CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE NEXT DECADE

A VIEW FROM THE DANUBE REGION

István Tarrósy – Susan Milford (eds.)

Pécs, Hungary
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PREFACE OF THE EDITORS

The ninth in a row! We are happy to present the readers the ninth volume of the research papers of the Danube Rectors' Conference summer school series, this time, from the Maribor event, July 2012. We are also ever so grateful for the cooperation with the University of Maribor, host of the 9th DRC Summer School on Regional Co-operation.

The present volume is unique in the sense that it addresses numerous issues of the challenges the European Union needs to face—already now, as we are writing this preface, but certainly for the decades to come. It is unique from the angle that it is the most interdisciplinary compilation of papers so far, in the history of the summer schools, and it does not only offer summer school participants the opportunity to publish, but accommodates other papers from young scholars of our regions across Central and Eastern European countries, some of whom took part in other events organized by the University of Pécs in the last years. Obviously, just some of the challenges can be exposed; their number has been growing...

The book is structured in four chapters, ranging from legal, migration-related questions via energy policies, language-related processes, to urbanisation and the notion of the city as seen from Central Europe.

In Chapter 1, first, Mohay gives an overview of the legal framework of the European Union regarding legal migration, including a brief history of the evolution of regulations within the treaties, together with such initiatives as the Blue Card scheme. This latter one also shows how much attention the EU has been devoting to foster legal and „well-managed" migration. Enough arguments are presented in support of the Single Permit, „a single application procedure that enables third-country nationals (TCNs) to attain a permit that pertains to residence and the possibility of employment at the same time, i.e. it is a combined residence and work permit issued by an EU Member State"—as much as about its shortcomings. Bánáti deals with a number of issues highly connected to present-day migration, such as fertility rates, ageing populations (especially across Europe), the crisis of the welfare state and the need for foreign workforce. Addressing topical questions ranging from security to legislation, Bánáti concludes that although for the sake of a functioning migration policy in the EU „in the last twenty years member states brought their (national) policies in these areas closer together," there is much to cooperate to better balance national and EU-

level migration in the policy domain. Nadjivan, finally, presents the case of Austria, in particular, as far as public debate and general discourse has been shifting from, immigration to integration'.

In Chapter 2, which embraces four papers from a wide variety of scholarship, first, Andrea Schmidt looks at the consequences of the last enlargements of the European Union, from the point of view of borders—how they are identified, and especially, managed, and therefore, in what ways they are closely connected with cleavages. As she thinks, what is seen today, is that „instead of the Iron Curtain there is a visible 'Wage Curtain' emerging". Malyarenko, then, addresses the issue of human security and its complexity in light of the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood Policy. Following up, Boneva, thoroughly investigates energy efficiency across the EU, and how it can be managed in the coming decade. As a final piece in this section, Kákai analyses Hungarian civil society, providing first-hand information from a survey he conducted about the non-profit sector in the country, in particular, its economic management and policy-related questions.

Chapter 3 also offers four papers with a variety of research questions from the domains of university strategies to multilingualism, language learning and education policy. Gál gives a scholarly overview of the place, role and opportunities of mid-range universities in regional development, providing an insight into some examples from the Southern Transdanubian region of Hungary. Skorupa deals with the educational aspects of multilingualism policy, whose success „is greatly conditioned by successful implementation of the education and training policy. This, in turn, depends crucially on the initiatives and concrete measures undertaken by individual Members States, regions and localities." Melita Aleksa Varga—lecturer at the CESUN summer university of the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Pécs—presents the case of Croatian language teaching in a wide framework of languages and language acquisition in general. This is in particular interesting as Croatia has joined the European Union as its 28th Member State, and so bringing in the community another important linguistic culture and cultural heritage. Cretu, as fourth in the chapter, compares the management of education policies in Italy and Romania, based on fieldwork and local research at universities in both countries.

Chapter 4 is surely an ever-so-enjoyable conclusion to our glimpses on some of the challenges of the decades ahead us. It accommodates two intriguing papers about urbanisation and urbanity, a true (hard)core issue for European regional development.

While Oklopcic offers a literary summary of the urban landscape citing some major authors from Central Europe, Dziuban leads us on a rather philosophical venture about the role of architecture in transforming the cultural experience of urban spaces.

With this book we intend to thank all the authors for their great job, our supporters and sponsors for their invaluable support without which we could not head on our journey towards the next edition of the summer school, then, the one after, and again another one! Enjoy reading the papers, which certainly show a variety of knowledge, expertise, and ways of thinking across the Danubian Region, in a growing network of young scientists, whose development lies in the heart of our mission with the DRC Summer School.

Pécs – Vienna, 2012-2013

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INTRODUCTION
EUROPE, INTERPOLARITY, REGIONAL CO-OPERATION.
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EU IN THE DECADES AHEAD

István Tarrósy

Drawing upon Grevi (2009) we can say, we live in an 'interpolar' world, where the system increasingly gets more multipolar, while—due to the forces of globalisation—relations become ever so interdependent. Regional powers are on the rise, new alliances are born, and issues at the local level turn out to be more complex than they used to be—just as much as our global world seems to be, with all its complexities. Co-operation got a new meaning as long as no single entity—not even the mightiest of all, the United States of America – can fight global challenges (or better to put challenges of a global kind) alone any longer. Not only in rhetorical terms, but also in everyday reality. The moment offers the opportunity of regional collaboration, within and between regions across the globe. In particular, taking notice of the changing environment and the changing nature of states within that. "In a networked world order," says Slaughter (2004: 7), "primary political authority would remain at the national level except in those cases in which national governments had explicitly delegated their authority to supranational institutions." This raises the question of whether or not, for instance, the European Union needs 'more EU', or a more colourful intergovernmental community of states. In a "just new world order of government networks" (Slaughter, 2004: 29-31) include key elements such as "global deliberative equality', 'positive comity', or 'subsidiarity', one of the major principles of the European Union. The closest-to-the-citizen level of decision-making and policy implementation immediately draw an even sharper attention to the sub-national levels, and therefore, to co-operation within and between regions – again.

When we articulated the initiative to launch a long-lasting project for young scholars within the Danube Rectors' Conference (DRC) in 2003, the opportunity of fresh and dynamic ideas coming from graduate and doctoral students, as well as young researchers from countries of the Danubian region were envisaged for the

enhancement of intraregional development. When this volume is presented to a wider audience in the course of 2013 we celebrate the tenth DRC Summer School, which has been rotating among member institutions of the DRC network since its foundation in 2004. Each year, acknowledged scholars and experts address current topics, and as we proceed, we realise how much our network of young social scientists has grown. The DRC Summer School Alumni in the last nine years contributed to a pool of knowledge in the form of scientific research papers published in a series of edited volumes—like the one you are holding in your hands. So far, well over a hundred such papers have appeared in the series, dealing with numerous questions from a Danubian perspective, or as "seen from the Danube Region".

Almost infinite challenges can be listed when attempting to understand what, for instance, the European Union need to get prepared for in the coming decade and beyond. Our intention with the summer school in Maribor in the summer of 2012 was to tackle some of the groups of challenges, ranging from migration to environmental and economic challenges, from education policies in support of (inter)regional co-operation to possible future rounds of further enlargement with all their limits and chances.

As far as migration is concerned, let me mention two increasingly significant aspects: 1. the phenomena of brain drain, brain gain and brain circulation, and 2. the substantial contribution of migrant entrepreneurs to the economies of both the member states as well as the EU as such. Obviously, national governments "recognize the importance of human capital accumulation, its input into the nation's development," and thus, "various programmes which help to attract the knowledge workers are implemented" (Daugeliene – Mercinkeviciene, 2009: 49). The migration of the highly skilled and qualified has been a phenomenon across the world, especially between the former Eastern and Western blocs in the bipolar era. Today, it continues to influence bilateral relations between the economically more developed and technologically more advanced part and the developing other part of the global arena—between the Global South and the Global North, as we can call them these days. Even more so, it has been an issue within developing regions, which may contain countries of the 'semi-periphery' (drawing upon Wallerstein 2004, 2010) with emerging economies possessing the capability and capacity to attract the highly qualified persons from within their closest regions—as in the case of the Republic of South Africa within Southern Africa.

If we look at a Danubian country, say, Hungary, which has a rather unique situation in terms of the incoming flow of migrants, more than two-thirds of who once came from Hungarian-speaking communities from the neighbouring countries (meaning that society at large does not really have experience with foreigners, people with other cultural backgrounds), brain drain has become a serious issue in recent years. It is not a new, but rather a re-intensifying phenomenon—during World War II, then, as a result of the 1956 Revolution, thousands of Hungarians emigrated. "Hollywood was flooded in the 1930's by dozens of Hungarian screenwriters and producers. A second wave of brain drain occurred soon after the War, [… and] scholars estimate that around 200,000 Hungarians emigrated from Hungary during the violent suppression in 1956" (Plous, 2011: 10 citing Hungarian Spectrum, 2011). The brand new wave of the highly qualified leaving the country has been happening nowadays, Hungary being one of the member states of the European Union. It is particularly painful for the country's health sector as hundreds of well-trained doctors search for jobs even beyond the EU. Medical Brain Drain (MBD) is motivated—similarly to other processes of brain drain—by several 'push' and 'pull' factors, among which old and out-of-date facilities, lack of government funding for research, or the more vibrant scientific community, the better climate for scientific research, higher salaries and greater opportunity for promotion (and respect) can be mentioned (Ibid: 16 citing Vizi, 1993). Does Hungary have a (coherent) brain circulation policy, one could ask, in order to reverse brain drain, and to let the highly skilled working in a foreign country to come back to their motherland? Not really. Actions and a programme have been on the way managed by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Momentum Programme), but more policy considerations are expected for long-term success. From a perspective of brain circulation, additional regional networking and collaboration may contribute to national aspirations. And this latter one again is not a newly invented approach—other regions have been struggling with similar challenges. In Africa, for example, after the G8 + 5 Summit in Italy, in July 2009, the Network of African Science Academies (NASAC) issued a firm statement how to involve the African diaspora, the economic sector and the international community to stop brain drain and promote brain circulation.

All these questions are even more highlighted when we take into consideration the demographic predictions the EU must face—one of its biggest challenges for the coming decades. "With falling birth rates and aging populations, demand for labour

is forecast to grow, as younger people are needed to maintain productivity" (Mutume, 2003: 22). Not only the highly skilled persons, but also young people with working skills in general are needed to maintain, first of all, population growth, and at the same time, economic performance. It is not surprising that the European Union has recently put high on its agenda the issue of the contribution of migrant entrepreneurs, who are as active as any other entrepreneurs of the host society, and they do create jobs vital for the given economy, even if the rate of self-employment is higher among them than in the native community (OECD, 2010: 4). They do not only create jobs for other people with migrant background, but basically, for anybody, any member of society at large. They form useful and important parts of their chosen countries. At the same time, while engaging in economic activities, they give the chance (and they should be given more) to integrate well and successfully. With all the potential obstacles, which any national policy should solve—including access to capital and other financial means (loans, for instance), or access to vital social networks, and obviously, compliance with the regulations of the host country – migrant entrepreneurs can be seen as valuable contributors to the national engines of sustainable economic growth.

