strategies, but also the relatively mixed way in which certain aspects are approached, with takeovers, immixtures and different overlapping which sometimes make the analysis difficult.

(c) Comparing the content of security strategies

As we have seen, there is a common part in all the five documents, named almost identically—*the security environment*. This is what it is called in the strategies of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic, while in Poland's strategy it has a slightly different name—"Conditions of national security"—although it speaks about the same issues. Here, the similarity of the content goes very deep, almost reaching the identical, because all the five documents speak in this part about *threats and risks*.

Thus we may identify a common approach to threats detailed, presented and explained in the document in the case of each of the five countries:

- terrorism ;
- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- regional conflicts;
- failed states or non-democratic regimes (except Romania, where there is no reference to them)
- organised crime (except in Hungary)

We synthesized the threats in the table below in the way they are identified in the respective documents, emphasizing two categories, namely: *global* threats and *national* threats.

Table 4: Presentation of the threats in the security strategies of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland[26]

	Romania	Hungary	Slovakia	Czech Republic	Poland
GLOBAL	Terrorism	Terrorism	Terrorism	Terrorism /extremism	Organized international terrorism
	Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
	Regional conflicts	Unstable regions	Regional conflicts in unstable zones	Regional conflicts	Regional and local conflicts (tensions in the Transnistria and South Caucasus, disputed issues in the Balkans)
	---	Failed states	Failed states	Failed states	Rogue states not able to control their territories
	Cross-border organised crime	---	Organised crime	Organised crime	Organised international crime
	Illegal migration	Illegal migration	Uncontrolled migration	(Waves of) Massive migration	Illegal migration (organised forms) Migration of young generation citizens
	---	---	Foreign special services	Non-state actors (extremist groups, terrorists, etc.)	- Non-state entities - Armed operations carried out by terrorist groups - Terrorist organisations
	Asymmetric threats (military or non-military), psychological, information or intelligence threats)	Challenges of the information society	Violation or failure of information systems	Major leaks of strategic data or intrusions into the information systems	Asymmetrical threats Acts committed in cyberspace against communication systems and networks
	Gradual exhaustion of vital resources; / serious dependence on vital resources that are hard to access	---	Unstable vital resources (energy, raw materials)	---	Dependence on supplies of energy resources (oil and natural gas) from one source
	Economic-financial crimes	Economic instability	---	---	Potential threats: - Collapse of the process of European integration - Weakening of ties linking the transatlantic community
	Increasing possibility of pandemics.	Global sources of danger: natural, man-made and medical	Industrial and natural disasters	Infectious diseases (pandemics – strategic threat)	Environmental threats: - break-downs of obsolete nuclear power plants; - trading in fissile materials; - storage and transport of radioactive materials, chemical substances and organic waste; - break-downs of pipelines transporting crude oil and fuels.
	Natural and ecologic catastrophes			Climate change (with potential risk of an environmental disasters)	
	Industrial catastrophes			Industrial accidents	

NATIONAL (internal)	---	Organized crime	The criminalization of social relations (including xenophobia and racism)	Organized crime	Organized crime
	---	Illegal economy	Economic crime	---	Economic underdevelopment Crime against fundamental economic and social interests of the state (crime against production of goods, technologies and services, etc.)
	Social insecurity, chronic poverty, social gaps	---	---	---	Unresolved social problems Differences in standards of living of citizens
	Institutional endemic corruption	Corruption	Corruption	Corruption	Corruption
	---	---	---	Imbalance between the North and South (economic and social)	Gap between different regions
	Massive migration	---	---	Illegal migration towards the Northern countries	Migration to other states The need to accept large numbers of immigrants
	---	Drugs	---	---	Narcotic crimes
	---	Political and religious extremism	---	Extremism, radicalism	
	Democratic deficit	Political and religious extremism	Demographic development	---	Falling natural growth Ageing of the population
	---	---	The decrease of food security	---	---
	Ineffective governance	---	---	---	Transformation of the legal system Improvement of infrastructure (modern transport and telecommunication network) The need for more effective administrative structures

[26] A clear differentiation between threats and challenges was not always possible, because even in the analysed documents often both terms were used for the same context.

Referring to the content analysis of the five security strategies, there are, obviously, both similarities and differences.

We may add to the *similarities* which we pointed out in the beginning of this paragraph that which refers to the fact that in all five cases terrorism is considered as a major threat, even as a "strategic threat" (Hungary). In each of the analyzed security strategies arguments to support this aspect are rendered:

- Romania considers that "international terrorism structured in cross-border networks, in particular—poses the most serious threat to human lives and freedom, democracy, civilization, way of life and the other fundamental basic values that make the foundations of the democratic community of the Euro-Atlantic states".
- Within Hungary's strategy it is specified that terrorism threatens security in the Euro-Atlantic region and contributes to the emergence of other global—political, economic, commercial, migration- and health-related—crises.
- Slovakia considers terrorism as a major threat due to its wide scope and consequences upon the vital interests of the state.
- The Czech Republic appreciates terrorism as a major threat by referring to the asymmetric strategy practiced by terrorist attack (avoiding direct attack and attacking the territories of their chosen adversaries, usually civilian populations) and to the combination with strategies which use weapons of mass destruction.
- Poland also recognizes terrorism as a major threat, stating that "*Organized international terrorism is a threat to Europe, including also to Poland*". It also emphasizes the central role that the fight against terrorism holds among the most important international security issues, besides the proliferation of the weapons for mass destruction[27].

Moreover, Hungary considers, terrorism and proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction as the two strategic threats among global challenges: these are also listed in the first two positions in terms of importance by Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Although Poland starts by presenting some national risks in its strategy, it combines them with global challenges and risks, among which terrorism is mentioned as a very important one.

[27] National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html , (25.08.2009), 2007, p6.

It should also be noticed that all five analyzed countries have placed the issue of the *regional conflicts / unstable regions* in the third position from the top as threats (after terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). This aspect proves a community of views but also similar concerns generated by the common fear upon the de-stabilizing long-term effects which these conflicts could generate.

Regarding the *weapons of mass destruction*, Romania includes them within the category of severe threats, based on some factors which, in the current context, become more and more evident: increased accessibility to such means, improving the delivery means of weapons of mass destruction, the presence of regimes driven by extremist political or religious ideologies exhibiting irresponsible behaviour, the existence of regions that evade state control, favouring the development of the black market for weapons of mass destruction. Hungary extends the threat given by the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction at the level of Europe's security and of the Euro-Atlantic region based on the non-conventional ways of using weapons of mass destruction and insists on cooperation with other states. This idea appears also in the security strategy of the Czech Republic, being even more precisely delimited by the identification of the high-risk regions—the Middle East and South and East Asia. Where Hungary speaks of "non-conventional ways", the Czech Republic uses the expression "various means of use of the weapons of mass destruction" to refer to this aspect. Slovakia refers to the weapons of mass destruction in the framework of the security environment presentation (at point 4 of the strategy), even if this seems not to have the same importance within the threats and risks hierarchy as for the other three countries.

Poland shows that "*An improvement in transatlantic relations and a rapprochement of the views of allies on the most important international security issues, particularly the fight against terrorism and putting a stop to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are positive developments*".

All five security strategies speak about the "*collective defence*" concept which they see as a unique possibility for managing the current security context and they agree that none of them can face alone the actual global threats of the international security environment (first of all terrorism and the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction)[28]. Romania identifies NATO as the most solid security guarantee in

[28] For example, the strategy of the Czech Republic in the chapter security policy speaks about "an approach based on the unquestionable value of collective defence and cooperative security provided by international organizations and multilateral arrangements". For Poland, increasing NATO's capability to carry out its basic tasks - collective defence and creation of grounds for consultations between allies in case of threat - remains a priority.

its history and considers the Alliance as being the main collective defence structure able to guarantee security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Romania shows that "in the contemporary security environment, no state can isolate itself or stay neutral, no state is protected and none should stay outside the global processes"[29].

In the following lines we will look at some of the the identified *differences*.

If in the case of Hungary the threats are split into global and internal, in the case of Slovakia they are presented in the framework of the same chapter (sometimes the *threats and risks* are combined at the *international* and *national* level in the same paragraph, …).

In the framework of Hungary's security strategy there is a consistent chapter about *regional* threats, risks and challenges which cannot be found in the case of Slovakia and the Czech Republic (they present only global and national threats).

Poland presents in a mixed manner the global and national threats, without explicitly making such classification and without creating a clear distinction between risks and threats. Challenges, threats and risks are presented only in the last part of the second chapter, after showing in the previous chapter and subchapter the national interests and the strategic goals, opportunities and the security environment.

Romania refers to the fact that the lines between global and regional and between foreign and domestic threats tend to become more blurred but it devotes an entire chapter (chapter V) to regional security and stability, in which regional threats are pointed out together with the security objectives envisaged by Romania in the region and the afferent ways of achieving them.

The Slovak Republic mentions that it refers within the presentation of its security environment to the present risks and threats which it confronts, and which, although they have different levels of danger (i.e. *risks* and *threats*), if they are not taken into account could generate crisis situations which would implicitly jeopardize the vital interests of the Czech Republic. This delimitation of the risks and threats is not so clear-cut within the security strategy of the Czech Republic.

[29] Security Strategy of Romania (2007), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html) , (25.08.2009), p11

The Czech Republic's security strategy defines its concepts of *risk* and *threat* thus:

- *threat* = any phenomenon potentially harmful to the Czech Republic's interests (taking into account only those threats arising from deliberate actions that can harm the Czech Republic's interests and values).
- *risk* = a certain likelihood of an event that is deemed undesirable for security reasons (risks have different degrees of risk, based on the risk analysis which takes into account the country's readiness to face the threat).

Clear definitions of these concepts do not appear in the case of Hungary, the Slovak Republic or Poland[30]. Neither does Romania define the concept of threat, although it makes an enumeration of threats (and in the beginning of the strategy it does define national security).

Only the Czech Republic explicitly speaks in its strategy (in the section about security policy) about improving military capacity and the demarches of building a modern army, while Hungary and Slovakia make references to the Military Strategies, and Romania does not directly approach the subject, mentioning it indirectly in only two places: engagement in anti-terror campaign with military participation and achievement of the security objectives by measures of (including) military nature. Within Polish security strategy there is a detailed description of the Armed Forces of the Republic's reforming and modernization process (actors, methods, effects, extent).

As a last difference, which distinguishes Romania in comparison with the other four analyzed countries, we are reminded here of the structure of the content of its national security document, which is totally different than the other analysed documents. Besides the common elements which are present in the case of the other countries (values and interests, security environment, threats and risks), the document contains also parts which do not exist in the other strategies. Poland's strategy also stands somewhat apart of the "template" used by the other three countries (Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) but the standard deviation is not that great as in the Romanian case (rather one can notice only a different order and dimension of the approached topics).

[30] There is only rather an indirect definition of risk in Poland's strategy (p. 8), as challenges resulted from coupled political, economic, social, demographic and environmental processes which often cross state borders.

Even they cannot be named as differences, we still wish to emphasize here some aspects which we will rather refer to as *particularities*, namely the references to the issue of nationals living in other countries and ways of managing the situation. We identified more dominantly these particularities in the case of Hungary and Slovakia.

There are at least two references to Hungarians living in neighbouring countries. One of them is made within the context of illegal migration (as a global threat), where it is shown that the particular emphasis in the migration policy relates to the sizeable Hungarian minorities living in the neighbouring countries. Hungary supports the concept according to which "*Hungarians living in neighbouring countries must enjoy forms of self-government and autonomy that best fit their particular situation and the rights deriving from them (…) as a community and remaining in their native lands*". This is a hidden issue, speaking about their intentions of preserving the nation-state even if the reality is no longer current. Some 3 million Hungarians live in neighbouring countries; 2 million in Transylvania, 600,000 in Slovakia, 350-400,000 in Vojvodina, Serbia, and 160-200,000 in Ukraine[31]. Hungary has even issued an Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (Act LXII of 2001)[32].

Poland refers only twice inside its security strategy to the issue of Polish citizens living abroad: once under the enumeration of the strategic goals stating that among other goals there is the one to ensure that Polish citizens abroad are safe, protected and provided with assistance and secondly under the sub-chapter presenting foreign affairs, where it is explained that the Polish state's active policy in the field of security requires greater protection of Poles abroad and control of foreigners entering Poland's territory and the Schengen Area.

The second particularity which we identified refers to attitudes towards NATO (the pro-atlanticist attitude).

Hungary refers immediately from the first line of its strategy to the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, a fact that, from our point of view, gives to it a major importance in the strategic vision and can be interpreted as a *pro* statement for the integration within the Atlantic structures[33].

[31] Binnendijk H., Simon J., November 1996, Hungary's "Near Abroad", Minorities Policy and Bilateral Treaties.

[32] The document may be found at the Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad, http://www.hhrf.org/htmh/en/?menuid=02, (25.08.2009).

[33] The idea that the United States is the leading nation in the global fight against terrorism and of the North Atlantic Alliance.

For Poland NATO is also *the most important form of multilateral cooperation in a political and military dimension of security and a pillar of stability on the European continent, as well as the main ground of transatlantic relations*[34].

In Romania's security strategy there is an entire chapter (chapter IV) dedicated to the issue of the new Euro-Atlantic identity, this being considered an essential requirement for the country's security. For Romania, NATO also represents the pillar of security, the document clearly expressing Romania's decision to support the Alliance, to take an active part in the decision-making process and to fulfil its obligations.

For the Slovak Republic, the European Union occupies the second place after NATO within the context of ensuring and developing the security environment and in providing long-term stability. The Czech Republic explicitly states that for it NATO is the pillar of collective defence.

Another particularity which we believe is worth mentioning is the existence of *strategic opportunities* in the case of Romania: the collapse of communism as a political system and the establishment of democracy, the enlargement of NATO and the European Union, opening the frontiers, intensifying the flows of persons, goods, services, and capital, the technological development—opportunities to which Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland do not refer in their strategies as factors of prosperity and integration in the Euro-Atlantic region. Without calling it *strategic*, Poland states only once in the whole document that it should use to the greatest extent possible the opportunities provided by Poland's membership in NATO and the European Union as well as their partnership with the United States.

A last particularity which we wish to point out is related to the affiliation of four out of the five analyzed countries—Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland —to the Visegrad Group. In presenting the objectives and tasks, Hungary shows that it has to play an active role within the regional cooperation forums and initiatives, by mentioning Visegrad Cooperation, the Central European Initiative, the Kadrilater (or Quadrilateral). Regarding its external security, Poland expresses the intention to tighten cooperation in the framework of the Weimar Triangle and the Visegrad Group

[34] National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html, (25.08.2009), p. 10.

and supports the development of other sub-regional institutions contributing to the democratization of the region and to greater security and stability.

Explicit references to the Visegrad Group appear in the strategies of the other countries (except Romania).

The activities of the Visegrad Group[35] (comprising Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia) envisage the strengthening of the stability in the region of Central Europe. The countries of the group perceive the cooperation among them as a challenge and its success as the best proof of their ability to integrate themselves in different structures, such as the EU. In 1991 when the Group formed, Romania missed out on membership due to the events of 1990 (the mineriads and the inter-ethnic conflict of Târgu Mureş). Subsequently its image was repaired, although membership promised for 2007 and 2008 was not accomplished. In June 2008, at the meeting of the Regional Development and Local Administration Ministers of the states members of the Visegrad Group and of Bulgaria and Romania, a meeting which was held in Prague, the participating countries engaged to elaborate a common document on territorial development of the Visegrad Group member states in which to include Romania and Bulgaria and which could be extended in the future to the countries neighbouring these states.

(d) Correlation with the European Security Strategy

There is a strong correlation as regards threats. In fact, the major threats identifiable in the European strategy document are to be found identically within the other analyzed strategies, even if they possess different degrees of importance (which are more obvious, for example, in the case of Polish and Romanian strategies).

The correlation regarding the manner of responding to threats in the cases of Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic is also remarkable. We may say that these three analyzed states have answers which are coherent with the European strategy. However, it is noticeable to see the nuances regarding the conflicts in the immediate vicinity (the Balkans, Afghanistan, etc.). There are also some obvious nuances when approaching threats (considered as such within NATO) to which Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic respond in a different slightly way in comparison with the EU manner of reply (see the cases of Iran, North Korea, etc.).

[35] The Visegrad Group, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=858 , (25.08.2009).

Last but not least, coherence is expressed at the level of approach in relation to the new world order, which in the case of Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic is based on efficient multilateralism. Although Poland does not explicitly mention the new world order in its documents, it does consider efficient multilateralism as being the solution, stating that "*significant interests also include … the development of international relations based on … effective multilateral cooperation in line with the goals and principles laid down in the UN Charter*".

Having strategic objectives synergic with those of the EU, the five analyzed states are involved (weakly or strongly) in designing some international policies starting from the fundamental concept of global order based on a strong international society, with functional international institutions and with states in which there is a governing rule of law[36]. Here we should recognise the sustained dynamism of Hungarian foreign policy in the sphere of relations inside the EU, but especially with reference to relations with the USA, the EU and Canada.

We may conclude that the strategies of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are profoundly coherent with EU strategy, the nuances existing only to those components which do not contradict the basic ideas of EU security.

Neither does Poland's security strategy contradict EU security strategy, but the level of coherence is not that obvious as in the other cases, due to the different structure and approach in treating the key issues. A particular common aspect in the strategies of Poland and Europe lies in the relations with Russia, both documents emphasising the importance of strengthening them in the future[37].

Yet Romania's National Security Strategy seems to be a controversial document through the opinions already expressed by experts or groups of analysis, some of them sustaining the value of the strategy[38] and its coherence with the European Security

[36] Romania shows, for example, in its security strategy, at p11, that "International security tends, more and more to show its indivisible character and the international community is ever more aware of the responsibilities incumbent upon it".

[37] In EU strategy it is stated that "We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity", while Poland affirms that it "recognizes NATO's cooperation with Russia as an area of special importance and it shall be actively engaged in advancing it. Partnership with Russia should result in that country's greater involvement in Euroatlantic cooperation, and thus add to greater security and stability in the region".

[38] Constantin Degeratu, State Counsellor at the Romanian Presidency and member of the team which worked in conceiving the strategy, has stated during an interview titled "Security Strategy. Way of use" delivered on 11th of August 2006 to "Revista 22", I do not believe it is about a bulky document, but about an elaborated, comprehensive one, maybe a bit didacticist, but – for sure – rigorous and coherent, under the aspect of both the options and the terminology".

Strategy[39], others rendering obvious elements of closeness rather to USA security strategy than to European strategy and having a concept which requires at least to be adjusted, if not re-written[40]. We consider that in the text of the National Security Strategy of Romania these tendencies of closeness to USA are indirect and appear only in subsidiary form.

However, a direct analysis of the text, such as the one we performed, without searching for hidden or indirect interpretations, makes obvious the elements which do not counterpoint Romania's National Security Strategy (RNSS) to the European security context of the European Security Strategy (ESS). Both documents agree upon the following aspects:

- no state can approach the security issue in an individual manner;
- terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime all constitute key threats;
- none of the threats is purely military; the best solution constitutes a combination of instruments and methods.
- regional security and stability are thought to be complementary in the context of a new paradigm, the policies of good policy of good neighbourliness playing a primordial role in providing them.

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: CURRENT STATE, FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

Europe is nowadays the stage of some profound changes as a result of the European Union enlargement process. Far from being an easy process, the achievement of European unity project has gathered strength, especially after enforcing the European Union as a political-economical organisation, the most relevant progress being achieved in these fields. But political and economical cooperation alone cannot ensure a vigorous community of states.

[39] Ibidem, "The Security Strategy of the European Union (December 2003) was one of our main sources of external inspiration".

[40] "Ovidiu Şincai" Institute, Political Analysis Report "Analysis of the national Security Strategy of Romania", Bucharest, 9th of March 2006: "…from a comparative perspective, the security strategy proposed by the Presidential Administration is strongly influenced by the American strategy, from which it took over the theme of anti-terrorist fight and the way of approaching it, and also (probably via European channel) the speculation of substituting the democracy by the concept of "good governance". The loans from the EU strategy are superficial and do not affect the document's substance (the lack of correlation between RNSS and the EU conception would create problems to Romania within the process of its European integration)".

The fundamental rights and parliamentary democracy also represent bases of Europe's present identity, which tends to a "community of values" being unanimously accepted, in close relation with the national and regional identities. The idea of a united Europe may be viable only through cooperation. In order to avoid fragmentation, disorder and conflict of any kind (social, economic, political, ethnic-religious, military) and to achieve a viable cohesion through cooperation and solidarity, a political, economic, juridical, security and defence identity have been shaped.

In comparison with previous periods in the European history, Europe will pass in the near future a period characterised by peace and a high level of stability. The European states' history of cooperation with the USA and NATO in the field of European security has had positive effects in strengthening peace and security in Europe. Today European and Euro-Atlantic security follow the same applicability principles in the international environment, having as their objective collective defence and the application of the principle of indivisible allied security.

Europe adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, a strategy in which it defends the thesis that to the challenges, risks and threats addressed to its security it must provide adapted responses and in which it expresses the intention to sustain a multi-level strategy. The European Security Strategy identifies some threats but also some vulnerabilities. The major problems which the ESS looks upon as vulnerabilities and threats do not strictly refer to any particular state or nation, but include general level theories, identifying risks and dangers such as poverty, hunger, the chaotic acceleration of the economic domain. On the other hand, threats are identified in much more objective presentations: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism; organised crime; hostile attitudes towards European expatriates; attacks against European peacekeeping and/or peace reconstruction forces. Some vulnerabilities and threats may affect the whole international system, others envisage only the zonal and regional levels, but some unsolved problems appear as risks which may become threats. The European concept of security is also specified in the "Joint Declaration on European Defence Integration 2004"[41], underlining the role of cooperation and consensus upon the responsibilities existing in the framework of NATO and EU structures and of certain common development

[41] Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, Joint Declaration on European Defence Integration, August, 19, 2004.

plans for the capacities necessary in implementing the NATO Response Force and EU inter-arms fighting groups.

Within the new European architecture, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) plays an increasingly important role, targeted to achieve the following objectives[42]:

- prevention of conflicts, crises management;
- control of armament and disarmament;
- increase of confidence and safety;
- economic, cultural, humanitarian and ecologic cooperation;
- conceptualization of a new security model in its area of responsibility.

Because today the military intervention of the strong nation-states is no longer efficient or necessary for maintaining peace and stability, it was appreciated that a regionally arranged network of collective security was required. The UN, NATO, the EU and OSCE are partisan institutions to security as such. Collective security is based on the premise that threats may appear not necessarily only from the outside, but from the inside as well, and avoidance of the danger is at least as critical as the response to threats within one's own capacities. The opinions of the majority are centred on the idea that investing in a non-state collective mechanism for restoring and maintaining security will create strong partners for states and alliances, in this period of a search for post-hegemonic security.

Although from the historical and geographical point of view Europe was the melting pot in which both world conflagrations have "fermented" and burst out and also the area where numerous armed conflicts have taken place, it can become a functional model for extended, sustainable stability and security[43]. The present Euro-Atlantic security architecture reflects the essential features of the geopolitical environment in which it develops: the transition towards the multi-polar international system; the competition between the powers in the Euro-Atlantic space for re-distributing the roles; the deepening of EU integration; the Russian Federation attempts to maintain its status of great power on the world arena and to hold key positions in the European security structures. Security is based both on political stability and on military stability, these being complementary conditions. A mobile

[42] According to the Helsinki Final Act, 1975.
[43] Duţă P. D., Purcărea M. T., Cordoneanu O., The International Organizations and the security environment, 2008.

European security system would be constructed only if the two components were consolidated.

Analyses of risks and dangers to security have led to a new perception of the security state and to a new orientation in the field of defence. Both Romania and other countries of Europe understand that under the present conditions of the international environment given by the complexity and fluidity of the political-strategic environment they can ensure their security only by integrating their own energy within the actions taken by the European and Euro-Atlantic security organisations.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, security and the states' concerns for ensuring it have held a central place in determining the world's evolution and in establishing the new world order.

The present security environment was consolidated by the political decisions of the NATO summit in Prague (2002) and of the EU summit in Copenhagen (2002), decisions which envisaged the re-evaluation of the security environment and its adaptation to the new threats of the today's world.

The NATO summit in Bucharest (April 2008) made a major contribution in developing and consolidating the security environment through the accumulations and results it obtained. The Alliance has taken the decision to continue extending itself and has invited Albania and Croatia to start discussions for joining the Alliance. The topic related to Afghanistan was also approached in a detailed way, 12 partners of the Alliance being convinced by the USA to continue supporting the fight against terrorism. The summit's contribution in strengthening the security environment was made complete by the organisation of the NATO-Russia Council, a meeting held in a climate of tension regarding the relations between the Occident and Moscow, in a sensitive context within the Balkans, where Kosovo has declared its independence, upon which there is no unanimous support among NATO members, and Russia, which has suspended its participation to the *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* and which wishes to be the main advocate of the Serbian cause.

Among the summit's remarkable results which will significantly influence the security environment, it is worth mentioning here the USA agreement with its NATO partners upon a plan regarding the construction of a anti-missile defensive shield in Eastern Europe, combining the American elements with those of NATO, with the goal of ensuring protection for the whole of Europe and energy security, but also protection against information technology attacks.

The European security environment reflects the complexity of the factors, conditions and relations existing at any particular moment in time at the political, military, socio-economical, ecological and cultural level etc.; it does not present itself as a unitary whole, but emphasizes certain specific points depending on region and geographical zone, and suffers certain influences from the regional and zone security environments, sometimes even from the local security environments.

Some of these influences are positive, others reverberate negatively upon the present security environment in Eastern and Central Europe. The Euro-Atlantic security environment generated by the European state members of NATO together with the USA and Canada fall into the first category; the same being the case for the regional environment of Occidental Europe, determined by the nature and the quality of the relations & institutions of the European Union states.

To the second category belong the evolving states of South-Eastern Europe, especially the zone of the Western Balkans, but also of Eastern Europe and even of Central Europe. Following Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltic Countries have joined NATO, meaning that in this European area fundamental changes have taken place from the security point of view.

Crisis focuses are still maintained in Macedonia and in Serbia as a result of the dispute for Kosovo.

The realities of the current European security environment emphasize in a suggestive way the interdependencies and correlations between the evolutions of the internal and international environments. The future seems also to be marked by the same powerful interdependencies, the forecast of the subsequent trends in the global security environment having an important stake in ensuring a peaceful and secure world climate.

The political analysts and experts working in the field of international relations studies estimate major changes in the security environment for the next 15 – 20 years, changes that will generate a reconfiguration dependent on the type, degree and level of participation of the key factors and of the international actors which will play a role in it.

In December 2000, the National Intelligence Council—USA published a report under the title, "Global Trends 2015" on the propelling factors and trends shaping the world in 2015. During the more then 15 months that the research work took with the view to elaborating this report, over 13 conferences and workshops were organised

with the relevant participation of representatives from non-governmental institutions and specialists from the academic environment, the private sector and various other fields (CIA, National Intelligence Council (NIC), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK, Potomac Institute, Arlington, VA, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, The National Defence University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, USA government, Georgetown University, Maryland University, etc.).

The study identified seven global actors and afferent trends which will shape the world in 2015, namely[44]:

(l) Demographic developments
(2) Natural resources and environment
(3) Science and technology
(4) Global economy and globalization
(5) National and international governing
(6) Nature of conflicts
(7) Role of the USA

The report underlines the idea that none of these trends will globally dominate the future at the time horizon of 2015, each of the identified factors having different impact levels on countries and regions. These factors do not necessarily sustain or consolidate each other; in some cases they will act in a competitive manner, with the potential effect of reciprocal weakening.

In October 2006, European Defence Agency (EDA) published the results of a study on same topic, reckoning that demographic and economic predictions as well as the estimated consequences of globalisation hold a high level of importance in order to properly manage Europe's future, its security and defence policy in the knowledge of the most "relevant and robust" global trends for the next 20 years (2006–2025) [45]. The features, identified by this study, of the future global context in which Europe will play, are[46]:

[44] National Intelligence Council's "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts" report, 2000, p2.
[45] European Defence Agency, An initial long-term vision for European defence capability and capacity needs, 2006, p4.
[46] Ibidem, pp6 – 8.

- the demographic growth accompanied by regional fluctuations and ageing populations (the Middle East will experience an increase in the young population, while in Russia the population will decrease by 10% by 2025);
- globalization—which will bring with it more and more diversity, interdependence and inequity;
- a decrease in the world's energy resources and the increase of Europe's dependence on the energy of the rest of the world (the interests of European security will face some challenges due to tensions from neighbouring and further-off zones, generated by the diminishing of energy resources);
- a world more interdependent and more exposed to controversies regarding the military operations non-explicitly authorized by the UN;

CONCLUSIONS

The five states analysed in the present study have security strategies with common and also divergent elements.

The common denominator conferring them the characteristic of a distinct group is given by their vision upon the preferred international order.

This common vision upon the international order may be described as follows:

- international legislation must reflect the changes in the character of the threats to security and must be adapted to the new changes;
- the role of the UN Security Council is seen as important but not as primordial or major (Hungary: "*the UN Security Council will continue to bear primary, but not exclusive responsibility…*", Slovakia and Romania do not mention the UN Security Council, the Czech Republic sees it as an organism "*whose mandate should be reached in the event of coercive actions*" and Poland is invariably in favour of strengthening the role played by the UN Security Council in the area of peace and international security);
- NATO is considered the most important security guarantor in all the five strategies.

Although we have seen that there are also differences in the five strategies, one cannot say that these are radical, being in a way linked to the hierarchy of the elements contained in the document and to their statements.

In conclusion, by taking into account both the common points and also those in which the five strategies are divergent, we may appreciate that basically the five documents reflect the same general vision on the concept of security, with "soft" and "hard" accents, depending on the regional contextual elements.

REFERENCES

Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (Act LXII of 2001), http://www.hhrf.org/htmh/en/?menuid=02, (25.08.2009)

Binnendijk H., Simon J., November 1996, Hungary's "Near Abroad", Minorities Policy and Bilateral Treaties.

David I., Romania and the evolutions of the European security environment, Review ComuniQue nr. 4, 2008, www.comunique.ro, (25.08.2009)

Degeratu C., interview in Review 22, "Security Strategy. Way of use" 11th of August 2006;

Duță P. D., Purcărea M. T., Cordoneanu O., The international organizations and the security environment, "Techno media" Publishing House, ISBN 978-973-7865-63-2, Sibiu, 2008.

European Defence Agency, An initial long-term vision for European defence capability and capacity needs, 2006.

European Security Strategy, 2003, MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html, (25.08.2009)

Helsinki Final Act, OSCE, 1975, http://www.osce.org, http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/4044_en.pdf.html, (25.08.2009)

Hough M., The concept of a national security strategy: the case of the United States and South Africa, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, November, 2006

Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, Joint Declaration on European Defence Integration, August, 19, 2004.

Klich B., The New National Security Strategy of Poland: Ready to Face the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, Quarterly Journal of the Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC) of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, vol. III, no. 2, June 2004. https://consortium.pims.org/filestore2/download/1616/Ready%20to%20Face%20the%20Challenges%20of%20the%20Twenty-First%20Century.pdf

Law no.45/1994 regarding National Defence of Romania.

Law no. 51/1991 regarding the National Security of Romania.

Mitchell W., USA and EU in a multi-polar world, "Review 22", 9th of December 2008.

Moştoflei C., The national security and the Euro-Atlantic and European integration (III) Strategic Colloquium, no. 6, 2004.

National Intelligence Council's "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts" report, December 2000 http://infowar.net/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/, (25.08.2009)

Pasti V., Miroiu M., Codiță C., Romania – Matter of facts, vol. 1: Society, Bucharest, Nemira Publishing House, 973-9301-20-7, 9301-21-5, 1997;

Political Analysis Report: "Analysis of the National Security Strategy of Romania", "Ovidiu Şincai" Institute, Bucharest, 2006.

Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=24118&ido=7567&idj=2, (25.08.2009)-

Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic 2001, MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html, (25.08.2009)

Ambassador Towpik, A., Shaping National Security Policy in Poland in Post-Cold War Europe, at Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, 24th of January 2007.

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary 2004, MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html, (4.07.2009)

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2007, MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html, (25.08.2009)

The National Security Strategy of Romania, 2007, MERLN (the Military Education Research Library Network), http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html, (25.08.2009)

Vlăsceanu L., Politics and development. Romania where to?, Trei" Publishing House, ISBN: 973-9419-86-0, Bucharest, 2001.

The Visegrad Group, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=858, (25.08.2009)

FURTHER READINGS

Arveds, Trapans Jan: National security concepts in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO Review no. 6, Nov-Dec 1997, pp. 27 – 30;

Atwood, Brian US Agency for International Development Administrator: Towards a New Definition of National Security: The New Strategic Threats, Current History, Vol. 62, no. 5, December 15, 1995;

Bailes, Alyson J. K.: The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Policy Paper No. 10, Feb. 2005;

Bailes, Alyson J.K. and Cottey, Andrew: Regional security cooperation in the early 21st century, SIPRI Yearbook 2006 chapters;

Bailes, Alyson J. K.: The world of security and peace research in a 40-year perspective, SIPRI Yearbook 2006 chapters;

Cosma, M., Ispas T.: Romania's integration within the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, Publishing House of the Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, 2002.

Cosma, M.: The North Atlantic Alliance – initiator of the organization and functioning of a security and collective defence system, Review of the Land Forces Academy No. 1, 2005;

Cummings, S.: War and Peace in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe, in War and Peace in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, ARAG publications (Advanced Research and Assessment Group), Central and European Series, March 2000;

Dwan, Renata and Lachowski, Zdzislaw: The military and security dimensions of the European Union, SIPRI Yearbook 2003 chapters;

Delevic, M.: Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies [ISS], July 2007, p. 106;

Fulga, Gh.: Implications of the NATO enlargement upon the regional security climate, "Defensa" Review, no. 320, December 2004, p. 6-7.

Gabal I., Helsusova L., Azayna S. T.: The impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic: Changing Czech Views of Security, Military and Defence, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, ARAG publications (Advanced Research and Assessment Group), Central and European Series, March 2002;

Gani, Miriam; Mathew, Penelope (editors): Fresh Perspectives on the 'War on Terror, ANU E Press, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia, edition 2008;

Grigorieva, J.: The Region under Tensions: Current Black Sea Region Stability Factors, in Security in the Black Sea Region, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, ARAG publications (Advanced Research and Assessment Group), Central and European Series, March 2001;

Hazewinkel, H.J.: Self-determination, territorial integrity and the OSCE, in: Helsinki Monitor Security and Human Rights, 18(4) 2007: 289-302;

Herd, P. G.: European Security and Post-Soviet Space: Integration or Isolation?, in European Security and Post-Soviet Space, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, ARAG publications (Advanced Research and Assessment Group), Central and European Series, December 2000;

Herolf, Gunilla: National and Supranational Actors in European Foreign Policy, in K Y Nikolov (ed.) Adopting to Integration in an Enlarged European Union (Bulgarian European Community Studies Association (BECSA), 2008;

Ispas, T.: NATO enlargement and the European security, the Review of the Land Forces Academy, no. 2 (22), Trimester II – 2001;

Keridis, D.; Pfaltzgraff, R.L. jr. [eds.]: NATO and south eastern Europe: security issues for the early 21st century, Dulles: Brassey's, 2000, p. 248.