Among several other potential challenges our authors in this volume address, the ones connected to energy and energy security are certainly 'heavy-weight'. Europe has to diversify its energy matrix, both in terms of dependence on a wider circle of resource-rich partnerships (e.g. with the Southern Corridor), and the continuous support for alternative ways of energy use. The establishment of an integrated energy market in the EU cannot wait too much time, together with a joint energy efficiency plan for 2020. The European Strategic Energy Technology Plan wants "safe and sustainable low carbon technologies (i.e. including nuclear)", but supports new initiatives such as electric vehicles, second-generation bio fuels, smart cities, in one word: calls for more innovation and technological developments. As for the security aspect, the EU knows well that it needs a more proactive external energy policy, too, so, for instance, energy security needs to be embedded in its Neighbourhood Policy, deepening and extending the so-called Energy Community.

More partnerships, more co-operations and more opportunities—some of the desired keywords of a hopefully sufficiently dynamic new financial framework of the EU, between 2014 and 2020. All about two core dimensions: 1. strengthening the positions of the EU as 'global player' (community dimension), 2. strengthening the positions of the individual citizens (local dimension). Some of our authors in Chapter

II and III in the volume elaborate on the various connected dimensions, ranging from education policies, via the role of universities in sustainable economic growth to language learning. All in all: the citizens themselves stay in the heart of all processes, changes and challenges—and the development of civil society, and policies to foster the development of civic participation, therefore, 'civic culture' (Almond–Verba, 1963) will remain crucial for Europe as it proceeds with plans for the second, then, third, fourth, etc. (following) decades of the twenty-first century. In particular, as Europe wants to stay on track providing more opportunities to its citizens.

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Chapter I

Migration and some European responses

THE REGULATION OF LEGAL MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

Ágoston Mohay

INTRODUCTION

Regulating international migration is a complex challenge, as migration is a varied phenomenon: the reasons behind individual decisions to migrate, the circumstances under which migration takes place, the readiness of a society to accept migrants, etc. can all differ considerably from state to state. The prerogative to decide who may enter the territory of a state is a traditional element of state sovereignty, states can however enter into international agreements in this field as well, and the European Union—as a supranational actor—also regulates migration, influencing and to some extent limiting the regulatory freedom of states in this regard. In our view, however, states are not able to effectively regulate the phenomenon of migration on their own at all, and this is even more the case regarding the Member States of the European Union, countries which are integrated in a common borderless economic area with common visa regulations.[1]

This paper aims to provide a brief overview of the regulation of legal migration in the law of the European Union, and to highlight some recent legislative developments in EU migration policy.

COMMON MIGRATION POLICY IN THE EU

First of all, a terminological point needs to be addressed: the migration policy of the European Union concerns the regulation of the entry, movement, rights and situation of third-country nationals in the EU. The movement of EU citizens (that is, the citizens of the Member States) within Union territory is regarded as a form of the free

[1] The Commission adopts the same view, see for example the communication 'A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools' COM(2008) 359 final, p. 2.

movement persons, be it economic in nature (as an element of the internal market) or devoid of commercial intentions, based purely on EU citizenship status.

The primary law legal basis of migration policy in the EU has developed gradually. Between the 1970's and the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), cooperation in this area between the Member States of the European Communities occurred via the traditional means of international law, including consultation in the form of the so-called TREVI group. As a result of the Maastricht Treaty, however, migration policy became part of the intergovernmental "third pillar" of the European Union, as an integral element of cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty "communitarised" a number of areas previously belonging to the third pillar—that is, the areas in question have been incorporated into the EC Treaty, enabling supranational integration (and the application of the Community law-making procedures) regarding these policies, including immigration. This change also meant that from 1999 onwards, secondary sources of Community law (Regulations, Directives, Resolutions) became adoptable in these fields. Amsterdam also meant the introduction of the concept of the EU as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice—which became a new objective of the Union. In the third pillar, only the policy areas concerning police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters remained. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon saw the abolishment of the pillar structure, thus integrating the remaining third pillar areas into a unified and supranational Justice and Home Affairs Policy of the EU.

Common migration policy is thus currently a goal of the European Union[2], as part of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – a competence area shared between the EU and the Member States.[3]

What are the main goals of EU migration policy? According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the fundamental aims of this policy area are to ensure the efficient management of migration flows, the fair treatment of third-country nationals (TCNs) residing legally in the Member States, and the prevention of—and enhanced measures to combat—illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.[4] To achieve these goals, the EU has adopted a large amount of

[2] See Section 2 of Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)

[3] Shared competence essentially means that the Union and the Member States may both legislate and adopt legally binding acts in a given competence area, but he Member States may only exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. (See Article 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.)

[4] Article 79 TFEU

secondary legislation over the years, essentially since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

IMMIGRATION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION – AN OVERVIEW

To achieve the objectives set out in the primary law (i.e. the Treaties) of the Union, the institutions of the EU adopt secondary legislation. The legal framework of migration in the EU is complex and fragmented: it consists of a large number of legislative instruments aimed at addressing specific issues of migration—legislative instruments which also vary as to their form. The EU institutions may currently adopt Regulations (binding in their entirety and directly applicable), Directives (binding as to the result to be achieved, requiring implementation into national law by the Member States) and Decisions (binding norms of an individualised nature) in the field of immigration. At earlier stages of integration, when immigration policy was based on intergovernmental cooperation, other special legal instruments were available to regulate this policy area: these legal instruments themselves had an intergovernmental nature, as opposed to the supranational character of the abovementioned legal acts.

I will present an overview of EU immigration law in four sections. (The issue of asylum is also closely linked with migration. However, the asylum law of the EU will not be considered in this paper as it constitutes a separate area of public policy and international, European and national law.)

Legal instruments regarding admission

The EU regulates the admission of TCNs via the Schengen *acquis* and visa regulations. The Schengen *acquis* refers to the body of law establishing and maintaining the Schengen Area as an area without internal border checks, coupled with enhanced and coordinated control at the outer borders of the Schengen zone.[5] The day-to-day operation of the Schengen cooperation is enabled by the Schengen Information System, the largest information system for public security in Europe that allows for easy information exchanges between national border control, customs and police authorities.[6]

[5] The 'Schengen cooperation' started in 1985 as a collaboration between five states outside the European Community framework, but was later incorporated into EU law by a protocol attached to the Amsterdam Treaty (which entered into force in 1999).

[6] The modernization of the SIS is currently underway and almost completed: by 31 December 2012, SIS II should be operational, complete with new possibilities, such as the option to use biometric data, new types of SIS-alerts, and the possibility to link different alerts (such as an alert on a person and a vehicle),while

The EU determines the list of countries whose citizens need to be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders and the list of countries whose citizens are exempt from this requirement.[7] The EU adopted a Visa Code laying down the procedures and conditions for issuing visas for the purpose of short stays and airport transit.[8] The format of visas is also uniform.[9] The establishment of the Visa Information System (VIS) was crucial in this field: as a system for the exchange of visa data between Member States, it enables authorised national authorities to enter, update and consult visa data electronically, in an integrated system.[10]

Legal immigration

Migration is considered 'legal' when the individual in question enters the territory of the EU while fulfilling all legal requirements (i.e. is in possession of the necessary documents, etc.). The EU aims to promote and foster legal migration, claiming that well-managed migration can be beneficial to all stakeholders.[11] The framework of legal migration includes Directives regarding family reunification (establishing common rules enabling family members of TCNs residing lawfully on EU territory to join them in the Member State in which they are residing, protecting family unity and facilitating the integration of nationals of non-member countries)[12], regarding the status of long-term residents (creating a single status for long-term resident TCNs ensuring equal treatment throughout the Union, irrespective of the country of residence—and ensuring equality with EU citizens regarding numerous aspects)[13] and determining favourable conditions for the admission of students (aiming to promote Europe as a centre of excellence for studies and vocational training by endorsing the

also ensuring enhanced data protection. See in this regard Regulation 1104/2008/EC of 24 October 2008 on migration from the Schengen Information System (SIS 1+) to the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) [OJ 2008 L 299/1] and Council Decision 2008/839/JHA on migration from the Schengen Information System (SIS 1+) to the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) [OJ 2008 L 299/43]

7 Regulation 539/2001/EC [OJ 2001 L 81/1] (Amended in nine instances until 2012.)

8 Regulation 810/2009/EC establishing a Community Code on Visas [OJ 2009 L 243/1]

9 Regulation 1683/95/EC laying down a uniform format for visas [OJ 1995 L 164/1]

10 The VIS was established by Decision 2004/512/EC [OJ 2005 L 213/5]. Its define the purpose, the functionalities and responsibilities for the VIS, the conditions and procedures for the actual exchange of visa data between Member States was regulated by Regulation 767/2008/EC concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas [OJ 2008 L 218/60]

11 See section 1.1 of the Stockholm Programme, the EU's justice- and home affairs political strategy for the period 2010-2014 (The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens, OJ 2010 C 115/1)

12 Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification [OJ 2003 L 251/12]

13 Directive 2003/109/concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [OJ 2003 L 16/44]

mobility of TCNs to the Union for the purpose of studies for a limited time)[14] and for scientific researchers (applying to TCNs who request to be admitted to the territory of a Member State for the purpose of carrying out a research project)[15]. The Blue Card Directive aims to improve the ability of the EU to attract highly qualified workers from third countries, enhancing the competitiveness of the Union in line with the Lisbon Strategy.[16] The Blue Card scheme is a clear manifestation of the intention to 'manage' migration instead of merely reacting to it, utilizing legal instruments to shape and influence social tendencies.

The social situation of legal migrants is regulated in a referring manner: the relevant Regulation extends the application of the legal norms regulating the social situation of EU citizens to TCNs falling under its scope.[17]

The newest addition to the legislative framework regarding legal labour migration is the Single Permit Directive[18], which is analysed in more detail below, aims essentially to simplify residing and working in the EU legally.

The EU also makes efforts to support the integration of immigrants in the Member States. The European Integration Fund[19] assists national and EU initiatives promoting the integration of TCNs into European societies: it supports Member States and civil society in enhancing their capacity to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate integration strategies, policies and measures, plus exchanges of information and best practices on migrant integration issues.[20]

[14] Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service [OJ 2004 L 375/12]

[15] Directive 2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research [OJ 2005 L 289/15]

[16] Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment [OJ 2009 L 155/17.]

[17] Regulation 859/2003/EC extending the provisions of Regulation 1408/71 and Regulation 574/72 to nationals of third countries who are not already covered by those provisions solely on the ground of their nationality [OJ 2003 L 124/1]. It should be noted that the two Regulations referred to by Regulation 859/2003/EC are only applicable in a situation which is not confined in all respects within a single Member State: the existence of a cross-border element is thus a prerequisite, apart from the TCN being legally resident in a Member State.

[18] Directive 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State [OJ 2011 L 343/1]

[19] Established by Decision 2007/435/EC [OJ 2007 L 168/18]

[20] For more information of the Fund and concrete actions see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/integration-fund/index_en.htm

Illegal immigration

As stated, the present paper focuses on legal migration. However, for the sake of clarity and because of the interlinked nature of the two issues, brief mention needs to be made of the EU's efforts to fight against illegal immigration.[21] Regardless of the continued effort to combat this phenomenon, irregular migration still constitutes a major component of immigration to the EU, although 'by its very nature, no reliable figures on the number of irregular migrants in the EU exist, with estimates of fewer than 2 million up to 4.5 million'.[22] Statistics are available on the 'visible side' of illegal immigration: in 2011, approximately 343,000 persons were refused entry to the EU, some 468,500 persons were apprehended and Member States returned cca. 190,000 TCNs to countries of origin.[23] As the large discrepancy between the numbers of cases discovered and the estimated amount shows, latency is very high regarding illegal migration. It must also be borne in mind that migrants cannot only 'become illegal' by entering EU territory illegally, but for example by overstaying their temporary residence permits.[24]

The focus of the Union is on combating illegal immigration and human trafficking, taking a security-oriented approach[25] that ranges from the criminalization of 'facilitation' of illegal entry and the employment of illegal immigrants to introducing effective surveillance technologies for border control. In order to manage the flow of illegal immigrants, the EU also concludes so-called readmission agreements with third countries in order to establish an effective return policy.[26]

[21] Taking the wording of the TFEU as a starting point, EU law and jargon uses the term 'illegal immigration'. It has been suggested that the term 'irregular migration' should be preferred as it is neither accurate nor preferable to deem an individual 'illegal', as only acts and not persons as such can be illegal from a legal standpoint. (For a terminological analysis of the issue see Paspalanova, Mila: Undocumented vs. Illegal Migrant: Towards Terminological Coherence, Migraciones Internacionales. Vol. 4, 2008/3, pp. 79-90.) Apart from numerous NGOs, the International Organization for Migration and the International Labour Organization also use the term 'irregular migration'. In this paper we will adhere to the official EU terminology.

[22] European Commission: 3rd Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2011) [COM 2012 (250) final], p. 4

[23] Op. cit.

[24] A study commissioned by the Transatlantic Council on Migration (a project of the Migration Policy Institute) lists eight ways in which non-nationals can become unauthorized migrants: illegal entry; entry using false documents; entry using legal documents containing false information; overstaying a visa-free travel period or a temporary residence permit; loss of status due to nonrenewal of permit; being born into irregularity; absconding during the asylum procedure or failing to leave the state after a denied asylum application; a state's failure to enforce a return decision for legal or practical reasons. Morehouse, Christal – Blomfiled, Michael: Irregular Migration in Europe, Migration Policy Institute, 2011, p. 4

[25] Carrera, Sergio - Parkin, Joanna: Protecting and Delivering Fundamental Rights of Irregular Migrants at Local and Regional Levels in the European Union, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011, p. 5 (http://www.ceps.eu/book/protecting-and-delivering-fundamental-rights-irregular-migrants-local-and-regional-levels-europ)

[26] This is mentioned as the first strategic priority area of managing migration by the Council action plan 'EU Action on Migratory Pressure – a Strategic Response'(23 April 2012, No. 8714/1/12 REV 1)

International agreements of the EU concerning migration

A rich area of law and research by itself, international agreements of the EU relevant to the issue of international migration also require attention. These international agreements can relate to establishing preferential treatment for citizens of certain third countries, having a positive effect on legal labour migration[27], or—as mentioned above—may concern raising the effectiveness of return migration, facilitate the readmission of individuals residing without authorisation in a Member State to their own country.[28]

Since 2007, the Union promotes mobility partnerships: a new instrument aimed at managing migration issues in a more complex way. Mobility Partnerships are meant to promote structured and sustained cooperation with third countries along the migration routes towards the European Union, bringing added value both to the EU and the third country with regard to the management of migration flows. Essentially, the idea of Mobility Partnerships was conceived as a soft law tool fostering circular migration, based on temporary recruitment of TCNs as workforce in a particular field in an EU Member State with the possibility of renewal.[29] Mobility Partnership agreements are legally non-binding instruments and EU Member State participation is voluntary. The 'added value' of such partnerships lies primarily in the fact that they are comprehensive and reflect a global approach to migration while the EU legal instruments used so far only focused on specific aspects of the issue.[30] Of course, the soft law nature of these agreements means that the commitments of the partners are not legally enforceable.

[27] Wiesbrock, Anja: Legal Migration to the European Union, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p. 93

[28] Such international agreements are referred to mostly as 'readmission agreements'. For a recent assessment of these instruments by the European Commission see the Communication 'Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements' [COM 2011 (76) final]

[29] Hernández i Sagrera, Raül: Assessing the Mobility Partnerships between the EU and Moldova and Georgia, Eastern Partnership Community, 2011 (http://www.easternpartnership.org/publication/mobility-and-migration/2011-08-23/assessing-mobility-partnerships-between-eu-and-moldova#_ftn1)

[30] European Commission: Mobility partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to Migration [SEC 2009 (1240) final], p. 6

THE SINGLE PERMIT DIRECTIVE – SIMPLIFICATION AND A COMMON SET OF RIGHTS

The European Parliament and the Council have recently adopted the Single Permit Directive—a directive aimed at creating a single permit for TCNs to reside and work in the EU, simplifying procedures and laying down a common set of rights.[31] The adoption of the act was lengthy, with political reluctance and various clashing institutional interests drawing out the legislative process, which in the end took four years to complete.[32] The Directive is nevertheless a positive development from the point of view of legal migration, even if its content was somewhat 'watered down' in the lengthy negotiations. The implementation deadline for Member States is 25 December 2013.

The most important element of the new Directive is that in introduces a single application procedure that enables TCNs to attain a permit that pertains to residence and the possibility of employment at the same time, i.e. it is a combined residence and work permit issued by an EU Member State. The Directive, however, leaves substantial regulatory freedom to the Member States, as it is up to them to decide in the implementing rules whether the would-be TCN employee or the employer should apply for the permit, and whether applications should be submitted in the country of origin or in the Member State.[33]

The Directive also sets out to provide TCNs falling under its scope with a set of common rights: as no horizontal EU legislation regarding this matter exists, the rights of TCNs may vary depending on the Member State in which they work and on their nationality. This new legislative measure thus means to narrow the 'rights gap' between legal migrants and EU citizens, as stated in its preamble: the defining factor is the right to equal treatment in various fields related includes working conditions (pay, dismissal, health and safety), freedom of association and trade union membership, education and vocational training, recognition of qualifications, social security, tax benefits, access to goods and services and support services provided by employment offices (Article 12). In specific situations, however, equal treatment can be restricted

[31] Directive 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State [OJ 2011 L 343/1]

[32] For details and reasons see Pascouau, Yves – McLoughlin, Sheena: EU Single Permit Directive: a small step forward in EU migration policy, European Policy Centre Policy Brief, 24 January 2012

[33] Pascouau – McLoughlin op. cit. p. 2

by the Member States (e.g. excluding TCNs from study and maintenance grants and loans), but only as defined by the Directive.

Although the Directive should be seen as a positive development that simplifies residence and working permit procedures and aims to ascertain a more unified set of rights for migrant workers, it does not effectively change the fragmented approach of EU migration law. EU law characteristically regulates migration-related issues in a fragmented way, tackling specific issues in individual legal norms, resulting in various parallelly existing regimes: as a good example it may be mentioned that this new Directive will not be applicable to seasonal workers or intra-corporate transferees (two fields of labour migration that will be the subject of two new legal norms[34]), and neither shall it be applied to highly-skilled workers (who remain covered by the Blue Card Directive). The scope of the Single Permit Directive as defined by Article 3 thus also reflects this fragmented approach, detailing to whom the Directive *does not* apply in no less than twelve subsections.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The extensive body of EU law concerning legal migration has succeeded in regulating numerous issues of this policy area. The EU legislators have also made an effort to not only react to, but to shape (control) migration, most notably by introducing the Blue Card Directive and concluding Mobility Partnerships.

The legal framework, however, has its shortcomings, and – as stated above – demonstrates a quite fragmented approach to migration, resulting from Member State reluctance to regulate admission and migration issues 'horizontally' at the EU level. The fragmentation was also noted by the Commission who—in line with the Stockholm Programme—produced a roadmap for introducing an immigration code that would consolidate and replace five Directives currently in force (regarding family reunification, long-term residence status, the Blue Card and the admission of students and researchers). Considering that the Single Permit Directive has been adopted in the meantime, and the Commission also proposed two new Directives regarding intra-corporate transferees and seasonal workers, these (draft) regulatory provisions could also be incorporated into the Code. The adoption of such a Code obviously raises the question whether the new law should only aim to consolidate existing rules, and at

[34] Pascouau – McLoughlin, op. cit. p. 1. The Commission has already presented the legislative proposals regarding the aforementioned areas – see COM(2010) 379 final and COM(2010) 378 final respectively.

least ruling out inconsistencies and identifying potential regulatory gaps, or whether this opportunity should also be utilized to introduce more far-reaching material amendments to EU migration law. This is of course a policy decision, and the original initiative of the Commission has left both avenues of action open.[35] Reacting to the initiative, the NGO Statewatch has presented its own draft Code.[36]

Previous positive examples of codification (e. g. the Visa Code and the Schengen Borders Code) indicate that a well formulated and more consistent immigration code could support the effective management of migration flows by a European Union that due to its demographic situation and its ageing society requires labour migration[37]: even with an overall EU unemployment rate of approximately 10 percent, numerous Member States are experiencing labour and skills shortages in different sectors.[38]

As a final remark, I would like to draw attention to some developments, which are not legislative in nature. In this paper I have so far reflected only on legislative answers to immigration issues by the EU, but recent judicial developments in this regard are also quite noteworthy. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)—which has traditionally not played a defining role in migration law mostly due to its previously limited competence in this area—has recently handed down a line of judgments which primarily concern EU citizenship, but indirectly also affect immigrants.[39] The CJEU has had to deal with issues affecting EU citizens and TCN family members, interpreting how the dependence of a Union citizen on a TCN can influence the residence rights of the latter.[40] Most notably for TCNs, it follows from the CJEU rulings that the right of residence of an immigrant may be based on his/her family relation with an EU citizen, provided that the EU citizen depends on the TCN in such a way that refusal to grant

[35] Roadmap: EU Immigration Code (Version No 2) COM DG HOME/B1 (http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2011_home_007_eu_immigration_code_en.pdf)

[36] The draft code was penned by Professor Steve Peers and is available at http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-167-immigration-code-steve-peers.pdf

[37] Carrerra *et al* are of the opinion that the new EU Immigration Code needs to adopt a more rights-based approach aiming at a fair treatment between TCNs and EU citizens: Carrera, Sergio – Atger, Anaïs Faure – Guild, Elspeth – Kostakopoulou, Dora: Labour Immigration Policy in the EU: A Renewed Agenda for Europe 2020, CEPS Policy Brief No. 240, 5 April 2011 (http://www.ceps.be/book/labour-immigration-policy-eu-renewed-agenda-europe-2020)

[38] European Commission: 3rd Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum [COM 2012 (250) final] p. 4

[39] See *inter alia* Cases C-127/08 Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [ECR 2008 Page I-6241]; C–60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [ECR 2002 Page I–6279]; C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [ECR 2004 Page I-09925] and C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l'emploi [Judgement of the Court of 8 March 2011, not yet reported]

[40] For an analysis from the perspective of EU citizenship see Mohay, Á. – Muhvić, D. (2012).

him/her a right of residence would deprive the EU citizen of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as Union citizens.