Kovalova, E.: The expanding security agenda: challenges for transition states, in: CONNECTIONS, 7(1) Spring 2008, pp. 167-176;

Lachowski, Zdzislaw: Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the New Europe; SIPRI Research Report No. 18, 2004;

Lupták, Ľubomír; Hersi, Alexander; Ondrejcsák, Róbert; Tarasovič, Vladimír (eds.): Panorama of Global Security Environment 2005 – 2006, Department of Security and Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava 2006;

Maties, M.: Prospects And Challenges To Romanian Foreign Policy In The Near Future, in War and Peace in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, ARAG publications (Advanced Research and Assessment Group), Central and European Series, March 2000;

Pantev, P.: The Stability Pact For South-Eastern Europe, in Security in the Black Sea Region, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, ARAG publications (Advanced Research and Assessment Group), Central and European Series, March 2001;

Romania – Country Assessment of Security and Democracy, Central and South Eastern European Security Forum (CSEESF) - Balkan Mosaic, Atlantic Treaty Association and the Euro-Atlantic Education Initiative, Third Sofia Meeting, Sofia, 28 – 30 June 2006;

Santini, Hanau R. M.: The European Union´s definition of threats after 9/11: a look at three relevant foreign policy documents, Annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, February 28, 2007;

Sherr, J.: Democracy in the Black Sear Region: The Missing Link in Regional Security, in Democracy in the Black Sea Region, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, ARAG publications (Advanced Research and Assessment Group), Central and European Series, March 2002;

Temirov, Y.: Security In The Black Sea Region: Military Threats & Potential, in Security in the Black Sea Region, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, ARAG publications (Advanced Research and Assessment Group), Central and European Series, March 2001;

Threats to security, Center for Security and Defence Strategic Studies, Publishing House of the National Defence College , Bucharest, 2004;

The security strategies of the Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia in the context of the European Security Strategy, Collective of authors, Polygraphic Department of the Institute for Security and Defence Studies of MoD of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava 2005;

The Visegrad Group – A Central European Constellation, International Visegrad Fund, ed. by Andrzej Jagodziński, Bratislava 2006;

Zhgenti, C.: Security In The Black Sea Region - The Role Of The OSCE , in Security in the Black Sea Region, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, ARAG publications (Advanced Research and Assessment Group), Central and European Series, March 2001.

Zulean, M.: The National Security Policy. Concepts, institutions, processes, Polirom Publishing House, 2007, "Collegium. Public Policies" Collection, ISBN 978-973-46-0624-5;

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN DANUBE STRATEGY

ARMAĞAN GÖZKAMAN

Coursing through nineteen states, the Danube region is one of the most multinational river basins of the world.[1] As a land of transition between Western and South Eastern Europe, it unites old and new democracies, market economies, social and cultural areas. With over 200 million inhabitants, the states which border the river represent an important socio-economic potential within Europe.

To these facts, one can also add its symbolic significance: the region is the emblem of the successful reunification of Europe after the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Wall brought about profound transformations for the whole international system and proclaimed a new geopolitical period for Central and Eastern Europe. The countries of the region used to be more in competition with each other than in partnership. Yugoslavia was a socialist state but claimed a particular status. Romania was a member of COMECON, but not of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Hungary adopted reforms that brought its economic system closer to capitalism.

Today, the situation is considerably different: the relations between the countries of the region are remarked by cooperation. In addition, as the Rhine symbolises Franco-German reconciliation and the beginnings of European integration, the Danube stands for the new European Union that has achieved reconciliation with its other half (The Danube – River of the European Future, 2008: 2).

An effort to expose the opportunities for an EU strategy on Danube may plausibly be built on two pillars. Hence, the first part of this study will expose the different levels of cooperation by taking into considerations the efforts made—mainly—by (a) the countries of the region and (b) the same countries' interest in fully integrating the European institutions. The second part will concern the EU's involvement in the Danube region by (a) giving the general overview of the existing structures and policies before (b) moving on with the European Danube Strategy.

[1] The basin covers part or all of 19 riparian countries: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and Ukraine.

I. COOPERATION IN THE DANUBE AREA: A MULTI-LEVEL PRACTICE

Cooperation is of crucial importance to states whose interests are interconnected. This reality remains unchanged in the Danubian Basin. Close scrutiny on two levels of cooperation seems to be useful for the present study. Therefore, the intra-Danubian initiatives will precede the defence cooperation between the states of the region and Western Europe.

a) Intra-regional cooperation on the Danube

Some forms of co-operation along the river already exist. In the Danube Region, as was the case for the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, the rapprochement to Western organizations was conducted parallel with regional cooperation. As a consequence, a multitude of transnational and regional initiatives have emerged. This new context has brought life to a sophisticated network concerning economic, social, political and commercial domains.

The Danube Commission was formed as an intergovernmental institution by eleven riparian countries—the Netherlands and France have observer status. Set up by the Convention regarding the regime of navigation on the Danube signed in Belgrade on 18 August, 1948, it aims to ensure free navigation and strengthen and develop economic and cultural relations between the signatory states (Danube Commission, 2009).

Since 1998, the International Commission for the Protection of the River Danube River (ICPDR) works for the preservation of the Danubian ecosystem. The signatories to the Danube River Protection Convention have reached consensus on the necessity to deal with water management issues by taking "all appropriate legal, administrative and technical measures to at least maintain and where possible improve the current water quality and environmental conditions of the Danube river and of the waters in its catchment area, and to prevent and reduce as far as possible adverse impacts and changes occurring or likely to be caused" (International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, 2009). Although its capacity needs to be improved, the efforts of the Commission led to satisfactory results.

The Danube Cooperation Process is an intergovernmental framework that was launched in 2002 by a statement signed by representatives of thirteen Danubian states, the Commissioner for External Relations of the EU and the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. The objectives of the Process are to *"broaden*

and deepen present Danube Co-operation and give to it clear political and economic dimensions, without creating new institutions, but taking stock of and using the existing structures and, where necessary, harmonizing their objectives and efforts, providing a focus, where appropriate, for their efforts within the Danube region" (Danube Co-operation Process, 2009). The areas that are covered concern economy, sustainable development, transport, navigation, tourism, culture and sub-regions (Ibid).

The initiative called "Danube Cities and Regions" is based on practical grounds. Various regions along the river have been developing joint projects in culture, science, education, ecology and business. A little effort has been sufficient to give a firm organisational structure to the existing network. The Council of the Danube Cities was established during the Fourth European Conference of the Danube Cities and Regions that convened in June 2009. The Council is expected to make a valuable contribution to the establishment of an integrated European Danube region (Danube Watch, 2009). Its objective is twofold: to strengthen the lobbying within EU institutions and to obtain EU funding to better cooperation between the countries and the regions of Danube (COMPress Wien, 2009).

b) Security: A particular platform of cooperation between East and West

The security/defence realm provides a strong justification of the desire on the part of region's states to integrate western institutions. In order to adhere to such bodies the states have pursued successful policies, and the OSCE, NATO and the EU foresee strong security cooperation. In addition to joining these institutions, one can also underscore the formulations in which they take part. This point is important not only for proving their willingness to strengthen their connections with western organisations, but also for revealing that this attitude is echoed on the European side.

Many examples can be given in order to support this view, one such being NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Set up in late 1991, it brought together NATO members and nine Central and Eastern European countries in a new consultative forum. It was in accordance with the 1991 Summit of NATO that convened in Rome, where the strategic concept was adopted by the Allies. The meeting outlined a broad approach to security based on dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defence capability by taking into consideration the evolving partnership and cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (The Rome Summit – November 1991).

The Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) was another mechanism of the post-Cold War period driven by the same logic. NATO suggested to the former members of the Warsaw Pact that they build up a framework for confidence-building cooperation. This move gave birth to the PfP, whose purpose is to reinforce stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Partner countries and NATO, without excluding partner countries (The Partnership for Peace, 2009). Pragmatism and flexibility are the determining features of the initiative: each state determines the areas in which it wishes to bring a contribution to the partnership. As of today, 22 states in eastern and south-eastern Europe, the southern Caucasus, Central Asia and Western Europe are involved in this cooperation scheme.[2]

In 1997, the NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) which was founded as a forum for political consultation to gather the 28 NATO members and the 22 partner states. The EAPC provides for both a short and long-term consultation and cooperation opportunity to discuss various topics. Its activities complement the PfP programmes (NATO Handbook, 2001).

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is another example. Launched in 1999 as the first comprehensive conflict prevention strategy of the international community, it aims at "strengthening the efforts of the countries of South Eastern Europe in fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity" (About the Stability Pact). The Pact has been changed into a regional cooperation network (Regional Cooperation Council, RCC), which works within the overall framework of the South-East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP). The latter is a forum for diplomatic and political dialogue among Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Turkey, Republic of Croatia and Montenegro. It was launched in 1996 in order to ensure a long-term multilateral cooperation in the following fields:

- strengthening stability, security and good-neighbourly relations;
- economic development;
- humanitarian, social and cultural issues;
- justice, combat against organized crime, illicit drug and arms trafficking, and terrorism.

[2] The PfP is composed of former Republics of the USSR (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan), former Yugoslav states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia), EU members (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden) and Switzerland.

II. THE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU'S DANUBE STRATEGY

The EU's enlargement towards the East necessitated a large-scale support for the development of the Central and Eastern European countries. Several declarations made by the Council, Parliament and the Commission pointed to this issue. The policies that the EU elaborated have been accompanied by financial instruments which aimed to meet this challenge. Three of them stand out: *Pologne et Hongrie Assistance pour la Restructuration Economique* (PHARE), *the Pre-Accession Instrument for Structural Policies* (ISPA) and the *Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development* (SAPARD).

PHARE, originally designed for Hungary and Poland and extended later to other Central and Eastern European candidates, has been funding modernisation for over ten years. ISPA has been funding transport and environmental schemes since early 2000, along the same lines as the Cohesion Fund model designed for the least prosperous EU members. SAPARD is operational since 2000 as well and helps the applicants fulfil the requirements of the common agricultural policy—especially in what regards the standards of food quality, consumer protection and environmental issues (ISPA, Phare and SAPARD, 2009).

Besides the above-mentioned programmes focusing on all of the candidate countries, the EU has proven its commitment to the Danubian region as well. In the first section, the involvement of the EU will be analysed by citing the factors contributing to its foundation. The elaboration of a European strategy for the Danube will come next.

a) The EU's ongoing involvement in the Danube Region

The reasons why the Danubian basin raises the EU's interest are numerous. That the Union has been extending its frontiers towards the region may be cited first. Over the years, many countries have acquired EU membership. One of them is a founding member of the Community. The first enlargement that incorporated a Danubian state occurred in 1995 and was followed by those of 2004 and 2007. More will join in the future. It is therefore not wrong to argue that the basin has become an EU space.

Further importance is related to the River Danube's being a Trans-European corridor. As part of the 35,000 kilometre-long inland waterway network, it is a major cargo route connecting the North Sea (port of Rotterdam) to the Black Sea (port of Constanza). For centuries, it has been an important transportation system. Its

importance was highlighted during the war in former Yugoslavia, which had a severe impact upon navigation when Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine were almost cut off from European markets.

Biodiversity is another feature that puts Danube on the EU's agenda. The basin, home to a considerable range of wildlife, is under threat of pollution. This has paved the way for international efforts, such as the *Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of Danube River* was signed in June 1994. The main objectives of the Convention are "sustainable and equitable water management" and the maintenance and improvement of the "current environmental and water quality conditions" (Louka, 2004: 200). For its part, the EU is involved in various initiatives that deal directly (such as the contribution of 500 million Euros to the wastewater treatment projects) or indirectly (for instance, through the "South-East Europe" and the "Central Europe" programmes) with the environment.

The European Commission provides important support to Danube developments. The Transnational Cooperation Programme "South-East Europe" that it approved in late 2007 involves Community support for regions in 16 countries[3] and will cover the period 2007-2013 (Operation Programme South-East Europe). The programme concerns a population of 200 million people with a budget of 245 million Euros to which an amount of 206 million should be added due to the European Regional Development Fund's assistance.[4]

Another, similar programme is called "Central Europe" and covers the same period of time as "South-East Europe". It encourages transnational cooperation to facilitate innovation, improve accessibility, promote environment and to enhance competitiveness in the Central European countries (Central Europe, 2009). To fulfil these objectives, the European Regional Development Fund has allocated a budget of 246 million Euros to provide funding for projects in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine.

[3] For 14 countries the eligible area is the whole territory of the country, namely for Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and Moldova. In Italy and Ukraine, only certain regions are eligible.

[4] The strategic goal aimed by the programme is to improve "the territorial, economic and social integration process and contribute to cohesion, stability and competitiveness" through the development of transnational partnerships. The programme focuses on four thematic priorities: Innovation, environment, accessibility, and sustainable urban development. The Commission's aim is to build a concrete opportunity for Western Balkans to move towards the European Union and to deepen relations with the EU neighbouring countries.

Through the European Commission, the EU also offers support for the Trans-European Networks. These networks are primarily designed to improve cross-country transportation and emphasise the link between growth and investment in infrastructure. The Rhine/Meuse-Main-Danube trajectory is one of the principal waterway projects that obtains a high rate of European-level financing. It is worth reminding that the ambitions of these projects are far more diversified than their name suggests. Apart from tackling transport, they maximise public benefits by enhancing flood prevention, regional development and protection of biodiversity.

b) The elaboration of a "European Danube Strategy"

In light of the issues that are laid out above, the fact that the policies pursued in the region will affect the lives of millions of European citizens is plain to see. As a corollary, it is legitimate to maintain that the region deserves a strategy that is similar to Baltic or Mediterranean regions. The statement made by the European Commissioner responsible for Regional Policy, Danuta Hübner, reflects a similar view: "*A one-size-fits all approach doesn't work in an EU of 27 Member States and 271 regions. We need a targeted policy for the Danube that meets its ecological, transport and socio-economic needs*" (Europa Press Releases RAPID, 2008).

In fact, all the work that somehow concerns the strategy is the end product of the European Union's long-term interest in the region. In other words, even though the objective of preparing the strategy paper has not been declared in the past, the steps that have followed one another seem to have tacitly led to its formulation. On these grounds, a European strategy for the future of the Danube river is to be drafted by the end of 2010 (Pop, 2009). This was also the date that the EU presidency, during the Brussels summit that convened in June 2009, had invited the European Commission to present a strategy for the region. The strategy will most likely accord priority to the following topics (EU Danube Strategy Background Paper, 2009):

- the improvement of transport;
- the protection of environment (including the fight against pollution);
- the promotion of economic development, activities of culture and tourism;
- the reinforcement of disaster management (for instance, flooding).

Undoubtedly stimulated by the Presidency's call upon the Commission, the Committee of the Regions of the EU (CoR), which has a key position in the EU's

endeavours to prepare a strategy for Danube, adopted a report in October 2009 which suggests fields of action for the strategy. These concern transport, environmental protection, energy security, general security, economy, education and culture, work, health and social affairs. The report also stresses the importance of the Danube area's inclusion into the European Commission's work priorities for 2010 as a prerequisite for further integration and economic development of the region.

The importance attached by the CoR to the region was already proved by the setting up of an inter-regional Danube group at the end of 2008. The group was composed of local and regional representatives from German, Austrian, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian and Bulgarian regions in the Danube area. Croatia and Serbia were represented as well.

PERSPECTIVES

In light of the EU's various policies and initiatives, it was undeniable that the Danube area had some place in Brussels' perceptions. Yet many of the institutions, networks and partnerships that have been created in the last 20 years have not been intensively linked to those of the EU. The recent emergence of a Danube strategy reveals a reverse of this attitude. The European Union, similarly to Mediterranean and the more recent Baltic examples, intends to reap the benefits of a coherent regional approach.

When the European Commission's proposal for the Strategy on the Baltic Sea Region is examined, it is easy to understand why the EU institutions are willing to see adopted a strategy for the Danubian Basin. First, the general overview of the two regions shows remarkable similarities. Both are highly heterogeneous areas in economic, environmental and cultural terms, while the countries share many common resources and demonstrate considerable interdependence. As the Commission document reminds one, actions in one area can very quickly have consequences for other parts, or the whole, of the region (Communication from the Commission, 2009: 2).

In the Baltic strategy, there is at least one more factor that highlights the pertinence of a European strategy for the Danube: The introduction of Community rules and policies in this zone have created new opportunities for closer cooperation on various sectors. As can be observed in the case of the Baltic region, they have improved the standards of living of Danubian citizens. Yet the situation can become even better despite the existing satisfactory levels of communication and cooperation

at international and inter-regional levels. An analogy can be built between the two regions by maintaining that the full advantage of the new opportunities that EU membership provides has not yet been exploited and that the challenges have not yet been adequately addressed. Therefore, the objectives pursued for Baltic states apply for the Danube region too.

The prospective EU strategy is all the more significant when taking into account its capacity to bolster the creation of a common development area, linked politically, economically and culturally along the Danube. It is a truism to affirm that cooperation and common policies may not always bring about the desired results. A wide-range strategy maintained by strong financial means will definitely be helpful in achieving the objectives followed by a variety of regional formulations.

Another usefulness of the strategy will be to help the region be considered as a single major unit. At present, the region is divided into separate eligible areas to receive structural funds. Both the states of the region and the EU are backing the single-unit approach. To have a reference to the Danube area as a unified development block and to ensure European institutions' strong commitment to the latter were among the issues on which the state representatives agreed to work during the Danube Conference 2008 (The Danube – River of the European Future, 2008: 6). For its part, the CoR had asked European institutions to consider the region in its entirety in the next development phase (Europa Releases RAPID, 2009). According to the CoR rapporteur, the Danube region "should be viewed as a single transnational European area of development" so that it can reach its economic, social, environmental and cultural potential to the fullest possible (Ibid).

The EU needs a vision in the Danube region. A clear and structured project for the region will only improve the existing situation. Therefore, the decision to adopt a European Strategy for the Danube is pertinent. The fact that such a decision is in conformity with the actions taken so far makes it all the more relevant. This stance gains more validity when the perspective is shifted from regional to global: The questions that the European Union need to tackle in the Danubian region match the objectives it follows in the international fora.

REFERENCES

Louka, E. Conflicting Integration: The Environmental Law of the European Union, Intersentia, Antwerp – Oxford – New York, 2004, p: 200.

Pop, V. (2009). "Danube Strategy to Focus on Transport and Environment", EUobserver, http://euobserver.com/882/28387, (22.08.2009).

"About the Stability Pact", Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, available at http://www.stabilitypact.org/, (22.08.2009).

"Central European Programme 2007-2013", Interreg III B CADSES, Central Europe available at http://www.central2013.eu/, (22.08.2009).

"Collaboration between Cities and Regions Generates the New European Danube Region", Danube Watch, February 2009 http://www.icpdr.org/icpdr-pages/dw0902_p_14.htm, (22.08.2009).

"Committee of the Regions Pushes Through Its Demand for an EU Danube Strategy" (2009), Europa Press Releases RAPID, COR/09/93 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=COR/09/93&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, (10.10.2009).

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, COM (2009) 248 Final, Brussels, 10.06.2009.

Danube Co-operation Process http://www.stabilitypact.org/wt2/DCP.asp, (22.08.2009).

Danube Commission http://www.danubecommission.org/index.php/en_US/index, (22.08.2009).

"Danuta Hübner Calls for a European Danube Strategy", Europa Press Releases RAPID, IP/08/1461, Brussels, 06.10.2008 (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1461&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en).

"EU Danube Strategy Background Paper" (Draft Version), Assembly of European Regions, 11/08/2009 www.aer.eu, (22.08.2009).

"Founding of the Council of the Danube Cities and Regions in Budapes", Compress Wien http://www.wieninternational.at/en/node/14713, (22.08.2009).

International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River http://www.icpdr.org/icpdr-pages/drpc.htm, (12.08.2009).

"ISPA, Phare and SAPARD", Regional Policy – Inforegio http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/ispa/enlarge_en.htm (22.08.2009).

"Operational Programme South-East Europe", Regional Policy – Inforegio, European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/details_new.cfm?gv_PAY=AL&gv_reg=ALL&gv_PGM=1323&gv_defL=9&LAN=7, (22.08.2009).

"The Danube – River of the European Future", Final Declaration of the Danube Conference 2008 on 6th and 7th of October in the Representation of the State of Baden-Württemberg of the European Union, p: 2.

"The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council", NATO Handbook; http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb020202.htm#FN1, (22.08.2009).

"The Partnership for Peace", North Atlantic Treaty Organisation http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm, (22.08.2009).

"The Rome Summit – November 1991", NATO Handbook http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb010301.htm, (22.08.2009).

EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGY FOR THE DANUBE REGION
TOWARD A STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE REGIONAL COOPERATION

Ioana Veronica Ionescu

INTRODUCTION

The River Danube, the cradle of civilizations for many ancient cultures of Europe, has been participating, as a real witness, in political ambitions and diplomatic negotiations, bearing on its troubled waves a true collection of spiritual and social connections and a unique space for the continuous development of its territory.

From a geostrategic perspective, the Danube delimitates, to the north, the Balkan Peninsula from the rest of Europe and represents a natural connector of the European Union with the non-EU countries in the South-East. Historically, the Danube has marked ages of cultural trends and socio-political experiences and been silent witness to the dramatic transformations in the ideologies, human conventions and social principles of the inhabiting nations along its banks.

We are all strongly related to this River: through traditions, cultural values, economical interests and religions. The Danube represents our common past and our future existence, a blue ribbon between the Black Forest and the Black Sea and a network of territories that goes beyond the region, to the rest of Europe and further to the East. The Danube region should be, then, defined by its increased strategic potential in sustaining ambitious projects with the purpose of improving living conditions and sustainable growth.

However, there are still some questions with no answer that invite the opening of a new reflective process over the best available mechanisms that can be used for transforming this European region in a competitive and dynamic structure: which is the most appropriate way of integrating local or national initiatives in a "macro" perspective for the benefit of everybody? Does geography matter in setting up political alliances or economic partnerships? Is our society ready for a new experiment in understanding and applying synergic tools of cooperation?

INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, HISTORY LESSONS

According to the *Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses*, an "international watercourse" means a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different states[1]. Therefore, boundary waters refer to waters such as rivers, lakes, reservoirs and canals, parts of which are situated in different states. They are called boundary because they either form a boundary between states or they run across one. In many cases, state boundaries have been drawn to coincide with rivers or a watershed for easy recognition. Boundary waters are also called international watercourses because they are already, by definition, international. For this reason, regulations on the use of these shared natural resources have to be established bilaterally or multilaterally[2]. For regulating the various interests concerned, states analyzed the opportunity of concluding international treaties, from the beginning of 19th century up to the Second World War. As a result, the first international waterway administration was established in 1804 to deal with navigation on the Rhine River.

Danube history was marked by the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris in 1856, foreseeing the enlargement of the Danube River legal regime and the setting up of the European Danube Commission. To this end, more than a century ago, the representatives of the European great powers of the time met in Galati (in nowadays Romania) in order to decide the first important project of Danube cooperation and to facilitate navigation on the Lower Danube. In the ensuing years, this undertaking was followed by others, in the fields of transport, economic relations, culture and education[3].

The Treaty of Versailles, concluded after the First World War, foresaw the freedom of navigation on the most important European Rivers, and Article 291 declared the Danube an international River.

The Danube region of the 20th century was marked by dramatic political changes, from systematic violations of old democracies and sovereign rights to the symbolic fall of the Iron Curtain and the gradual recognition of new international actors—countries in the West Balkans. After the Second World War, the new political dynamics of the continent was labeled by division in two antagonistic spaces. The "lead plate" of

[1] Selected Texts of Legal Instruments in International Environmental Law, UNEP 2005, pg. 383.
[2] Kuokkanen, Tuomas, "International Law and Water", International and Environmental Law-Making and Diplomacy Review, 2004, pg. 167.
[3] Following this model of waters administration, another International Commission was established, for the navigation on the Congo River, in 1885.

communism suppressed the ethnical and national aspirations of the populations in south-eastern Europe, generating new imbalances and frozen conflicts that would strongly emerge after 1989, especially in the Balkans. Therefore, after a *status quo* that lasted 45 years, the old differences and disputes would return in force in the 1990s. What happened in the Balkans in the last decade of the 20th century, the conflicts in the ex-Yugoslavia, is not a result of a certain historical determinism or of the conflict vocation of the populations living in this space, but the result of overlapping and mutual stimulation of the communist regime crisis with the remains of the post-war multinational state. Both communism and the multinational state were two artificial systems, and their mixture and decomposition has led to the explosion of conflicts in the past years. The geopolitical European borders divided the countries along the Danube into separate spaces, governed by two opposite ideologies: capitalism and communism.

However, international law has recorded several victories among the dust of the battlefields and the setting up of a new Europe. In 1948, after the Second World War, in Belgrade, the Convention regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube was signed. This is today's international legal instrument governing navigation on the Danube. The Convention provides for free navigation on the Danube in accordance with the interests and sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties of the Convention. According to it, the eleven Member States undertake to maintain their sections of the Danube in a condition *navigable* for river-going and, on the appropriate sections, for sea-going vessels and to carry out the work necessary for the maintenance and improvement of navigation conditions and not to obstruct or hinder navigation on the navigable channels of the Danube. The Danube Commission, which consists of the representatives of the Member States—one for each—has been established to supervise the implementation of the 1948 Convention and to fulfil various other tasks aiming at ensuring adequate conditions for shipping on the Danube.

After the implosion of the Soviet Union and the communist regime's collapse in Europe, the dawn of a new era of cooperation in the Danube region come out. As a recognition of old alliances, in 1991 four young democracies, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia shook hands over a formal arrangement called the "Visegrad Group" that had as its political goal to embark on joint efforts in achieving the objective of successfully accomplishing social transformation and giving mutual support in the European integration process. This is an example of a common action for achieving

European aspirations, an initiative that was borne out of the idea to enhance the four members' cooperation with the purpose of accelerating their internal reforms and the EU accession process that finally took place in 2004.

The Danube Cooperation Process[4] was a result of an initiative developed by Austria, Romania and the European Commission within the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and was formally launched at its first Ministerial Conference on 27th February, 2002 with the adoption of a Declaration by the European Commission, the Stability Pact and the 13 participating countries of the Danube Basin. The purpose of this alliance is to *"broaden and deepen present Danube Cooperation and give to it clear political and economic dimensions, without creating new institutions, but taking stock of and using the existing structures and, where necessary, harmonizing their objectives and efforts, providing a focus, where appropriate, for their efforts within the Danube region."* Although under the framework of the Danube Cooperation Process several technical meetings took place to address concrete challenges such as flood prevention, container traffic, inland ports and the potential development of hydropower stations in the Danube Basin, this cooperation format remains a theoretical one, with weaknesses and bottlenecks in implementing real projects with social and economic impact in the regions along the Danube.

After the troubled '90s, along with the new tendencies from the international arena and the difficult accession process of the Eastern European Countries, the new democracies of the Danube region become a European voice, contributing to turning the old and conservative Community into a flexible, regionally-oriented partner and an advocate of the EU enlargement policy to include the countries in the neighbourhood.

Considering their troubled past and their political experiences of the last decades, the Danube EU countries are the most entitled to support the cooperation process and to encourage the political and economical efforts of the candidate or potential candidate countries on their road to accession.

Although backlogs and delays in structural reforms are remarked, important steps have been made in transforming the Danube in one of the most important artery road of Europe, a protected ecosystem and an economic area with increased potential.

[4] Member states of the Danube Cooperation Process are Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Republic of Moldova, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

EU COHESION POLICY AND REGIONAL COOPERATION – TOWARD A STRUCTURAL REFORM

Today's Europe has become more and more a space of people-to-people contacts, an area of intercultural dialogue, a dynamic, regionally-oriented structure, pleading for good governance at local level and decentralized administration.

Likewise, the EU institutions, from political to technical levels, have been engaged in performing structural reforms focused on regional needs and on strategic developments. The Cohesion policy, initially defined with a view to economical and social dimensions, is changing, receiving a new valence—territorial cohesion[5]. The fifth Progress Report on economic and social cohesion "Growing regions, growing Europe" underlines that "Cohesion policy is anchored in Article 158 of the EC Treaty, which states that the Community aims to promote harmonious development and that with this purpose it shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of economic and social cohesion. The Lisbon Treaty, which is at present in the ratification process, adapts this text in referring to economic, social and territorial cohesion". This may be a political signal that the future of the cohesion policy is in the common will of the member states to contribute to their balanced development using regional partnerships and geographic features.

The goal of territorial cohesion is to encourage the harmonious and sustainable development of all territories by building on their territorial characteristics and resources. The three basic elements proposed to achieve these goals are: concentration (achieving critical mass while addressing negative externalities), connection (reinforcing the importance of efficient connections of lagging areas with growth centre through infrastructure and access to services), and cooperation (working together across administrative boundaries to achieve synergies)[6].

The territorial approach of cohesion policy could bring the EU directly to the concrete link between human factors and the natural environment, the core of all sustainable development policies. The added-value of the territorial dimension of cohesion is mainly the opportunity to think and to act taking into account the diversity of territories in Europe, to open a new strategy closer to the European citizens' daily realities, to re-organize one of the major common policies in favour

[5] The public debate on territorial cohesion was launched by the European Commission in October 2008, when the Green Paper – *Turning territorial diversity into strength* – was published.

[6] Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council- Sixth progress report on economic and social cohesion, pg. 11-12, Brussels, 25.06.2009.

of a new European governance and to give coherence to the EU sectoral policies with territorial impact (as defined in the Territorial agenda)[7].

The Committee of the Regions "affirms that territorial cohesion aims to give each Community territory access to infrastructure and services of general economic interest in order to help citizens enjoy better living conditions in line with 21st century European standards, acknowledging that access is not only geographically dependent, but is also determined by connectivity, availability and quality of infrastructure and service. It "considers that the notion of territorial cohesion is based on the principle of solidarity which requires mechanisms to ensure harmonious development of the Community as a whole and to reduce disparities between the levels of development of the various territories[8]".

The Austrian Conference on Spatial Planning offered another definition of territorial cohesion, underlying that "Territorial Cohesion denotes the intention of decision makers in public policy in the EU to put all territorial units (regions, territories, municipalities) in a position to develop respectively make use of their potentials and strengths in the best possible and most sustainable way and to reduce existing weaknesses and bottlenecks for development. This needs to take into account aspects of quality of life, of sustainable economic growth respecting natural resources and appropriately securing social cohesion. In particular, this requires also taking account of territorial effects (impacts) of policy measures of all territorial levels and the integration on all concerned territories[9]".

All these definitions are focused on three main concepts that are used to build upon the future of the cohesion policy of the EU: strengthening cooperation across borders, sustainable economic growth and reducing disparities. It is obvious that, for the next financing period, post-2013, a reform of the cohesion policy will be in line with the new tendencies of budgetary allocations, considering the territorial dimension and the importance, in this context, of the European regions. Therefore, territorial cohesion represents a solidarity approach of the European Union territory, in terms of sustainable development and economic growth, for a better achievement of welfare and prosperity goals at regional level. This means that different territories belonging to different states and having diverse features shall work together to

[7] Association Européenne des élus de montagne – contribution to the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion, on http://www.promonte-aem.net/news-1/contribution-on-the-green-paper-on-territorial-cohesion (20.10.2009)

[8] Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Green Paper on territorial cohesion, COTER-IV-020, pg. 3

[9] The Austrian Conference on Spatial Planning – opinion on the Green Paper on territorial cohesion http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/consultation/terco/pdf/2_national/10_orok_en.pdf (20.10.2009)

transform this diversity into an asset and to enable citizens to make the most of the inherent features of these territories.

In 2009, Fabrizio Barca, General Director within the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Italy, prepared a Report on what the cohesion policy will look like post-2013. His final paper, generally known as *Barca Report*, argued that "there is a strong case, rooted in economic theory and in a political interpretation of the present state of the European Union, for the Union to allocate a large share of its budget to the provision of European public goods *through a place-based development strategy* aimed at both core economic and social objectives; cohesion policy provides the appropriate basis for implementing this strategy, but a comprehensive reform is needed if present challenges are to be met; the reform requires the adoption of a strong policy concept (renewing the original ideas of EU founding fathers), a concentration of priorities, key changes to the governance, a new high-level political compromise and an appropriate adjustment of the negotiation process on the budget; current economic and political events have increased the urgency for change: some of the reform proposals can and should be anticipated in the current programming period[10]".

***

Considering these new tendencies of the cohesion policy dynamics, countries in the Danube region will be entitled more than ever to strengthen their cooperation and to carry out strategic formats in order to maximize the efficiency in using structural instruments, in proposing new regional cooperation programs and in promoting a constructive dialogue within the neighbourhood.

The Danube region has all the potential for becoming a brand. It is a natural resource and an attractive space, with important tourist and natural resorts lying along this River, contributing to its value: the Wachau valley and the Nationalpark Donau-Auen in Austria, the Naturpark Obere Donau in Germany, Gemenc in Hungary, the Srebarna Nature Reserve in Bulgaria, the Iron Gate and the Danube Delta in Romania, where traditions and rituals mixed with popular archetypes and ethnic cultures represent a continuous source of inspiration and research for any scientific undertaking. The "Danube brand" refers to a conglomerate of specificities, a

[10] Barca, Fabrizio - *An Agenda for A Reformed Cohesion Policy - A place-based approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations*, Independent Report prepared at the request of Danuta Hübner, Commissioner for Regional Policy, on http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/future/pdf/report_barca_v0306.pdf, (18.10.2009)

package of folklore and arts and a taste of eclectic elements, all of which contribute to the diversity and specificity of this unique European space. But the "Danube brand" goes beyond this allegory, concentrating serious potential in transport and energy infrastructures, in waters and biodiversity management and in setting up industrial clusters or urban and rural development planning.

As Mrs. Danuta Hübner, former EU Commissioner for Regional Policy stated on the occasion of the *Open Days* conference in Brussels in 2008, "The importance of the Danube Basin for the EU cannot be underestimated. Our policies and the investments we are making in the Basin through the EU's cohesion policy in particular have an impact on the livelihoods of 20 million citizens. The Danube needs a specific strategy comparable to the strategy we are developing for the Baltic Sea Region. A one-size-fit all approach doesn't work in an EU of 27 Member States and 271 regions. We need a targeted policy for the Danube that meets its ecological, transport and socio-economic needs."