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IMMIGRATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION – A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE LATEST CHALLENGES OF MIGRATION TO THE EU

Áron Bánáti

INTRODUCTION

One of the greatest challenges of the 21st century is migration. While the population of the world has recently reached 7 billion (UN, 2012, B)—and it is estimated to further grow to 9.2 billion by 2050 (UN, 2006)—the number of poor and hopeless people is also rapidly increasing; every second person in the world has an income of less than 2 US dollars a day. Poverty is reproducing itself as it has a direct correlation with high fertility rate. By 2030, the number of people living in slums (1 billion!) will double (HVG, 2011). As a consequence, every year millions of people decide to leave their homes behind in hope of a better life. According to the International Organization for Migration in 2010, there were 214 million international migrants in the world (IOM, 2012), of which 70 million were hosted on the European continent (UN, 2008). The number of international migrants has been increasing in recent decades, with an average of 15 percent in every five years since 1975 (Pólyi, 2011), and the greatest increment in the number of immigrants between 1990 and 2010 occurred in developed countries (by 50 percent—about 45 million people, while in the developing world the increment is only 18 percent (Ibid.).

In Europe the number of immigrants has increased by 41 percent in the last two decades and by now six out of the ten countries with the most foreign-born residents in the world are European (France, Germany, Russia, Spain and the Ukraine (Ibid.). According to Eurostat, there are approximately 20 million third-country nationals (TCNs) in the 27 (28 from July 2013 as Croatia also joins the community) member states of the European Union and the large-scale inflow of migrants is no longer confined to countries with "traditionally" high rates of immigration (e.g. United Kingdom or France)[1].

[1] Member states such as Italy or Spain have been previously exporters of workers became receiving countries, too (Milborn, 2008).

The magnitude of immigration to the EU is even better visible if we take a look at those big cities around Europe which foreign-born residents constitute more then one-fourth of their population (Ibid.). Although the 2008 financial crisis has significantly decreased the pace of immigration to the European Union[2], it will not diminish on the longer term.

The above described rapid population growth is globally uneven as developed countries tend to have lower fertility rates than the developing world. This often results in ageing and declining population and the European Union is no exception either. In 2009 the combined fertility rate of the 27 member states was 1.6, which is well below the replacement level of 2.1 born children per woman (Eurostat, 2010). Low fertility will result in the high representation of retired citizens; the current proportion of citizens above the age 65 is 16 percent and by the year 2060 it is expected to rise to 30 percent, which means every third person in the EU will be retired. As a consequence of ageing and low fertility, by 2050 the working-age population will be 50 million less (ibid.).[3]

As we can see from the above figures Europe is getting old[4] and soon it will be very difficult to maintain welfare services (especially pension systems) in the upcoming decades. Member states are increasingly rely on foreign workforce to keep their economies in balance. According to Eurostat, in 2010 there were already 31.4 million foreign-born residents in the EU which is 6.3 percent of the overall population of the community (Eurostat, 2011), and the proportion of non EU-born citizens is even higher in many Western European countries.[5]

In sum, we can say that the number of international migrants heading to Europe is constantly growing, and at the same time ageing societies and the lack of workforce are threatening the functionality of member states as they are already having difficulties to maintain their welfare system because of low fertility rates. Therefore, the European Union is facing a paradox in form of a double demographic pressure: a declining and

[2] At the turn of 2008, even internal migration from new member states to Ireland has fell by 60 percent, while immigration to Spain from the same countries fell by 75 percent (Pólyi, 2011).

[3] In comparison the proportion of old persons is much lower in the less developed regions of the world: while it is one in five persons in Europe, one in nine persons in Asia and Latin America, and one in sixteen persons on the African continent (UN, 2012, A). Consequently these countries have much higher fertility rates as well. African countries' fertility rates varies approximately between 3.5 and 7.5, but other Third World countries are also well above the 2.1 replacement level (CIA, 2012).

[4] While global median age is 28 years (US GHP, 2012), the median age of European countries is currently around 40 years and by the year 2050 it will be 46 years (UN, 2010).

[5] Countries with the highest number of residents, who were born outside the EU are Germany (6.4 million), France (5.1 million), the United Kingdom (4.7 million), Spain (4.1 million), Italy (3.2 million), and the Netherlands (1.4 million) (Eurostat, 2011).

thus rapidly ageing population inside, which is combined with an increasing flow of international migrants from the outside.

HOW OPEN ARE EU MEMBER STATES?

Despite the challenges presented earlier, most member states are not open for immigrants as they used to be in the 1960's and 1970's, not to mention that the EU is further fortifying its external borders (Frontex, Schengen Information System II) and many member states are signing bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries of the EU[6] to be able to deport illegal immigrants. There are growing anti-immigrant sentiments especially against Muslim communities. Far-right and nationalist parties are on the rise in almost every member states[7] (some of them even made it to government coalitions[8]) and although EU policies have declared that Europe needs immigrants, and community law is also trying to promote immigration as an effective tool to tackle the lack of labour force, national legislations are many times going the opposite direction; they are making it more and more difficult for immigrants to legally settle down in the EU. As a result, the number of illegal immigrants is constantly growing. In 2008, according to a study prepared by the European Parliament the European Union hosted 14 percent of the world's refugees, a total number of 220 thousand applications were submitted to member states (Erdei-Tuka, 2011). But irregular migration is not the only threat for host societies. There are already millions of former immigrants and their descendants in many member states who were unable to integrate into majority society. Recent years there were a number of physical and verbal clashes between immigrants and host societies (e.g.: 2005, 2007 wide-spread riots in France, 2005 world-wide protests against the Danish Muhammad cartoons, 2011 riots in England) and many are increasingly concerned about the integration of immigrants. Although, radical parties have been condemning immigration and immigrants for decades, lately, as a new trend, mainstream politicians have also started to speak up against

[6] Spain, France and Italy have all signed agreements with Maghreb countries to be able to stop the massive inflow of illegal workers.

[7] In Germany the National Democratic Party, in France the National Front, in Denmark Danish People's Party, Danish Progress Party, in Austria the Austrian Freedom Party, in Belgium the New Flemish Alliance and the Flemish Interest, in the United Kingdom the British National Party, in Italy the Northern Alliance, in Greece the Popular Orthodox Rally, in the Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn and the Freedom Party, etc. (Wilson and Hainsworth, 2012)

[8] Freedom Party in Austria, National Alliance in Italy and the Danish People's Party was also supporting the ruling party without getting into formal coalition.

multiculturalism and the lack of integration. The first[9] politician who broke the ice was a leading German socialist Thilo Sarazzin, the former member of the Executive Board of Deutsche Bundesbank (federal bank) who criticised the failure of German post-war immigration policy in his famous but much-debated book "Deutschland schafft sich ab"—"Germany Eliminates Itself: How We are Putting Our Country on the Line". Sarazzin specifically named Turkish and Arab immigrants as unwilling to integrate into mainstream German society saying that:

> *"Integration requires effort from those that are to be integrated. I will not show respect for anyone that is not making that effort. I do not have to acknowledge anyone who lives by welfare, denies the legitimacy of the very state that provides that welfare, refuses to care for the education of his children and constantly produces new little headscarf-girls. This holds true for 70 percent of the Turkish and 90 percent of the Arab population in Berlin."*

Although, early reactions of other mainstream politicians (including his own party members) harshly criticised Sarazzin for his book and opinion, surprisingly, the famously politically correct German society did like his book; the first edition was an instant success and was sold out the very first day[10]. Therefore, it is no wonder that Sarazzin started a landslide and two months after the publishing of his book Angela Merkel German Chancellor said that German multiculturalism has "utterly failed" (Weaver, 2010). She was soon followed by David Cameron, British prime minister who said that the "doctrine of state multiculturalism" has failed (BBC, 2011).

As we can see, the debate on immigration is truly at the top of the political and social agenda in all of the member states with large immigrant populations. The European Union has also been paying increasing attention to the regulation of immigration as it is clear by now, that beyond certain economic gains, member states will have to increasingly face those serious demographic, economic, legal, security and political challenges which arise with immigration to the European Union. By now, the debate

[9] Previously other celebrities and politicians – such as Oriana Fallacci or Pym Fortuyn – have also spoken up against multiculturalism and especially against Islamic fundamentalism – and although Fallaci's book 'The Rage and The Pride' has been sold in 1.5 million copies Europe-wide – they were mostly considered radicals.

[10] Several editions followed, and by May 2011 more than 1.5 million copies were sold. According to the online-poll conducted by the Berliner Morgenpost almost half of the German population agree with Sarazzin and 18 percent would even vote on him if he had his own party.

is often not even about whether member states should let more immigrants to settle or not, but the question is how to integrate those immigrants who have been living in the EU for decades, but do not feel they belong to mainstream society. This has becoming a stressing issue because—as a consequence of ageing societies, family reunification, and the higher fertility rate of previously settled immigrants—the proportion of immigrants has been constantly growing in many member states in recent decades (Pólyi, 2011). Still, some believe that replacement migration is the right tool to restore the 'missing amount' of employees on the labour market with immigrants from outside Europe. A 'win-win situation' one could say. But is immigration a feasible option to solve the problem of ageing populations?