Therefore, after a progressive and continuous effort of Romania and Austria to have an EU Strategy for the Danube Region, the countries in the Danube region and then all the EU member states concluded that Europe needs a new mechanism of cooperation for the Danube River.

The green light for designing this new and ambitious project was formally given by the Council of the European Union during its Summit on 17-18 June, 2009. The Conclusions of this Summit specify that "*The European Council invites the Commission to present an EU strategy for the Danube region before the end of 2010*". This means that the European Commission is asked to elaborate a final document by December 2010 that will contain the architecture of the new methods of cooperation between countries in the Danube region.

We might say that this Strategy, along with its older sister, the Baltic Sea Strategy[11], is an EU "pilot-project" for the implementation of the new macro-regional approach over European territory. As was envisaged in the most recent Report of the EU Commissioner Pawel Samecki over the macro-regional strategies in the EU, "a macro-

[11] In 2007, the European Council decided to ask the European Commission to work out an EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. This Strategy was presented to the European Council in June 2009 and is one of the main priorities of the Swedish Presidency on the EU, during the second half of 2009. The Commission services, with the Directorate General Regional Policy leading the work, presented the first draft of the Strategy at the consultation process with stakeholders. This was the first time ever that the EU had launched an institutional framework for a deepened macro-regional cooperation – Andersson Marcus, *Building a visible and attractive region: identity, image, branding and transnational cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region*, Crossing Perspectives Review, pg. 45.

region represents an area including territory from a number of different countries or regions associated with one or more common features or challenges. (…) In this definition, the concept of territory was introduced from the start. While the macro-regional approach is not an *alias* for territorial cohesion, it is clear that there are significant synergies between the two concepts. Each is place-based, inclusive and, in principle, prepared and implemented on a multi-level basis. The difference lies, perhaps, in the underlying driving force. Macro-regional strategies are endogenous, focused on addressing the challenges and exploiting the opportunities within the macro-region. As already mentioned, the frontiers of a macro-region do not have to be precisely defined. Moreover, there is no requirement that any given territory be part of only one macro-region[12]".

The Baltic Sea Strategy, tailored for the specific needs of the countries in the Baltic Sea Region, represents a first attempt of the European Commission and of the Baltic countries in finding new cooperation opportunities among regions belonging to different states, animated by common goals and objectives. Similarly, a Danube Strategy will have a key role in strengthening cooperation between riparian countries, and will give the occasion of building upon a new architecture of the economic and social growing potential.

Sustainable environmental development, economic growth, education and research or cultural exchange are just some areas in which Danube basin countries can be an example of good practice and added value.

The third objective of the cohesion policy, European territorial cooperation, as it was projected for the current financing period, has a strategic importance in upholding the system of multi-level governance based on accountability and partnership and for boosting economic growth. Urban and rural areas along the Danube are now connected through the common will to implement projects with social and economic impact.

The Danube can also be defined through its environmental protection dimension. We cannot progress if we ignore the current challenges raised by the increased needs for natural resources. Our continuous search for economic growth sometimes leads to disturbing the natural balance and this cannot be easily redressed. Trans-boundary pollution and the endangerment of species and of their habitats are mainly

[12] Samecki, Pawel, Macro-regional Strategies in the European Union, pg. 3 (http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/baltic/pdf/macroregional_strategies_2009.pdf, 18.10.2009)

the consequences of human activities. We have the moral duty to preserve the Danube region's richness for future generations. We have the responsibility to respect the international treaties and agreements on environmental protection and to be aware of the obligations assumed as EU members to promote sustainable development, by integrating environmental concerns into the external relations and trade policies of the European Union. The Danube Delta, where the Danube flows into the Black Sea, is an ecological system unique in Europe. Its ecological value is inestimable. It has a triple status. It has been a World Natural Heritage Site since December 1991, with more than 50% of its territory in Romania, a Biosphere Reserve within the UNESCO-MAB Reserves Network (since September 1990) and a Ramsar Site (since May 1991). Since 2000, it has been an international protected area and the Ukrainian part of Delta has also been declared a Biosphere reserve[13]. Through an EU Strategy for the River Danube, all the countries in the region will be committed to contributing to the preservation of the natural beauties of this River and will work together to balance environmental protection with economic development in a sustainable manner.

There is also an external significance in an integrated EU Danube strategy. The Danube represents a corridor for supporting and promoting European values outside EU borders. It is not without significance that the Danube is defined as the Enlargement River. Using the current financial instruments, cross-border programs have been developed that essentially contribute to bringing together member states, candidate countries and external partners in working for the sustainable development of their regions. The European Union and its neighbouring countries shall work together for better results in building their future. This is why it is essential for all the countries in the Danube region to equally participate in this exercise and to bring their contributions to the Danube Strategy.

The Danube can be a tool for mitigating the risks in the region and contributing to the creation of new market opportunities and infrastructure investments.

The wider Danube basin comprises countries and regions that could further benefit from the direct access to the Black Sea and further to the East. During the past years, a new concept of the European Union was progressively developed in the framework of the TEN-T network with relation to inland transport waterways —the European transport corridor VII, Rhine-Main-Danube. This corridor connects

[13] Environmental performance reviews for Romania, United Nations Publication, New York and Geneva, 2001, pg. 127

the Northern Sea by Rotterdam harbour and the Black Sea, through Constanta, in Romania. In this context, the River Danube can be assimilated into the old transport routes, similar to the ancient "silk road". The importance of connecting the EU to the Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia through the Danube region has already been acknowledged by the EU in its Black Sea Synergy. Further investments in infrastructure should be designed to improve both the environment and the economic activities of the region.

What is the added value of the future Strategy? It is obvious that its purpose is mainly an economic one, analyzing and proposing the most efficient methods of investing money, time and ideas in projects with social impact, especially tailored for meeting people's needs in the region. In this context, the three key-words composing the theme of the future Danube Strategy might be *partnership, commitment* and *sustainability.*

Apart from the on-going debates related to the future of the cohesion policy, with the territorial dimension and the macro-regional approach, EU Strategy for the Danube Region will guide the European dialogue toward a more specific area: how will the countries in the Danube region be able to overlap former failures and to turn them into strengths? Let us hope that the future EU Strategy for the Danube Region will be able to find an answer to this question and to add a new page to Danube region history.

REFERENCES

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Fifth progress report on economic and social cohesion, Growing regions, growing Europe.
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/interim5/com_2008_371_en.pdf, (20.10.2009)

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Sixth progress report on economic and social cohesion, pg. 11-12, Brussels, 25.06.2009, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/interim6_en.htm, (22.10.2009)

Results of the public consultations on the Green Paper on territorial cohesion - Turning territorial diversity into strength. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/consultation/terco/contrib_en.htm, (22.10.2009)

Green Paper on territorial cohesion - Turning territorial diversity into strength http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/consultation/terco/paper_terco_en.pdf, (22.10.2009)

Association Européenne des élus de montagne – contribution on the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion. http://www.promonte-aem.net/news-1/contribution-on-the-green-paper-on-territorial-cohesion, (20.10.2009)

Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Green Paper on territorial cohesion, COTER-IV-020, pg. 3
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/consultation/terco/pdf/1_eu/4_cotr_en.pdf, (20.10.2009)

Andersson Marcus, "Building a visible and attractive region: identity, image, branding and transnational cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region", in Crossing Perspectives Review, first edition September 2009, Arkitektkopia, Norrkoping Sweeden

Environmental performance reviews for Romania, Economic Commission for Europe – Committee on Environmental Polity, United Nations Publication, New York and Geneva, 2001.

Kuokkanen, Tuomas, "International Law and Water", in International and Environmental Law-Making and Diplomacy Review, 2004, University of Joensuu, Department of law, Joensuu, Finland, 2005.

Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses in Selected Texts of Legal Instruments in International Environmental Law, UNEP 2005.

WATER WAYS
20 YEARS OF CLOSE COOPERATION IN DANUBE REGION

VICTORIIA LIEPKOVA

The marine environment is a precious asset. Oceans and seas provide 99% of the available, living space on the planet, cover 71% of the Earth's surface and contain 90% of the biosphere and consequently contain more biological diversity than terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems. The marine environment is essential to life on earth (particular as the main source of oxygen) and plays a key role in climate and weather patterns. It is also an important factor in economic prosperity, social wellbeing and quality of life.

While water pollution is an environmental problem, it is also a serious threat to public health. Cleaner water and better sanitation could prevent over 30 million cases of water-related diseases each year in the region. The protection of human health and well-being by better water management includes the protection of water ecosystems.

THE DANUBE BASIN - VITAL FOR EUROPE

Since Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, the Danube has become an internal EU waterway. As one of the "Trans-European corridors" it represents a priority axis for inland waterway traffic across the Union. The "Rhine-Danube" corridor provides a direct link between the North Sea and the Black Sea. Improving navigability for cargo, in a more environmentally-friendly manner, is an important challenge. Two on-going projects supported by the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) work to improve the navigability of the river in Romania, and along its shared border with Bulgaria. A bridge is being built over the Danube linking Calafat (Romania) to Vidin (Bulgaria), with support from the EU totalling €120 million. Construction of the 1971-metre long bridge is due to be completed before 2010.

The Danube Basin is also rich in bio-diversity. Its wetlands host many breeds of wild birds and the islands provide rich habitats for many species. For instance, the Danube Delta is home to 70% of the world's population of white pelicans. However the

waters of the Danube are no longer quite as blue as the waltz suggests and pollution is a real threat to this wildlife. Efforts to establish new water treatment plants, with the support of cohesion policy, will contribute to the improvement of water quality. For 2007-2013, investments in 10 major wastewater treatment projects (EU contribution: €500 million from the Cohesion Fund) have been approved by the Commission in Hungary, a large part of whose territory lies in the Danube Basin.[1]

The Danube area also offers strong potential for economic development with its good access to transport and availability of water resources representing attractive factors for businesses. Culture and tourism also present great opportunities. Tourism operators are considering developing a specific "Danube label", which will increase the visibility and attractiveness of the region.

"The importance of the Danube Basin for the EU cannot be underestimated. Our policies and the investments we are making in the Basin through the EU's cohesion policy in particular have an impact on the livelihoods of 20 million citizens. The Danube needs a specific strategy comparable to the strategy we are developing for the Baltic Sea Region. A one-size-fits-all approach doesn't work in an EU of 27 Member States and 271 regions. We need a targeted policy for the Danube that meets its ecological, transport and socio-economic needs." (Commissioner Hübner, European Danube Strategy Conference). Cohesion Policy programmes in the Danube Basin already focus on a number of these topics, through both national programmes and two transnational programmes, "Central Europe" and "South East Europe". Regional decision-makers in the Danube Basin "to think and act as one" and will present in the near future "to set out a methodology to achieve a European Danube strategy, to define a wide partnership and to agree on an action plan".

The river Danube is the second longest river in Europe (2,850 kilometers) connecting ten countries in Central Eastern Europe and the Balkans (Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Ukraine and Moldavia). It is the only major river that flows eastward from Western Europe and connects very heterogeneous territories of the continent. The river Danube is not only a geographical notion but also a transport corridor and has been in the focus of several ecological, political and economic conflicts. Its economic importance, its role in waterway transport has always changed in the course of time but the river itself has always had a minor role in the international division of labour.

[1] http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction : The website of the European Institutions.

In a geopolitical sense the landlocked character of the Danube Basin was emphasized by the fact that it was surrounded by political (imperial) borders and the river's area turned into a site the rivalry for the great empires. Granting the right of free shipping was a fundamental pre-condition for the navigation on the river Danube. This was granted by international treaties signed by the representatives of the Danube region's great empires and by the Danube states. The Paris Treaty of 1856 and the Versailles Treaty of 1919 declared the river Danube an international waterway and set up the Danube Committee, which was authorized with administrative competences related to Danube navigation. With the election of the Danube Committee an international organization was created to guarantee free rights for shipping on the river Danube.[2]

MARINE ENVIRONMENT FOR EUROPE

Shipping is fundamental to our well being, with around 90% of EU external trade being moved by ships and more than 3.7 billion tonnes of freight a year being loaded and unloaded in EU ports. Ships produce a significant amount of waste during their operation and this is disposed of in emissions to water and air and some is landed onshore for disposal. It is estimated that some 80 per cent of the total pollution from ships originates from operational discharges (such as discharges of waste oils or tank cleaning operations), and that much of this is deliberate and in violation of international rules. To prevent and control pollution from ships a wide range of legislation has been developed at the international level.

The reduction of pollution from shipping has formed an integral part of EU maritime safety policy. To reduce the risk of marine pollution from ships, the European Marine Safety Agency (EMSA) provides technical assistance to the European States must realize environmental protection from pollution in the internal water ways in country is the protection of global water resources.

When the Iron Curtain was finally raised in 1989, no one had a clear idea of the state of Europe's environment. Environmental protection and restoration emerged as new issues for pan-European cooperation.

The region's Environment Ministers launched the "Environment for Europe" process in 1991 at Dobris Castle near Prague. Their aim was to improve the region's

[2] Ranki, Gy. (1983). Economic and Foreign Policy: the Struggle of the Great Powers for Hegemony in the Danube Valley, 1919-39. Columbia University Press: New York.

environment and to work towards the convergence of environmental policies throughout the continent. The "Environment for Europe" Conferences are convened every three to four years. The sixth Ministerial Conference will take place in Belgrade in October 2007. The Conferences have reflected the priority concerns of countries in the region and struck a balance between subregional and regional issues. The "Environment for Europe" process has evolved into "the major long-term pan-European political framework" to discuss key policy issues, develop programmes, prepare legally binding instruments and launch various initiatives, including new institutional structures for the environment.

WHAT WILL THE RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT PLANS DELIVER?

2009 is an important year for European water policy. The Water Framework Directive (WFD)[3] requires that Member States establish the first River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) for all

110 river basin districts across the EU by the end of the year, including specific measures to ensure that all EU waters reach good status by 2015. The Commissioner for the Environment pointed out the focus of the Water Framework Directive on river basins, rather than arbitrary administrative or political limitations, as a key innovation. This facilitates a coordinated management of water resources and is particularly important where river basins cross national borders. (Mr. Stavros DIMAS, European Commissioner for Environment)

The question of "what the river basin management plans will deliver" is an important one. The river basin management plans should not be considered only as a paper outcome but be accepted as a platform for action. The significance of these plans is underestimated. Some think that the plans will remain on paper, thus this conference is great opportunity to address such scepticism. We need integrated water management and a place to solve sectoral conflicts. There is a need to invest in raising public awareness despite the economic crisis. Some European countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary) also face major challenges in the field of water management, among others the challenge of climate change and the fact that most of its river basins are transboundary. (Ms Lubka KATCHAKOVA, Deputy Minister of Environment and Water of the Republic of Bulgaria).[4]

[3] Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy.

[4] http://water.europa.eu/participate Summary report of the European Water Conference (2009).

A more water-body-specific approach is needed to make citizens understand what is going on and how it might affect them. It was asked how the process could be influenced to ensure information is presented locally/at water body scale. Governments can be persuaded to give more information at the water body scale if they realise that this will help the public to understand the problems better and it is possible that stakeholders bring forward measures. We need to be realistic on what we are able to achieve and to ensure that we work together with other downstream countries.

VITAL ENVIRONMENT COMPONENT OF FUTURE MARITIME POLICY

Water is attracting a lot of attention at present, with many related events taking place on the international level. Our understanding of water and also regulation in this area is growing. The main issue is what kind of regulation to use, how much regulation and in which direction it should go. Despite multiple directives on water, if there are no answers on the soil issues, society will suffer from the impacts of climate change since proper soil management is expected to play a key role in this respect. Water management is indeed affected by many other policies and needs to be coordinated with them. It is important to look at the impact of a number of other economic activities on water, e.g. agriculture, and coordinate with a number of other sectors as well, such as industrial sectors, tourism etc. Policy implementation in the field of water management will only be successful if all different levels of administration across Europe work hand in hand and understand what subsidiary means. We should first understand properly what we would like to do jointly and then we should decide how to achieve it. Within the different draft river basin management plans, the level of ambition differs a lot, from some Danube region countries that have developed relatively comprehensive strategies and have already started pricing them and are beginning to identify the means to implement them, to other countries whose plans remain a lot more general and often attached with a lot of exemptions. We need to focus on a more coherent level of ambition throughout the EU.

Specific efforts have been made to improve national systems for monitoring the environment and collecting, processing and managing data, particularly in economies in transition, and to make these systems compatible throughout the region. Special attention will be paid to the development and investigation of the own Marine Strategy of countries in the Danube region.

Part of what follows in this study aims at analyzing the perspective of development of the Water strategy of Danube region countries.

The aim of Strategy is to protect more effectively the water environment across Europe. It aims at achieving good environmental status for the EU's marine waters and to protect the resource base upon which marine-related economic and social activities depend. The water Strategy constitutes the vital environmental component of the future maritime policy, designed to achieve the full economic potential of oceans and seas in harmony with the marine environment.

The Water Strategy must establish European Marine Regions on the basis of geographical and environmental criteria. Each member state is required to develop strategies for their marine waters. The marine strategies to be developed by each member state must contain a detailed assessment of the state of the environment, a definition of "good environmental status" at regional level and the establishment of clear environmental targets and monitoring programmes.

Each member state must draw up a programme of cost-effective measures. Prior to any new measure an impact assessment which contains a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the proposed measures is required. Where Member States cannot reach the environmental targets, specific measures tailored to the particular context of the area and situation will be drawn up.

The reviews have three main objectives:

- to help countries in transition to improve their management of the environment by establishing baseline conditions and recommending better policy implementation and performance;
- to promote continuous dialogue between member countries by sharing information about policies and experiences;
- to stimulate greater involvement of the public in environmental discussions and decision-making.

This strategy establishes common principles on the basis of which European States have to draw up, at the level of designated marine region and in cooperation with the European States and third countries within those regions, their own strategies to achieve a good ecological status in the marine waters for which they are responsible.

This strategy meets a twofold objective:

- to protect and restore Europe's seas;
- to ensure the ecological sustainability of economic activities linked marine environment.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE (CONCLUSION)

Concerns relating to the prevention and reduction of pollution from ships have grown constantly over time within the EU institutions, the international maritime community and among the general public, and they look set to continue doing so in the future. Even during the relatively brief existence of close cooperation of European countries, it is clear that tasks in this field have widened significantly, and there is no sign of a reversal of the trend. Shipping cannot afford to be (or even be perceived to be) an industry which fails to take its environmental responsibilities seriously. As land-based industries implement stringent environmental requirements and policies, shipping's proportional share of the total output of pollutants increases and pressure for further action grows. Keeping up with these tasks includes several different types of action, both in relation to implementing rules that already exist and complementing them with new stands.

In addition to continuing and intensifying the above-mentioned tasks, the Strategy will provide Danube region countries with the opportunity of continuously assess the need for further action in the environmental field, with a view to contributing to cleaner Danube.

REFERENCES

Convention on the Prevention of pollution from ships 1973 (MARPOL 73). http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258

Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.

Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.

Irene L. Murphy (1997). The Danube: a river basin in transition. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht

Libor Jansky, Masahiro Murakami and Nevelina I. Pachova (2004) The Danube – Environmental Monitoring of an International River. United Nations University Press

Ranki, Gy. (1983). Economic and Foreign Policy: the Struggle of the Great Powers for Hegemony in the Danube Valley, 1919-39. Columbia University Press: New York.

Rules for prevention of pollution from ships (2005). Shipping Register of Ukraine.

http://water.europa.eu/participate Summary report of the European Water Conference (2009).

http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ The website of the Council of the European Union

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction: The website of the European Institutions.

ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ROMANIA
THE PROSPECTS FOR A NEW ACCOMMODATION

VASSILIS PETSINIS

Throughout the post-Communist era, the management of ethnic relations has been a top political priority in Romania. Different governments have applied different mediums, some of them with greater and others with lesser success. Nevertheless, the accommodation of ethnic relations in Romania still remains a question that is open to various interpretations and recommendations. In this article, I will focus specifically on the relations between the national majority and Romania's most politicized minority group, the ethnic Hungarians. My focus will be cast on the post-Communist era, with an emphasis on the developments that have occurred over the last nine years. Particular attention will be paid to: a) the impact of the politics of identity in Romanian political discourse; b) the grass-roots dimension and the outlooks of Romanians and Hungarians on each other.

In the early '90s, the inter-group tension between Romanians and Hungarians reached its zenith with violent manifestations such as those that occurred in the Transylvanian town of Targu-Mures (March 1990). On that occasion, an attack on the headquarters of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) triggered a series of clashes between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians. The troubles ended with 5 dead and 278 injured[1]. Nevertheless, such incidents have not been repeated since. What will be demonstrated in this article is that the politics of interest seem to have gained precedence over the politics of identity. Prior to this, a reference to the constitutional provisions for national minorities, as well as a short overview of Romania's ethnic landscape under Communism, should be made.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL PROVISIONS

Romanian policymakers have been keen on a classical liberal approach to minority issues. Minority rights do not constitute a different category from other civic rights

[1] For a full account of the ethnic troubles in Targu-Mures, see Romania, Human Rights Developments, Human Rights Watch World Report for the Year 1990 at: http://www.hrw.org .

and are allocated on an individual basis within a unitary state's structure. According to the *Constitution of Romania* (1991), minorities are granted the right to 'preserve, develop and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identities' (Article 6.1)[2]. Nevertheless, the measures of protection are restricted by Articles 6.2 and 16.1 which dictate that no positive discrimination should be applied on the grounds of ethnic affiliation. Article 32.3 concedes minorities the right to education in their mother tongue but, at the same time, the only language enjoying official status is Romanian (Article 13)[3]. Nevertheless, the 2003 constitutional revision has authorized '…the public use of national minorities' languages in those local communities inhabited by national minorities, as dictated by organic law' (Article 120.2). This organic law is *Lege 215* on local administration, adopted by the Romanian parliament on April 23rd, 2001.

In all of this, it should be born in mind that the notion of collective rights for national minorities has not been clearly defined within the Romanian constitutional and legal framework. The terminology used, with respect to minority rights, is rights of '*persons* belonging to national minorities' (e.g. Article 6). As will be demonstrated later in this article, the Romanian policymakers' insistence on the state's unitary structure and the allocation of minority rights on an individual basis have often provided a source of tension between the Romanian and the ethnic Hungarian elites.

ETHNIC RELATIONS UNDER COMMUNISM

After the end of the Second World War, the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) sought to reach a *modus vivendi* with the ethnic Hungarian Communist elites. As part of this process, the medium of ethno-territorial autonomy was applied for this part of the country where the ethnic Hungarian concentration is particularly dense. Consequently, in 1952, the 'Hungarian Autonomous Region' was formed, comprising the so-called 'Szekely region' (i.e. the modern-day counties of Harghita, Covasna and Mures in the Central Carpathian Basin). Through this arrangement, the system of local administration in the 'Hungarian Autonomous Region' was placed under the jurisdiction of the ethnic Hungarian PCR officials. At the same time, ethnic Hungarians enjoyed extensive autonomy in the fields of education and culture.

[2] On this issue see Constitution of Romania (1991), at: http://ccr.ro .

[3] In addition to this, Article 148 forbids a constitutional revision, as far as the state's official language is concerned, and Article 1.1 defines Romania as a unitary national state.

The Hungarian revolution of 1956 was a watershed. Many Transylvanian Hungarians expressed sympathy with the cause of the dissident elites in Budapest and this alarmed the PCR leadership. Meanwhile, a greater emphasis on Romanian nationalism had started to supersede proletarian internationalism among the Party's high ranks. Nicolae Ceausescu would consolidate this novel approach, as a means of legitimizing his rule in the eyes of the Romanian masses. In line with these developments, the jurisdiction of the 'Hungarian Autonomous Region' would be constantly restricted until its final dissolution in 1968. Moreover, after the late '60s, it was not always possible to attend Hungarian-language classes at the secondary education level. The restrictions on Hungarian-language education reached their zenith in the mid-'80s. Until 1989, Ceausescu employed a virulent anti-Hungarian rhetoric as a last resort in the legitimization of his regime. This rhetoric was basically levied against Hungary and the '…crypto-nationalist and irredentist campaign' that Budapest had allegedly launched against Romania. Nevertheless, in the long term, these policies resulted in the alienation of the Hungarian minority from the Romanian state.

THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND THEIR IMPACT ON ROMANIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Before proceeding to the empirical discussion, it is necessary to introduce the notions 'politics of identity' and 'politics of interest'. In this context, I am using these two terms in direct relation with the function of politics within ethnically diverse environments. Specific attention is paid to the decision-making of political parties that represent minority groups. 'Politics of identity' denote a state of affairs whereby the politicization of ethnic identity provides the essential basis for decision-making within a minority party. The frequent response of the mainstream elites to the politicization of a minority's identity is to counter-propose a classical liberal framework within which the rights of an ethnic minority cannot gain priority over the rights of the (political) majority. 'Politics of interest' refer to a course of political action whereby greater importance is attached to the rational calculation and balancing of trends in the mainstream political arena. Within the bounds of such an approach, lesser emphasis is added to catalysts such as ethnicity or religion. In those cases where the 'politics of interest' is the steering wheel behind a minority party's decision-making, the prospects for a compromise with the mainstream elites are more evident.

The period that followed the collapse of Ceausescu's regime was marked by a renegotiation process between the Romanian state and the ethnic Hungarian elites. In the beginning, the UDMR stood firm in their intention to secure the Hungarian minority's collective status within Romania's constitutional and legal framework. To this end, they lobbied for the concession of separate self-government and educational institutions. Their project soon clashed with the Romanian elites' emphasis on the unitary character of the Romanian *national* state. Consequently, the friction between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians escalated. The UDMR concretized their proposals for the institutionalization of the Hungarian minority's collective status in the *Cluj Declaration* (25 October 1992). This document calls for the concession of personal autonomy and regional self-administration to Romania's ethnic Hungarian community and to this day remains the stepping stone of the party's decision-making (at least to a formal degree). Personal autonomy addresses the fields of culture, education and public information with the aim to preserve the ethno-cultural identity of the Hungarian minority. Regional self-administration refers to the self-government of the counties where the Hungarian concentration is particularly dense (e.g. the Szekely region in the Central Carpathian basin)[4]. As a matter of fact, the UDMR's demands for ethno-territorial autonomy have often constituted a source of tension between the party and Romania's mainstream elites.

Political tensions have run parallel with the symbolic competition between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians at Transylvania's regional level. Interest groups, originating from both communities, have sought to reaffirm the Romanian and/or Hungarian 'historical presence' in Transylvania through symbolic activities such as ritual public events, national celebrations and commemorations, demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. Perhaps the most noteworthy example was the controversy over the permanent decoration of Cluj-Napoca's main streets and squares with the Romanian tricolor during most of the '90s. This was a decision taken by Georghe Funar, Cluj-Napoca's former mayor and an avid nationalist. The local Hungarians' reaction was to emphatically parade their own national symbols in the course of their national celebrations (e.g. the commemorations of the 1848 Hungarian revolution). With the exception of the political mobilization in the early '90s, this symbolic competition has not resulted in violence or the threat of violence.

[4] For more on this issue see UDMR, Memorandum on Romania's Admission to the Council of Europe, Cluj-Napoca (1993), p18.

Nevertheless, since the late '90s, the politics of interest have gradually sidelined the politics of identity in Romanian political discourse. This development was subject to the impact of two kinds of catalysts, internal as well as external. With regard to the internal catalysts, the chronic state of instability in Romanian politics has often urged Romania's larger parties to form coalitions with smaller political actors. In other words, the popular mistrust towards the main parties' agendas has often hindered these parties from forming a majority government in their own right. Meanwhile, Romania's ethnic Hungarians have rallied almost uniformly behind UDMR's banner. The combination of these two factors has often rendered the UDMR an eligible partner for a political coalition to the eyes of Romania's mainstream elites. This option has also been facilitated by the declining popularity of nationalist parties (e.g. Vadim Tudor's Greater Romania Party). Similarly, the UDMR leadership have regarded their entrance into the halls of power as a good opportunity to promote, at least, their main standpoints. At this given moment, for instance, the UDMR participates in a government coalition together with a number of mainstream Romanian parties. As part of this political bargaining, the Romanian elites have watered down their insistence on Romania's unitary structure and made certain concessions in the field of Hungarian-language education. For example, in those counties which are inhabited predominantly by ethnic Hungarians (e.g. the Harghita and Covasna counties), ethnic Hungarian pupils can attend classes in the Hungarian language from the elementary to high (or technical) school level. At the same time, the ethnic Hungarian elites have given up quite a few of their prerogatives with regard to ethno-territorial autonomy and started focusing on educational and cultural issues instead.

As far as the external catalysts are concerned, the most crucial of them has been the impact of the 'EU factor'. At this point, I will focus specifically on the UDMR and the Hungarian Civic Alliance (UCM)[5]: As a matter of fact, the ethnic Hungarian elites have viewed Romania's accession to the EU as a development that can only affect the country's Hungarian minority in a beneficial manner. One of the main expectations among ethnic Hungarian policymakers is that the EU funds for regional reconstruction will have a positive impact towards the improvement of the local infrastructure in those peripheries where most ethnic Hungarians reside (e.g. the Central Carpathian Basin). Besides, it is expected that a greater number of

[5] The Hungarian Civic Alliance evolved from a splinter-group within the UDMR in 2001 and was formally registered as a political party on March 14th, 2008. This party positions itself as an alternative to the UDMR and equally adheres to the concept of ethno-territorial autonomy for Romania's ethnic Hungarians.

ethnic Hungarian private entrepreneurs (engaged in educational as well as cultural activities) will be enabled to apply for funding to EU sub-organizations that focus on the protection of minority languages and cultures. In all of this, the role of the EU as such, in releasing the tensions between Romanians and Hungarians, has been critical.

At this point, a crucial detail should be set in context: As a matter of fact, resulting from the absence of a regulatory mechanism for EU institutions in the area of minority rights, the protection of minorities is regarded as an *internal issue for member-states*. This absence of a unified framework and a coordinated strategy, at the 'European' level, is to account, amongst others, for the lack of a regulatory mechanism for the precise definition of the relations between kin-states and kin minorities (e.g. in this case, Romania's ethnic Hungarians and Hungary). In spite of these institutional deficiencies, however, some notable progress has taken place 'in the field'. EU advisers held a series of joint sessions with representatives of both the ethnic Hungarian elites and Romania's main parties. In the course of these sessions, the EU advisers highlighted to their interlocutors Romania's benefits from entering the EU. They also clarified how EU's provisions for minority identities can improve the situation of the ethnic Hungarian community without, at the same time, jeopardising its relations with the Romanian state.

The alleviation in the tension between Romanian and ethnic Hungarian elites has been reflected in the field of inter-state relations. An early but significant indication was the agreement on a 'Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of Romania Concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries and Other Issues of Bilateral Cooperation', reached in Budapest on December 22nd, 2001. One of the Memorandum's clauses was that the Republic of Hungary would not provide any kind of support to the Hungarian political groupings in Romania unless it had previously informed the Romanian authorities and obtained their consent (Section I, Article 10)[6].

THE GRASS-ROOTS DIMENSION

The state of competition, both at the political macro-level and at Transylvania's regional level, has often taken its toll upon inter-communal relations between

[6] For a full-text version of the memorandum see Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad at the Hungarian Government, http://www.htmh.hu .

Romanians and ethnic Hungarians. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in a variety of public surveys, some additional catalysts seem to have reduced the ethnic distance between the two communities. These are, namely: a) social mobility (which has relaxed the barriers of residential and socioeconomic segmentation); b) the absence of ethnic discrimination on the part of public institutions (e.g. the systems of public and financial administration, the social welfare services) and c) the increasing number of mixed marriages[7]. Public surveys carried out in Transylvania over the past 9 years hint that Transylvanians (Romanians and Hungarians alike) believe that instances of ethnic discrimination in the employment sector are rare. Moreover, catalysts such as coexistence in the same workplace or neighbourhood seem to take precedence over ethno-cultural or religious cleavages. Finally, most Transylvanian Romanians do not seem to object to the cooperation between ethnic Hungarian institutions and their counterparts in Hungary over educational and cultural issues[8]. Indeed, the contacts between ethnic Hungarian interest groups with state agencies (e.g. the Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad at the Hungarian Government) as well as private entrepreneurs in Hungary have steadily increased over the last few years.

It might therefore be argued that, as result of a long-term socialization process, groups with different origins have adopted common behavioural patterns as well as a shared system of values. In Transylvania, there may not exist an articulate notion of *regional identity*, as is the case, for instance, in the Romanian Banat or Vojvodina (Serbia). Nevertheless, a sense of a shared Transylvanian identity is still evident. It is this awareness of a shared *regional* heritage that establishes some common values and, by extension, provides a common cultural substratum for diverse ethnic groups. The part played by similar living conditions, historical links, as well as the common prospects for the future, should be taken into account as well. This is a social reality that remains visible up to date in Transylvania, irrespective of the role of regional elites in the amplification of ethnic conflict. Within this matrix, and in so far as it does not escalate to violent confrontation, the symbolic competition between Romanians and Hungarians operates as a medium through which different groups manage to preserve a sense of collective integrity in the course of their interaction with each other.

[7] According to an independent estimation by the Centre for Research on Ethnic Relations (Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca), approximately 1/3 of Transylvanian Hungarians are married to Romanians.

[8] For some information over the state of social interaction between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians, as well as the Romanian outlooks on the relations between ethnic Hungarians and Hungary, see: Research Centre for Interethnic Relations. Ethnobarometer: Interethnic Relations in Romania, EDRC: Cluj-Napoca (2000), pp 37-8, 57-8; Ethno-cultural Diversity Resource Center, Barometer of Ethnic Relations, EDRC: Cluj-Napoca (2002).

CONCLUSION

Since the late '90s, the politics of interest seems to have superseded the politics of identity in Romanian political discourse. This development has resulted from a combination of catalysts, internal as well as external. With regard to the former, the popular mistrust towards Romania's mainstream parties has often prevented these parties from forming a majority government in their own right. This has prompted their leaderships to assess the prospects for alliances with smaller political actors, including the ethnic Hungarian elites. Meanwhile, the ethnic Hungarian elites have started viewing their entrance into the halls of power as a good opportunity to realize at least their main aims. As part of the whole process, both sides have opted for a milder approach to the relations between the Romanian state and the Hungarian minority. As far as the external catalysts are concerned, the impact of Romania's entry to the EU has been critical upon releasing the tensions between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians. These processes, at the elite level, have been facilitated by certain social realities in these areas where Romanians and ethnic Hungarians coexist. In Transylvania, there may not exist an articulate notion of *regional identity*. Nevertheless, the awareness of a shared *regional* heritage seems to have established some common values and provided a common cultural substratum for Romanians and ethnic Hungarians. In an overall assessment, it would not be an exaggeration to speak, at least temporarily, of a 'Romanian success' in the field of managing ethnic relations.

TABLES

Table 1

Romanians' everyday interaction with Hungarians in Transylvania		
	False	True
I avoid the Hungarians	75.9 percent	20.9 percent
I know Hungarians by sight	36.3 percent	62.7 percent
I sometimes shop from a shop where the shop-assistant is Hungarian	59.5 percent	39.6 percent
I greet Hungarian neighbours	67.3 percent	32.3 percent
I have/had Hungarian workmates	51.8 percent	48.1 percent
I pay visits to Hungarians	71.6 percent	27.9 percent
I sometimes ask a Hungarian for help	72.5 percent	26.5 percent

I have Hungarian relatives	84.9 percent	15.0 percent
I often consult a Hungarian in personal problems	80.2 percent	18.4 percent
Hungarians' everyday interaction with Romanians in Transylvania		
	False	True
I avoid the Romanians	83.6 percent	15.2 percent
I know Romanians by sight	5.9 percent	93.8 percent
I sometimes shop from a store where the shop-assistant is Romanian	5.8 percent	93.8 percent
I greet Romanian neighbours	28.1 percent	71.5 percent
I have/had Romanian workmates	20.9 percent	70.9 percent
I pay visits to Romanians	42.5 percent	57.3 percent
I sometimes ask a Romanian for help	23.4 percent	76.4 percent
I have Romanian relatives	66.1 percent	33.7 percent
I often consult a Romanian in personal problems	65.3 percent	34.5 percent

Source: Research Center for Interethnic Relations 2000: 37-8.

Table 2: Where you live, do you think that nationality makes a difference in obtaining a job?

Romanians are…		
	Romanians from the Szekely region	Hungarians from the Szekely region
Advantaged	5.6 percent	15.7 percent
Disadvantaged	30.0 percent	9.4 percent
Nationality doesn't matter	47.0 percent	46.8 percent
It does not apply	13.9 percent	14.0 percent
Don't know	3.5 percent	14.0 percent
Hungarians are…		
	Romanians from the Szekely region	Hungarians from the Szekely region
Advantaged	33.4 percent	23.0 percent
Disadvantaged	2.1 percent	12.3 percent
Nationality doesn't matter	47.0 percent	44.7 percent
It does not apply	13.6 percent	8.9 percent
Don't know	3.8 percent	11.1 percent

Source: Ibid: 57-8.

REFERENCES

Biro A and Kovacs P. (2001). Diversity in Action (Local Public Management of Multiethnic Communities in Central and Eastern Europe), Open Society Institute, Budapest.

Constitution of Romania (1991), at: http://www.ccr.ro

Council of Europe Publishing House. (1995). Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg.

Ethno-cultural Diversity Resource Center. (2002). Barometer of Ethnic Relations, EDRC, Cluj-Napoca.

Feischmidt, M. (2002). Ethnizität als Konstruktion und Erfahrung (English-language summary), LIT, Hamburg, 287-305.

Horowitz, D. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, Los Angeles.

International Peace Information Centre. (1999). Interethnic Relations in Romania (Basic Facts), IPIS, Antwerp.

Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad at the Hungarian Government, http://www.htmh.hu

Research Centre for Interethnic Relations. (2000). Ethnobarometer: Interethnic Relations in Romania, EDRC, Cluj-Napoca.

Romania, Human Rights Developments, Human Rights Watch World Report for the Year 1990 at: http://www.hrw.org

UDMR. (1993). Memorandum on Romania's Admission to the Council of Europe, Cluj-Napoca.

MINORITY NATIONALITY EDUCATION: A TRUE MARKER OF DEMOCRACY

RENÁTA ANNA DEZSŐ

"You can judge a society by the way it treats its minorities."
M. Gandhi

INTRODUCTION

One of the most burning challenges of new democracies is how to treat their minorities. Hungary's most numerous[1] though still heterogeneous minority group is the Roma/Gypsies[2] who face prejudice, xenophobia and injustice both in public speech and at various levels and forms of institutions. A significant number of Hungarian citizens welcome extreme right ideas (LeBor, 2009) and do not even see those as dangerous phenomena (Hodgson, 2009).

The present paper examines a basic concern of the Roma: minority education. First I illustrate the situation of the Gypsies in education in general from the transition years up till today. Following the overall picture I introduce relevant education policies of the last twenty years and provide examples of some institutions dealing with minority education in the last twenty years. Lastly I summarise the most important features of teaching minority languages, Boyash and Romani, and outline the challenges future minority language teachers may face.

ROMA IN EDUCATION: GENERAL FEATURES

Before the transition years in Hungary research on Roma education was a rare academic question as even the slightest idea of treating any group of our society differently was not an acceptable part of the socialist ideology. Since 1989/1990 educational sociologists and public figures (Hegedűs 1998; Hegedűs and Forray, 1998a and 1998b; Forray 2006; Kovats, 2001; Liskó, 1996; Choli-Daróczi 1996; Radó, 2001)

[1] Most educational sociologist refer to research data of 600 000 Gypsy inhabitants in Hungary (Forray, 2006:113).

[2] In the present paper the terms Romani/Gypsy (adj.) and Roma/Gypsies (noun pl.) are used interchangeably without negative connotation.

have described typical relevant challenges and general features of Gypsy children in education:

- law attendance,
- behavioural problems,
- high and early dropout rate from secondary schools,
- unsuccessful results,
- over-representation in special education.

Also these researchers point out possible causes of failures such as:

- anti-Gypsy atmosphere at school and in the wider Hungarian society,
- prejudice of teachers,
- fear of failure to assimilate / fear of losing contact with the Roma micro economy,
- different conceptualisation of useful and important knowledge,
- different conceptualisation of priorities and responsibilities of young family members,
- lack of factual knowledge required by the education system,
- lack of learning skills attainable in pre-school education.

One believing in democratic transformation may suppose that during the last twenty years the situation described above has started to change in a positive way. According to a recent study (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2006), however, the present markers of Gypsies in education have become worse than they had been immediately after the transition. Today approximately 10% of children and youngsters are of Romany/ Gypsy origin (Kovats, 2001:113). Due to free choice of schooling segregation has become a crucial issue: whereas in 1993 one third (32%) of Roma pupils learnt in segregated school environments, the relevant percentage had almost doubled by today (61,5%). Kertesi and Kézdi (2006) point out that in Hungary:

- there are approximately 180 schools with dominantly Romany/Gypsy students where the Roma/Gypsies are dominantly represented in almost 3000 classes,
- 1,200 Gypsy pupils learn in homogenous ethnic classes, and
- one third of Romany pupils learn in extremely segregated environments.

Concerning secondary school attendance (Table 1), one can conclude that although the ratio of those who completed primary education by the age of 17 increased by 18% within ten years, secondary school attendance of the Roma is still a lot worse than that of the national average. Out of those Roma who continue their studies in secondary education 18% more study in less prestigious vocational schools and 27% fewer try to acquire A-Level examss than the national average. Although 5% more teenagers of the national average received a secondary education in 2003 than in 1993 the relevant data for Gypsy youngsters has decreased by 4%. All in all the difference in the decade examined worsened 9%—not the result one would accept from a newborn democracy.

MINORITY EDUCATION POLICIES

Legislation Framework

An in-depth analysis of relevant educational policy of the last two decades is beyond the scope of this paper, so my intention is to outline its challenges. If one considers examining minority education policies they have to take into account several elements (Radó, 1999):

- Policy initiatives of Governments targeting the education of Romany children,
- Mainstream educational policies—because of their direct or indirect affection on the education of Gypsy children,
- Ongoing transformation of the systemic environment of education.

When the challenge of minority education appears in the horizon of theories and ideology background we can proudly quote the Preambles of two acts:

> *"In order to assure the practice of the right to culture and education on the basis of equal opportunities, to ensure the freedom of conscience and conviction and of religion, in order to ensure that the love of the country is provided within the course of general education, in order to ensure the right of national and ethnic minorities to education in the mother tongue as well as the freedom of learning and teaching, in order to define the rights and duties of children, students, parents and the employees of general education and in order to ensure the management and operation of a system of general education which provides up to date knowledge, Parliament makes the following law…"*
>
> *(Act LXXIX of 1993 on General Education)*

"The language, material and intellectual culture, the historical traditions of national and ethnic minorities living in the area of the Republic of Hungary with a Hungarian citizenship, as well as all other particularities related to their minority existence are a part of the individual and communal identity.
All these represent a special value and their protection, sustenance and enrichment is not only a basic right of national and ethnic minorities but represents a vested interest for the Hungarian nation, and ultimately, for the international community"

(Act LXXVII on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities)

The acts (on general education with its amendments) quoted above have been valid for almost two decades, while educational policy-making regarding the Roma has changed several times during this period.

In the 1990s catch-up programmes of those with social handicaps and the Gypsies articulated segregation strategies. Around half of Romany/Gypsy pupils participated in some kind of catch-up education (Kovats, 2001:122), without any significant measurable result in a national level. Today a totally different approach can be traced: integration and inclusion is desirable. Since 2003, the National Educational Integration Network (OOIH) has supported inclusive intentions in public education and since 2007 equal chance experts of public education are supposed to have been aiding the work of municipalities (the most typical maintainers of public education institutions) in order to help them get access to relevant finances from the European Union.

Although both acts (the latter by nature) guarantee equality of opportunity, most of the time the practical realisation of such a guarantee remains nonexistent in respect to Roma/Gypsies. Minorities with a mother country (Germans, Croats), even if their representation is far less than that of the Roma, are much luckier regarding practice of their basic human rights. As mentioned before, in spite of the nature of education policies the segregation of Romany children in schools has been increasing during the last two decades (Kertesi-Kézdi, 2006).

Challenges of Realising Education Policies

I believe there are two main reasons behind the failures of educational policy intented to provide equal chances for Roma children. These two elements are extremely different in nature: the first is psychological while the other is structural .

Like it or loathe it, there are elements in the last hundred years of the history of Hungary which suggest that our nation supports racist, xenophobic beliefs. Between the two World Wars people of our country accepted anti-Semite acts, chose governments that supported Nazi Germany and cooperated with the Holocaust and Parajamos (Roma Holocaust). The results of the 2009 European Parliamentary Election for Hungary[3] show 14,77% for the extreme right party, Jobbik, whose namecan be translated in two ways: a) "better": probably suggesting a better choice for voters and b) "on the right" (indicating political/ideological conviction), whose popularity and discourse is built on anti-Gypsy propaganda[4]. If we explain this ideological phenomenon with the collective unconscious (Jung, 1949) of the Hungarian society the challenge to governmental policies may prove to be a narrow framework for finding a solution.

If we ignore psychological factors, what remain to be examined are relevant governmental policies. As Figure 1 suggests, educational policy should work within a system of other policies related to the challenges Romany/Gypsy people face. Social, regional, economic, financial and employment policies (Polónyi-Timár, 2005) should each be considered as a structure, as none of the elements can be reformed when the rest are neglected. The State Audit Office of Hungary (ÁSZ) recently carried out a study on the extent and efficiency of supply spent on developing the situation of the Roma living in Hungary since the system change. Researchers found that

- most of the goals policies have set are too general,
- there have been several government departments appointed responsible for particular goals but this complexity has not worked in practice—there have been no coordination and cooperation among departments,
- required finances have not been indicated properly,
- the use of financial sources has not been transparent so it cannot be controlled,
- success indicators have not been applied (Pulay-Benkő, 2008:6-7).

[3] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/hungary_en_txt.html (15/08/09)
[4] http://www.euronews.net/2009/07/04/dehumanising-the-roma-people-in-hungary/ (04/07/09)

In other words, a huge amount of money has been misused during twenty years for "the Roma issue" without significant outcome and no-one is responsible for the waste of this public sum – all in all not a flattering marker of a newborn democracy.

MODEL MINORITY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The establishing of a system of minority educational institutions has been the declared intention of several governments after the transition years but these policies remained unfulfilled promises towards the biggest minority of Hungary: the Gypsies. The existence of such institutions can be (and is) continuously debated from the point of segregation, although education theory distinguishes between artificial isolation and voluntary segmentation. The latter category stands for any institutions which define themselves as nationality or religious entities. As illustrated below, most of the time the existence of minority nationality schools are not the consequences of generous donations of the state budget.

Gandhi Secondary Grammar School

The Gandhi School is the best-known Gypsy minority school in Hungary, which is celebrating its 15th anniversary in 2009. As the results of the document analysis I carried out at this institution show, during these years the institution has made it possible for altogether 446 students, most of them Roma[5], to obtain their secondary-school leaving certificates (Table 2 and Table 3).

The school was founded by the Gandhi Foundation, a private initiative of mostly liberal intellectuals and organizations in 1992. The Foundation opened the school in January, 1994 in a suburb of Pécs, a cultural centre of the south west of Hungary, as a six graded boarding school. After a few years the state became the main financial supporter of the school and since 1996 it has operated as a background institution of the Ministry of Education: the maintainer since then has been the Gandhi Public Foundation. Besides the government, the Soros Foundation has supported the school with significant finances whenever it was in need.

The institution is a boarding school where today around 230 students study annually—today their training takes four or five years due to a recent structural change in the school. Additionally since 2002 another 200 students have been studying

[5] The Second Chance Department for Adults has as many Romany as majority citizens among its students. Dezső, 2007:232)

at the Second Chance (Adult) Department in the afternoons and at weekends. This department, as its name suggests, intends to give a second chance to those who once dropped out from the education system or need the school-leaving exam in order to keep or improve their position in the labour market.

The international uniqueness of Gandhi School is that to date it is the only "pure" secondary grammar school established for the Roma as the original idea of the founders was to enable Gypsy students to pursue academic studies—other, similar institutions offer vocational training as their primary goal. Gandhi School was the first to teach Boyash and Romani languages and Romany/Gypsy culture as a part of the curriculum in Hungary. The effectiveness of the school has not been investigated yet[6] though Katz (2005) found that the first cocoons (first graduates) are mostly on their way to success (compared to their original micro economies) in life.

Don Bosco Vocational Training Centre and Primary School

Supported by the Roman Catholic Church of Hungary, in 1988 this institution became the first to target those with social handicap (Kovats, 2001:128). Situated in Kazincbarcika, a large town in north-east Hungary that has faced industrial decline after the transition years, the school provides educational (primary and vocational) activities for the primarily Romany/Gypsy youth in the area, where economic conditions restrict their opportunities.

Since 1995, with the help of donations, a hostel has been operating as an additional service of the school. Although this institution is not a minority school it is well worth mentioning among our target schools. According to their homepage[7] today they have 450 pupils and 120 adult students, mostly Roma. Building on Catholic values, the ethos of the school is to instil its students with self-confidence.

Józsefváros Day School (Tanoda)

Józsefváros is a popular name for a part of the Hungarian capital where the Roma representation of the population is extremely high. Also, the 8th district of Budapest is one of the poorest areas: one can find a high percentage of low quality and overcrowded houses there.

[6] It is one of the main goals of my doctoral dissertation in progress.
[7] http://www.don-bosco.sulinet.hu/ (09/09/09)

This institution, as its name suggests, is not a proper school but a place that offers afternoon programmes for young Gypsies living in the district attending upper four (5th-8th) grades of primary or any type of secondary education (Szőke, 1998). The institution has been operating since 1997 with the help of the Soros Foundation, private donations and sponsoring. Pupils and students attending receive subject-specific tutorial help with their studies, become familiar with art, and make and edit journals in order to become exposed to regular activities requiring responsibility.

Similar initiatives have worked nationwide for shorter and longer periods of time in Hungary but due to financing challenges most of them have stopped operating temporarily or closed. Although it was the businessman-founders' original and public intention, Soros's withdrawal from Hungary (January, 2008) meant a serious setback for many working in the social and education sector.

Kedves[8] House

Located in Nyírtelek, a small town in a crisis-area in the north-east of Hungary, since September 1995 a family-like hostel has been operating in close contact with the primary school of the settlement. Families of pupils learning here live far from one another in farming settlements (Krajnyák-Lázár, 1996:145). The institution does not claim any minority-specific curriculum; its students however come from poor Gypsy families.

'For the Children SOS '90 Foundation' maintains the hostel and its related development programmes (Consultation, Trainers' Training) (Lázár, 1998:211), which are "to promote values that serve to improve the efficiency of school education, secure the harmony of the development of the children's personalities, foster their sense of identity, enable them to develop a positive vision of their future and create the basis of their integration into society" (Krajnyák-Lázár, 1996:149).

Collegium Martineum

Another student hostel, situated in the Mánfa valley in the south west of Hungary, between the city of Pécs and the town of Komló served as a unique scenario that provided residential accommodation and educational support to students coming from poor, basically Gypsy families (Dezső, 2007:229). The mission of the institution

[8] Nice, sweet, amicable,dear, gentle – in Hungarian.

was to enable students to improve their original communities once they acquired knowledge and skills in fields where they prove to be talented.

The hostel was run by a foundation attached to the Catholic Church in Germany and also received funding from Soros. Annually around 40 students found shelter in this quiet place, many of whom went to universities. A talented young researcher, Julianna Boros whose secondary studies were helped by this institution is now assistant professor at the University of Pécs, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Social Work and Social Policy.

After 12 years of operation, in September 2008 Collegium Martineum closed for financial reasons. Some of its students were accepted by the hostel of the vocational school of Komló.

Little Tiger Vocational School

Founded by a Buddhist association, the "Gate of the Dharma" (Doctrine), an alternative school, started operating in September, 2004 in the 100% Gypsy populated village of Alsószentmárton in South Hungary, neighbouring the Croatian border. This minority institution provides an opportunity for further study for the villagers and the inhabitants of the neighbouring settlements.

Here the population's educational level is extremely low: the main objective of the school is to help young people who live in a highly segregated situation to find their way to social integration (Dezső, 2007:230). The institution functions as a catch-up school for those who have not yet completed their primary education – regardless of age, it offers vocational training and academic secondary education too.

In the afternoon adults are taught in their mother tongue, Boyash, and some general subjects. The school works with different alternative models to transfer knowledge to its students. Classes are small, a lot of group work is applied and students are encouraged to search for knowledge on a specific topic on their own. The first graduates (some 20 students) of the school were awarded their school-leaving certificates in June, 2008.[9]

Kalyi Jag Roma Minority Vocational Secondary School

Located in central Budapest the school started its work with a few dozen students in 1994. Its basic goal is to provide vocational education to those who have completed

[9] Information received from the examinee of Hungarian language at A-level 2008, Ms Jánosi.

their primary studies and to arm them with useful skills such as English as a foreign language and information technology.

The school explicitly emphasises its minority nature, running classes in Romany/Gypsy culture and history. (Kovats, 2001:128) According to the homepage of the school[10] their dropout rate is 15-20% annually. Extracurricular activities organised by the leadership of the school contain Gypsy/Roma tradition camps, theatre, movie and museum attendance.

Since 2004, students have been able to attend training where in addition to vocations, the matriculation exam is aimed as a final step in secondary studies. In a town located in the heart of Hungary, Kalocsa and in a city with a high representation of Gypsy population in the north east of Hungary, Miskolc, other institutions of Kalyi Jag have recently been introduced. The founder, supporter and maintainer of the school is a successful artist and Roma musician Gusztáv Varga who feels and acts responsible for his people.

Dr András T. Hegedűs School, Szolnok

Functioning as a foundation middle school, vocational school, evening elementary school and dormitory and located in the eastern Hungarian town of Szolnok, this institution was established in 1996. At that time the name of the school was the "Roma Chance Alternative Vocational Foundation School"; later on its name was changed to express respect to Professor Hegedűs who passed away as a middle-aged researcher known for his work regarding educational psychology regarding the Roma). The structure of the institution is rather complicated, one can attain practical skills and study on in order to receive the secondary school leaving certificate. Today the school has 260 students.

Although they teach Gypsy minority content-based subjects the policy of the school is to train Roma and non Roma together. This initiative is run by the National Gypsy Minority Local Authority together with Lungo Drom, a Romany organisation (Kovats, 2001:126). The leader of the school, Béla Csillei has received several educational awards and also teaches at the teacher Training College of Jászberény.

[10] http://www.kalyijag.extra.hu/page.php?2 (02/09/09)

Dr Ambedkar Secondary School[11]

The 'Jai Bhim' Buddhist association set up this school in 2007 in Sajókaza, a remote village in the neighbourhood of some very poor Gypsy communities in the North East of Hungary. In this region of the country the ratio of people with school-leaving certificates is lower than 1%. Dr. Ambedkar, who was an Indian politician coming from the caste of the untouchables, put the emphasis on self-help when talking about social mobility. His theory is very relevant regarding the "Roma issue" in Hungary.

Even though the school is located in a segregated environment its teachers' long-term goal is integrate their students. The objective of this institution is to show the way out of poverty to local people and make environmental stimuli enjoyable for everybody. In order to achieve its goals the school offers personal student-centred education. Although they intend to radiate modern up to date information to their students teachers also encourage them to realise the values of their own culture and integrate those to the knowledge they are attaining while being trained for their final exams.

Lessons of Model Institutions

With all the examples and initiatives introduced above relating to Romany minority educational institutions one might wonder where the challenge is when such a colorful scenario can be introduced in a country of 10 million people. The essential challenge is in the character of the maintainers of these model institutions: they are churches and foundations although by legislation the provision of equal opportunities in education is a basic, declared function of the state. Most of the models are constantly struggling with financial issues which consume time and energy that could be spent on professional (educational) development. The institutions introduced reach only a slight proportion of those whose equal opportunities are more than dubious, and being isolated educational centers their effectiveness can most probably be traced on a local rather than a more widespread, nationwide level.

TEACHING MINORITY LANGUAGES

Minority education consists of two basic elements: teaching the culture and languages of particular minorities. This paper does not detail minority culture education issues,

[11] Detailed information in English can be found at the website of the school: http://www.ambedkar.eu/category/front-page/ (10/09/09)

as cultural elements are transferred through language. My main goal in what follows is to emphasise and introduce the current situation of Gypsy languages in education.

Status Quo of Gypsy Languages in Hungary

When talking about Gypsy languages I understand languages spoken by Gypsies in Hungary: Boyash (an archaic version of Romanian) and Romani (an Ind language, internationally recognized as "the Gypsy language"). The legislation of teaching Gypsy languages has been a long process in our country—there are quite a few experts of it, such as Anna Orsós Pálmainé who devotes a chapter to this question in her doctoral dissertation (Pálmainé, 2007). Even educationalists lack knowledge in this field and publish misleading information (see for instance Nikolov, 2003).

The number and ratio of population who speak these languages are quite uncertain: our dta are based on the so-called Kemény studies (Landauer, 2004). We can find the freshest data in the latest Kemény study (Kemény-Janky, 2003). According to this, in 2001 people recognizing themselves as Boyash and Romani speakers were altogether 8,5-8,9 % of the whole Gypsy/Roma population. The absolute number of speakers is increasing although their ratio is reducing (according to the 1993 data speakers of Gypsy languages are 105 000 people). Although the third Kemény study (the one published in 2003) is considered to show the most uncertain results due to its sampling technique, we can estimate the percentage of young Roma/Gypsy who speaks either language (Table 2).

One can say that the representation of 10% and 20% of speakers is an ignorable ratio of those Gypsy children who probably speak their mother tongue, yet we cannot violate anyone's basic linguistic human rights approved by our Constitution. Language discrimination, in other words linguicism is an instrument that legitimizes and reproduces an unequal distribution of social resources and power (Kontra, 2001). Minority language teaching therefore can be considered as much a human right activity as a profession of applied linguists and future teachers.

On an international level Professor Yaron Matras of Manchester University has been carrying out the Manchester Romani Project: he and his colleagues are describing different dialects of Romani. However, the Linguistic Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences does not have a linguist dealing with this language as regards conditions in Hungary (although Szalai has done research among the

Kalderash in Transylvania), whereas there are researchers studying and describing Boyash.[12]

Still, the situation of Gypsy languages and applied linguistics in Hungary is much better than in other countries of Europe. We already have essential dictionaries and language books (Rostás-Farkas and Karsai 1984, 1991; Choli-Daróczi, 1988; Orsós, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2002; Orsós-Kálmán 2004), although these resources have not been processed according to age-specific learners' needs. Those teaching Romani in Hungary use not more than a dozen of books—they supplement the existing material with their own notes and teaching aids (Lakatos, 2008).

In optimal circumstances, when we talk about the systematic language teaching-learning process we need to consider each of its elements (Figure 2). Once minority languages are officially recognized they must appear in educational legislation and also in the national curriculum. The system of language requirements appears in the curriculum and in the framework of language exams at different levels. First, present speakers of the language, especially in the case of minority languages, may become future teachers of the particular language, in our case Boyash and Romani. In order to train these people we need teacher training programmes, where they learn to create and use teaching material with adequate methodology of the learners' needs. Learners may come from nursery age to adults, and so naturally the way they acquire the language differs in several concerns—in other words relevant teacher training must be aware of its market.

Sources of Minority Language Teaching Material

Before the political changes of the late 80s and early 90s of the last century, creating education material used to be the exclusive competence of course book writers and experts of Hungarian public education. Today, due to new social and public educational circumstances, these tasks are challenging teachers who may never have been educated in curriculum development. The case of minority languages in this concern is an even more burning issue: teacher training of minority language teachers and teaching minority languages in public education are its basic factors.

Due to the limited number of well-educated experts in Gypsy languages and applied linguists among them, those taking the responsibility of teaching Boyash and Romani need to create their own teaching material out of existing resources. There are

[12] see http://www.nytud.hu/oszt/elmnyelv/index.html#Fő%20kutatás for details (28/03/09)

a number of collections one can find when taking up the pioneer role of the minority language teacher.

Among collections in Hungary, first we have to mention the stores of the library of the Gandhi Secondary Grammar School and Boarding, Pécs (Gandhi School). As this institution was the first in Hungary to teach Romani and Boyash, it has functioned as a publisher of several books and teaching material: song books, collections of tales and language books can be found among the publications.[13] There is also an ever-expanding library at the Department of Sociology of Education and Romology at the University of Pécs. This latter is the pioneer workshop of Hungarian Higher Education with respect to Gypsy languages. Being a university center the department functions as a publisher focusing on the works of the department staff (Lakatos, 2004, 2005; Orsós, 2005).

The National Széchenyi Library offers a complete bibliography that helps in organizing classes on Gypsy languages. The collection contains relevant literature both in Gypsy languages and in Hungarian and its items were collected between 1967 and 1999 by Zsuzsa Bódy.[14] Among them we can find dictionaries, language books, studies, folklore series, audio sources, informative papers and literature.

An electronic database can be downloaded from *romaweb*, one of the most recognized sites dealing with Roma/Gypsy issues. From the database link we get to the document store: this is where we find bibliographies—this link offers a list of dictionaries and language books.

Next to the document store one can find the art repository. Here, in the category of literature we have access to poems, folktales, tales, novels, short stories and jokes in divisions by author. In music, again by composer (also accessible from the art repository) we find authentic material both in Boyash and Romani from which we can compile our language classes.

A printed posthumous collection of Romani children's literature (Réger, 2002) introduces ritual games, tales, life-tales, conversation pieces, role plays, dialogue plays and riddles. This database of authentic material is a unique treasure box for teaching Romani for small children.

[13] As for material published so far see the link „Kiadványaink" at http://gandhi.dravanet.hu/regi/ (26/10/08) According to a new project a syndicate is set up consisting of the National Gypsy Self Government, the Gandhi School and the Primary School of Darány – seven teachers are working on putting together language books in Boyash and Romani for the first two grades of elementary school. See page 9 for details at http://www.romakultura.hu/vilagunko907tartalom.pdf (02/09/09)

[14] Ms Bódy passed away in 1999 so the list does not contain items from the 21st century. The collection can be downloaded from http://mek.oszk.hu/00000/00035/00035.htm (12/10/08)

Among Hungarian sources we need to mention the best quality Roma children and youth magazine, *Glinda* (Mirror) edited by the Amaro Trajo (Our Life) Association for Roma Culture. This publication started its seventh volume in 2009, although annually (for financial reasons) they only publish a few numbers. The magazine has headings for teachers, language lessons (first Romani only, today Boyash as well) and a series of comics entitled "Genesis"—in Hungarian, for the time being. Adaptation of the heading contents may contribute to Gypsy language classes both as compulsory and supplementary material.

Due to language use specialties of Roma communities in Europe, international sources are exclusively Romani database, mostly of those who belong to Matras' professional circles. Publication of the first collection of international sources (Bakker-Kychukov, 2004) was supported by the Open Society Institute, Budapest. The authors of the book primarily recommend their work to teachers. They provide their readers with their electronic address and invite them to note mistakes or to place supplementary information in the collection. A short guideline is given to readers, informing them about dialects according to which the items of the collection are structured. The collection introduces several books applicable for school, including ABC books, elementary mathematics, literature and language books.

The freshest rosary (Proctor, 2008) is recommended to everyone who intends to learn Romani. This collection is not only a canon of authors and titles but gives annotation to each of its items. With the help of these comments language teachers (and learners) can decide which aid is the most appropriate for their purposes. The database gives information on printed, online and audio material.

Almost each database introduced has a crucial issue: that is, accessibility. Once they find the most appropriate sources, the readers have to find out for themselves where the items can be purchased or borrowed from. In order to overcome this challenge one may need to consult institutions where Gypsy languages are already being taught. A list of institutions teaching Gypsy languages today in Hungary can be accessed from romaweb, the portal that has already been mentioned.

Gypsy Languages in Schools

According to current educational legislation in Hungary, whoever has a language certificate at C2 level and is trained as a teacher specialised in *any* subject can teach Gypsy languages in the public education system. Should a school employ a teacher

fulfilling these criteria the local curriculum has to provide two forty-five minute long lessons per week—all this, supposing eight (most probably functional illiterate) parents' relevant written requirements are submitted to the school administration. The question is whether parents are aware of their rights in this matter.

There are several challenges ahead for those who intend to map the present situation of Gypsy languages in Hungarian public education, as well. Data from the last five years show similar results concerning teaching Boyash and Romani.

A research financed by the Hungarian Ministry of Education and carried out by the Department of Romology and Sociology of Education in May-June 2009 (Lakatos, 2009) was designed to find out where educational institutions teach Romani in Hungary. The researchers found that no statistics can be found on relevant institutions. The Information System of Public Education (KIFIR) has no information on schools teaching Gypsy languages at all and the data the Ministry of Education has in this matter is misleading. Consequently, researchers had to operate with information attained in other ways, namely received from present and/or ex-students of Romology at their own department.

Applying the snowball method, researchers discovered that today in Hungary there are 23 settlements nationwide where 27 educational institutions have Romani as part of the curriculum. Altogether 1,325 pupils and students learn Romani in public education: 13% of them are pre-schoolers, most of them (70%) are primary school pupils and the rest of the students have access to Romani secondary school (17%). These institutions mostly employ one (64%) or two (26%) teachers of Romani, while three or four language educators work in a very few places (5%-5% each). Though there is theoretical agreement about the importance of early education concerning minority language education there are altogether two kindergartens nationwide where three or four kindergarten teachers use Romani on a daily basis.

In 2005/2006 there were ten educational institutions (Figure 3) where learning Boyash was a possibility. Altogether eight primary and two secondary schools offer Boyash as a minority language, which meant 1,042 pupils or students (Pálmainé, 2007). There are only two schools where all children attending take Boyash, one of them being the Gandhi School. 53% of the pupils at the ten institutions examined took this minority language in 2004/2005. All in all we can predict that approximately 2,300-2,500 children learn either Romani or Boyash today in Hungary at school.

Success Criteria of (Language) Teachers

Although we can find sceptics on the necessity of Gypsy language education (Takács, 2008), the process of teaching minority languages has already started. There is a demand for accredited language exams at each level, both for Boyash and Romani, which representatives of the majority society also choose to take (Lakatos, 2008).

Teachers of Boyash and Romani have a significantly diverse educational background (Pálmainé, 2007; Lakatos, 2008). It is time to synchronize theories and practices applied in minority language teaching nationwide and this process has already started at the University of Pécs. Starting with the academic year 2009/2010 students are able to choose Masters Romology studies. Candidates can choose to be trained teachers of Boyash or Romani Languages or Roma/Gypsy culture. Due to this option the South Transdanubian Region in Hungary is the first in the European Union to train educators of minority languages and culture.

The accreditation material of the course (Pálmainé, 2008) contains the special competencies of the teachers of Romology. As regards requirements, future teachers must:

- have high standard linguistic competences in the target language (Boyash or Romani)—the minimum level is C1 of the European Language Framework,
- apply the most appropriate language education techniques during the teaching learning process they face,
- share Roma/Gypsy history, cultural values and traditions,
- plan the language learning process with the instruments of project and drama education.

Candidates also need to prove their talents as curriculum development specialists who are/have:

- ready and able to create and adapt,
- good communicators, co-operators and coordinators,
- talented diagnosticians,
- unprejudiced decision makers,
- flexible,
- a concept of process analysis and evaluation,
- an integrative approach,
- open in a critical way towards new methodology in and outside their country,
- educational selfreflection - not only as mere theory (Bárdossy, 2002).

Representatives of a new discipline should always have courage. Future candidate teachers of Gypsy languages and cultures may take a double portion of this characteristic. They will need courage to teach content that is debated by colleagues and to speak in publi as well; courage to become flexible and easy-going without losing professional values; courage to build respect for a new discipline and to take professional responsibility. However, taking responsibility does not belong to those characteristics that are internalized in Eastern Europe. Learning how to do so is a long journey which will require much personal experience.

SUMMARY

Two decades after democratic changes in the political structure of our country a particularly significant marker, minority education does not show either satisfying or optimistic results. Different educational policies and approaches intending to solve the "Roma issue" have failed and Romany/Gypsy minority education faces more challenges than twenty years ago. Legislation provides opportunities; policy-making, however, has not proven to go hand in hand with a theoretically given framework and real options.

Democracy has to be born in people's minds, in our ways of thinking, judging, decision-making, and acting in everyday life situations as much as in realising the ideas of those who proclaim equal chances when introducing acts based upon basic human rights. Martin Luther King had a dream in 1963 and the United States of America has an Afro-American president today, in 2009. Shall we have a Prime Minister coming from the Romany/Gypsy minority in another twenty five years?

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Educational attainment of the 16-17 year olf (Roma: 17-18) population in 1993 and 2003 (per cent) (Kertesi-Kézdi, 2006)

	Completes primary school by age 17 (approx.)	Continues studies in		
		Vocational school	Secondary school	Total
Roma population				
1993	68	33	9	42
2003	86	24	14	38
change	+18	–9	+5	–4
National average				
1993	96	39	48	87
2003	96	12	80	92
change	0	–27	+32	+5
Roma – National difference in differences				
	+18	+18	–27	–9

Note: The category of continuing studies covers those who studied in vocational or secondary schools or completed any of those. Continuing rates are underestimated by dropout rates.
Sources: Hungarian Roma Surveys of 1993 and 2003, and Hungarian Labor Force Surveys of 1993/4 and 2003/ 4.