SOME SECURITY-RELATED QUESTIONS

A recent study has showed that replacement migration alone cannot be a feasible solution for the EU's demographic decline, because enormous numbers of immigrants would be necessary to offset the decline of working-age population (Gál, 2009). For instance, in the case of Germany, between 1995 and 2050 25.2 million immigrants would be necessary to compensate the decline of working age population and 188.5 million to maintain the potential support ratio at its 1995 level because immigrants themselves are also getting older (Ibid.). So, if the constantly low fertility rate of native population is to be compensated, a continuous flow of immigrants would be necessary, or the already settled immigrants must maintain higher fertility rates. Either way, immigrants and their descendants can outnumber native population within a generation. The economic, social and political consequences of such unprecedented demographic increment of immigrants can be catastrophic for host societies. Replacement migration alone cannot compensate the fiscal burden of ageing, as it is just one instrument among many to relieve fiscal burden on public budgets, not to mention, that its economic benefits are not automatic, but conditional (Ibid.). This means that it can only benefit host societies if the fiscal balance of immigration—the difference between public revenues and public expenditure related to immigrants—is positive[11].

Beyond the economic perspective, mass immigration to the European Union affected public and national security as well. Public safety risks may result from

[11] If the fiscal impact of immigration is negative – and immigrant related costs (e.g. welfare transfers) are higher than revenues paid by immigrants – migration is causing a fiscal burden for host countries.

certain acts that previously were in line with the norms of the sending country but the same acts can mean the violation of the norms of the host country (Póczik, 2011). Such existing alien customs are forced marriages, honour-killings, mass-rapings, or the mutilation of female genitals (Milborn, 2008) which are existing problems of Western European immigrant-inhabited suburbs. In time, with their growing numbers, immigrant ethno-cultural groups can also alter previous political and institutional relations.[12] This is particularly dangerous as ethno-cultural groups can even alter and disintegrate the centuries-old traditional legal system, including the incorporation of strange and alien laws (such as the Islamic Sharia-law), the restriction of certain rights (e.g. equal rights for women) or the assurance of certain privileges (e.g. polygamy). Ultimately, the disintegration of the coherence of the legal system results in the weakening of the rule of law and the concept of the nation state (Póczik, 2011). Another threat to national security are the underground cultural and political movements, and fundamentalist religious activities (terrorist cells recruited by radical imams in European mosques) which tend to use aggression (Pym Fortuyn Dutch politician and Theo van Gogh Dutch director were both killed by radicals in 2002 and 2004) and terrorist acts (Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005) as acceptable tools to achieve their goals.

However, despite all of these hardships immigration can possibly cause, the EU does need foreign labour force because even with current levels of immigration by 2030, working-age population will decrease by 20 million because of low fertility rates (Milborn, 2008). European economies are already dependent on foreign labour force in many sectors, not to mention that illegal workers are also increasingly present on the labour market[13] (in the construction industry, agriculture, and domestic jobs). One of the reasons of illegal immigration is therefore the constant availability of illegal jobs, due to the steady need of cheap labour. The other, equally important reason of the growing number of illegal immigrants is the stringent national immigration policies which make it extremely difficult to legally work and reside in the EU. According to economist Friedrich Schneider, "shadow economy" is the most dynamic economic branch in Europe, because illegal employees are the perfect flexible workforce;

[12] In the United States, for instance, [as we could see at the 2012 election] it became impossible to win the presidential election without the support of the Latino and African-American voters.

[13] As of 2007, the number of illegal immigrants was estimated between 3 and 8 million and their number is growing with up to 500,000 every year (BBC, 2007). In 2008, only in Central and Eastern Europe 282 thousand persons were apprehended for border violation or for its attempt in the 21 reporting countries of the region (ICMPD, 2008).

employers do not have to pay any taxes, health insurance or minimum wage and these employees can be fired at any time. Therefore, the complete expulsion of illegal workers would include millions of people, which would destruct European economies (Milborn, 2008).

SIGNIFICANT STEPS IN COMMON LEGISLATION

Recent years a number of important legislations have been accepted on community level to tackle the above-presented problems caused by recent decades' unregulated immigration. The first policy that dealt with immigration on the community level was the Amsterdam Treaty after it came into force in 1999. Among other things, the Treaty tightened cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs including asylum and immigration rights for third-country immigrants, visa policies, and the control of external borders (Erdei–Tuka, 2011.). The implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty was concretised in the Tampere Programme in which the European Council set up a five-year action-plan (1999–2004) and it laid the foundation of the Common Immigration and Asylum Policy. The basis of the Tampere Programme was the realisation that legal and illegal immigration are to be managed together as the success of policies related to legal migration mainly depends on the efficiency of the fight against illegal immigration (Euvonal, 2012). To foster legal immigration, the Programme included directives on:

- Family reunification (2003/86/EC), to simplify the reunification of immigrants' families which is a prerequisite of the social integration of immigrants.
- The issuance of long-term residency for non-EU citizens (2003/109/EC), to provide similar rights for those immigrants who are residing permanently in the EU to the rights of EU-citizens.
- The admittance of third country nationals for studying, training, volunteering (2004/114/EC) and research (2005/71/EC) purposes. This latter directive not only supports the foreign researchers to join European research programmes, but it also supports their return to their home countries to contribute to their development and to prevent brain-drain[14].

The Tampere Programme was followed by the Hague Programme in 2004 which in line with the Lisbon Strategy placed the emphasis on economic immigration with the ultimate aim of making the EU into a competitive, knowledge-based society. The

[14] Brain-drain is the large-scale emigration of highly-skilled individuals.

basis of the new EU immigration policy is the establishment of managed migration, a legal immigration system which adjusts entry procedures to current labour market demands. The Hague Programme recognises that a comprehensive approach is necessary in the field of migration which includes all stages of migration and takes into consideration its causes, integration and returning policies as well. The Programme describes ten priorities to strengthen freedom security and justice in the EU (Ibid.). Among these were:

- The aiming for a common asylum system including the setting up of a common asylum-procedure and the creation of a common status for refugees by the end of 2010.
- The integrated management of the Union's external borders—in practice this meant the establishment of the European Agency for the Management of External Borders (Frontex) in 2004.
- A balanced approach to migration, which on the one hand, means the fighting of illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings, while on the other hand, the support of legal migration.
- The encouragement of member states to maximise the positive impact of immigration by pushing forward with the integration of immigrants.
- Integrated and coherent anti-terrorist measures on the community level. A comprehensive response to terrorism including the focusing on terrorist recruitment and financing, prevention, risk analysis, increased cooperation with third countries and between the law-enforcement services of member states.

The next milestone in the evolution of EU immigration policies was the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum adopted during the French Presidency of the European Council in 2008.

The pact includes five basic commitments, which are to be implemented after the Hague Programme from 2010 (EPIA, 2012). These are:

- Controlling illegal immigration to ensure that illegal immigrants return to their countries of origin or to a country of transit (including cooperation between member states, transit, and sending countries; inciting voluntary return, and stepping up against those who are exploiting illegal immigrants)
- Making border controls more effective by providing the necessary resources to Frontex to enable the effective integrated management of the EU's external border;

- The construction of a 'Europe of asylum' by creating a single asylum procedure and a uniform status for refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection; establishing procedures for crisis situations to assist any EU country facing a massive influx of asylum seekers due to their geographical or demographic situation; and setting up the European Asylum Support Office, which provides practical cooperation between member states.
- Creating a comprehensive partnership with the countries of origin and of transit in order to encourage the synergy between migration and development (including the promotion of circular migration, the prevention of irregular migration and helping immigrants to transfer their remittances more securely and cheaply).

The latest development in the evolution of migration policies was set out by the Stockholm Programme (2010/C 115/01) during the Swedish Presidency of the Council in 2009. The document includes priorities for the period of 2010–2014. It further stresses the importance of the duality of providing legal access for non-EU nationals while strengthening the external borders to ensure the security of citizens. The programme emphasises that along with the reinforcement of Frontex, the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the Visa Information System (VIS) are also necessary to be fully operational to provide an integrated protection of the community and to counter illegal immigration and cross-border crime. However, at the same time the EU must guarantee protection for those who are in need of international protection. A new initiation of the programme was the plan to set up the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) to create an area of protection and solidarity within the EU. In the same year, the Treaty of Lisbon has also entered into force. The new treaty solved several years of institutional issues and it has also strengthened previous years' achievements in common immigration policies by aiming for a common immigration policy which is able to deal with new challenges of immigration of the 21st century.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In sum, we can say that the European Union's migration policy is one of the areas in common policies that developed the most in recent decades. In the last twenty years member states brought their policies in these areas closer together; internal border controls across most of Europe were abolished, a common visa policy was

adopted, external border controls, asylum standards and certain conditions of legal immigration were harmonised and member states are cooperating in controlling illegal immigration too.

These directives and laws, however, still loose enough to provide a wide possibility for member states to manage their own national immigration policies and EU institutions have no competence to decide the number and quality of migrants that can legally reside in member states. Thus, it is utmost important to further harmonise different national immigration policies as migrants can quickly adapt to changing policies and can find loopholes in the uneven national immigration policies.

It became vitally important that all members of the European Union recognise the importance of international migration because of the following reasons. There is a huge contrast between the ageing population of industrialised Europe and the exponential growth of the young (and often unemployed) generations of the underdeveloped world. EU labour markets cannot be supplied exclusively from domestic sources anymore, and those are increasingly dependent on immigrant workers. Most European societies are rapidly ageing which, on the one hand, draws the radical reconsideration of pension systems while, on the other hand, a new kind of approach towards immigrants. The current demographic crisis of Europe cannot be solved by measures providing direct entry similarly to the 1950's and 1960's as the tolerance of host societies has decreased due to the growing number of conflicts between radical groups of immigrants and host society. Anti-immigration rhetoric has also gained ground among political parties across the EU and radical parties are on the rise in most member states. Unlike in the United States or Canada there are centuries-old traditions in Europe and different nationalities are often intolerant with each other as well. The European Union is not a 'melting pot' (such as the USA), or a multicultural host country (such as Canada), but a conglomerate of different countries—the motto of the EU is also 'United in Diversity'. On the other hand, European countries are built on common Christian, Jewish, Roman and Greek traditions and culture and this is even true despite strong trends of globalisation and multiculturalism. Therefore, local societies expect newcomers—whether they are coming from another member state or from a third country—to accept and respect local culture, manners and most importantly the secular state.

Currently, the vast majority of immigrants coming to the European Union have little or no qualification they could use on the European labour market, not to mention

that they are also a great burden to national welfare systems. Therefore, the promotion of seasonal work and the introduction of a list of high-demand occupations could help managing illegal migration. The promotion of circular migration can also be an effective answer to both the lack of workforce and brain-drain. This way, workers from outside the Community can legally come to work in an EU member state for a limited period of time, earn money, support their family, gain experience and later use this knowledge and financial capital when they return to their home country. The result is a 'triple-win' situation where the host country, the migrant and the sending country benefits as well.

Although the assistance of refugees has an important place on the EU's agenda (as it is also declared in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum), member states cannot take in unlimited numbers of refugees as those in the long run mean serious financial burden for their welfare systems. Instead, the EU as a whole should act more effectively in the international space to prevent or solve crises and conflicts in the world.