Table 2: Daytime Students Attaining A-level at Gandhi School 2000-2009. (Dezső)

	Number of A-Levels
2000	18
2001	22
2002	18
2003	26
2004	25 (7+18)
2005	29 (13+16)
2006	37 (19+18)
2007	35 (19+16)
2008	16
2009	57
sum	283
average	28

Table 3: Adult (Second Chance) Students Attaining A-levels at Gandhi School 2004-2009[15] (Dezső)

	Number of A-Levels
2004	21
2006	36
2007	(59/)37
2008	34
2009	(62/)35
SUM	163
AVERAGE	32-33

[15] Because of a change in the training structure there were no exams in 2005 at the second chance department. Numbers in brackets refer to the number of those who took the exams not the ones who actually passed.

Table 4: Roma/Gypsy aged 7-19 speaking Gypsy languages in 2009 (%) (Dezső)

Age (yrs)	Hungarian only	Romani	Boyash	Other	Altogether
7-14	88,1	8,0	2,8	1,1	100,0
15-19	80,1	12,0	5,0	2,9	100,0

Figures 1: Education Policy in the Governance Structure (Polónyi-Timár, 2005)



Figure 2: Prerequisites of the Systematic Language Teaching-Learning Process (Dezső)



Figure 3: Pupils/Students Learning Boyash at Primary and Secondary Schools in 2005/2006 (Pálmainé, 2007)



REFERENCES

Bakker, P. and Kyuchukov, H. (2004). Publications in Romani Useful for Romani Language Education. Budapest/Amsterdam, Next Page Foundation-OpenSociety Fund/European Cultural Foundation.

Bárdossy, I. (2002). A curriculumfejlesztés alapkérdései. Budapest, UNESCO Tanárképző Portál – ELTE.

Choli-Daróczi, J. (1988). Zhanes Romanes? Cigány nyelvkönyv. Budapest, Magyarországi Cigányok Kulturális Szövetsége.

Choli-Daróczi, J. (1996). School Success for Roma Children. In: Fényes, Cs., McDonald, C., and. Mészáros, A. (Eds.) (1999). The Roma Education Resource Book. Volume 1. Open Society Institute, Budapest, 40-44.

Dezső, R. A. (2007). "A Starting Point" – The Contribution of a Secondary Grammar School of the Romany Ethnic Minority to Lifelong Learning. In Tarrósy I. and Milford S. (Eds.) European Higher Education in a Changing World. A View from the Danube Region. Publikon, Pécs 225-238.Forray, R. K. (2006). The Situation of the Roma/Gypsy Community in Central and Eastern Europe. In: Abreu, L. and Sandor, J. (Eds.) Monitoring Health Status of Vulnerable Groups in Europe:

Past and Present. Compostela Group of Universities and PhoenixTN, European Thematic Network on Health and social Welfare Policies, Pécs, 111-126.

Hegedűs, T. A. (1998). The Tasks Concerning Gypsy Children's Socialisation at School. In: Fényes, Cs., McDonald, C., and. Mészáros, A. (Eds.) (1999). The Roma Education Resource Book. Volume 1. Open Society Institute, Budapest, 27-39.

Hegedűs, T. A. and Forray, R. K. (1998a). Particularism, Universalism and Teaching to be Different. In: Fényes, Cs., McDonald, C., and. Mészáros, A. (Eds.) (1999). The Roma Education Resource Book. Volume 1. Open Society Institute, Budapest, 45-47.

Hegedűs, T. A. and Forray, R. K. (1998b). Teachers on the Gypsy Culture. In: Fényes, Cs., McDonald, C., and. Mészáros, A. (Eds.) (1999). The Roma Education Resource Book. Volume 1. Open Society Institute, Budapest, 178-183.

Hodgson, R. (2009). Jobbik Not Extreme: Poll http://www.budapesttimes.hu/content/view/12173/219/ (08/06/09)

Jung, C. G. (1949). Psychology of the Unconscious. Dodd, Mead and Company, New York.

Katz, S. R. (2005). Emerging from the Cocoon of Romani Pride: the First Graduates of the Gandhi Secondary School in Hungary. Intercultural Education 3, 247-261.

Kemény, I. and Janky, B. (2003). A 2003. évi cigány felmérésről. Népesedési, nyelvhasználati és nemzetiségi adatok. Beszélő, 10, 64-76.

Kertesi, G. and Kézdi, G. (2006). Expected Long Term Budgetary Benefits to Roma Education in Hungary. Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.

Kontra, M. (2001). Language Discrimination in Education and Gypsy Unemployment. In: McDonald, C., Kovács, J. and Fényes, Cs. (Eds.) (2001). The Roma Education Resource Book. Volume 2. Open Society Institute, Budapest, 317-325.

Kovats, M. (2001). Hungary. Country Report. In: Pinnock, K. (Ed.) Denied a Future? The Right to Education of Roma/Gypsy and Traveller Children in Europe. Save the Children, London, 108-135.

Krajnyák Mrs, J. and Lázár, P. (1996). Pedagogical Activities in the School of Nyírtelek. In: Fényes, Cs., McDonald, C., and. Mészáros, A. (Eds.) (1999). The Roma Education Resource Book. Volume 1. Open Society Institute, Budapest, 145-153.

Lakatos, Sz. (2004). Klasszikusok romani nyelven. Pécs, PTE BTK NTI Romológia és Nevelésszociológia Tanszék.

Lakatos, Sz. (2005). Igei táblázatok a lovári nyelv tanulásához. Pécs, PTE BTK NTI Romológia és Nevelésszociológia Tanszék.

Lakatos, Sz. (2008). A romani nyelv a közoktatásban. In: Cserti Csapó, T. (Ed.): Tízéves a romológia. Konferenciakötet. Pécs, PTE BTK NTI Romológia és Nevelésszociológia Tanszék. 171-181.

Lakatos, Sz. (2009). Educational Institutions Teaching Romani in Hungary. Research Manuscript for the Hungarian Ministry of Education.

Landauer, A. (2004). Utak és problémák a magyarországi cigánykutatásban. Problémavázlat. In: Nagy, A. and Péterfi, R. (Eds.): A feladatra készülni kell. A cigányság kulturális beilleszkedése és a közkönyvtár. Budapest, OSZK – Gondolat Kiadó. 13-46.

Lázár, P. (1998). The Pedagogy of Kedves Ház. In: McDonald, C., Kovács, J. and Fényes, Cs. (Eds.) (2001). The Roma Education Resource Book. Volume 2. Open Society Institute, Budapest, 189-215.

LeBor, A. (2009). Jobbik: Meet the BNP's Fascist Friends in Hungary http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6457752.ece (09/06/09)

Liskó, I. (1996). Supporting the Vocational Training of Gypsy Children. In: Fényes, Cs., McDonald, C., and. Mészáros, A. (Eds.) (1999). The Roma Education Resource Book. Volume 1. Open Society Institute, Budapest, 118-132.

Nikolov, M. (2003). Az idegennyelv-tanítás megújulásának hatásai. Új Pedagógiai Szemle 3, 46-57.

Orsós, A. (1994). Beás nyelvkönyv. Kaposvár, Csokonai Vitéz Mihály Tanítóképző Főiskola.

Orsós, A. (1997). Beás-Magyar szótár. Kaposvár, Csokonai Vitéz Mihály Tanítóképző Főiskola.

Orsós, A. (1999). Magyar-Beás szótár. Kaposvár, Csokonai Vitéz Mihály Tanítóképző Főiskola.

Orsós, A. (2002). Beás-Magyar Igeszótár. Pécs,Gandhi Közalapítványi Gimnázium és Kollégium.

Orsós, A. and Kálmán, L. (2004). A beás nyelv alsó szintjei. Budapest, MTA Nyelvtudományi Intézet.

Pálmainé Orsós, A. (2005). Felkészülési segédanyag a PROFEX Nyelvvizsgaközpont Beás nyelvvizsgájához. CD melléklettel. Pécs, PTE BTK NTI Romológia és Nevelésszociológia Tanszék.

Pálmainé Orsós, A. (2007). Nyelvi helyzet, nyelvoktatás, nyelvtanárképzés. Vizsgálatok és gondolatok a beás nyelv megőrzésének lehetőségeiről. Pécs, PTE BTK, Oktatás és Társadalom Doktori Iskola.

Pálmainé Orsós, A. (2008). Kérelem a romológiatanár tanári mesterszak indítására. Pécs, PTE BTK NTI Romológia és Nevelésszociológia Tanszék.

Polónyi, I. and Timár, J. (2005). Gondolatok az oktatáspolitikáról. (Thoughts on Educational Policy) Új Pedagógiai Szemle 9, 3-26.

Proctor, E. (2008). Gypsy Dialects: A Selected Annotated Bibliography of Materials for the Practical Study of Romani. Hertfordshire, University of Hertfordshire Press.

Pulay, Gy. and Benkő, J. (2008): A magyarországi cigányság helyzetének javítására és felemelkedésére a rendszerváltás óta fordított támogatások mértéke és hatékonysága. (The Extent and Efficiency of Supply Spent on Developing the Situation of the Roma Living in Hungary since the System Change.) Állami Számvevőszék (State Audit Office of Hungary), Budapest.

Radó, P. (2001). Roma Education Policies in Hungary. In: McDonald, C., Kovács, J. and Fényes, Cs. (Eds.) The Roma Education Resource Book. Volume 2. Open Society Institute, Budapest, 43-62.

Réger, Z. (2002). Cigány gyermekvilág. Olvasókönyv a cigány gyermekfolklórból. Budapest, L'Harmattan.

Roma Portál http://www.romaweb.hu/romaweb/index.html (2008. 10. 26.)

Rostás-Farkas, Gy. and Karsai, E. (1984). Kenyva Kiponca – Képes szótár. Budapest, Országos Pedagógiai Intézet.

Rostás-Farkas, Gy. and Karsai, E. (1991). Cigány-magyar, magyar-cigány szótár. Budapest, Kossuth

Szőke, J. (1998). The Józsefváros Day School. In: McDonald, C., Kovács, J. and Fényes, Cs. (Eds.) (2001). The Roma Education Resource Book. Volume 2. Open Society Institute, Budapest, 174-188

TAVES BAHTALO![1]
HEALTH POLICIES AND THE ROMANIAN GYPSY COMMUNITY

ANAMARIA NEAG

ABSTRACT

This research aims at evaluating how health care policies affect the life of the Roma minority in Romania. The Roma or 'gypsies' are the second largest minority in Romania and the one most discriminated against. Living in sheer poverty, the life expectancy of the Roma is 10-15 years shorter than that of other citizens of Romania, revolving around 50-55 years. The Roma suffer—most commonly—from cardiovascular, digestive, and lung diseases. Besides health problems, the Roma community has to face illiteracy and a high rate of unemployment as well.

In the present research the impact of specific internationally financed Romanian health programs and policies towards gypsies will be evaluated. Both quantitative (surveys) and qualitative (interviews) methods will be used to give a clear view on the impact of health policies.

The initial presumption is that these programs and policies do not truly reach out to the Roma community and that they do not have the expected impact. The results will be correlated with Norman Daniels' just health care theory and the research will then analyze the connection between healthcare and life opportunities of this community.

INTRODUCTION

Romania has an upper middle economy according to the World Bank's 2008 country classification, with a GNI per capita of 6150 US dollars in 2007 (World Bank, 2007).

Since the fall of communism in 1989, the country has experienced a period of harsh transition which led eventually to the accession to the European Union in 2007. The end of communism brought not only democracy and a market economy,

[1] Romani greeting; meaning: Be healthy, Be lucky!

but significant disparities in living conditions and poverty for some groups. And one such vulnerable group is the Roma minority.

Romania has the largest population of Gypsies in Central and Eastern Europe. According to the last census, in 2002, their number officially is around half a million (2.5% of the population), but the unofficial estimates are much higher, around 1.5–2 million people (Bárány, 2002).

The history of the Romanian Gypsy community

The history of gypsies in Romania is one clouded by slavery, darkness and poverty. The first written accounts of this community were created in around the eleventh century (Crowe, 1991), when the Roma arrived in the regions of Wallachia and Moldavia. Gypsies were enslaved from the fifteenth century onwards until the middle of the nineteenth century. In this period they were heavily exploited, since they were known to be good craftsmen and also musicians. This exploitation in many cases was followed by torture and bad treatment. (The World Bank, 2005: 90)

During the eighteenth century in Transylvania (then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), gypsies were forced to speak the language of the majority and the landowner had to offer them small lands in order to oblige them to work in agriculture. These rules were implemented as a means of transforming the Roma's nomadic way of living.

Then, in the nineteenth century, slavery was abolished, but many Gypsies had to face poverty again. Some of them moved to the outskirts of cities and villages and some returned to the traditional nomadic lifestyle.

During the Second World War the Holocaust reached the Roma community too, yet for a long time nobody addressed this issue. It is difficult to know how many Roma were killed, but the numbers revolve around 300,000-500,000. In Romania alone an estimated 25,000-36,000 Gypsies were transported to camps in Transdneister (now part of Ukraine) where they died of cold, hunger and improper living conditions (Crowe, 1991).

In the communist period, according to the Party line, everybody enjoyed equality. But this equality meant assimilation of minorities, and as a consequence Gypsies were not allowed to study in their native language or to preserve their culture. Yet, on the bright side, the majority of the Roma had a job (as unskilled workers in factories) and shelter, which meant a rise in living standards.

But then with the fall of the dictatorial regime an even larger discrepancy came to the surface between the majority of the population and the Roma. With the introduction of the capitalist economy, the Roma lost their jobs and their small, but secure income. Adding to this—during the transition period—they had to face a rise in nationalism and discrimination.

Since the middle of the 90s international organizations have started off programs intended to improve the conditions of the Roma in education, health, employment and housing. There is still a lot of work to do.

HEALTHCARE POLICIES IN ROMANIA

The drift from communism to democracy brought a great impact on the health system of Romania. When under communism, access to health care was in general universal and free; the step to a market economy meant crisis, new policies and chaos.

In 2000 a new health insurance system was implemented in Romania. Under this system all the citizens of the country had to be registered with a family physician to be eligible for health care. The insurance works by payroll tax deductions for those who work in the formal sector, while those who are self-employed have to make contributions on their own. Beside these taxes, citizens have to pay for some drugs, transportation to health care facilities, and official and unofficial out-of-pocket payments (bribes) to doctors and nurses.

Since many of the Roma community do not have formal working places, they do not pay taxes or contributions for health insurance. Thus they do not figure in any register so when in need of health care they must pay. Since many Roma cannot afford this, they have to struggle with poor health conditions. It is a vicious circle which has proven increasingly hard to break:

> *Poor living conditions, such as overcrowding and lack of adequate sanitation facilities, make Roma communities more susceptible to infectious diseases than other groups. Reports of epidemics of hepatitis, tuberculosis, and parasitic diseases were common during and after the socialist period. Skin diseases, such as eczema, are also common. The last reported cases of poliomyelitis in Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, and Romania were all in Roma communities (OSCE 2000).*

Adding to this there is a heavy discrimination and a negative attitude towards this minority practiced by the health providers: "While there are positive examples, this relationship is more often characterized by miscommunication, distrust and, in some

cases, discrimination […] The attitudes and perceptions of both patients and medical staff can have a significant impact on how health needs are conceptualized and the quality of service delivery." (The World Bank, 2005: 108)

Yet the Romanian government has made important steps in trying to assess the healthcare of the Roma community. Although this is not the only reason, some of these measures have been taken up since Romania is participating in the so-called *Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015*: "The Decade focuses on the priority areas of education, employment, health, and housing, and commits governments to take into account the other core issues of poverty, discrimination, and gender mainstreaming." (www.romadecade.org)

Through this program, so far two reports have been published on the health status of the Roma minority in Romania. The one published in 2005 deals with the Roma Health Mediator Program, and the other one is an assessment of HIV and TB programs. Both of the reports agree that "unhealthy living conditions are one of the major causes of poorer health among Romani populations, particularly in the many ghettoized settlements. These conditions include sub-standard and crowded housing; little or no access to clean water, garbage collection, and roads; and geographic isolation. Other social issues, such as poverty, discrimination, and low position in the social hierarchy play an equally important role in shaping Romani health."(Mediating Romani Health, 2005: 10)

This means that in addressing Roma health issues, governments have to deal with an interconnected, complex issue of unemployment, housing, education and health problems.

One of the most important health policies has been the introduction of the so-called mediators in the public health system. "Members of the Romani community themselves, RHMs [Romani Health Mediators] aim to improve community health through (1) mediating between Romani patients and physicians during medical consultations, (2) communicating with Romani communities on behalf of the public health system, (3) providing basic health education, and, (4) assisting Roma in obtaining the health insurance or identity documents necessary to visit the doctor."(Mediating Romani Health, 2005: 10)

Some programs try to deal with the high incidence of tuberculosis and HIV (Roma Decade National Action Plan on Health), but the 2001 Strategy of the Government of Romania for the Improvement of the Roma Situation does not mention TB or HIV/

AIDS. Yet we have to acknowledge that the mere attempt to develop a governmental strategy proves that the state is interested in solving these problems.

It is still a question to what extent these programs and policies confront the conditions that cause health problems among Roma. According to one report on the mediator program: "results have not been effectively leveraged to bring about systemic change, and program activities are not sufficiently oriented toward remedying the structural inequities that shape Romani health in the first place. Integrate Romani health needs into overall health and social services reform." (Mediating Romani Health, 2005: 11)

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Bill Jordan (2006) sees the importance of social policies in their strength of supplying a certain degree of security and protection. People need proper health care to function well. Although the Washington Consensus model was meant to "discourage governments from trying to adopt redistributive policies or seeking to give their citizens economic security" (Jordan, 2006: 30), Samuel Bowles argues that "[…] government provision of both health and education services and unemployment benefit can increase productivity, employment and wages by more than the cost of supplying these services. These institutions are all complementary; workers consider it worth going to school and looking after their health if employment is relatively secure and a subsistence income is guaranteed during spells of unemployment." (Cited in Jordan, 2006: 35)

Research on the impact of health policies for the Roma minority might start with the question of whether access to health care is a "requirement of social justice, or is it simply a matter of social policy that some countries adopt and others do not" (Daniels, 2008). If we choose the social justice path, then we have to consider the need for positive discrimination for the most vulnerable, in this case, the Roma minority. According to the Webster's Online Dictionary, positive discrimination can be defined as those measures that are targeted at a particular group and are intended to eliminate and prevent discrimination or to balance disadvantages arising from existing attitudes and behaviors,.

To provide an answer, it might be useful to deal with the egalitarian theories which try to express the idea that all humans are equal in fundamental worth and moral status (Arneson, 2008). One of the highlights of egalitarian doctrines is the

equality of opportunity ideal. In connection with this, John Rawls has formulated a famous and debated theory, and that is the principle of equality of fair opportunity (EFO).

In his theory, Rawls presents a society in which only native talent and ambition can make a difference in one's chances to succeed in life. In a way, he speaks about a sort of classless society. John Rawls' theory is appealing because "EFO also opposes racial and sexual and similar prejudices that work to deprive disfavored individuals from enjoying opportunities to become qualified so that they would benefit from formal equality of opportunity." (Arneson, 2008)

Yet this theory cannot fully serve the purpose of the present research since we have to connect the ideal of equality of opportunity with that of health care for all. And Norman Daniels makes this connection in his book, *Just Health Care* (1985).

He advances a theory of justice in the distribution of health care. Daniels extends Rawls's appeal to a principle assuring fair equality of opportunity. One of his main arguments in favor of "universal access to some forms of health care builds on the contribution made by health—and derivately by health care—to the opportunities people can exercise."(Daniels, 2008) Since this theory builds on Rawls' justice as fairness claim, which states that we have the social obligation to protect the opportunity range of individuals, consequently it could posit that we have the obligation to promote and protect the normal function for all people. At the core of his theory we find what he calls species-typical normal functioning, which means that all human beings have certain needs -like food, housing, health care- irrespective of preferences about their ways of life. And he links species-typical normal functioning to opportunity. "Species-typical normal functioning is morally significant because it influences the size of an individual's share of the normal range of opportunities in a society." (Jacobs, 1996: 321)

Therefore in his theory the goal of health policy is that all people have to function in a normal way. As a consequence this goal is both egalitarian and maximizing.

When choosing a path for research we have to deal with this path's (theory's) essential strengths and weaknesses. One of such weaknesses of the just health care theory is that it is too broad. Daniels acknowledges this problem: "we lack prior agreement on more fine-grained principles that tell us how best to protect opportunity in this context. Because we lack a consensus on such principles, we should engage a form of procedural justice or fair process to yield fair outcomes." (Daniels, 2008)

Another defect might be the one denoted by Lesley Jacobs (1996). This weakness concerns the fact that Norman Daniels deals only with ill health in his discussion about fair opportunity in life and forgets about another natural disadvantage: the lack of certain talents or skills. The author argues that both ill health and natural talents have to be linked to fair opportunity. Although Jacobs' observation is pertinent, in the present proposal we are interested in the strict problem of access to healthcare and how this influences people's life, thus we will not deal with the question of natural talents or skills.

All these shortcomings are acknowledged and the consequences will be dealt with in the research report.

To conclude, Norman Daniels' work is considered to be the most suitable for this topic and his main argument- that health has a major role in one's opportunities in life, thus there should be an equal distribution of health care services- a starting point in researching the impact of policies for Gypsies.

THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

There are many scholarly discussions about justice and equality of opportunity. As stated above, Norman Daniels takes these discussions to the field of health care.

The research on the impact of health programs for gypsies can provide an empirical example for this discussion. Daniels' conclusion might be considered a milestone: "[…] a health care system should be designed to even out differences among individuals in terms of personal health in the same way that the education system should be designed to even out differences between similarly talented individuals from different socio-economic classes." (Jacobs, 1996: 330)

So we reckon that through equal and just health care Roma could have better opportunities in life. Consequently, if Roma could enjoy equal opportunities in healthcare they could have better chances to achieve so-called "species-typical normal functioning."

The Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015 has precisely this goal for Roma to be able to enjoy the same opportunities as the majority of citizens in Central and Southeastern Europe. There remain a few years to see whether the Decade will be successful.

The questions therefore will be as follow: Did the specific health policies and programs have the expected impact for the Roma community? If so, is the

improvement in health condition a background condition for fair equality of opportunity for this community? But Daniels' theory could be checked even if the impact hasn't been the expected one since the next question would then be, Does this lack of equal opportunities in health care have a major role in their opportunities in life?

It is anticipated that that the answers of the research questions will provide comments on the larger question of justice and equal opportunity. It is also expected that these answers will support Daniels' theory but that they will also prove that—in the case of Roma—access to equal healthcare only will not guarantee better opportunities in life.

RESEARCH METHODS

For answering these questions several quantitative and qualitative methods will be used, among them surveys, content analysis and interviews. Since the purpose of this research proposal is to measure the impact of health programs and policies, surveys and interviews are regarded as the most useful procedures. These methods have been chosen because impact is not understood here purely as a measurable unit (surveys) but also as one that has a highly subjective value (interviews).

This combination of methods is to be pursued to obtain greater knowledge about the issue of the study, but it could be used to mutually validate the findings of these approaches. An additional option would be a literature study to comprehensively understand the problem through academic articles and reports.

Regarding this topic another author, István Pogány, in his study (2004) about the human rights of the Roma community used the interview as a method to bring his research closer to people: "This approach provides a contextual depth to the analysis and avoids the glib generalisations and disparaging stereotypes that can undermine such accounts." (Clements, 2005: 161)

In another study, which focused upon rural women seeking for health information in remote areas, the researchers used semi-structured interviews to discuss the then mismatch between these women's lives and the Canadian policy assumptions supporting the development of electronic health strategies. (Harris, Wathen, 2007) This last research is particularly interesting because it demonstrates that often there is a discrepancy between the aim of the policies and the actual lives of the people in question.

In a qualitative study of Roma communities in Romania researchers used similar techniques to portray the actual living conditions of Gypsies (The World Bank, 1999). In this research they were interested in drawing a picture of Roma life and their access to social services. The researchers worked with interviews, site visits and additional primary and secondary materials which were afterwards analyzed.

For identifying such and similar problems, in the course of the fieldwork, interviews will have to be conducted with members of the Roma minority, people taking part in the health mentor programs and health practitioners. It would be advantageous to interview a large number of Roma (from different parts of the country, coming from different groups of Roma). By interviewing people of Roma minority, it is more likely to discover the personal viewpoints on the topic of health and opportunities. Thus open-ended interviews will be used which are closer to everyday interaction and might give a better insight to how these people think and feel about healthcare. Although the researcher has to work with a large degree of subjectivity, these open-ended questions can provide a complex view on the impact of policies people really experience.

During fieldwork focus groups are also to be considered since they are particularly useful when discussing taboo subjects, and Roma health care is in many cases this type of subject. Adding to these focus groups could be used for discovering common processes of problem solving in this minority (Flick, 2006).

In the World Bank research mentioned earlier there were made 65 in-depth interviews with key-informants and more than 165 with Romani people individually and in groups. The large number of interviews was needed to discover the general access of Gypsies to social services.

Since this study has a precise target (health care) and the time and fund limit is shorter, it is assumed that around 40-50 interviews will be carried out in total. Still, this number of interviews is considered to be enough for the purpose to be accomplished.

Another chosen method is the survey. Although not always accurate when dealing with this community, surveys could help in understanding how successful the different programs and policies were in preventing or curing illnesses. Sometimes it is helpful to use national level data to provide a context to qualitative research. Adding to this, surveys might back up the findings of the interviews or they might contradict

those. Either way these findings together with the correspondence/ contradiction will be analyzed in the report of the research.

The combination of these two methods is considered useful to show the impact of the health policies and how this impact influenced or not the fair opportunities of Gypsies.

Research plan

Time-frame: the fieldwork could be estimated to be completed in about three-four months, during which interviews will be done in several rural and urban areas in Romania. After completing the fieldwork, another three months will be needed for the completion of the whole project (data analysis, conclusions)

DIFFICULTIES AND SOLUTIONS

One of the difficulties in this research is that the Roma groups are somewhat closed communities. Another problem might be linked with certain taboo topics in healthcare such as vaccination or women's health issues. These matters apparently are not discussed openly and there is a sense of shame when they are taken up (Council of Europe & European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2003).

For handling the first problem: the researcher has to be accepted by the community in order to get factual answers to these difficult questions. For solving the issue it might be useful to get into contact first with the representatives of some Romani NGOs who could help to make the way to the community smoother. By using "contact persons" it could be easier to get closer to the group. Another option would be to collaborate with a Roma researcher or research assistant. It would probably give a better insight since people will be more open to someone from their own community.

With regard to the taboo topics: although focus groups should be heterogeneous, it could be more opportune if there were only single-sex groups. Thus sensitive topics (women's health, for example) could be easier discussed without the restraints of gender-roles so powerful in the Roma culture.

Lastly, one of the biggest issues is the victimization of this community. Usually Gypsies themselves (but others as well) tend to be highly biased when talking about discrimination and their problems. Although this is normal to some extent, the researcher has to deal with this problem in a neutral way. In solving the issue, focus groups with health practitioners- nurses, doctors- will be used. Thus, by, choosing to

consider the situation from the practitioners' point of view, the results and conclusions will be more accurate. This method could be much more effective since in the above-mentioned World Bank qualitative study (1999) researchers found that while the Roma blame the medical staff for discriminating against them, practitioners consider that communication with Gypsies is difficult and they distrust the Roma:

> *I do not register gypsies as a family physician. I do not accept gypsies. . . . They come here and ask for money, ask for medicines. . . They have a lot of nerve. You have to keep an eye on them when they enter here. I do not think they are poorer than other people. They go to Hungary with business; they probably have more money than we have. They go by car to ask for social aid. (The World Bank, 1999: 108)*

Ethical considerations

The study will be conducted in accordance with a pronounced ethical awareness. The rules and guidelines of the research follow the Swedish Research Council's recommendations.

Participants in this research will be previously informed about the background, the purpose and the voluntariness of this study. The information will be adapted to the participants' general circumstances, especially taking into consideration the high rate of illiteracy in this community. Adding to this we will consider and respect the cultural norms existing in the Roma minority. Facing the problem of illiteracy and cultural differences will be a step-by-step process, first talking to the leaders of the community or a specific NGO-leader to inform them about this research. Subsequently, similar discussions will be conducted with individual subjects.

Although it is important to apply the research ethics standards, we find it equally important to develop these standards so that they are relevant and sensitive to the specific context of the Roma community.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this research proposal is to shed light upon the experienced impact of health programs and policies targeted at Gypsies in Romania. By examining this impact, the next step will be to prove whether just health care and positive discrimination means in reality more opportunities for this minority.

The objective of all these policies is the inclusion of the Roma community in society, but the question is whether they are successful and if not how they can be changed in order to fulfill this ambition.

The World Bank gives some guidelines, but they seem easier in theory than in practice:

> *Policies should balance three related sets of objectives: first, increasing economic opportunities by expanding employment participation; second, building human capital through better education and health; and third, strengthening social capital and community development through increased Roma empowerment and participation. (The World Bank, 2005: 192)*

The research will end with a discussion of the policy implications of the findings. It will show the positives and negatives of the programs and policies but mainly it will hopefully give an insight on how the people affected see these. And this insight could help policymakers in understanding and shaping the programs for the needs of the community. One of the biggest problems of policies for the Roma is that they usually neglect the cultural difference between the majority of citizens and the Roma. Through this research it is aimed that the administration in charge will better understand how Gypsies themselves feel about the importance and impact of such programs.

We believe that this research approach is feasible and that if everything runs as planned, it will be successful. The data collected through these methods will fill a gap of communication between policymakers and the Roma people. The proposed research will make an important contribution to existing, but limited knowledge. We believe that the success of this research will have a major potential in improving health care policies for the Roma community.

REFERENCES

Arneson, Richard, "Egalitarianism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall2008Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/egalitarianism/>.

Clements, L. 2005. István Pogány, The Roma Café: Human Rights and the Plight of the Romani People, Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 34, Issue 1.

Council of Europe & European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2003. Breaking the Barriers – Romani Women and Access to Public Health Care.

Daniels, N. 1985, Just Health Care, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Daniels, N. 2008, Daniels, Norman, "Justice and Access to Health Care", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/justice-healthcareaccess/>

Deacon, B., 2000, Eastern European Welfare State: The Impact of the Politics of Globalization, Journal of European Social Policy, vol. 10, no. 2 (May).

Gabel, S. G., 2009, The growing divide: the marginalisation of young Roma children in Bulgaria, International Journal of Social Welfare, vol. 18, no.1.

Guglielmo, R. & Waters, T.W, 2005, Migrating Towards Minority Status: Shifting European Policy Towards Roma, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, Nr 4.

Flick, U., 2006, An Introduction to Qualitative Research. Third Edition, London: Sage.

Harris, R. M., Wathen, C. N., 2007, "I Try to Take Care of It Myself." How Rural Women Search for Health Information, Qualitative Health Research, Vol. 17, Issue 5.

Jacobs, L. 1996, Can an egalitarian justify universal access to health care? In Social Theory & Practice, Vol. 22, Issue 3.

Jordan, B. 2006, Social policy for the twenty-first century, Cambridge: Polity.

Open Society Institute Network Public Health Program. Mediating Romani Health 2005.

Policy and Program Opportunities. 2005, New York: Open Society Institute.

Rawls, J. 1971, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Yeates, N. (ed.), 2008, Understanding global social policy. Bristol: Policy.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, at http://plato.stanford.edu.

The World Bank Report. Roma in an Expanding Europe: Breaking the Poverty Cycle. 2005, Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.

www.romadecade.org

www.vr.se

POST 1989 HIGHER EDUCATION IN ROMANIA: TRANSITION, REFORM OR BUILDING THE COMMON?

Sonia Pavlenko

When World War II ended and the Communist Party came to power in Romania, the universities were affected alongside other institutions and fields of life. "Academic culture in "eastern socialism" bore the telltale print of a closed society" (Marga, 1994). Marxist-Leninist ideology was not compatible with the university, which acted as an objective defender of liberty and reason. The universities lost their autonomy and the highly centralised state would make all the decisions in what the universities were concerned, starting from the curriculum (new mandatory subjects such as political economy or scientific socialism had to be studied now by all the students, regardless of their majors), through staff appointments (often made on the basis of the political pro-communist activity of the appointee and not based on competence in the subject s/he was supposed to teach) and all the way to student selection (the students that did not have a healthy background had real difficulties in securing a place at the university) or university mergers. In fact, in the late '50s Ceaușescu, the dictator-to-be, personally attended and gave directions for the merger of the two universities of Cluj, namely Babeș University (which taught in Romanian) and Bolyai University (which taught in Hungarian)[1]. The result of the merger was Babeș-Bolyai University.

Universities under communist rule became a place for propaganda; they trained the students strictly in the professions that the state needed (as a matter of fact the number of students enrolled in universities decreased and many majors were cancelled); they were under the direct rule of the state; teaching and the research were completely separated, and research was restricted to "agreed fields" as there were a lot of taboo topics.

Philosophy as the overarching discipline in the pre World War II world was replaced completely, first by the Marxist-Leninist disciplines and later by History

[1] The way the communists phrased it, this merger was just a natural response to the initiatives coming from the Hungarian and Romanian youth. In fact, the political background was much more complicated. For further details see Bottoni, *Transilvania Rossa*, 2007

(as a result of an increasing nationalism as well as a concern with the "destiny of the nation" (Marga, 1994).

Once the communist regime was overthrown in 1989, the Romanian universities were faced with an unexpected situation. Firstly, for the first months of 1990 they had to function in a legislative void. Many of the laws passed by the communists were abolished and it took some time to adopt new, so called "democratic" laws.

Brătianu (2008) points out that the complex changes that society went through as a result of the overthrow of communism challenged the universities to transform themselves as well. Thus the entire higher education system from Romania embarked on a very complex process of transformation.

Most often this process was called a process of transition. However, one could easily question the appropriateness of the term used. A transition process implies a change from a state A to a state B, or from a place A to a place B. Nevertheless, the greater majority of the Romanian universities embarked upon this transition process without defining what they meant by B, i.e. without clearly knowing what they wanted to attain.

The communist heritage meant that the starting point for all the changes (not to venture to call them reforms) was a production system based on the command-and-control economy, with virtually no exposure to a competitive business environment. Moreover, the management process and the administration used to be controlled directly by the single party's authority, and thus every and any decision had been dependant on the political ideology and the political leaders. The education system had been overcentralised and *all* important decisions were made at the ministry level. University management had a purely administrative nature and academic leadership did not exist at all. A mechanical existence and total obedience were the main characteristics of the starting point for the change process at the beginning of 1990. (Brătianu 2008)

The wider context of Eastern Europe provided some potential paths to follow. One could have been to respond to the challenges of the region, namely to

> *"change their governance and management structures to more democratic ones that would allow more autonomous behaviour; change their curricula to match the transformation from socialist economies to market economies; change their mission from mainly teaching oriented to incorporate research; and compete with a new sector of private higher education institutions of varying kinds" (Westerheijden and Sorensen, 1999, pp.13-14).*

As mentioned before, a transition process implies a change from a state A to a state B, and while is was common knowledge what state A represented, no one knew for sure what the aimed-for state B was nor when it was going to be attained. Empirical observations have suggested that the most commonly mentioned phrases in connection with the final stage of transition have been "capitalism" and "market economy", but given the lack of a clear definition, these terms are also "fuzzy" at best.