In addition, there has to be a change in the approach towards immigration on behalf of national governments and host societies. Discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-immigrant sentiments have to be tackled to allow the successful integration of immigrants and their descendants across Europe. Member states must follow EU directives more closely in their national legislation and the exchange of experience in integration methods is also extremely important to prepare those member states for future immigration which have not experienced mass immigration yet (these are mostly those Eastern European states which joined the Community in 2004 and 2007). Nevertheless, as it is also pointed out in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, member states must set up clear rules which are to be followed by immigrants at all times. Pre-entry requirements such as language and citizenship tests can also be effective methods of integration and the prevention of the above-mentioned social and security threats to member states. These can, on the one hand, prevent the entry of those who do not accept host societies' basic values, and on the other hand, can also help immigrants to better understand their host country and its society already upon their arrival.

Immigration to the European Union is an unstoppable trend, but it does not necessarily mean a threat to member states. On the contrary, if properly managed, the demographic potential of least developed countries can be utilised by Europe in a

way that all parties (sending country, host country and the migrants themselves) can benefit from it. In other words,—as it is written in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum—"… legal immigration should be the result of a desire on the part of both the migrant and the host country to their mutual benefit."

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(IN-)VISIBILITIES OF MIGRATION BACKGROUNDS IN AUSTRIA

Silvia Nadjivan

INTRODUCTION

From a global point of view, Austria belongs to both the groups of leading business locations as well as immigration countries. However, it has not been officially declared as an immigration country for decades which was nationally and internationally criticised. The current Austrian government proves to include those critiques after inventing the position of the State Secretary for Integration. So, the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) functionary Sebastian Kurz holds this position at the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior since April 2011. In 2010 the Expert Council for Integration was established in order to support the current Austrian migration and integration policies. The council is chaired by the nationally and internationally well-respected migration researcher Heinz Fassmann.

As a matter of fact, the public and first of all official debate on migration has begun to change. In this sense, Sebastian Kurz states that Austria is "of course" an immigration country which needs skilled immigrants for the future labour market as well: "Without these people we would have already major problems in areas such as health care, but also science and research." (Integrationsdialog 2012) In 2011 Sebastian Kurz launched the project of "100 Integration Ambassadors" with the aim to set up "role models" for successful integration in Austria and to contradict existing situations of and debates on exclusion, dequalification and discrimination of people with migration backgrounds on the labour market.

The main assumption of this paper is that the official migration debate in Austria currently undergoes discursive transformations and therefore becomes much more diversified. So, the connotation of the term migration is discursively changing from a primarily socio-political and security (negatively occupied) problem, as emphasised during the 1990's—after transferring the responsibility for immigration and integration from the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs to the Ministry of the

Interior in 1987 (Georgi, 2003: 5)—into the economic benefit of diversity and specific skills of migrants, as actually promoted.

In the following the term 'migration background' will be elaborated in order to clarify the possibility of "social mobility", meaning the socio-economic and professional achievement in the Austrian context as well as to reveal the importance of "role models" in the current awareness raising process that has been initiated by the Austrian government.

FROM THE IMMIGRATION TO THE INTEGRATION DEBATE

According to Reiner Keller, discourse can be defined "as identifiable ensembles of cognitive and normative devices. These devices are produced, actualised, performed, and transformed in social practices (not necessary but often of language use) at different social, historical and geographical places. […] Discourses in this sense constitute social realities of phenomena … [and] are realised by social actors' practices and activities." (Keller, 2005a) Furthermore, the power to enforce their own interpretation or discourse depends on resources which are available for social actors. Thus, not the teaching of "common knowledge" is focussed on here, but rather the social production of knowledge within differing public sectors, or identifiable and distinct institutional and thus permanent fields of society (Keller, 2005b: 228).

This paper deals with the official discourse on a particular group of people in Austria, namely people with the migration background of the former Yugoslavia which is—from the quantitative point of view—the most represented in Austria.

When talking about migration background, the usual definitions vary. In general, it is about the ancestry of the parents of affected persons. So, according to Statistics Austria those people "whose parents were both born abroad" (Statistik Austria, n.y.) are defined as people with migration background. This definition refers to the one of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). According to other surveys also people of whom only one parent was born abroad belong to that group. Worth noting is that this definition (people with migration background) does not rely on the actual citizenship, nor is it a synonym for the term foreigner. (Medienservicestelle n.y.) Although this concept is not without controversy, it proves to be feasible for a number of recent studies, because it goes further than the term citizenship. Moreover, as a discursively produced term it reveals discursive transformations within the last thirty years. As Ingrid Oswald (2007: 128) emphasises,

it was common to use the terms "foreigners" or "guest workers" and furthermore "guest workers' children" in the 1980's, in the 1990's those terms were more or less replaced by the term "persons of foreign origin". Meanwhile, it is common to talk about "persons with a migration background" (Ibid.).

The Austrian immigration debate has become interlinked with the debate on integration so that the postulate of assimilation appears to be replaced by the slogan of personal efforts and and self-commitment. In other words, it is about the accumulation of human capital.

The main assumption here is that migration background is obviously put as a category of ethnicity to the foreground and at the same time connected to efforts and performance that serve as a category of human capital. By interlinking ethnicity and human capital, "role models" are set up, or taken out of the background so that finally performance and productivity overshadow the ethnicity factor.

In this sense, efforts and perfomance refer to human capital (the accumulation of cultural capital, such as education and professional skills), while migration background is discursively extended by adding categories such as multilingualism, intercultural skills and international networks (especially to the so-called "home country") and therefore positively connotated. As a result, the migration background is brought to the surface and forms—in contrast to the previous decades—no stigma, but an economically exploitable "social capital" (Bourdieu, 1989: 190).

THE LIVING SITUATION OF PEOPLE WITH EX-YUGOSLAV MIGRATION BACKGROUND IN AUSTRIA

In 2007, before the international financial and economic crisis hit the global arena, an OECD ranking placed Austrian gross national product (GNP) fourth among the European countries, and ninth among all OECD countries. (OECD, 2007: 20) Even the crisis itself did not seem to harm the Austrian economic and employment situation at all. According to the OECD Economic Survey of 2011, in 2009, the unemployment rate—after a brief rise—rapidly fell to 3.9 percent. That was close to the OECD average. Due to its high employment rate Austria holds the eleventh place in an international comparison (OECD, 2011: 6).

Among the approximately 8.4 million people living in Austria the proportion of foreign nationals is 11 percent (as of 19.05.2011). (Statistik Austria, 2011a) In the frame of the EU enlargement in Eastern and Southeastern Europe Austria became one of the

largest investors in that region (OECD, 2007: 8). Parallely, the quantitatively largest immigrant group comes from Southeastern Europe, from the former Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav successor states. So, at present (as of 01.01.2011), a total of 376,149 people from the successor states of Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia) are registered in Austria. In comparison, the share of citizens with Turkish citizenship is 159,891. Due to current migration flows migrants from Germany are with a number of 198,525 currently the second largest immigrant group in Austria (Statistik Austria, 2011b). This group appears to be the largest one, if people from the Yugoslav successor states (including Bosnia and Herzegovina: 134,098; Croatia: 34,037, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo together: 188,627) are considered separately (see Ibid.). In sum, the ex-Yugoslav immigrant group proves to be the most numerous one.

The large number of ex-Yugoslav and Turkish immigrant groups results from the recruitment policy of the Austrian government in the 1960's when due to a booming economy and a shortage of labour force immigrants had to compensate the lack of domestic labour (first migration flow). Bilateral agreements between Austria and Turkey (1964) as well as Yugoslavia (1966) made the recruitment of temporary workers possible. These, so-called "guest workers" ("gastarbajteri") mostly came from rural areas and were less educated. They and later their families settled in Austria. The number of these "gastarbajteri" increased from 76,500 in 1969 to 227,000 in 1973, 178,000 thereof came from former Yugoslavia. (Jandl/Kraler 2003)

Until the late 1980's the most numerous migration group, people from former Yugoslavia, respectively "gastarbajteri" and their families, and children (the so-called "second" and "third generation") where primarily characterized by low education and living standards as well as social and political marginalisation or discrimination

Similar to the high share of citizens from former Yugoslavia, the transformation of this group's social structure can be traced to the second immigration wave, when refugees, mainly from Bosnia and Herzegovina fled to Austria due to the Yugoslav disintegration and wars during the 1990's (Ibid.). In the course of this second immigration wave the social structure of those people has changed to the extent that the share of highly-educated people and females increased.

National and international studies (see Bauböck, 1996; Bauböck, 2006a, b; Biffl, 2004; Binder, 2005; Blaschke 2004; Bratić, 2000; Castles, 2006; Davy/Waldrauch, 2001a, b; Erler, 2007; Fassmann, 1995, 2002, 2003, 2007; Jawhari, 2000; Oberlechner, 2006; Perchinig, 2005, 2009) criticised in recent years that new circumstances,

challenges and requirements were not considered by the Austrian immigration and integration policy.

As a matter of fact, immigrants and their children mostly remain marginalized and discrimintated in four key areas, namely with regard to the labour market, education, housing and in terms of political participation. The results of the OECD Economic Survey of 2007 revealed the lowest educational attainment among migrant children or children with a migration background, the so-called "second" or even "third generation" in Austria (OECD, 2007: 12). With regard to higher or university education the marginalization of the second generation is obvious. The share of those university students who have a non-German mother tongue and who have passed the whole Austrian educational system (of 12 years) as "educational natives" ("BildungsinländerInnen") is about 7 percent (Unger/Wroblewski, 2007: 79).

The Vienna AMS survey on young unemployed people with a migration background revealed similar results: in 2006, 25 percent of the unemployed in Vienna were foreign nationals, the share of Austrian unemployment was about 18 percent (AMS, 2007: 13). Two-thirds of the unemployed youth have a migration background, mostly from Yugoslav successor states and Turkey, while their educational attainment is not much higher than the one of their parents. (Ibid.: 1) When taking into account the specific type of their education or training it is striking that 29 percent have attended the secondary school, 19 percent have attended a polytechnic course and 25 percent have recently gone to a vocational school (Ibid.: 2). In addition to an inadequate knowledge of the German language, "cultural" and "religious" specifics are mentioned in this survey as the key "challenges" or problems to integrate these young people into the Austrian labour market (Ibid.: 4). What exactly is meant by the "cultural" and "religious specifics" is not further clarified. This might lead to the conclusion that marginalization and discrimination in education and employment do not rely on structural, but rather on individual, personal reasons. On the contrary, the essay "The integration lie" ("Die Integrationslüge") written by Eva Maria Bachinger and Martin Schenk which was published and widely discussed in 2012 provides the following conclusion: the discourse on culture silences the asymmetric access to resources and hence economic and social problems as a cause of marginalisation and discrimination.

According to the comparative analysis of European immigration and integration policies by Ulrike Davy and Harald Waldrauch, in 2001 the Austrian one ranks the

last. In order to counteract the intergenerational reproduction of economic, social and political marginalization, the above-mentioned OECD report asks for action, in particular the promotion of German language skills among pre-school children. That has already become part of everyday practice Austria. Meanwhile, the last kindergarten year, or pre-school year is mandatory so that children should be promoted at that time. In some Austrian schools bilingual education is already offered by the help of two teachers. The awareness that apart from school, also the kindergarten serves as an educational institution is gradually increasing.

LANGUAGE SKILLS, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Inadequate language skills are officially declared as one of the most immanent problems the so-called guest workers' children, the "second" and even "third generation generation" face nowadays. In addition to ethnicity, language serves as a criterion of ideological differentiation as well. Language is not subsumed by ethnicity due to the reason that the importance and significance of languages are determined discursively.

Western European languages are valued differently than Eastern or even Southeastern European ones according to "symbolic geography" and "mental mapping" (Liotta, 2005; Brooke, 2006). Thus, speaking German with a French or with a Slavic accent evokes contrary connotations, associations, and finally stereotypes, for instance, the imagination of 'la garande nation' in contrast to the 'wild' or 'Balkanised Balkans' (see Todorova 1999).

The long-standing Austrian migration, integration and language policy can be understood in the historical context of the Habsburg monarchy where non-German-speaking people were successfully integrated on condition that they adopted the official language German and the "Austrian way of life" (Georgi, 2003: 8). However, multilingualism in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy proved to be natural which was reduced due to arising national movements and established nationalisms since the end of the 19th century.

The growing importance of multilingualism and care of the mother tongue or everyday language can be actually seen especially in the context of the EU enlargement process in recent years which is in stark contrast to the 1970's and 1980's. At that time it seemed to be recommendable to conceal Serbo-Croatian language skills to avoid associations with "gastarbajteri" and furthermore discriminations with regard to "ethnicity" and "class".

Nowadays, the Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian languages do not only serve as social capital (skills), but also as a specific human capital (knowledge). In the economic sector those languages proved to be useful and profitable in form of human capital due to the EU enlargement in Eastern and Southeastern European countries. Such developments appear to contradict the blooming period of the "guest workers movement" when Southeast European languages seemed to be stigmatised (Nadjivan, 2012: 290).

Meanwhile the value of mother tongues or everyday languages has increased, while the more or less perfect knowledge of the German one is officially declared as "the key to successful integration". In contrast to that, missing language skills lead to social, economic and cultural exclusion.

While the mother tongue promotes the accumulation of social capital, education contributes to the accumulation of human capital. In their study on recent developments within the educational paticipation of the second generation, Hilde Weiss and Anne Unterwurzacher refer to the European Commission study "Efficiency and Equity in European Education and Training Systems" of 2006 which directly interlinks problems of those children (on the mirco level) with national migration policies in Europe (with the meso and macro level). Those policies were primarily focused on the regulation and protection of the labour markets, instead of facilitating a long-term integration of immigrant families and their children born in the host country (Weiss/Unterwurzacher, 2007: 227).

Such policies went hand in hand with statistical invisibilities of the second and third generation. In 2005, Barbara Herzog-Punzenberger (2005: 5) estimated the number of the second and third generation of about 300,000 which correlates with the aforementioned actual data of Statistics Austria. Her comment that naturalised immigrants are statistically invisible seemed to be heard so that the official data situation has become more accurate. Raising awareness in data collection should also correlate with new accents in the Austrian migration and integration policy.

Both, the first (2003) as well as the second Migration and Integration Report (2007) that were edited by Heinz Fassman revealed the statistical difficulty of covering the second generation appropriately. As a result, longitudinal studies concerning that focus group are still hardly to realise on the basis of the existing data which is expected to change in the future.

However, Hilde Weiss and Anne Unterwurzacher discovered a slight improvement regarding the educational participation of immigrants' children

(Weiss/Unterwurzacher 2007: 229). In comparison to the school year 1993/94 the "over-representation" of children with an ex-Yugoslav or Turkish background, the second, or even third generation in special schools was reduced and their "under-representation" in secondary schools such as high schools and vocational high schools improved.

In contrast to earlier statistics, new quantitative surveys capture already naturalised immigrants and make them in the following statistically visible. Thus, new statistical surveys include categories such as "people with a migration background" as well as "immigrant of the first generation" and "immigrant of the second generation", and also provide information on the country of birth and the current nationality (Statistik Austria, 2011c).

With reference to Barbara Herzog-Punzenberger, Weiss and Unterwurzacher acknowledge that the academic success of the second generation in Austria seems to be systematically underestimated, since many of this group statistically "disappear" or get "lost" after their naturalisation. In the same direction also points the actual migration and integration report of Statistics Austria (Statistik Austria, 2012) Meanwhile the group of naturalosed immigrants is made visible by the above-mentioned actual statistical surveys that collect the birthplace of the parents as well.

According to Herzog-Punzenberger the Austrian citizenship or naturalisation appears to be a crucial factor (not to mention a sine qua non condition) for political, social and economic integration as well as for academic success. The Austrian citizenship, therefore, implies a specific bonus or "Staatsbürgeschaftsbonus" (Herzog-Punzenberger, 2007: 242). Weiss and Unterwurzacher conclude that naturalised students have capital forms such as "language skills, education acculturation, safe maintenance" at their disposal which vice versa facilitates their school success (Weiss/Unterwurzacher, 2007: 232).

In this sense, naturalisation appears to significantly promote social mobility. At the institutional level the Austrian citizenship facilitates the working and living conditions, and enables the political participation (right to vote). From the symbolic point of view, the Austrian citizenship permits the integration into the majority society and culture. At the individual level, the self-identification with the country, coupled with the subjective feeling of social mobility (to a higher "class" or layer) is facilitated.

However, social mobility only on the basis of naturalisation should not be taken for granted of course. As highlighted by the studies of Weiss and Unterwurzacher

and Martin Unger and Angela Wroblewski the training for the second generation in general takes longer than in the case of those young people without a migration background. Besides, members of the second generation are more frequently affected by unemployment than the comparison group. The main reason for that might be the lack of social capital, that means the networks for finding a job in Austria. Similarly, the longer duration of training can be related to insufficient economic resources leading to a more difficult social situation. The so-called "heritage of the guest work" (Ibid.: 241) evokes lower educational achievements of the second generation compared to "natives" of the same social class. In other words, the "native" working-class child has those forms of capital at his/her disposal that are not available for the "gastarbajter" child. To sum up, Austrian citizenship and naturalisation favour the accumulation of different forms of capital, as reflected in the above-mentioned findings. According to August Gächter (2010), social mobility in Austria takes three to four generations, since immigrants traditionally always enter the lowest ranks of the labour market and displace hence the second or even third generation up.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DISCURSIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In Vienna alone, there live more people with international origin than in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary together (Breinbauer, 2009: 30). This situation, as a matter of fact, proves to be profitable for operational handling or planning, management and control of cross-border business processes. So, it can be concluded that those people are predestined by the following skills: specific (East and Southeast) language skills, intercultural skills and special knowledge about actors and networks at home and abroad (Ibid.: 28). All these skills result from migration experiences and hence developed "transnational" or "trans-state networks", meaning networks beyond national boundaries. Such networks can generate new forms of identities, loyalties and interests—finally so-called "hybrid spaces"—that may contradict the nation-state self-identifications and solidarities (Sheffer, 2005: 16).

However, political and economic decision-makers appreciate the specific individual skills and competencies or "soft skills" of people with East and Southeast European migration backgrounds. According to the report of the Vienna Immigration Commission, Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries prove to be priority target areas and target markets for Vienna. As mentioned above, especially from those countries the migration flows to Vienna took place in the last decades. As

an obvious benefit for the city of Vienna appears to be the possibility of those migrants to easily develop economic, scientific and cultural networks to those countries. As a result, those networks can be established in Vienna much faster than in other European cities (Wiener Zuwanderungskommission, 2010: 9).

Similarly, the research findings of Kurt Schmid come to the conclusion that foreign language skills and intercultural competence are "valuable resources for the development of new markets" (Schmid, 2010: 7) in Austria and abroad. First of all, the highly qualified with migration background are particulary important for international companies, because they can be engaged in project management as well as in technical and commercial areas (Ibid.: 4).

Andreas Breinbauer, however, emphasises that significant stereotypes and barriers prevent to recognise and use the potential of people with migration background appropriately (Breinbauer, 2008: 51).

According to the SME Research Austria stakeholders, agents and companies (meso level) are often not aware of the Austrian "migration elite" (KMU-Forschung Austria, 2005: 138). In general, people with a migration background often face a 'guest worker's image', associated with a low level of qualification, although their educational careers and employment history reveal a great human capital (Breinbauer, 2009: 28). This problem is interlinked with the problem of "brain waste" which means that the professional qualifications of immigrants, first of all third-country citizens, are not fully recognized in the destination country so that they face the risk of dequalification on the Austrian labour market (Gächter, 2006, 2007, 2008).

As a result, the current project of "role models" of the State Secretary for Integration serves as an awareness-raising initiative with the aim to change the discourse on migrants as a whole and furthermore to improve their social and economic situation under the condition of effort and performance.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

In the public discourse, the categories of human capital (in terms of education and performance) and social capital (meaning "soft skills" based on the specific migration background) are increasingly interlinked, and positively connotated which correlates with current social, economic and finally political developments.

Once in the 1960's, low-skilled workers from Southeast Europe were required for industrial applications, today it is the use and profit from highly-qualified and

skilled workers (especially in engineering and nursing). The origin or ethnicity of the workforce is now enhanced discursively, by referring to the social capital that proves to be profitable. What as a discursive reference point remains unchanged for almost 50 years—equally in times of economic boom, recession and crisis—is the factor performance and labour (in terms of human capital) that reveals market-oriented interests. In this sense, migration background, or ethnicity is highlighted as a profitable social capital in order to point to the parent and targeted human capital in the next step. Finally, the economic benefit of human capital proves to be the main reference point of the current migration and integration debate in Austria. The discourse is not only transforming with regard to improving the social, economic and political situation on the micro level, of individuals (people with migration background), but also with regard to maintaining the high economic level in Austria. Obviously, migration flows to Austria are needed to compensate demographic challenges such as low birth rates in the future. After the low-qualified immigrant workforce was needed during the ecomonic boom in the 1960's, highly-qualified people with migration backgrounds are expected to meet the future tasks of an increasingly internationalised market economy.