A number of universities (especially the comprehensive ones) have set about trying to regain their pre-World War II status, by making many changes towards accommodating many characteristics of the Humboldtian model made famous by the University of Berlin. The most obvious change consisted of the return of research in the universities and the freedom of teaching and research (as there were no longer taboo subjects or topics).

The former pressure that censorship had put on the higher education institutions was replaced by different kinds of pressure, coming from various groups of stakeholders that could now express their requests and concerns freely. The most vocal were, naturally, the students.

But there were also alternative paths to be followed. Some universities set about aiming for status (taking Oxford, Stanford or Harvard as role-models), some started by updating their curricula to join the most recent international debates in their respective fields, while others (especially private initiatives) set about making money. Up until 1989, the Romanian higher education system consisted solely of state institutions, but starting from 1990 onwards quite a number of private institutions were set up.

However, when Burton R. Clarks' books were published in Romania in the early 1990s they made history, and most of the universities embraced almost immediately the entrepreneurial model as part of their reform process. This meant diversified sources of funding, and not relying solely on the funds coming from the state. Unfortunately, despite all the enthusiasm at the declarative level, even today the bulk of the funds for state universities comes from the state (around 60%).

Following the model of the American universities, the Romanian ones also moved towards massification of higher education, as well as towards its marketisation. Burton R. Clark is often cited or the idea of the entrepreneurial university is mentioned in most of the discussions about the direction in which the universities should head.

In the last decade, the enthusiasm for the entrepreneurial model is somehow tempered by the reforms required by the Bologna process, which are currently under way, and also required by law.

One could argue that the enthusiasm for reforms was not mirrored at all in the actual reforms being implemented. Marga (2003) diagnosed the system as follows:

- "it transmits knowledge, but does not encourage creativity;
- it is mostly repetitive;
- it is based on the separation into rigid subjects, while there is no real inter-disciplinarity;
- it is an equalitarian system of a collectivist type where individual performance is not really recognised;
- it is centralised, since for any decision the approval of the Ministry is required;
- it stresses general qualification at graduate level with less attention paid to postgraduate studies;
- it functions under the pressure of corruption (concerning grading, competitions, job offers, examinations, etc) when competition, transparency, accountability are really needed;"

At this point of the discussion a brief look at some numbers concerning the Romanian Higher Education system should be useful. In 2002 there were fifty-six public higher education institutions and twenty accredited private ones, which together had over half a million students enrolled. The number of students increased to almost one million in the academic year 2006-2007[2]. According to the National Statistical Yearbook in 2006 there were 107 higher education institutions, of which fifty-six were public and fifty-one private. While the number of public institutions remained constant, the number of the private ones more than doubled in less than half a decade. Also in the academic year 2005-2006 there were 716,464 students enrolled in higher education institutions, which represented around 35% of the 19–23 age cohort. Of these, about 2,500 students were taking part every year in Erasmus programmes. The education sector is allocated about 4% of the GDP, although for almost two years now there is a public document signed by all the stakeholders in education stating that education should be given yearly at least 6% of the GDP.

[2] This can also be considered a result not only of a higher degree of enrolment in higher education of high school graduates, but also to the increasing of the age cohort as a result of a communist decree that outlawed abortion.

In 1998, the Minister of Education at the time, Andrei Marga, signed the Bologna Declaration on behalf of Romania. He pointed out (Marga, 2008) the options available for the Romanian higher education system at that point, namely

- the reform process should be completed even if it takes place in a problematic context, i.e. education reforms cannot wait for economical revival and they must be applied as soon as possible.
- The reform process should also be a comprehensive one. Marga distinguishes three stages of the reform process, namely the recuperation reform (recovery of what had been lost during communist times), the synchronisation reform (i.e. the reform that would allow Romanian universities to compete with similar universities from the region or even continent) and the reform process that tackles the issue of globalisation, in which any university has to compete on a global level with the best universities in the world and with the latest scientific discoveries and innovations. A superficial reform, one that remains only at declarative level, would only lengthen the period of agony of the system. Even today, many voices argue that the reform process has not been completed in full and that there is still need for fundamental reforms.
- Reform should also be accompanied by a European concept of the education reform, i.e. the reform should be compatible with other change processes taking place at European as well as regional and global levels. An "original" reform that would ignore any other processes taking place simultaneously would not yield the best outcomes. For example, the university reform of 1998 was structured along six chapters: curriculum reform; abandoning the reproductive in favour of the problem-solving-based education; an innovative interaction of the university with the economic and administrative environment, decentralisation; a new university management; and advanced reforms of internal cooperation.

According to Brătianu (1998), at the beginning of the present decade the Romanian system of higher education faced three major challenges, namely the adaptation to a new market economy, with not only national actors, but rather European and even global actors; integration in the European Higher Education Area through the Bologna process and upgrading of their leadership and management to the "knowledge society".

Throughout the entire two last decades, the Romanian universities were faced with many issues and challenges. We shall briefly discuss the most important of them.

The comprehensive universities that, among others, aimed for status, joined similar universities in national consortia. Furthermore, they clarified and followed their mission statements and their vision and leadership. A new success model was being created for the Romanian university, one that would allow the individual universities to reach international prestige. Some universities are given as examples for the brilliant way they adapted to their regional context; to mention just two of them, Babeş-Bolyai University adopted the policy of multiculturalism which answered successfully the learning needs of the ethnically varied population from Transylvania, including Romanians, Hungarians, Germans and Jewish people. Babeş-Bolyai University is also frequently quoted as an example of ecumenism, as it houses no fewer than four different faculties of theology (Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, Catholic and Reformed). Iuliu Haţieganu University of Medicine and Pharmacy implemented teaching in English and French for a number of degrees it offered, answering the needs expressed by foreign students to study full courses in English and in French.

All the success stories of the universities included, among other things, strategic management, quality assurance processes, mobility of staff and students, international cooperation programmes, a multitude of interactions with society and last but not least institutional reconstruction.

In the last few months, a debate has also been started related to the implicit values of education, and higher education especially. The results of the debate are most likely going to make a noticeable difference in the field, helping to speed along the process of classification and eventually ranking of the Romanian universities.

Other current issues are connected with money, participation in higher education, the public versus the private sector, internationalisation, governance, etc.

Money is most often mentioned in debates over autonomy versus accountability, as universities would strive for as much autonomy as possible while trying to minimise their accountability towards the Ministry as main provider of funds and other stakeholders from society at large (from students all the way to employers). Entrepreneurialism, as mentioned above, has also played an important part in the universities' strategies of diversifying their sources of funding. Against the same background related to money, the question of the cost of study has also been often

raised. The debate is still open as to whether tax-paying students should cover in full the cost of their study or whether the university (and/or other actors) contribute towards some of these costs.

Where participation is concerned, the rate of high school students that go on to university is fairly high; nevertheless, there is still quite a gap between the students that leave secondary education and those who go on to higher education. However, the Romanian higher education system now faces a different problem. In communist times, Ceaușescu passed a decree that outlawed abortion. As a result, the rate of birth was very high. For instance, the number of children in the 0 to 4 age group in 1980 was 1,998,000, almost 2 million. When communism was overturned, the first decree to be abolished was the one banning abortion. As a direct consequence, the number of births decreased enormously. In 1997 the number of children in the 0 to 4 age group was only 1,191,000, a bit more than half what it had been seventeen years before. This has as a direct consequence a decrease in the demand for school places, even on purely demographic grounds.

Universities reacted to this by diversifying the degrees offered, by adopting massification strategies and by trying to teach degrees that offer general skills rather than overspecific ones. Until 2007 the system benefited from a constantly increasing number of students participating in tertiary education. Starting with 2007, the demographic gap started being noticed, as the age cohort numbers began decreasing dramatically. However, the large number of students recorded up to 2007 should also be considered within the broader context of issues such as "double-degree-ing", degree polishing and "tyranny of numbers". By "double degree-ing" we aim to describe a common practice among Romanian youth, namely studying for two separate Bas at the same time. Thus the system most often is likely to consider one student as two, a phenomenon that is going to be more accurately measured in a couple of years once the National Enrolment Student Registry is implemented. A number of articles in specialised journals have also referred to the "degree polishing" strategies of Romanian students. As there is a difference in the perception of private and public universities, many students tend to get a BA degree from a private institution and then try and "polish" it by completing an MA degree at a public institution. Last but not least, the "tyranny of numbers" has to be considered as a very important pressure factor in the higher education system. More specifically, because of the increase in the number of people that have completed tertiary education, many jobs that twenty

years ago required only high-school studies now demand a university diploma. Thus today you need to have at least a BA in order to get the same job your parents got with a Baccalaureate diploma.. Massification in higher education has also led to isolated extreme cases in the system, such as false diplomas and higher education institutions that in exchange for a sum of money would issue an officially recognised diploma. Corruption is still an important problem of the system, and quality assurance rules are yet to be fully adopted by all universities and strictly enforced by the Romanian authorities.

The relationship between the public and private higher education institutions has many a time been described as "symbiotic". Nevertheless, many consider it to be posing risks for student and research activities in terms of quality. In order to prevent any kind of problems, it is our belief that the sector should be better organised through specific legislation.

Many universities also embarked upon the process of internationalisation. They started joining the Erasmus programme and implementing the ECTS system, the first steps towards the Bologna process. Moreover, a number of universities were also actively involved in international structures (such as the EUA, the GUNI network, the Salzburg seminar, international research networks, etc). Also partly due to internationalisation processes new "fashionable" degrees started being developed, such as forensic science or environmental studies. Romanian universities were constantly looking west, trying to import and adapt good practices but also complaining of the lack of resources in comparison to some American universities, for instance. But then, this kind of discourse is a common trait of all European universities that barely compare in terms of their assets with the very rich American universities. Internationalisation also brought about individually set objective such as reaching a certain position in internationally relevant rankings (e.g. reaching top 500 in the Shanghai ranking).

Even though during the last couple of hundred of years Romanian universities have looked towards the West and tried to adopt and adapt the best model there was, one should keep in mind the specificities of the Romanian culture and societies, which made the adoption of certain models more successful at a certain time than others. Nevertheless, any model adopted had to be adapted to the Romanian realities, and there could never be a model completely imported and applied as such, i.e. in the way it worked in the country in which it was first set up.

The governance system is one of the most highly debated aspects of higher education. There are essentially three models (Hüfner, 1995) in existence: the state-control model; the state supervising model and the market-based model. It goes without saying that the lines between these models are never clear cut and most often can be blurred.

The state controlled model is rather similar to the Napoleonic type of university, namely where the state regulated almost everything concerning the university, from access conditions to curriculum and degree requirements (van Vught, 1994), seeing the universities as an instrument for delivering government priorities. Nevertheless, the academic community often retains considerable authority and independence in the day-to-day running of internal affairs.

The state supervisory model is a weaker form in which the state expresses it authority. It implies that individual universities have more power in making their own decisions, though the government retains its overseeing role of the system, "steering at a distance" (Huffner, 1995).

The market-based model requires no role on the part of government. Higher education institutions make all decisions individually on the basis of the demands of the market.

Table 1: Sadlak[3] (1995) synthesises the situation in Romania

	PRE-COMMUNIST Implicit and self-regulatory	**COMMUNIST: Centrally-regulated**	**POST-COMMUNIST: Explicit and self-regulatory**
Main traits	Confidence in values, in particular academic freedom	Aims, tasks, and resources in teaching and research defined by the Communist Party and allocated by the State	Competition for students, funding: importance of institutional and programme academic standing: multiple forms of self-representation; adherence to academic freedom.
System-wide regulation	Minimal	Compulsory and detailed party/state regulation	Preferably within a broad State regulatory role
Planning/system approach	None or very limited	Comprehensive: an instrument of political control	Particularly important at institutional level

[3] Sadlak's conceptualisation includes the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe, but is fully applicable to Romania as well. The framework is especially important in that it highlights the general characteristics of higher education in the region, relevant to the role and significance of governance and strategic management in the present, post-communist, and post-conflict periods.

Accountability	Yes, but its parameters were differently defined than nowadays	Hardly any or at the discretion of the political authorities	Determined by the degree of accountability to specific constituencies
Incentives	Reliance on intrinsic motivation in learning and research	Achievement of goals set by the party and the state	Well-being of the institution and of its principal constituency
Financing and budget	Heavily tuition-fee dependant/input-oriented line-item budgeting	Totally state-dependant but relatively "worry-free"; rigid line-item budgeting	Multiple sources and instruments of financing and budgeting
Relation to Labour market	Minimal and only indirect	Close co-ordination with state-set manpower planning	Significant but indirect; a result of interaction of multiple constituencies
Internal governance and structure	Federation of relatively independent sub-units (Chairs)	Externally determined and politically controlled	Concentration of administrative power/ Diversity of structure
Strategic planning	Occasionally at sub-unit level, not essential for governance	Almost none at institutional and sub-unit level	Essential for survival and well-being of the institution. Important approach in governance.

Source: Sadlak, 1995

It is our opinion that the third column presented above is accurate only for the period between 1990 and 2005, when Romania finally passed legislation implementing the Bologna process at national level. The implementation of the Bologna process is bound to cause more changes than before to the Romanian higher education system

Scott (2000) also suggested a number of the main characteristics connected to reconstructing the system of higher education in South-Eastern Europe, characteristics that are fully valid for the situation in Romania as well.

- "Reconstruction consists of changes on a scale and at speed never attempted in other parts of Europe. New policies are being developed and implemented in a very short period.
- In some places, reconstruction has to be total: the legal framework in which universities operate, as well as their mission and articulation within wider systems, has to be reconsidered.
- The diversity across the region is immense and therefore no standard solutions can be applied. For example, in some places it is necessary to strengthen the university at the expense of their faculties or other constituent parts, while in other places, decentralisation of the decision-making process is necessary.
- Staffing is a major issue. The level and appropriateness of skills and qualifications and the mechanisms for renewing the staffing base are central concerns for the most universities and higher education systems.

- The chronic under-financing of higher education is of utmost importance, Universities have passed through the transition period facing fierce financial constraints.
- The academic and the administrative management of universities are not separated. Most of the university managers are elected, and sometimes huge collective bodies (Senates, Academic Councils, etc) are involved in making decisions. This situation contributes to a largely unclear distinction between executive decisions and policy-making.
- The HE systems now face new challenges including the development of a significant private sector (which looks to be more dynamic and flexible) and the increasing role of research in universities. In some countries, this process was accompanied by the integration of the institutes managed separately by the Academies of Science. This, therefore, is the background against which planning and management of higher education must operate."

Despite all the problems the system faces, it still has to own up to the challenges raised by international actors in the field. In 2003, the OECD made the following recommendations regarding the higher education system: it should strive for better management, it should focus on core skills rather than excessive specialisation (as there are too many specialisations), a balance between public and private institutions should be reached, accountability should be increased; and last but not least, data collection should be improved.

Further changes in the system are imminent, as the new law of education still awaits either implementation or amendment by the next government. What the future reserves for the Romanian universities is still to be seen.

REFERENCES

Bottoni, Stefano, 2007, Transilvania rossa: Il comunismo romeno e la questione nazionale (1944–1965). Rome: Carocci

Brătianu, Constantin, 2008, Leadership and Management in the Transition. Romanian Higher Education System. Paper delivered at Ljubljana conference in May 2008, available at www.managementmarketing.ro/pdf/articole/99.pdf

Clark, Burton R., 1998. Creating Entrepreneurial Universities. Organisational Pathways of Transformation. London and New York: International Association of Universities Press and Pergamon Elsevier Science

Clark, Burton R., 2000. Crearea universităților antreprenoriale. Direcții de transformare organizațională., București, Paideia

Marga, Andrei., 2006. Filosofia unificării europene. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Fundației pentru Studii Europene

Marga, Andrei. 2004. Philosophy of European Unification, Cluj-Napoca: Editura Institutului European

Marga, Andrei., 1994. The Culture of Scholarship in Europe Today. Daedalus, Cambridge, Summer 1994, pp.171-173

Marga, Andrei., 2003. University Reform Today, Cluj-Napoca: Cluj University Press

Sadlak, Jan. 1995 "In Search of the Post-Communist University – The Background and Scenario of the Transformation of Higher Education in Central and Easter Europe", in Hüfner, Klaus Higher Education Reform Processes in Central and Eastern Europe. Frankfurt: Peter Lang

Scott, Peter 2000 "Higher Education in Central and Eastern Europe. An Analytical Report." In, Ten Years After and Looking Ahead: A Review of the Transformations of Higher Education in Central and Eastern Europe. Bucharest: UNESCO-CEPES

Van Vught, Frans A. 1994, "Autonomy and Accountability in Government/University Relationships" in Salmi, J., and Verspoor, A., eds. Revitalizing Higher Education. London: Pergamon Press

Westerheijden, D.F., Sorensen, K. 1999. People on a bridge. Central European higher education institutions in a storm of reform, in: Jongbloed, B., Maassen, P., Neave, G. (eds.) From the eye of the storm. Higher education's changing institution, pp. 13-38. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers

Taylor, Jan, and Miroiu, Adrian, 2002 Policy Making, Strategic Planning, and Management of Higher Education, Bucharest: UNESCO-CEPES

MOTIVATION FOR MIGRATION, RETURN AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE RETURN
A CASE STUDY OF BULGARIAN STUDENT MOBILITY

MARIA VELIZAROVA

Return migration is not a new phenomenon in migration history, either for Bulgaria or the rest of the world. On the other hand it is one of the least explored parts of migration science.[1] It should be considered that the first migration step can not be seen as the last mobility experience.[2]

In our research, the first problem to tackle was the lack of information and data on the topic. The second and even larger problem was the extreme lack of data about Bulgaria, not just about returnees but also about how many people had left the country since 1989.

This problem may be overcome by making use of a register of all Bulgarian living abroad for longer than a year. Such a register can be made with the help of the countries which are known as preferred destinations for Bulgarian migrants. A register of returnees is a harder task. The only solution to the problem of obtaining information about this group of Bulgarians might be the implantation of questions on this topic in the micro census in Bulgaria.

MIGRATION SITUATION IN BULGARIA

Bulgaria is a country that has a high emigration rate. After 1989, there was a large emigration flow out of the country[3]. The net migration flow from 1992 until 2001 is 177, 000 people. Most of these were young and of working age, with at least a secondary

[1] Cp. Russell King, *Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems*, (Routledge 1986) 4.

[2] Cp. Petrus Han, *Soziologie der Migration: Erklärungsmodelle, Fakten, politische Konsequenzen, Perspektiven*, (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius 2005), 8.

[3] Before 1989 there was no emigration, because the political system didn't allow it. Before that year Bulgarian citizens needed a special permit to work abroad. Usually this permit was only granted for countries with which the government had good relations.

school qualification[4]. A study on the return plans from ASSA-M suggested that only one-fifth of the emigrants want to stay abroad, the other 80% want to return.[5]

The primary reasons for this emigration were economical.[6] Because of the economic difficulties in that period, many people saw a better opportunities abroad. If that really was the main reason for the emigration, then a back flow of returning migrants was to be expected in the last few years, as the situation in Bulgaria has been improving over this period.

The Bulgarian economy needs its migrants, especially the highly qualified ones, to return to their native land due to the deficit in human capital caused by the economical and negative demographic growth.[7]

RETURN MIGRATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Return migration is seen as a movement from one country to another and back. Circular migration can also be seen as a part of return migration, where movement from one country to another is repeated over time. Return migration is also seen also as "ancestral return" (when after one ore more generations people return to the country of their ancestors), "brain return"(highly qualified people returning after studying or working abroad), "retirement migration" (people who after spending most of their active life abroad are coming back to spend their retirement years in their home country).[8]

The latest definition on return migration is: "*The movement of a person returning to his/her country of origin or habitual residence usually after spending at least one year in another country. This return may or may not be voluntary. Return migration includes voluntary repatriation*."[9]

[4] The Bulgarian National Statistic Institute; "Вътрешна и външна миграция на населението в България (резултати от репрезентативно изучаване)"; 2001; http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Vivmigr.htm

[5] ASSA-M; „Emigration Attitudes of Bulgarian Citizens"; 2007; http://www.assam.com/en/research41en.htm

[6] The Bulgarian National Statistic Institute; "Вътрешна и външна миграция на населението в България (резултати от репрезентативно изучаване)"; 2001; http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Vivmigr.htm

[7] It is to be taken in consideration that this survey was made before the world economic crisis which took place at the end of 2008.

[8] Cp. Russell King, *Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems*, (Routledge 1986) 5-7.

[9] International Migration Law N°1 - Glossary on Migration; IOM; 2004



One of the goals in this study is to define the mobility stages and the motivation for mobility at each stage, and also to analyze if after the return home there is still a potential for more mobility actions.

There are five theoretical approaches in return migration studies: neoclassical economics (NE), the new economics of labor migration (NELM), structuralism, trans-nationalism and social network theory.

- **Neoclassical economics:**

  In this perspective the return migration is seen as a failure. The returnees are those who couldn't make it in the new country. Another name for this phenomenon is the return of failure ("*Returnees who intended permanent emigration but chose to return*")[10].

  "*…in a neoclassical stance, return migration exclusively involves labour migrants who miscalculated the costs of migration and who did not reap the benefits of higher earnings. Return occurs as a consequence of their failed experiences abroad or because their human capital was not rewarded as expected.*"[11]

- **The new economics of labor migration:**

  "*NELM views return migration as the logical outcome of a "calculated strategy", defined at the level of the migrant's household and resulting from the successful achievement of goals or target*"[12]

[10] Robert B. Potter, Dennis Conway, Joan Phillips; The experience of return migration: Caribbean perspectives; (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.; 2005),3 cp. Gmelch, "Return Migration", Annals, 9 Review of Anthropology (1980), 138.

[11] J. P. Cassario; "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited"; International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS), Vol. 6, No. 2, (2004): 162 - 188 ISSN 1564 4901,www.unesco.org/shs/ijms/vol6/issue2/art4 © UNESC, 146.

[12] ibid. J. P. Cassario; "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited"; International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS), Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004: 162 - 188 ISSN 1564 4901,www.unesco.org/shs/ijms/vol6/issue2/art4 © UNESC, 164.

For NE the Profit should be maximal, and in NELM there is a specific profit goal in the migration plan, after reaching this goal the migrant is free to come back home. The length of the migration depends on the time the migrant need to reach his/hers goal.[13]

- **The Structural approach:**

  In this approach the return depends not only on the individual experience abroad but also on the social and institutional situation in the country of origin. "*In fact, return is also a question of context*."[14]

  King makes a more specific categorization of the return of failure from Gmelch, making a difference between the circumstances under which the primary motivation for permanent migration changed. He saw three different reasons for return in this case. The first is the "*forced return*", when the migrant loses their job or has family problems at home; the second reason is "*nostalgia*" (which he defines as a return of failure) and the third is "*the better situation at home*" which has appeared during th migrant's absence.[15]

  Gmelch makes an important observation in the case where the expectations in the country of origin do not meet home reality. If the social, economic and political situation does not equal the expectations of the returnee, he/she will find it difficult to reintegrate in the home country, and that may lead to new migration. Such a situation questions the sustainability of the return.[16]

- **The Transnational approach** is very popular nowadays when the migration is seen in a global context where mobility is no longer an impediment.

  "*According to transnationalists, returnees prepare their reintegration at home through periodical and regular visits to their home countries*" [17]

[13] Cp. Andreas Breinbauer, *Mobilität österreichischer und ungarischer Mathematiker: ein Beitrag zur Brain Drain-Debatte in einem kleinen Segment Hochqualifizierter,* (V & R unipress ; Wien: Vienna Univ. Press 2008), 85.

[14] Cp. J. P. Cassario; "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited"; International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS), Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004: 162 - 188 ISSN 1564 4901,www.unesco.org/shs/ijms/vol6/issue2/art4 © UNESC (S. 166)

[15] Cp. Russell King, *Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems*, (Routledge 1986) 11-13 cp. Gmelch "Return Migration"; Annals; 9 Review of Anthropology (1980) 135-159.

[16] ibid. Russell King, *Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems*, (Routledge 1986) 11-13 cp. Gmelch "Return Migration"; Annals; 9 Review of Anthropology (1980) 135-159.

[17] ibid. J. P. Cassario; "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited"; International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS), Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004: 162 - 188 ISSN 1564 4901;www.unesco.org/shs/ijms/vol6/issue2/art4 © UNESC ,171

So the concerns of Gmelch about successful reintegration at home are solved by regular visits home..

- Finally there is the **Network approach**, which seems in some aspects common with the transnational one.
  "Social structures increase the availability of resources and information, while securing the effective initiatives of return migrants."[18]

The difference with the transnational aspect is that in the case of network it is more about the informal connections within a country. For the transnational perspective the institutional and economic connection on an international level are the influential factors for migration mobility. The purpose of this survey was to identify stages of and motivation behind emigration in order to discover what incites Bulgarian students to return home.

RESEARCH RESULTS

Because of the lack of information about Bulgarian returnees and taking into consideration the definition of return migrants given from IOM, the only possible way to collect the data was by using a snowball method. The conditions for participation in this survey were Bulgarians who spend at least one year in a foreign country and at the time of the survey were living in Bulgaria.

The sample contains 70 respondents from an online questionnaire and 8 respondents from in-depth interviews. The use of mixed methods is extremely important in order to acquire more reliable results.[19] The in-depth interviews were helpful, not only in constructing the online questionnaire but also in explaining the results of the survey in greater depth..

80% of the respondents are between 20 and 30 years old. There are an equal number of men and women. 18% have graduated from secondary school and 82% have graduated from university. Of the latter, 33,3% have been awarded their university degree by a Bulgarian university and 40,6% from a foreign university, while 5 of the respondents graduated both in Bulgaria and abroad. 86% were studying in Bulgaria

[18] ibid. J. P. Cassario; "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited"; International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS), Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004: 162 - 188 ISSN 1564 4901;www.unesco.org/shs/ijms/vol6/issue2/art4 © UNESC, 174.

[19] Russell King, *Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems*, (Routledge 1986) 69.

before their departure. So it can be concluded that this study is about young, well-educated people who after staying abroad for some time decided to come back to Bulgaria.

After a factor analysis of the push and pull factors on the micro level for migration and return, 3 categories of motivation were constructed, as the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (2000)[20] suggests. These are economic factors (job improvement, a better income, or a higher standard of living), family or emotional factors (family reunion or marriage, social network), and other factors (reasons related to school or studying, fear of war or persecution, retirement, end of contract, homesickness, expulsion). As these categories are universal, they can also be applied to the Bulgarian case.

• Situation at Home

For better explanation of the motivation behind migration, the macro situation in Bulgaria before the departure of the respondents was also taken in consideration, which can be seen as a push-factor for emigration (Figure 1). The macro level also argues 3 factors: political situation (institutional problems), economic situation, and social conditions.

Figure 1: Macro Push- Factors



58% of all 70 respondents pointed to the economic factor as a reason for leaving the country; 40% of the respondents identified social conditions as the reason for leaving Bulgaria; and 56% were not satisfied with the institutional system at the time of departure.

[20] Eurostat, J. Schoorf, L. Heering,I Esweldt, G. Groenewold, R. Van der Erf R, A. Bosch A, H. de Valk, *Push and pull factors of international migration. A comparative report*, (de Bruijn B Luxembourg : Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 2000), 23.

• **Decision for mobility**

65% left Bulgaria after 2001, after the European Union abolished visa restrictions for Bulgarians.

Figure 2: Micro Push- Factors



The Push- Factors (Figure 2) provide the personal reasons of the respondents for leaving Bulgaria. The economic push-factors are also in the lead at the micro level, with 31% by all respondents. Studying abroad was a motivation factor for leaving the country for 69% of the respondents, while for 11% that was one part of the motivation for going abroad. The economic pull-factors are also the most common, with 40% followed by the security factor with 14%, while just 4% of my sample was attracted to a country for family reasons.

Figure 3: Micro Pull- Factors



The Pull-Factors (Figure 3) provide reasons for choosing a specific destination country. The economic pull factors were mostly important for the returnees from Austria (72%), the USA (71%) and Germany (37.5%). 83% of returnees from Germany were entirely motivated to study abroad. Of the returnees from Austria, 36% were entirely and 27% mainly motivated to study abroad. For the USA returnees this proportion was 57% to 20%. Therefore it can be expected that another motivation, like

a good job or a good salary, has a bigger impact on the decision to choose Austria or the USA than the education motivation.

• Emigration planning

As regards the question of whether the respondents had planned their return, just 11% said they hadn't wanted to come back and 8% were planning to go abroad again. Therefore it can be concluded that almost 80% of the participants had been planning their return, whereas 38% of them didn't know when exactly they were going to go back. This corresponds with the results of the ASSA-M survey.[21]

The 5 most represented countries in the sample are Germany, Austria, USA, Italy and England. This was to be expected, because these destinations are the most attractive ones for high-skilled migrants. Spain and Greece for example, are the most desired countries for low- skilled migrants from Bulgaria.[22]

• Situation abroad

60% of the returnees stayed abroad between one and five years, which is considered as a critical stage in one's emigration life: after 4 or 5 years abroad comes the time for taking the decision of whether one will settle or not. 36% were in another county between one and three years and the other 24% were abroad between four and five years. As many studies suggested, the length of the stay abroad is connected with the decision for coming back. The longer one is abroad, the more probable it is that one will stay there.[23]

64% visited Bulgaria during their stay abroad two or more times a year and 31% once a year. These numbers prove that the migrants are still strongly connected to their social networks in Bulgaria. The country in which the returnees were living did not have any significant influence on the frequency of their visits to Bulgaria. This fact shows that geographical remoteness does not have an important impact on the network in the home country.

[21] ASSA-M, Emigration Attitudes of Bulgarian Citizens, 2007, http://www.assam.com/en/research41en.htm

[22] The Bulgarian National Statistic Institute: "Вътрешна и външна миграция на населението в България (резултати от репрезентативно изучаване)"; (Sofia, 2001); http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Vivmigr.htm

[23] Petrus Han, *Soziologie der Migration: Erklärungsmodelle, Fakten, politische Konsequenzen, Perspektiven*, (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius 2005), 124.

Figure 4: Micro Push- returns Factors



Looking at the Push-return factors (Figure 4), or in other words reasons for leaving the foreign country of residence, returnees once again found themselves confronted with economic difficulties . 14% had had economic problems and for 26.8% this was a part of the motivation to return.

There is an interesting significant correlation between economic problems abroad and the length of the stay in a foreign country. 90% of the respondents who had had such problems stayed abroad between one and five years, while 60% of the participants had been living in another country between two and three years. It is important to mention that none of the respondents' with a degree from a university abroad was complaining about his economic situation in the foreign country.

The absence of a social network was a problem for 12.7% and partly a problem for 22.5% of the respondents. Neither was the absence of a social network abroad a problem for the returnees with foreign university degrees. Residence rights posed a serious problem for 11.3%, and for another 43.7% that was a part of the motivation to return. The people with serious residence problems stayed abroad between 4 and 10 years. Only 14% of the respondents with foreign degrees had no residence problem, for the respondents from the education groups this present was 77%.

• **Decision for coming back home**

Figure 5: Micro Pull-Return Factors



The results related to the pull-return factors such as family and network were particularly interesting. 62% of all participants identified these factors as the main reason for their return. Another 18.3 % mentioned the current economic situation in Bulgaria and carrier-related perspectives as the main reason to come back.

• **Situation at home after return**

70% of all respondents have at the time of writing spent to date no longer than two years permanently in Bulgaria.

Currently almost 50% of the respondents are economically very well integrated in Bulgaria, 26% are partly integrated and 24% (68.8% of whom are female) are not so well integrated. This proportion is also valid for the participants who came back for of family reasons. The data confirmed the positive relation between economic reintegration and the length of the stay in Bulgaria. The longer the returnees have been in their home country, the better their economic reintegration has become.

80% of the respondents were well or very well informed about the country in which they were planning to live. Regarding the question about their migration plans after their return, 15% do not want to live in Bulgaria and 40% of them would live abroad if they had the opportunity to do so. 11% were not sure. Also all of the respondents from the in-depth interviews said they didn´t want to stay in Bulgaria and they are going to use the good economical situation in the country to earn experience, to make a career and to reach a good position in a few years. To do so abroad, they stated, would have taken much longer. They were making plans to attain their goals and good positions within a few years and to go abroad as a higher qualified worker. All those results

questioned the sustainability of the return. This opens up a new area of research: detecting the factors that are responsible for the sustainability of return in Bulgaria.

CONCLUSIONS

As expected, in my study all of the theoretical aspects from Cassario's article can be seen. The participants of this survey are well informed which is a sign for a strategy (NELM). They return with the idea of making a career, which is possible because of the situations abroad and at home (structural). A lot of the respondents want to go abroad again, which means they are still connected with life abroad, and while being abroad they still stay in touch with Bulgaria (transnational). Last but by no means least, the main reason that most people pointed out for their return was the family and network at home, automatically securing their return (network). It should be taken into consideration that most of the respondents were well educated. The reason that most of them left the country at about 20 years of age was their goal to study abroad, which put them in the upper middle class. That automatically secures a better start in Bulgaria. Of course after a few years abroad in countries which are further developed than their own, they are likely to miss a certain living standard that they have become accustomed to abroad. The fast prosperity in one´s career is the first step people are taking to secure their standard of living. The social network is also very supportive in this way. But there are also things in life which do not depend directly on a person but on the state this person is living in. The state should provide security in the social areas and should give people a feeling belonging, if the state wants the people to be there for it.

Sustainability of return is very important for Bulgaria at this moment, as an enormous demographic problem is developing. The economy is growing fast, investments are high, the capital is a fact but the human resources are missing. In 1989 Bulgaria´s population was about 8 Million. Today it has reduced to less than 7 Million and the future is not looking much more optimistic. That is the reason why the government, especially in the last year, is really concerned with the question of how to get its population back. They are trying to inform Bulgarians abroad about the opportunities they have back home. I think there is a more important problem to solve, which is not the return itself but its sustainability once it has taken place. Bulgaria should strive to become an attractive place where people want to build their long-term future, not only stay for a few years.

It should be taken in consideration that this survey was made before the economic crisis which occurred at the end of 2008. Now, at a time of growing unemployment in the USA and the European countries, the migrants will be the first people to lose their jobs, especially the low-qualified ones. At the beginning of 2009 the news was widespread that many emigrants from countries (Spain mostly) hosting poorlyskilled Bulgarian emigrants were returning to Bulgaria because they had lost their jobs abroad. The Bulgarian government slowed down their activities in attracting Bulgarian emigrants back home after the economic crisis was felt not to be affecting Bulgaria to the extent that it was other parts of the world.

THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS ON UKRAINIAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS

Iuliia Diachenko

As the global economic outlook has worsened, Ukraine as an open emerging economy has been badly affected. For the country, the crisis has hit at a difficult time. Ukraine's economy has reacted extremely painfully to the deepening crisis around the world.

As the Ukraine is extremely deeply integrated into the world economy (exports volume 47 % from gross national product), it is obvious that the dynamics of Ukrainian economy data over a shorttime period will entirely follow global trends.

The extremely difficult position of the country was borne out by the statement of Austria's Erste Group in a July 1 report. "Ukraine, as expected, suffered the worst economic contraction in the Central and Eastern Europe region in the first quarter of 2009". For developing economies such as Ukraine global trends were shown in considerable decreases in production levels, interruption in internal crediting and depreciation of the national currency adding an element of uncertainty to the life of the average Ukrainian.

The main channels through which the world crisis has had its harmful impact on Ukraine's economy are the openness of the economy, export-oriented branches which are not diversified enough to make the effect of the global recession less painful. For Ukraine such export-focused branches are metallurgy, the chemical industry and agriculture.

Some analysts forecast that in the light of the sharp drop in external demand and prices for steel, a series of bankruptcies of financial institutions and delays in rates of development of the real sector of the economy, and a poor political and economic policymaking background, the economy is expected to experience a deep recession in 2009 and only slow growth in 2010.

Although Ukraine has one of the most recession-ravaged economies in Eastern Europe, there are signs that the country is at the bottom of the recessionary curve and is perhaps taking the first tentative steps on the long road to recovery.

Cause for cautious optimism is born out of recent figures from the State Statistics Committee that reveal that industrial production grew by 3.1 percent from May to June.

This positive trend lies in February-June macroeconomic data revealing early signs of stabilization in Ukraine's economic situation. However, the magnitude of the economic downturn means that the economy is still in a difficult situation.

For export-oriented branches of Ukraine better times become closer and closer: starting from March-April this year, raw product prices began to rise as soon as the situation on the foreign exchange market improved. That is a sign of a slow and gradual growth of global demand upon which Ukraine as a country with an open economy is dependent.

But the negative tendency can still be observed. This is another confirmation that the Ukrainian economy was severely damaged by the global recession. Exports continued to suffer from weak demand in the main trading partner countries and low world commodity prices, contracting 41% YOY over January-April.

Nevertheless preliminary balance of trade statistics for the first half of 2009 have been encouraging. Though in the first half of 2008, exports of goods equaled USD 17330 million, having fallen by 46,8% or by USD 15257 million against the respective period of 2008; imports of goods contracted by 53,4% in the first half of 2009 versus the respective period of 2008 amounting to USD 19773,7 million (Table 1 and 2).

As a result, due to a more considerable decline in imports, Ukraine registered that the trade deficit had narrowed sharply to less than $ 2443,7 million compared to $ 9836,6 million over the same period last year. So one of the main financial vulnerabilities of Ukraine, large trade deficits, was substantially reduced.

But what caused this sharp adjustment of the trade balance?

We can normally detect trade surplus, or a so-called favourable balance of trade when exports exceed imports in an economy over a certain period. An unfavourable balance of trade is known as a trade deficit or, informally, a trade gap. So there might be two options in improving a trade balance: to contract imports or to increase exports. In the Ukrainian case the cause of sudden improvement was the decreased value of imported goods. Several processes in the Ukrainian economy made that decrease possible.

Firstly, due to the devaluation of the Hryvnia and weak domestic demand, helped by import restrictions, rapidly deteriorating industrial performance, declining world commodity prices and crude oil prices in particular, the value of goods imports was

more than twice as low over the first four months of 2009 as in the same period the previous year. It gave new impetus to import-substituting industries.

There is another reason to be mentioned: the trade deficit could be even lower without custom declaration of gas in the first quarter, having been transported to the country in the previous years. The value of gas according to the declaration is approximately $1.76 billion. So, the real trade deficit for the first half of 2009 is $677.1 million.

After the first quarter lower imports of natural gas were observed. This was mainly due to the cutting of the Russian gas supply. This was the result both of a lower price for imported gas in 2Q 2009 ($271 per 1000 m3 compared to $360 per 1000 m3 in 1Q 2009) and volumes (due both to contracting real sector activity and postponement of the gas imports to be pumped into gas storage).

Total imports decreased due to the slowdown in products supply of the following industries:

- machine building products (by 3,5 times) (in USD 9,4419 billion)
- mineral products (by 1,9 times) (in USD 6,1954 billion)
- chemical industry products (by 1,6 times) (in USD 2,1483 billion)
- metallurgy industry products (by 2,7 times) (in USD 1,9569 billion)

But despite these few positive factors regarding the trade balance, the magnitude of the economic downturn means that foreign trade is still in a difficult situation.

Since September, 2008 a reduction of volumes of merchandise trade caused by crisis has been observed in the industry as a whole and in the majority of its branches. Industry substantially focused upon export has already felt influence of crisis phenomena. The international crisis has exposed the risks inherent in the growth model that Ukraine followed during the boom years, as in many other countries in the region.

With earlier economic growth heavily hinged on external demand, Ukraine's export-oriented sectors have continued to suffer from the sharp decline in commodity prices and economic woes in Ukraine's main trading partner countries.

Analysts argue that Ukraine is too dependent on a limited number of heavy industries—such as metal production—making it more vulnerable when foreign demand slows. Due to weak external demand and low international commodity prices, Ukrainian exports contracted sharply during the first half of 2009.

Here is the hare of some main commodity groups within total exports:metallurgy industry products (33,7%), agricultural products (24,0%), machine building products (16,9%) (Table 3).

The economic downturn has hit the price of metals worldwide, and Ukraine relies heavily on this sector for exports. A recovery in metallurgy, Ukraine's main export, has been felt in recent months, but production levels are still only 60% of last year's levels.

In the period under report, the increase in exports was caused by that in exports of:

- metallurgy industry products (2,5 times) (in USD 8,785 billion);
- machine building products (1,8 times) (in USD 2,3145 billion);
- mineral products (2,3 times) (in USD 1,8638 billion);
- chemical industry products (2,3 times) (in USD 1,7858 billion);
- light industry products (1,7 times) (in USD 335,6 million).

Although the main exporting industry, steel, is struggling, farming (which employs a quarter of the workforce) is doing well. Actually, agriculture was the only sector that demonstrated an increase in exports, by 7,3% YOY or USD 284,2 million over January-June. The growth in the production of grain (multiplied 1,6 times YOY) and oil seeds and plants (multiplied 4,1 times YOY) are the main agricultural branches. Ukraine agricultural potential is quite high and the country is considered to be one of the world's largest grain exporters. Mainly thanks to the faster growth of agricultural products exports, particularly grain, the rate of economic decline has slowed.

In the sphere of imports the situation is worse. Imports of transport vehicles, machinery and equipment as well as metallurgical products fell the most, by 84% YOY, 62% YOY, and 63% YOY respectively. Imports of energy resources, the weightiest commodity group in total imports, declined by almost 45% YOY in January-June. It happened mainly due to a protracted gas dispute with Russia, which resulted in Russia's gas supply cut-off to Ukraine, a number of industrial enterprises were forced to reduce or stop production . As a result, virtually all sectors, both export and domestic market oriented, reported a dramatic downturn, the worst in more than 10 years.

In the structure of merchandise exports and imports we can see changes too.

Within the overall volume of exports the shares of grain, mechanic machines, metallurgy, electric machines, fats and oils, seeds and fruits of oil plants, paper and paper products have increased by 6.3% YOY, 1.7% YOY, 0,4% YOY, 0,9% YOY, 2% YOY, 1,7% YOY and 0,6% YOY respectively.

At the same time in the overall volume of imports the share of metallurgical products has decreased by 11,4% YOY, energy materials, with oil and the oil products standing at 1,9% YOY.

Here is the share of some main commodity groups within total imports: mineral products (35,3%), machine building products (19,3%), chemical industry products (16,9%), agricultural products (11,5%) (Table 3).

The geographical structure of Ukrainian foreign trade also changed during the first half of 2009.. The crisis did change the direction of the Ukraine's trade structure, even though Russia remains the Ukraine's main trade partner (20% of total exports and 21,5% of total imports). Other leading positions in exports are also occupied by such countries as Turkey (5,5%), China (4,7%), Kazakhstan (4,5%), Belarus (3,2%), Italy (3%), India (%). The main trade partners in imports after the Russian Federation are Germany (8,5%), Uzbekistan (8,1%), Kazakhstan (6,9%), China (5,5%), Poland (4,9%) and Turkmenistan (3,5%). Foreign trade operations occurred with trade partners from 201 countries

Ukraine has nevertheless made strides in diversifying into new markets, especially Asia. As we can see in Table 4, over the first half of 2009 the number of Ukrainian exports rose to China (mainly because of increasing the deliveries of metallurgy production, ore and Tailings), to India (due to an increase in deliveries of agricultural products and chemicals) and to Kazakhstan.

A regional cut crisis has seriously impacted the trade relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Both import and export operations have reduced, by 2,7% and 4,2% respectively. Finally, there was a protracted gas dispute with Russia which resulted in Russia's gas supply being cut off. Nevertheless, Ukraine remains totally dependent on Russia for most of its energy imports, especially natural gas, and Russia is still an important market for Ukrainian metals and machine-building exports (Table 4 and 5).

As external demand recovers, exports will pick up again in 2010–2011. Imports will also expand, although more slowly than exports because of the increased cost of

such goods with devaluation, poor access to credit, and feeble growth in disposable incomes. Analysts expect the current account deficit will turn into a surplus in 2010.

Analysts argue that Ukraine is too dependent on a limited number of heavy industries—such as metal production—making it more vulnerable when foreign demand slows. According to experts, the Ukrainian economy will grow due to the expected increased demand for Ukrainian steel and chemicals on international markets and the resumption of normal functioning within the country's banking system.

After analyzing the above-mentioned data I must admit that the current economic crisis has exposed the high degree of dependence of the Ukrainian economy on exports. It is vital that Ukraine makes such structural reforms in its economy as maintaining prudent macroeconomic policies, forming effective production and ensuring a firm domestic demand. The government should diversify its structure as it cuts the share of exports in its GDP.

Table 1: Rate of growth in 2009
compared with the relevant period of the previous year, %



Table 2: Volume of Foreign Trade January-June 2009, mln USD



Table 3: Exports and Imports of merchandise, by Merchandise groups in January-June 2009

Merchandise groups	Exports		Imports	
	Thsd USD	% of the total	Thsd USD	% of the total
Total Exports	17330036	100	19773712	100
Basic metals and fabricated metal products	5870895,2	33,9	1245708,8	6,3
Agriculture	3243760,1	18,7	1410269	7,1
Machinery and equipment	2924625,9	16,9	3814104,9	19,3
Chemical and petrochemical industry	1377569,3	7,9	3349791,1	17
Coke, refined petroleum products	1259232,2	7,3	6887238,4	34,9
Food products, beverages and tobacco products	911266,1	5,3	869707	4,4
Light industry	475760,8	2,8	850245	4,3
Paper and paper products	369201	2,1	576012,7	2,9
Other non-metallic mineral products and fabricated non-metallic mineral products	320986,1	1,8	326243,7	1,7
Wood and of products of wood, except furniture	308088,8	1,8	112113,5	0,6
Others	268650,7	1,6	332278,3	1,7

Table 4: Dynamics of exports of goods in January-June 2009, % by countries



Table 5: Dynamics of imports of goods in January-June 2009, % by countries



REFERENCES

Frizorenko, A.O. (10.09.2009). Foreign Trade of Goods of Ukraine in January-June 2009. State Statistics Committee. http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/express/expr2009/0909/191.zip

Galchinska, T.A., Chepyrnova, N.I., Berezuk, N.O., Nikilaychuk, S.A., Strilets, A.V., Ryabokin, M.I., Troitska, O.V., Rogozhuna, N.M.(17.07.2009). Balance of Payments and External Debt of Ukraine 1 Quarter 2009. The National Bank of Ukraine. http://bank.gov.ua/Publication/of_vydan/BALANS/PB_2009_Q1.pdf

Ministry of Economics of Ukraine. Governmental support of the Ukrainian export. Foreign Trade of Goods and Services of Ukraine in January-June 2009. http://www.ukrexport.gov.ua/ukr/vnishno_t_balans/ukr/2185.html

Olearchyk , R.(2.07.2009).Ukraine GDP down by 20%. The Financial Times. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/713ed4c0-666a-11de-a034-00144feabdc0.html

Raiser, M. (13.04.2009). 2009Why Ukraine must act now to implement an anti-crisis plan. Zerkalo Nedeli 13 (741). http://www.mw.ua/2000/2020/65893/

Lvova, O., Wolanskyj, L.A.(12.01.2009). The economic crisis will bite Ukraine more deeply in 2009. A publication of the International Centre for Policy Studies 1 (435). http://www.icps.com.ua/eng/

The World Bank
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/07/22/000333038_20090722235102/Rendered/PDF/495100NEWS0ENG10Box341963B01PUBLIC1.pdf

World trade organization. WTO welcomes Ukraine as a new member.(5.02.2008). http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres08_e/pr511_e.htm

Institute of economic reasearch. Industry: Global Tendency. (18.02.2009) http://www.ier.com.ua/ua/full_doc.php?nr=193

Economist. Ukraine Country Profile. http://www.economist.com/countries/Ukraine/profile.cfm?folder=Profile%2DEconomic%20Data

Pogarska,O., Segura, E.I. (10.07.2009). Ukraine - macroeconomic economic situation - June 2009. News agency Unian. http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-325554.html

Research and Branding Group(10.04.2009). Economic crisis in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia: washing out a stability of the states? http://www.rb.com.ua/eng/company/publications/2009/730.html

BBC News(16.07.2009). Ukraine's economy 'to shrink 15%'. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8154321.stm

CROSS-BORDER LEARNING, LIVING AND WORKING
THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN OFFICE/ VIENNA BOARD OF EDUCATION

HERBERT SEHER

INTRODUCTION

Twenty years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the consequences, outcomes and changes in Europe will be examined in the light of socio-political circumstances in Austria and Central Europe. Particularly relevant here are certain opinions and reactions to change arising from the perspective of a central Europe still largely shaped by the nostalgic late 19th century view of Vienna as a potential fulcrum for the Europe of the future. The political and strategic tensions peculiar to the mid-1990s arose out of various upheavals in the extended central European region, some of them highly contradictory—the entry of Austria to the European Union, the launching of the former communist countries towards a democratic and united Europe, and the intractable Balkan conflict emerging in the formation of new borders and states in ex-Yugoslavia.

Austria has endeavoured to establish a new self-image. The change in orientation more and more towards the east, the opening up of new "old" neighbour countries, an aggravation of the problems surrounding migration through the increasing influx of immigrants from the Ex-Soviet Union, Ex-Yugoslavia and Africa, were followed by a gradual adjustment of socio-political positions, not least in the Austrian educational landscape.

The starting-point was the intensification of intercultural learning, tentatively initiated cross-border cooperation and projects in the Centrope-Region[1] largely on the level of school policy and teaching practice. The European Office of the Vienna Board of Education—already in existence at that time as a contact point for European affairs—was now in a position to expand its field of work.

[1] Centrope-Region includes the regions Eastern Austria and Vienna, Southern Moravia (Brno), Bratislava and the County of Győr/Moson/Sopron in the neighbouring countries Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

The development of a network in the neighbouring regions was followed by cooperation in the form of school partnerships, student exchanges and encounters for young people and teachers, practitioners and educational managers, all of which received an increasing amount of support from the EU. This signified a sustained wave of pedagogical innovation both in methodology and content. The neighbouring languages became particularly important to the process, leading to the development of a wide choice of services and resources for all school types. Of no little importance are the large number of projects and cooperation initiatives with partners all over Europe for EdQ School Quality, ERC-The European Regional College and the European Language Portfolio, in which the European Office was involved as the lead partner.

In response to the modern demands of our society today, the European Office cooperated with other institutions to develop the so-called Basic Competence Model for activities across borders, carried out a whole series of innovative activities and initiated an INTERREG project on the theme of competences in school and business. Key activities are currently being presented in the following areas: European Citizenship, Holocaust in Education and Civil Society.

PROJECTS AND INITIATIVES IN RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENT IN THE CENTROPE COUNTRIES: "GO WHERE YOUR MARKET IS"

EdQ – Education Quality was created as an INTERREG IIIA, EU-sponsored project in order to support and secure the quality of educational opportunities in the Centrope Region by means of cross-border cooperation and initiatives. The goal was to achieve sustained innovative cooperation among the regions involved, addressing students, teachers and educational experts of the partner regions Bratislava, Brno, Győr-Moson/Sopron and Vienna as target groups. The European Office was the organisation executing this project from 2004 to 2007, in cooperation with its project partners—The Brno Educational Authority and the Pedagogic Institute of the region Győr-Moson-Sopron. The EdQ Educational Partnership initiative supported cross-border cooperation and intensified communication between Viennese schools and schools of the neighbouring regions. Students of two partner regions worked together on one chosen topic for the duration of a year. Thus the willingness of the future citizens to engage in cross-border work in Europe was stimulated, an awareness of

joint elements in our cultures was established, and tolerance and acceptance of other regions was encouraged.

The ELP—European Language Portfolio—is a tool created by the Council of Europe to enable language learners themselves to assess and document their knowledge.

One of its main aims is to promote awareness of a European cultural identity and to develop mutual understanding among people of different cultures. The Vienna Board of Education was involved in creating a European Language Portfolio for the Central European Region. Thus, it overlaps in regions and levels and it is intended to identify and document language ability as well as social and cross-cultural experiences of learners in the Centrope-Region. Included in this project are primary level (6 to 10 years old), secondary level I (10–15 years), secondary level II (16–19) and adult education. In cooperation with various schools and educational institutions it was possible to incorporate the ELP into the curriculum, and to date all three ELPs for 10–18 year-olds studying within the Centrope-Region have been accredited by the European Council (accredited model 94/2008) and can be downloaded www.edtwin.eu

The regions in an enlarged Europe are confronted with similar economic and social challenges: particularly those posed by rapidly evolving technologies, the need for sustainable development, progress and its consequences for an information society, and the globalisation of trade. Education must likewise meet these challenges, and fulfils a vital role in this context, in that it can act as an icebreaker to overcome barriers and prejudices as well as support and promote regional development.

EdGate (Education Gate) was established as a network to foster educational exchange among institutions and their representatives from all over Europe with the aim of strengthening economic and social cohesion. The EdGATE Vision – Mobility for Europe – was the motor for the European Regional College (ERC), where regional experts were developing a concept for a new type of European school for 6 – 18 year-old children. 12 partners from 10 regions were involved.[2]

This new educational concept enables European students to become mobile in a united Europe of tomorrow:

"• Mobility of Communication: ERC students will be perfect European ambassadors with outstanding competence in their mother tongue, as well as English, plus another language.

[2] Countries: AT, UK, PL BiH, HR, RS, RO, UA and DE

- Mobility of Thinking: ERC students will learn to be mobile in thinking, studying according to a European curriculum and focusing on European themes in a new study field called "European Studies"
- Mobility of Interaction: will enable ERC students to work and cooperate with other students; they will learn to face challenges, solve problems and look for common solutions with colleagues."

Another important aim of EdGATE was to bring together regional educational institutions, their experts and decision-makers in a lasting Europe-wide network. Vocation in Education should provide an important input for the concept of ERC by defining goals for entrepreneurship and civic education.

BASELINE COMPETENCES REQUIRED FOR WORKING AND LIVING IN A BORDERLESS CENTROPE-REGION

As discussed in the introduction with reference to the complex situation in the CE at the end of the 1980s, it has become necessary to change the old view of the world with Vienna at its centre, and to be prepared for the challenges posed by industrial development and the economy in the cross border regions, as well as the mentality and emotionalizing behaviours of its people and, of course, its political institutions.

"What kind of basic assumptions, values, norms and behaviour regulation characteristics should an individual possess within a multicultural company if the company is made up of individual employees who were socialised in a number of different cultures?"1) Agnes Borgulya: Diversity in value Europe: The future of Europe 3rd SS.

In spite of the differences between the former regions, there are boundless concrete activities to be managed every day. Thus the EdQ-Partners from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Austria have developed baselines for skills and competences, the so-called Grundkompetenzmodell, as a commitment for any successful cooperation in this region. This "baseline model" includes five competences—communicative, social, knowledge, strategic and intercultural—and most of the expert reports focus on one specific item. Any one competence is an approach which should cover as an umbrella all aspects related to all the other competences. The model of competences was developed together with students, experts in the field of education, representatives of the economy and the general public. The outcomes have

been evaluated by experts from different countries and areas and finally combined in a structured catalogue and published.

It would be very interesting to explain the themes and objectives of this guideline on the basis of two examples:

The first will illustrate in a very practical context how working in the field of intercultural competences can provoke personal and practical difficulties:

"The development of intercultural competence is thus not without its problems, but the richness of experience it offers can rather facilitate understanding of different histories, politics, religious values and behaviours in those situations where different cultures encounter one another."

"Lastly the educational systems within any one culture may not support a destabilising approach to intercultural competence, so that any development of intercultural competence will need to be tailored to what is feasible in any one context."

This guideline should serve as a valuable base and reference to any cross border educational project in the Central and EEC countries. Another good example of the deep and well-founded research is the Areas of Personal Development and Fields of Competence in Interregional Cooperation:

The competences are reflected in three basic areas of the personality:

- Knowledge, which is shown above
- Affective development of personal development
- Interpersonal skills (e.g. conflict-management)

Table 1:

Areas of Personal Development	Communicative Competence	Social Competence	Strategic Competence	Knowledge Competence	Intercultural Competence
Knowledge	Knowing how to work with people from the partner region in a communicative and constructive way This includes the following general communicative abilities in particular: • Having the capacity for verbal self-expression and interaction • Presenting and explaining one's own ideas • Managing situations in which language is without or only with a limited command of this language • Recognizing different kinds of obstacles to verbal and non-verbal cross-border communication	Knowing how to participate in a cross-border environment Negotiating in a cross-border context that is characterised plurality and divergence Having the capacity to create shared commitment and visions Knowing how to delegate and co-operate while working in an interregional team (sharing tasks and responsibilities)	Identifying an interregional challenge and formulating adequate strategies which will allow problems to be solved Knowing how to react by applying appropriate procedures to assigned tasks and to any irregularities that may occur Identifying a problem situation which can be solved by using certain strategies Transferring any strategic experience acquired to other challenges in cross-border cooperation Knowing how to evaluate and self-evaluate cross-border initiatives	Mastering the tasks and content in a specific field of work This includes the following in particular: • Understanding • processes and systems of the partner region • Being able to interpret • the symbols and formulae of the partner region • Utilising different technical unit systems Discovering what channels of communication • and support systems already exist between countries and using these to the full	Developing the awareness, knowledge and skills needed to understand 'between the lines' messages across cultures, avoiding miscommunications, and building strong relationships when working in a cross-border environment. Knowing about specific forms of culture in one's own and in the partner country, as well as [their] recognising similarities. This includes the following: • Knowledge about the partner's language • Country specific knowledge, e.g. of its history, geography, politics, and economy

AN AMBITIOUS PLAN TO MANAGE THE FUTURE

ET-struct: A common initative as a response to the crisis: At the interface of training and the economy

"At this time, as the EU is seeking to minimise the impact of the current economic downturn and set the course for renewed growth, it is vital that the momentum is maintained in favour of educational investment that is both efficient and equitable. Good policies will simultaneously aid recovery from recent shocks and build the basis for meeting future challenges with confidence."

In order to find a strategy which can exert a calming effect on the social and economic consequences of the downturn, a partner consortium has been formed with 17 active, capable relevant and compatible partners from 10 NUTS3 CE regions in six of the eight CE countries (Austria, Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and a region on the western border area of Ukraine). Its purpose is to launch a project, to develop, pilot, evaluate and implement "efficient and equitable…good policies." In concrete terms, the partnership plans to set up permanent territorial management and organisational structures to overcome the general lack of coherence in "the connections of the educational system to the leading edge of technology and business practices. These structures will connect the relevant policy, economic and educational partners/stakeholders to match and optimise work force qualifications with the needs of regional economies." An extensive network of over 40 associated institutions will support active partnership and ensure the implementation of the project outcomes.

For a better understanding of the intention of this Central Europewide project it is useful to take a look at the concrete background in four different regions involved in this structure:

1) In a recent representative study almost 70% of the 148 companies in Austria stated that workforce qualifications did not sufficiently match the needs of regional economies. This hinders economic growth, competitiveness and employment and is hence in contradiction to the renewed Lisbon agenda.
2) Another representation of several major problems commonly faced by countries and regions is the "brain drain" of young and well-educated people in some regions. A lot of qualified young people are leaving the area to work in more financially potent regions in Germany. This is due to various factors. New

industries are reluctant to come to the area because of the lack of a qualified workforce. A sinking birth-rate and gradual depopulation of the region could be seen as a further challenge—not only in Germany.

3) Especially among the migrant population, the increasing size of an unqualified or poorly qualified workforce is a notable phenomenon. Their lack of linguistic and professional skills (e.g. among adult Roma in Novo mesto/Slovenia) means that they cannot adequately contribute to economic growth. A knock-on effect is a high percentage of long-term unemployed, particularly unskilled women. In this context the contrary effect on a qualified migrant workforce with higher levels of qualification should be underlined (e.g. Veneto/Italia).
4) In Hranice (Czech Republic) and the surrounding region there is a need for a stronger link between the secondary education offered and the ever-changing demands of the labour market. Though there is interest in dynamic industries operating in the area, there is not enough qualified labour to meet the demand, particularly in the technical fields.

As already mentioned, the issues the project will address are not only regional problems: they also have a translational dimension. The project therefore offers a platform where regions can learn from each other and exchange models of best practice. They can jointly address common issues of interest such as innovative approaches to aging in regions…the establishment of effective links between public administration, research and the private sector and new approaches to improving human capital.

This is indeed a very professional approach to the "red hot" problems in the spiralling dynamics with which we are confronted, and to finding solutions for "easier mobility from one country to another—in order to continue studying or finding employment."

EDTWIN–EDUCATION TWINNING FOR EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: HEADING FOR EXCELLENCE IN THE CENTROPE REGION

EdTWIN represents a particularly ambitious project of the European Office. It signifies a new generation of cross-border projects at the Vienna Board of Education. As these initiatives progress and expand, students, apprentices and teachers from Vienna, Southern Moravia, the Bratislava region and the County of Győr/Moson/Sopron

will extend their competences and skills. The European Office is the lead partner for EDTWIN, carrying the main responsibility for handling and documentation.

Getting to know how to identify oneself with Europe requires interaction with people from differing regions, a willingness to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers, and the consequent development of tolerance and understanding. In order to support the cultural, social and economic development of Centrope, the European Office has developed three bilateral twin projects with partners from the neighbouring Centrope-regions, under the umbrella of EdTWIN.

The various initiatives are aimed at pupils, teachers and education experts in the regions and offer a variety of opportunities for interaction and cooperation. Special emphasis is placed on the opportunity to learn the neighbouring languages. In recent years Czech, Slovak and Hungarian have rapidly gained in importance in Vienna, and are building the basis for sustainable interaction in the future.

School, vocation, language: these three core areas are the main fields of project activity, and aim at extending the competence of all participants involved. The goal is to be culturally and linguistically prepared for closer contact and to be equipped for cross-border access to the labour market.

The focus is on the development of communication and knowledge skills, as well as an increase in social, strategic and intercultural understanding. The activities include: financing of school partnerships, lesson observation, activities which lead to understanding of the neighbouring educational systems, joint art and culture activities, development of joint teaching material, specialist workshops for teachers, vocational internships for students attending vocational schools, as well as language workshops in Czech, Slovak and Hungarian. It is, in other words, a wide, exciting initiative which is above all practical and workable in everyday life.

One example of an innovative and demand-oriented educational activity is the project "Cross Border Occupational Orientation" by which students about to choose a career can be offered a compact opportunity for exchange of experience. In 7-day blocks, young people are introduced to the course and then given the task of independently planning, organising and carrying out a visit to one of the neighbouring border regions. Trainers, who may also act in some phases as advisors, are responsible for an appropriate follow-up and, if necessary, further advice. The intention is particularly to get to know the neighbouring regions, make personal

contacts, make at least rudimentary use of the language, and complete a short traineeship in a vocational institution.

The educational centre created this year is intended, as already indicated, to provide the opportunity for students (from aged 15), teachers and educational experts to receive language instruction and information but also to acquaint themselves with the neighbouring regions. In the course of five intensive days students will begin the workshop by receiving language instruction from native speakers and finish with an excursion into the corresponding language region. The fact that the seminar centre is booked for the entire school year shows the dynamic effect of this activity, and the same applies to the special evening courses for educational personnel and teachers, where Slovakian, Czech and Hungarian is offered at different levels.

Education in the European Dimension is a further basic element in the working conception of EdTWIN and in the "spirit" of European office alike: EU citizenship education should aim to

- impart knowledge on the key elements and the main institutions involved in EU policy-making and legislation
- inform about the role of the media in the European context and qualify pupils/students to interpret its messages
- instil students with a lasting sense of European integration as an ongoing process affecting all spheres of social, legal and political life, and the understanding that it is far from being complete
- increase students' general awareness of the potential scope for action and opportunities
- encourage students to collect additional information about the EU on their own initiative

These objectives will be achieved through an engagement with topical issues and through close cooperation with NGOs and EU institutions. Young people especially expect to learn in the framework of the community, to discover how to increase their access and achieve full participation in society (e.g. civic participation, prevention of social exclusion) and how to foster solidarity between youth and society (e.g. mobilisation of youth in global policy-making). Ultimately all must work together to find an answer to the question of whether Europeans do indeed share a homogeneous and lasting set of values.

The following two concrete examples will show ways in which aspects of a European education may enable political participation to be achieved:

In 2007 a symposium for educational leaders of the Centrope region took place in Vienna, during which the significance, basis and practical aspects of the Holocaust in Education was discussed. Historiological contributions from high-ranking experts were compared with significant findings and experiences of teachers and discussed in the context of best practice examples. The differentiation between individual and collective memory, the very different approaches to history in teaching and research, and also the cultural differences in approach to the past in the different regions were identified, alongside modern history teaching methodology. Thematic points were covered by a presentation from the International Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust and the Jewish Museum in Vienna. The highly interesting contributions can be downloaded (www.edq.eu.com) and will shortly be published with a wider spectrum of themes in print form.

Approaches to history – not only that of former centuries – current trends and the challenges posed by a European society which is by no means free of social and political tensions, and the demand for basic competences to enable a European citizen to take an active part in the civil society, are the issues at the centre of an international symposium planned for Autumn 2010. Internationally renowned experts (political scientists, historians, sociologists and teachers) will here propose a profile for a European Citizen, who thinks, lives and acts as a member of the civil society.

The current challenges for relevant socio-political managers and the question of an adequate policy for Citizenship Education will be addressed primarily with emphasis on the situation in central and southern Europe.

DIFFICULTIES ?! A CHALLENGE TO THE FUTURE

Twenty years after the largely "Velvet Revolution", it must be clear to us all that Europe has not yet achieved its goals.

The British-German scholar Ralf Dahrendorf once said that the development of Europe after changes would happen in major phases: six years to achieve international acceptance, six years for the adaptation of the new economic systems, but another sixty years for the formation of a coherent civic society. Seen thus, the merging of Europe—and this not even within the EU—is far from being completed, and we will all need to invest much effort on the long road ahead.

Thus future priorities must on the one hand be changes in the social structure and their effects, and on the other the post-communist development of civil society and everyday cultural change. Major themes such as urbanisation and secularisation, change in social and family structures and gender roles, mobility and migration and the relationships between pan-European developments at the interface between "West" and "East" will keep us occupied for several decades. There are a whole series of questions which must very soon be addressed:

How have social inequality and regional disparity changed?

Which groups are now threatened by "social" exclusion?

What is the status of ethnic and social minorities?

What changes have taken place in the educational landscape, the media and everyday culture?

And finally: which are the new elite groups and civil structures, and which new and efficient forms of democratic participation have developed?

What will happen after the "Crisis"? In what situation will our society find itself?

What developments will be taken within the EU and how will the environs of the EU react?

It matters little what the answers are. They will only achieve real constancy if they are made together by all of us, democratically and responsibly. Centrope—the centre of Europe—will play a decisive role here. An important contribution will certainly be made by Austria, Vienna, and of course the European Office too.

REFERENCES

Austrian Education News 58 (2009). Austrian Federal Ministry for Education, Arts and Culture, Vienna

Education Quality, Centrope Excellence (2004). EdQ Zentrum, European Office

European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture

Gal, Z. Regional Dimension of Investment on Research; European Higher Education in a Changing World. Tarrósy-Milford (eds) 2007

Havel, V. (Reclaiming Democracy) 2007, Forbig, Joerg and Demes Pavol (eds)

Key message to the Spring European Council in the field of education and training – Czech Presidency background paper 15914/08

Living and Working in the Centrope Region, 2008, Ed EB, SSR p. 249

Schneeberger, Nowak,(2007). Institut für Bildungsforschung der Wirtschaft, May 2007

The European Regional College (ERC) (2006). EdGate, European Offfice, Vienna Board of Education

Velikic, D. (2008) Info Europa, Kulturführer Mitteleuropa, idm

Vocation in Education, Priority Areas (2006). EdGate, European Office, Vienna Board of Education

www.edtwin.eu

www.edq.eu.com

contacts:

franz.schimek@ssr-wien.gv.at (Head – European Office/Board of Education in Vienna)

stuart.simpson@ssr-wien.gv.at (EdGATE/ET-Struct)

bernhard.seckl@ssr-wien.gv.at (EdTWIN)

max.steiner@edq.eu.com (Comenius-Regio)

herbert.seher@edq.eu.com (Vocational education)

FROM GORBACHEV'S EUROPE PLAN TO PUTIN'S GAZPROM DIPLOMACY

THE ROLE OF CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

GERGELY TAKÁCS

INTRODUCTION

The present work wishes to present the conceptions, if any, of the leaders of the Russian foreign policy, about our region after 1990. In order to be able to determine the main characteristics of the Russian foreign policy after the formation of the Soviet Union, it is vital to go back to 1985, to the time when Gorbachev came to office.

Mikhail Gorbachev, first the secretary-general, later the president, never planned to reform the Soviet system, as he believed that he would be able to control the previously launched processes, and with substantial western aid, he would be able to keep his position in the long term. Gorbachev's delusion was proven by the coup d'etat implemented by one of his trusted men, Boris Yeltsin. The new president could not really centralise power in his hands either, therefore his foreign policy also lacked a uniform conception.

The country with a damaged economy had a leader in poor health, who became exposed to the oligarchs after his support in internal political issues had decreased. Under the presidency of the new and dynamic Putin the economy started to develop. As Putin had a stable political background, it enabled him to place more emphasis on foreign policy and this way to regain the position of a great power.

Thus it can be concluded that Russia's position in the world and its relations in the region have been determined to a great extent by the person of the current leader, the state of its economy, and the leaders of the diplomacy.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

The essence of the western policy in the nineties is best reflected by the views of the Clinton administration, according to which Russian only pretended to be a great power, while others pretended to believe it.

In the first section of the present work the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, later of Russia, will be presented through the secretary-generals and presidents. This is considered necessary since these leaders influenced the development of Russian foreign policy in a unique way.

Mikhail Gorbachev, appointed in 1985 was primarily governed by his own interests, while Yeltsin's presidency was marked by the consolidated domestic crisis, the charges of corruption brought up against his family and relatives and the more and more drastic state of the economy. The president, losing the support of the West and the oligarchs as well, and getting into a worse health condition was replaced by Vladimir Putin. The youthful and confident president brought new currents into the government, as well as to foreign policy.

Gorbachev: The era of confusion and helplessness

Gorbachev, the elected secretary-general was as helpless as his predecessors, who had not known how to conduct the policy of perestroika effectively, without changing the core of the Soviet model.

However, when he came into power this was not his primary and most important problem, as his position in the party was weakening. He spent the first five years of his office by placing his own people into the most vital positions and by making changes in the structure of the party, enabling him to fulfil a stronger role. Due to these changes, he managed to centralise power only temporarily, and now, looking back to the past, it seems that as opposed to his intentions, he was making steps to destroy rather than to maintain the Soviet system.

Later it also became evident that the more he tried to modify the Soviet structure, the more he damaged its chances of survival, and the more concessions he was forced to make in foreign policy to strengthen his demolishing internal power and legitimacy.

The European plan

Accordingly, Gorbachev's intention was to reform Socialism as such, and to work out a system based on adopting mechanisms of the market economy, ceasing violence and keeping the central role of the party. The secretary-general and his close circle developed a new way of thinking, which aimed at decreasing the polarity of the continent, focusing on the balance of interests rather than the balance of power, and strengthening national organizations, mainly the United Nations, under controlled circumstances.

Integrity and strengthening the institutions were emphasized in the Russian foreign policy especially because after withdrawing from international conflicts, they did not want the United States of America to remain the sole participant on the scene.

The conception, serving integration was present in three different levels, on a military, economic and social level [Lévesque, 44, 2001]. The first steps were taken on the military level, as these resulted in the most substantial cost saving, and these were considered the most important by the United States. Therefore, the policy of armament was replaced by that of disarmament, which started the long term process of decreasing the tension between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

The second level involved the improvement of economic relations. As the first step of the Europe plan, the Council for Mutual Economic Assisstance (COMECON) and the European Economic Association (EEA) made a common declaration in July 1988, in which they acknowledged one another's existence.

As the Soviet Union and its satellite countries were extremely underdeveloped, the Soviet secretary-general focused on the stimulation of economic relations. Gorbachev also hoped to obtain capital and credit from the West, in exchange for the concessions made to them. The astonishment of the USA and its allies by the Soviet opening was an obstacle to developing mutual trust, which could have given an opportunity for capital investment. However, the USA's intention was only to support Gorbachev to an extent which could prevent the Soviet Union from its collapse.

Besides the military and the economic changes, the third level of reform was social. In order to decrease the splitting of the continent democratizing Socialism became essential. The main opposers of the plan were the party secretaries of the socialist countries in the area, who feared the loss of their power due to the new Soviet foreign policy. Although the strongest opposition originated from the German

Democratic Republic, as a result of persistent efforts, Honecker's power could be weakened. Consequently, in December 1989, on Malta, within the framework of the Russian-American presidential meeting the Russians renounced the German Democratic Republic and agreed to unify the two parts of the country.

A prominent step in the process of democratizing was the 21st assembly of the party in 1988, where a significant resolution was passed. A number of the decisions served the decrease of the degree to which the party patronizes the state, while others brought personnel changes enabling the spread of the new trends in foreign and security policy.

In order for Gorbachev to prove his determination -and considerable impatience- in December 1988, in Vienna, he announced the re-launch of the negotiations about the conventional military sources, undertaking a unilateral reduction in several Soviet territories. Apart from being a gesture, this act also had more rational reasons, namely to be able to start the curtailment of Soviet military costs.

The quick steps were justified by the fact that the economies of Central Eastern European countries were so disastrous that only two options remained: to apply for western financial loans and aids or to further debit the budget of Moscow, which would have been impossible.

Simultaneously with the events in Central Eastern Europe, sharpening ethnic conflicts emerged in the Caucasus mountains, and more and more intense nationalist movements appeared in the Baltic countries, as well. In the given situation and under the pressure of the events Gorbachev decided to let hold of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic, hoping that these countries may possess some reserves of Socialism and develop a community beyond the economic, commercial and political relations [Deák, 98, 2002].

From this moment, the leadership in Moscow lost its interest in the region, which also remained unaffected by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in the near future. They only aimed at preserving the neutrality of the region.

Boris Yeltsin: continuous instability

The existence of the Russian diplomacy officially started from December 1991, the formation of Russia. The chaos in the internal policy is well reflected by the fact that in the subsequent six years (until December 1997) three fundamentally different foreign political doctrines followed one another.

Before outlining the foreign policy of each era, the changes of the international and domestic political environments will be presented, then the reaction of the diplomatic leadership will also be discussed. Finally, it will also be examined how the development of foreign policy affected our region.

The Atlantic Era: January, 1992 - October, 1993

After the break-up of the Soviet Union a new state was developed, the borders of which coincided with the borders under the reign of tsar Peter the Great. The international environment of the new state was completely transformed, 80% of its borders lacked contract validity and the loyalty of the heterogeneous population was also dubitable. Due to the lack of the establishment of institutions the internal stability and the maintenance of the country was a constant problem. Moreover, until January 1994, the question of the constitutional form was still undecided.

Thus the main tasks for the Yeltsin administration in the first two years was to reduce the number of conflicts to a minimum. The West was also concerned with improving the situation and establishing stability, therefore they also supported the Russian elite, sometimes providing the only source of legitimacy to them. The external defencelessness of the country substantially limited its scope for action in foreign policy. For the USA and its allies the powerful Russian leadership was vital in this period, as the consequences of a possible disintegration would have been unforeseeable. Moreover the future of the nuclear weapons stored in the territory of the autonomous republics would have also been doubtful.

For Moscow, besides the above discussed conditions, maintaining the status of a great power, securing it in international organizations and building a good rapport with the United States were the most significant issues in this short period. The only means to preserve its role was with the help of foreign policy. After the break-up of the Soviet Union Russia had to face new challenges mainly in economy, and having significant shortfalls, its role in the global economy was questioned.

Russia's position in the international negotiations was harmed by the critical economic situation, resulting in the loss of a vital tool of diplomacy. Due to rational reasons, the West was only concerned with political support, as an economically prospering country would have been more difficult to control.

The only card of the Russian leadership following the disarmament was the traditional military force and the quantity of the nuclear ammunition, which was

still the most substantial one on the continent. In order to obtain the hoped economic advantages, in its foreign policy Russia could only exploit these opportunities, which enabled it to become an inevitable factor in European foreign and security policy . On the other hand, it cannot be neglected that the Russian economic, political and commercial relations extended over the whole continent, which was necessary to utilize in the nineties, for instance in the case of settling the Balkan Crisis.

Based on the 1991 doctrine of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Andrey Kozyrev, the leaders of diplomacy reckoned that the democracies of the region were so young that there was no possibility of European integration. The democratic governments set up in the countries of the region excluded the possibility of tightening the relations. Moreover, despite of the substantial economic and raw material dependency of the region, they tried to gain foreign political advantage of either the rapprochement of the Russian bear or the fact that it was about to fall into pieces. However, 100% of the military supply and 90% of the energy import of the Visegrad Four countries originated from Russia, and the Russian market was also important for their agricultural products [Deák, 94, 2002].

Being not necessary for its two main goals, Central Eastern Europe did not play a role in the Atlantic foreign policy. Not only did the new Russian foreign policy feel activating relations with these countries beneath its dignity [Deák, 100, 2002], but it also considered supportable to cease old-type economic relations.

The task of the Russian diplomacy was to attract western capital to the country, which would have been necessary for the shock therapy of Gaidar. However as the domestic situation became instable and the government was unable to control social processes, western states were less and less willing to provide aid for the country sinking into economic crisis. Following the failure of the economics, the external policy of Kozyrev and the possibility of catching up with the West were also questioned.

Turning against the USA: 3 October, 1993 – 3 July, 1996

Yeltsin, being victorious in the events of the "bloody October", in order to consolidate his power, implemented several changes in the constitution, which resulted in the dominance of the presidential position in the Russian political system. The constitutional changes were also legitimated by a referendum. The authority of legislation was curtailed substantially, so that it became only inevitable in accepting

the budget. As a result of the alternations in the constitution, foreign policy entirely got into the scope of the president. Due to the temporary tranquillity in the domestic political situation, the presidential administration could focus on foreign policy.

Given the stable political background, the Balkan Crisis and the expansion of the NATO served as good opportunities for Yeltsin to fulfil a more prominent international position. As it became evident that the West was not willing to provide any financial or economic aid, the Russian leadership broke with the Kozyrev doctrine, and ceased supporting the west in the hope of obtaining capital.

As a result of disillusionment, new opportunities emerged in Russian foreign policy, and relying on their own power came to prominence. They made efforts to build mostly economic relations with countries losing the USA's favour, namely Iraq, Iran and China. Boosting its own industry, Russia became the most important military supplier of these countries. Nevertheless, the newly acquired markets became saturated soon, and because of its substantial technical backwardness in the defence industry, Russia was not able to advance further. In supporting the above mentioned three countries, Russia tried not to exceed the extent which would have resulted in the break of the Russian-American relations.

The Balkan crisis and the issue of expanding NATO emerged simultaneously. First, Russia only acted as an observer in the Balkan crisis, however the development plan of the Clinton administration assigned a part to Moscow as well. Based on the contents of the Vance-Owen plan, Americans reckoned that as the Russians formed a "civilisational community" with the Serbs, this could be utilized during the diplomatic negotiations. Certainly, the Russian leadership was satisfied with this role, as they felt that their presence as a great power was necessary in settling the problem. Nonetheless, after a considerable time the NATO bombings enflamed the relations of the USA and Moscow.

Due to the earlier mentioned reasons, Kozyrev's diplomacy did not consider the possibility of the Central Eastern European countries joining the NATO earlier than the European Union. However, NATO on its Brussels summit on 10-11 January, 1994 announced its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and requested the countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to join its initiative. As PfP was considered the hallway to NATO, it became evident for Moscow that the joining of the Visegrad four countries would result in a loss of a part of Russia's earlier sphere of interest.

Since the Russian leadership had not taken into consideration this option, they were uncertain about what viewpoint to take, therefore, for a short period of time, Moscow's opinion in this question changed from week to week. The uncertainty was ended in November 1993, when a military doctrine was passed, which unambiguously stated that Russia is against the expansion of NATO.

In the following year Russia still believed that it was evitable that the countries of the region would join the NATO, therefore they continuously worked on alternatives for delaying this. Their drafts aimed at establishing a European Committee structure guaranteeing the participation and non-ommissibility of Russia. According to one of the proposals OSCE would have been transformed to such an international organization that would have guaranteed Russian influence in European security policy. Another plan aimed at reforming the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to guarantee Russian participation.

Thus, Moscow did not consider the expansion a military threat, it rather feared its own isolation and that due to the expansion, as a priority of the West its place would be occupied by Central Eastern Europe.

Russian hopes to prevent the expansion vanished on 1 December, 1994, when NATO member states announced in Brussels that they were committed to accept the countries of the region to their organization. The fatal blow was the next session of the OSCE on 5 December, 1994, in Budapest, where it turned out that the structural changes which would have been supposed to assure a special place for Russia would not be realized.

Although at the beginning of the next year, Russia still attempted to obtain some kind of compensation in exchange for supporting the expansion, the secret discussions ended unsuccessfully and the negotiations were ceased. Only the new Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Yevgeni Primakov managed to normalize relations.

The Primakov era of consolidation: August 1996 – March 1999

Foreign policy in the captivity of oligarchs

The re-election of the first president of the Russian Federation would not have been successful without the support of Bill Clinton and the Russian oligarchs. While the USA, seeing the chaotic domestic situation, considered it necessary to defend the actual president, who they had already known and had regarded predictable, the

oligarchs viewed the political events purely as a business investment, guaranteeing their power in the subsequent years.

In the years preceding the elections, in order to be successful, the opposing parties did not refrain from the usage of even the harshest tools. The president, bearing low popularity among the population but more in the business sphere did not have a difficult task, thus the results of the elections were foreseeable.

Following the elections, Moscow strived to find new basis for its foreign relations, excluded them from politics and in its diplomacy, the economic and commercial aspects were emphasized instead. The main supporter of this attempt was the group of proprietors in the upper crust, who wished to expand their economic scope for action this way. As the oligarchs occupied a prominent role in domestic policy, they were able to influence the presidential administration directly to support the NATO membership of the Central Eastern European countries, with military and security political guarantees. In return, Russia could get admission to the market of developed technologies and to participate in international economic cooperation (for instance WTO), yielding a profit. This can be viewed as a western tendency in foreign policy, parallel to which the integration into global economy became more prominent.

The idea of the NATO expansion did not only have to be accepted by the Russian elite but to a certain extent also by the public. For this reason a media campaign was launched in Russia. The breakthrough in the American-Russian negotiations was achieved by the meeting of the two presidents in March 1997, where the parties recorded the most important issues in a contract. They agreed to establish institutional relations between Russia and NATO, moreover the American president also promised to aid Russia's comeback to the mainstream of the global economy, to support its admission to the WTO and the G7, which includes the seven most economically developed countries of the world. Following the successful Russian-American agreement, Central Eastern European countries could also be invited to NATO in July, the same year. At the Madrid summit meeting, the monarchs and prime ministers of the NATO member countries officially accepted the previously named three states, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary as fully qualified NATO members.

End play

The stability experienced in foreign policy was not present in economy. The global economic recession, which started in July 1997 with the Asian financial crisis reached Russia in 1998. The problems in the economy put the Russian leadership into a more and more difficult position, however the crisis only followed on 23 March, 1998, when the president suddenly wanted to dismiss the prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin and his whole government, and to replace him by the young technocrat Minister of Energy, Sergei Kiriyenko.

The duma turned down the president's proposal two times, however at the third time Kiriyenko was nominated, as Yeltsin had previously threatened the representatives to dissolve legislation otherwise. Neither Kiriyenko nor the half a year later nominated, previous Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Primakov managed to handle the domestic and economic crises. Primakov was considered to be a man of compromises, and his growing popularity and support made Yeltsin distrust him, thus in 1999 he was replaced by Sergei Stepashin. The new Prime Minister remained in his office for less than three months, at the end of the summer he got to the same fate as his predecessors.

By that time, the president had already struggled with serious health problems, and as one of his last decisions, he nominated Vladimir Putin to Prime Minister, the previous secret service agent, just like Stepashin. The parliament elected Putin with a great majority.

Domestic instability certainly affected the Russian foreign policy, so just like the national relations, foreign policy was also unforeseeable. In the given situation it was not surprising that before the bombings in Kosovo, Russia's viewpoint had not been requested, moreover the Americans had not even brought the issue to the only international forum, the United Nations Security Council, where Moscow could have intervened. However, leaving out the Russians did have rational reasons: Moscow intentionally tried to gain time, and they chose to disregard the serious attacks suffered by the Albans in Kosovo for weeks.

Parallel to feeling anger, the Russian leadership also feared becoming insignificant. Despite the intense tension with NATO, Moscow did not want to burn all bridges behind itself, which is proven by the fact that in October 1999, as a response to the collective strategy formulated and issued by the EU, Moscow also revealed its 10-year-plan for the European Union.

For the Russian diplomacy, the Central Eastern European region appreciated economically, as it became evident that NATO membership would soon be followed by European integration, enabling Russia to build a closer relationship with the European Union through the countries of the region.

Putin: Russia and the multilateral world vision

After Putin's nomination to Prime Minister in August 1999, guessing started whether he would be the politician to replace Yeltsin. The president also served the basis for this guessing, as right after Putin had been elected, Yeltsin's statements forecasted that he had found the right person to follow him in leading the country.

As time was passing by, the future was already predictable. On 31 December, 1999, half a year before the end of his mandate, and knowing that his "candidate" would undoubtedly be elected in spring, Boris Yeltsin decided to resign, so Putin became the provisional president. The presidential elections held on 26 March made Putin the completely legitimate leader of the Russian Federation.

The heritage of the previous president was wearisome: the society and the economy were in their ruins, moreover in the first weeks of Putin's presidency Chechen troops invaded the territory of Dagestan. Several houses were exploded, allegedly by the Chechens in Moscow and several other towns, causing the death of hundreds of people. However, the perpetrators of these explosions are still not known for certain today. Until the explosions the public mood was completely against the attack against the Chechens, however after the terrorist attacks their opinions changed and they wanted the Russian troops to respond to the assaults attributed to the Chechens. Assured of the support of the Russian population, the president sent troops to Chechnya at the end of September, starting the second Chechen war.

Due to Putin's harsh domestic and foreign political actions and his past in the secret service, at the beginning of his office as a prime minister and his first period of presidency, the international political community did not welcome him with trust. The solid majority of the parties supporting him in the parliament and the economic prosperity due to the increasing oil prices enabled him to pay more attention to the Russian foreign policy.

As one of his first steps, Putin strived to restore his relations with the great powers of Europe, which did not prove to be an easy task, as his etatist domestic political

provisions were welcomed with strong dislike by a number of western political leaders.

Putin made substantial concession in foreign policy and gave up several of his previous positions in order to be able to concentrate on the areas where real progress could be achieved: he renounced the previous nuclear parity, he started decreasing the number of nuclear weapons, he limited the country's obligations in the Balkans, he liquidated the unnecessary elements of the country's global military presence, and made serious efforts to cease the isolation following the Kosovo conflict.

The new Europe policy

The new foreign political conception of the Russian Federation was signed by the Russian president on 28 July, 2000, in which one of the top regional priorities is to improve the relations with Europe.

Based on this document, there is a central attempt in the Russian Europe policy to form a cooperative structure which has a stable and democratic basis. For this aim, just like in the conception of Yeltsin, the OSCE is considered the most suitable organization. Besides participating in settling the security and foreign political questions, the doctrine passed in 2000 considered the development of a Europe policy necessary to regulate economic relations. This is well reflected by the fact that in the new foreign political conception foreign trade is the top priority.

According to the new foreign political strategy, Putin attempted to restore Russia's relations with Europe as soon as possible, as this was in Russia's economic interests. On the other hand, based on its abilities, Russia could be group together with the western European countries rather than the USA, where the newly elected George W. Bush and his neoconservative circle were famous for their impatience in diplomacy.

Therefore Russia constantly tried to be a predictable partner on the European continent. Following the terror attack of 11 September, 2001 against the World Trade Centre, for a short time Moscow and Washington found one another, as both of them were looking for supporters against terrorism.

After having cleared political and economic life from the oligarchs in 2003-2004, the economy started to increase steadily, giving more scope to Russia and decreasing its dependency on the West. The launch of the Iraq War caused the alienation of Russians from the USA, so when a decision had to be made, Putin chose to support Paris and Berlin in this question. Economic interests also played a vital role in this

decision: Russia could expect more aid for the modernization of the country from Western Europe than from America. Another important aspect for the Russian diplomacy was not having to form an opinion against a country of Islamic religion.

Russian-American relations froze only later, when the USA, guided by its geo-strategic interests openly supported the revolutions in countries of the Russian sphere of interest (the Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan).

Putin started viewing the American foreign policy as "neocontainment". Taking a glance at the newest NATO member countries, it can be noticed that Moscow's fears are not unfounded. The admission of Baltic and South European states in 2004 caused mostly the dislike of the Russians.

The Ukraine is considered to be a specially sensitive area for Russia. First, Russia feared that by losing its influence in the Ukraine, they would be separated from the unifying Europe, secondly the country is one of the most valuable transit areas of Moscow, and finally the greatest Russian diaspora also lives in the Ukraine. Following the revolutions in the countries of the Russian sphere of interest, relations with Europe also deteriorated, as the members of the European Union clearly supported democratic ways of changing power.

Despite the events of the past three or four years, to prove that it has caught up with the continent, Russia needed and still needs the Central Eastern European region as a transit area, since almost half of the Russian foreign trade is transported through these territories to Western Europe (most of the roads and pipelines passes through the territory of the Visegrad Four countries).

However, it also essential to highlight that for the Russian diplomacy aiming at retaining its global position, a stable background is necessary, a part of which is our region. From the Visegrad Group, Hungary should be treated specially not only economically but also because it is considered to be the most easily detachable country [Magyarics, 2006].

CONCLUSION

My study aimed at presenting how Central Eastern Europe transformed from a territory of strategic importance for Russia, with influence on the outcome of the cold war to a minor character of geopolitics of the nineties. It could also be seen that when the new president, Vladimir Putin came into office at the millennium, his foreign policy, focusing on the development of economic relations placed special

emphasis on our region again. This special role was further increased by the Iraq War, the revolutions in the Ukraine and Georgia, the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute and the American missile shield planned to Europe.

REFERENCES

Donaldson, H. Robert - Nogee, L. Joseph (2005). The Foreign Policy of Russia: changing systems, enduring interests.M. E. Sharpe, New York.

Kissinger, Henry (2002). Diplomacy, Panem-Grafo, Budapest.

Isakova, Irina (2005). Russian Governance in the Twenty-First Century: Geo-strategy, geopolitics and governance. Frank Cass, New York.

Jacques Lévesque (2001). The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe, Aula Publisher, Budapest.

Kiss Ilona, Tatjana Sakleina, Andrej Kortunov (ed.) (1998). Doktrínák és alternatívák. Az orosz külpolitikai gondolkodás, 1992-1998., COLPI, Budapest.

Romsics Ignác (1995). Magyarország és a nagyhatalmak a XX. században. Teleki László Foundation, Budapest.

Ljubov Siselina – Gazdag Ferenc (ed.) (2004) Oroszország és Európa. Orosz geopolitikai szöveggyűjtemény; Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest.

Gazdag Ferenc – Kiss J. László (ed.) (2004). Magyar külpolitika a 20. században, Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest.

Ronald D. Asmus (2003). A NATO kapunyitása; Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest.

Magyarics Tamás: Orosz-amerikai rivalizálás Kelet-Európában. Neo-containment vagy demokráciaépítés. Teleki Hírlevél 2006/11. július 3.

PROGRAMME

5 July, Sunday

Arrival at Hotel Peregrinus, Szerb utca 3., Budapest (*Hotel Erzsébet for lecturers*)

16.00-17.00	*Registration*
17.00	*Introduction, First meeting*
19.00	*Dinner at Véndiák* (Egyetem tér 5., Budapest)

6 July, Monday

8.15-9.00	*Registration*
9.00-9.30	*Rector's address (ELTE, Room A/14)* **Ferenc HUDECZ**, Rector of ELTE, Budapest, President of DRC
9.30-9.45	*Opening* **Susan MILFORD, István TARRÓSY**
9.45-10.30	*Keynote speech* *1989 – 2009: Achievements and Lackings* **István STUMPF**, Századvég Foundation, Budapest
10.30-10.45	*Break*
10.45-12.15	*Plenary lectures*
10.45-11.30	*Transition and the Judiciary* **Péter HACK**, Faculty of Law, ELTE, Budapest
11.30-12.15	*Civil Society and Participation* **László KÁKAI**, University of Pécs
12.15-13.15	*Lunch (Aula Restaurant - Rákóczi út 5.)*
13.30-14.15	*The economic development in the Danubian Region after 1989* **Vladimir GLIGOROV**, Vienna Institut for International Economic Studies
14.30-18.00	*Workshop sessions*
19.00	*Dinner (XO Bistro - Rákóczi út 5.)*

7 July, Tuesday	
10.00-12.30	*Plenary lectures*
10.00-10.45	*Global Challenges, European answers, CEE prospects* **Tamás SZEMLÉR**, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
10.45-11.00	Break
11.00-11.45	*Background Stories: History of Austria-Hungary, 1989 and CEE Grants* **Tamara SCHEER**, Research Assistant, Vienna University, Institute for Contemporary History
11.45-12.30	*Political Transformation in the Central European Region: Similiarites, Disparities and Peculiarities* **Andreas PRIBERSKY**, Institute for Political Science, University of Vienna
12.30-13.30	*Lunch (Aula Restaurant)*
13.30-18.00	*Workshop sessions*
19.00	*Dinner (XO Bistro)*
8 July, Wednesday	
9.00-17.00	*Excursion (from Kálvin tér)* Trip to Visegrád and to Esztergom *(by bus)* *Sandwich-lunch*
19.00	*Dinner (XO Bistro)*

9 July, Thursday

9.15-12.30	*Plenary lectures*
9.15-10.00	*The youth and its role in transformation*
	Jörg FORBRIG, German Marschall Fund of the United States, Bratislava
10.00-10.45	*Corruption and ways of dealing with it*
	Tina OLTEANU, University of Vienna
10.45-11.00	*Break*
11.00-11.45	*Regime Change and their impact on the perception of the Danubian Region*
	Emil BRIX, deputy chairman, IDM, Vienna
11.45-12.30	*CEE - The backyard of the EU or international player?*
	János MARTONYI, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest
12.30-13.30	*Lunch (Aula Restaurant)*
13.30-18.00	*Workshop sessions*
19.00	*Dinner (XO Bistro)*

10 July, Friday

Visit to IBM Hungary - Neumann János u. 1., 1117 Budapest

10.00-12.30	*Field Trip to IBM Hungary*
13.00-14.00	*Lunch (Aula Restaurant)*
14.30-17.30	*Sightseeing in Budapest by bus*
17.30-19.00	*Free programme*
19.00	*Dinner (XO Bistro)*

11 July, Saturday

10.15-13.00	*Workshop sessions - Final reports*
13.00-15.00	*Lunch*
15.00-16.30	*Closing session: Presentations and discussion of the workshop results*
17.00-17.30	*Closing ceremony*
19.00	*Dinner and farewell party*

12 July, Sunday

Departure

WORKSHOP TOPICS

1. **Revolutionary Changes and Their Political Impacts on Europe**
2. **Economic and Social Perspectives of Democratic Change**
3. **1989 as Impetus for Regional Co-operation with Special Focus on Science and Research and for Development of Civil Society in CEE**
4. **New Geopolitical Era for CEECs? – The Danubian Region in International Relations 20 Years after the Fall of the Iron Curtain**

WORKSHOP LEADERS

Tamara SCHEER - Research Assistant, Vienna University, Institute for Contemporary History
Workshop 1

Renáta Anna DEZSŐ - Researcher, PhD aspirant, Education and Society Doctoral School, University of Pécs
Workshops 2 and 3

Armagan GOZKAMAN - Research Assistant, Istanbul Technical University, ISS
Workshop 4

INSTITUT FÜR DEN DONAURAUM UND MITTELEUROPA (IDM)

Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM)
A-1090 Vienna, Hahngasse 6/1/24
Tel.: + 43 1 319 72 58
Fax: + 43 1 319 72 58-4
E-mail: idm@idm.at, www.idm.at

50 Years of Research for the Danube Region

The IDM was founded in 1953 as the "Research Institute for Issues of the Danube Region". As an Austrian scientific institution, it was dedicated specifically to research on the Danube region.

In 1993 the Institute was renamed as the "Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe" (IDM).

Today the IDM is an extramural research institution based on an association – constituted by individual and corporate members – with its head office in Vienna.

The Institute is funded by the Austrian Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministries of Science and Research, of Education, the Arts and Culture, of European and International Affairs and of Economics, Family and Youth as well as by individual provinces, cities, the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, the Federation of Austrian Industry, the Austrian Central Bank and private sponsors.

Facilitator and clearinghouse

As a gateway and a facilitator institution the IDM makes an important contribution to co-operation in the fields of research, culture, politics, economics and administration. At the same time the IDM sees itself as a clearinghouse for concerns of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe, supporting the work of embassies, trade missions, cultural institutes and national tourist offices of the countries of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe in Austria, as well as the work of Austrian missions to these countries.

Since 1995 the chairman of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) is the former Austrian vice-chancellor Dr. Erhard Busek.

Groundwork

As a think tank the IDM performs basic groundwork for government agencies and institutions in the fields of politics, education, research, culture and business and supports efforts in the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe.

PR work

The IDM performs PR work and serves as a lobbyist for the region.

Research

The IDM carries out research projects dealing with current political, sociological, social, economic, cultural and ethnic issues of the countries of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe. The results are publicised by means of events and publications.

Next generation support

The IDM supports recent graduates and young professionals in research and practice.

Educational activities and events

In seminars, symposiums, summer schools and the post-graduate course "Interdisciplinary Balkan Studies" in co-operation with the University of Vienna, all with international participation, the IDM also serves as an institute of learning and training. In addition, the IDM organises expert meetings, conferences, workshops and lectures. In this context, cooperation with institutions that share the IDM's goals is of particular significance.

Corporate services

On request the IDM will organise custom-tailored introductory and advanced seminars for companies (executive briefings).

Publications

- "Der Donauraum" ("The Danube Region") – scientific journal of the Institute (quarterly/price per copy: € 9.60/subscription: € 34.50) – Böhlau publishing house, Sachsenplatz 4-6, A-1201 Vienna)

- "Buchreihe des Instituts für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa" ("Book Series of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe") – Böhlau publishing house
- "Das Magazin für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa" ("The Magazine for the Danube Region and Central Europe") – issues on individual countries
- "IDM-Studien" ("IDM Studies") – on topical issues
- "Info Europa" – journal on the enlarged EU (5 issues per year, subscription: € 40, reduced price € 15) with topical supplements
- "IDM-Info" – newsletter of the Institute including the programme of events (5 issues per year/subscription: € 15/free of charge for members of the Institute)

Documentation

The IDM maintains a documentation centre and a magazine reading room with specialised publications on current developments in the countries of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe. Documentation is supplemented by regular reports provided by country correspondents working for the Institute on a voluntary basis.

IDRESEARCH LTD.

IDResearch Ltd.
H-7624 Pécs, Jakabhegyi út 8/E
Office and postal address
H-7621 Pécs, Ifjúság útja 11.
Tel./Fax: +36 72 522-624, +36 72 522-625
Mobile: +36 30 4086-360
E-mail: tarrosy@idresearch.hu, Internet: www.idresearch.hu

ID in the name of our enterprise indicates first the significance of possible research and co-operation between different disciplines (InterDisciplinary) in today's globalising world; second, refers to the ability of developing creative ideas (Idea+Development) and third, covers Innovative power and Dedicated aspect of the enterprise.

Since 1997, a team of young researchers, students and Ph.D. aspirants from the University of Pécs have been organising various national and international symposia, conferences, seminars and summer schools about different aspects of social and political changes in Central and Eastern Europe (ranging from regional co-operation, the place and role of the V4 countries to security dilemmas of our global world). IDResearch is a young company based on the experiences and achievements of the past years, with a special intention of generating and shaping collaborations among young researchers in Central Europe. The aim of the company is to become a well-known generator of co-operations between national and international actors in the field of human sciences and research, project development and training. IDResearch Ltd. is interested in strengthening a new generation of social scientists who can search for and interpret affects of global processes appearing on the local level, and contribute to expressing social demand by establishing a new co-operation culture. For this aim the company plans to develop accredited trainings for young scientists to help them obtain complementary and pragmatic skills useful for their future work.

Current projects include

- the DRC (Danube Rectors' Conference) Summer School series on Regional Co-operation (www.d-r-c.org; www.drc2008.idresearch.hu);
- Cultural Development Strategy - for the city of Kaposvár;
- the Publikon project (portal for social science research (www.publikon.hu); own development);
- spin-off agency for the University of Pécs (innovating summer school development strategies, promoting international student recrutation, comprehensive surveys);
- consulting agency for the Hungarian Tourism Board Regional Marketing Directorate (regional strategies for youth tourism);
- publisher of African Studies (Afrika Tanulmányok) periodical and initiator of several researches, conferences and workshops on African issues - www.afrikatanulmanyok.hu;
- Collaborator in the International Cultural Week in Pécs series (www.icwip.hu).

We offer complex services

Scientific Research, Market Research
Conference Organisation
Project Management
Publishing Books and Journals
Grant-writing and Fundraising
International Partnership (network) Building
Media Analyses, Promotion Campaigns, Campaign Communication Trainings
Webpage Design and Content Development

PARTNERS AND SUPPORTERS

Many thanks for their important financial contribution to the following institutions:

With the support of the European Union: Support for organisations active at European level in the field of active European citizenship:

'Europe for Citizens' Programme

LIST OF AUTHORS (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

Georgeta Chirleşan, Dr., Associate Professor (Romania)
University of Piteşti

Renáta Anna Dezső, Ph.D Candidate (Hungary)
Education and Society Doctoral School of Education
Faculty of Fine Arts, University of Pécs

Iuliia Diachenko, M.A. student (Ukraine)
Kiev National University of Trade and Economics

Ivan Dimitrov, M.A. student (Bulgaria)
Lafayette College, Pennsylvania, USA

Armağan Gözkaman, Research Assistant (Turkey)
Istanbul Technical University, ISS

Ioana Veronica Ionescu, Diplomat, Third Secretary (Romania)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania

Anamaria Neag, M.A. student (Romania)
Lunds University, Sweden

Sonia Pavlenko, M.A. student (Romania)
Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

Vassilis Petsinis, Post-doctoral researcher (Greece)
Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörns Högskola,
Stockholm, Sweden

Herbert Seher (Austria)
European Office, Vienna

Gergely Takács, Ph.D Candidate (Hungary)
Faculty of Humanities, University of Pécs

Maria Velizarova, M.A. student (Bulgaria)
University of Vienna

Victoriia Liepkova (Ukraine)
Shipping Register of Ukraine

Online

news
info on application
speakers
events
programme
downloadable studies

Contact

Dr. István Tarrósy
Managing director
IDResearch Ltd.
Tel: +36-30-408-6360
Fax: +36-72-522-624
e-mail: tarrosy@idresearch.hu
www.drcsummerschool.eu

Dr. Susan Milford
Managing director
IDM
Tel: +43-650-5934-334
Fax: +43-1-319-7258-4
e-mail: s.milford@idm.at
www.idm.at

Zoltán Vörös
Project manager
IDResearch Ltd.
Tel: +36-30-867-1955
Fax: +36-72-522-624
e-mail: voros@idresearch.hu
www.drcsummerschool.eu

Visit

www.DRCSUMMERSCHOOL.eu

Supported by: International Visegrad Fund - Grant No. 20810161