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Chapter II

Enlargement, energy, civil society

THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE EU ENLARGEMENT – THE NEW BORDERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

ANDREA SCHMIDT

European construction aroused popular aspirations, which were radically opposed to what is actually happening: aspirations for a continent that would resist antisocial policies while being open to the world, according to a democratic, social, ecological and solidarity-based logic… This was in particular what was hoped for in Eastern Europe, where the populations aspired to live better and more freely. Their hopes were profoundly disappointed, preparing the ground for xenophobic currents… Understanding what were the turns that history took, where things went wrong, understanding the present crisis is essential for the peoples to be able to re-appropriate their choices and thus their future. (Catherine Samary)[1]

THE MEANING OF BORDERS

The economic crisis of 2008 raised old fears and questions to be solved. The stability and integrity of the European Union were questioned as the problems seemed to be somewhat similar, but the reasons and the heritage were different among the old, as well as the new member states. This paper is an attempt to point out the roots and differences on the European continent. It tries to explore the problem how the phenomenon 'Europe' can be identified, from which angles we can speak about a homogeneous Europe, and where cleavages can be pointed out. If such cleavages exist, can they serve as inner borders of the continent, what can be told about their origin, historical background?

Starting off our investigation the first and foremost problem we have to focus on is the question of borders. Borders are strongly connected with the possiblility to identify a unit, a group of people, settlements, defense zone, possibility of separations from the others. Among others, one group of the most visible borders is political borders. Unavoidably, they can exclude and oppose, dividing the larger from the smaller, the

[1] http://www.viewpointonline.net/eastern-europe-faced-with-the-crises-of-the-system-catherine-samary.html

richer from the poorer, the weaker from the stronger. As a practical consequence of their political nature, they often also mark the division line between one currency zone and another, or the limits between different types of electrical sockets. Apart from political borders there exist many types of boundaries that demarcate the outer limits of the place we call 'home', or at least of that area where stuff looks, sounds and tastes familiar. They usually are the most visible ones, though. Not just on the border, where the precarious embrace of two sovereign entities has solidified into barriers, buildings and a bureaucracy; also on either side.

The examination of the roles of the borders is a complicated problem. The first question is the way in which we make a definition about the role and the appearance of borders. There are physical aspects, such as the process of designation of borders, the changing of borders, or even their disappearance. The second problem is the examination of the spatial changes of borders, the defintion of the question what kind of decision could affect how they actually change, what kind of conflicts could arise after the new positions of borders. Changes can be a consequence of a histoical development (Gorzelak, Jałowiecki, 2002); borders can be created naturally or violently (Bialasiewicz, 1999, Paasi, 2002). They can be created by the state (from above), from outside (as a consequence of the winning of the war), from inside (according to national demands). Borders can be distinguished according their character—natural or created. According to Éger and Bialasiewicz (Éger, 2001, Bialasiewicz, 2002), borders can be created in several ways: they can be natural or artificial, or even symbolic[2] (Bialasiewicz, 1999).

Table 1. Classification of the borders

Result	Initiator
From above	State
From outside	After a victorious war
From inside	National demands

Edited by the author

[2] This latter issue is characteristic in those cases when there is no way to describe the political borders of a given state. Partly because the national demands and the political decisions are far from each other, or because the previously existed state became divided among other empires, as in the case of Poland in the 19th century.

Apart from the political, cultural, physical or geographical borders of Europe it is also important to define the so-called inner[3] borders of the continent. As this definition is not clear, there is a great number of scientists who try to delineate borders of different parts of Europe in different ways, especially if they want to describe such problematic issues as Central, Eastern or East-Central Europe.[4]

Border as a phenomenon got its importance with the birth of the nation states in the 19th century and kept it through several ages. After the First World War, with the collapse and the diasppearance of the great empires in Central and Eastern Europe, state borders strengthened their separating role. (Hardi – Hajdú – Mezei, 2009)

Connecting the problems of borders with the identification of Europe it is obvious that 'Europe' can be identified as a concept as well as a continent, and the borders of both oscillate wildly. (Jacobs, 2012) According to Jacobs's interpretation, in the Middle Ages, 'Europe' became virtually synonymous with Christendom. A relatively recent and generally unaccepted theory sees Europe spanning half the globe, from Iceland to the Bering Strait, nearly touching Alaska. During the cold war, however, the opposite tendency triumphed more often: all of the Soviet Union, including Vilnius, Riga and other cities that today lie within the European Union, were excluded from Europe entirely. At times even the Soviet satellite states in the Warsaw Pact were left out, as well, so much had "Europe" come to be synonymous with "the West" and its associated political values.[5]

DIVERSITY IN EUROPE

Analyzing Europe's historical models we can distinguish some characteristic aspects. Among others the so-called diversity can be mentioned; the difference in the process of development of the different regions. As a consequence, from there can be distinguished minor inner structures separated by geographical, historical, economic and cultural cleavages, or the results of different ways of development and the interactions among the zones. Secondly, the role of expansion, or the connection

[3] Or it can be called invisible.

[4] If we take a look at the Hungarian attempts we have to mention Gábor Gyani (Gyani, 1988, 1999), or Jenő Szűcs (Szűcs, 1981) who distinguished two different parts of the Eastern part of Europe during the age of Socialism. This was a unique experiment as they argued that it was an inner cleavage in the so-called homogeneous Socialist bloc breaching with the theory of the homogeneous Socialist world. In the last decade of the Socialist era the transition, with the change of the regime the idea of Central Europe became more and more accepted. Several works got published, the idea of the redefinition of Europe, the Central European borders, their meaning became the theme of several dissertations, articles in the region.

[5] http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/where-is-europe/

between an expanding Europe and other cultures of the world, the global connections. Thirdly, the diversification, the political sphere. Instead of a homogeneous political, cultural and economic integration nation states appear to entail potential political conflicts. Finally, the possibility of the interruption of historical problems and wounds, the weakness of the chance of the integration. (Kosáry, 1997)

Although attempts to create federative structures existed, such as the ideas of Jászi to reorganise the Habsubrg Monarchy in accordance with the federal way – but his theory was not supported by the surrounding nations. Instead of integration they wanted to create their own nation states. (Erdősi – Gál – Hajdú, 2002)

The examination of the roles of borders was very popular among the geographers in the West, even during the age of Socialism; however, it was almost neglected in the Socialist sphere of Europe. There are several reasons for this lack of interest. Among others, there was no reason to deal with borders because it was against of the attempts of the creation of a partly homogeneous Socialist sphere of interest. As most of the policies were controlled either by the state parties themselves, or directly by Moscow, there was little chance to care about cross-border cooperations, even if there had appeared such attempts between Socialist states.

During the age of cold war it was well known and agreed upon where the borders of the divided Europe were to be found, and which borders were the most important ones (Bialasiewicz, 2009). The borders that divided Europe also divided the world. They made geopolitical division between East and West. The Iron Curtain both divided Europe, and because the division was exported to other parts of the world, also worked as a global border. The revolutions of 1989 brought, among other things, a profound reordering of the spatial imaginary of Europe. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet bloc rendered necessary new geographical stories, new spatial representation to capture and codify the cartographic chaos of the ex-Eastern European space (Bialasiewicz, 2003). Although the cold war was over the border did not disappear at once. It was inevitable that the European borders between West and East became strengthened and while in the Western part of Europe a kind of integration was recognisable with the declining role of the borders, in the Eastern part of the continent the isolation of the borders became even more determining.[6]

[6] That caused several problems in the case of the so-called national, or artificial borders of some states from the Socialist group. The intensity of cross-border relations declined, as all initiatives had to become either from the capitals, or at least the capitals had to support such attempts. Fors instance, this practice

Typically, for the group of former Socialist countries a specific cleavage arose between the two parts of Europe. In the Western part of the continent borders began to loose their importance, and states going into the direction to struggle over the creation of federative structures—the then existing federative Socialist states, such as Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia launched their processes of dissolution. The situation did not change significantly after the transition either. As Western European states were going ahead of the loss of their borders following the idea of unification, the collapse of old federative states in the post-Socialist world[7] recalled old fears and repressed nationalism with a new, overdue process of nation-making. (Hardi – Hajdú – Mezei, 2009) That duality can be recognised in the perception of the EU membership within the "old members" and the "new" member states. The process and the experience of European integration are present together with the reflex of the nation states that can influence the perceptions concernig the notion of borders.

THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AS A HISTORICAL FACT

As the whole Central and Eastern European (CEE) region belonged to the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union, it was hardly possible to discuss about any kind of cultural, ethnic, or even religious cleavages, or just differences within the group of the Socialist countries. However, especially from the second half of 1980's new discussions began about the strucure of Europe. Following Huntington's theory or the consequences of the discussion between Halecki and Bidlo from the 1930's about the borders of East and West, it was accepted that the historical division of Europe into Central and Eastern was dated from 1054 as a consequence of the great schysma. According to this division, the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia and Croatia remained the Western part of CEE region, while the territory of Russia, Belorus, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, FYROM and parts of Bosnia created the Eastern. (Huntington, 1996, Gorzelak, 2002) The theories composed either in the interwar period or in the Western democracies gradually became shared among post-Socialist scientists, too.[8] It is also accepted that Central Europe composed a frontier belt between West and East, it remained the border of the West, a special kind of

hindered the intensive cross-border relations between the Hungary and the Hungarian ethnic minority around the Hungarian state borders. (Gulyás, 2005)

[7] Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia

[8] See Halecki's perception about the division of Europe, or Fox's theory about the role of religion as a reason of cultural cleavages (Halecki, 1993, Fox, 2004), or Wallerstein's perception about the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery. (Wallerstein, 1984)

transitional zone. It is a special transitional and civilisational zone. A part of periphery or semi-periphery without the Mediterranean and the Scandinavian space. If we take a look at the followig maps, we can see the cleavages from the West and from the East. It was commonly accepted that the transition zone lies between the so-called Iron Curtain and the cleavage of Eastern Christianity.

Figure 1.



Source: Gorzelak, Grzegorz, 2010 The regional patterns of the post-socialist transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (RSA conference, Pécs)

The first map shows the line between Latin Christianity and Orthodoxia, while the second map represents the line of the Iron Curtain.[9] England, the Netherlands, or even the feudal France belonged to the more developed parts, and as for the neighbouring territories, the German and Italian regions were divided, some parts belonging to the core area and some parts to the semi-peripheries. The famous Polish geographer, Grzegorz Gorzelak in his theory calls the frontier belt as "Golden Curtain", the symbolic line that divides the rich West from the poor East. With the enlargement of the EU it is still an issue, as it will be seen later.

Examining the consequences of this division it is also important to explore the reasons of these dinamic changes. The European continent of the 18th century can be characterized as a triple-divided construcion (Wallerstein, 1983):

[9] As the first map is in Polish there are some cities with Polish names, like Rome=Rzym, Munich=Monachium, London=Londyn, etc.

1. A more developed epicentre—a central core or plateau, the developed countries with the appearance of capitalism, the free market, global division of labour, including the existence of independent political units (in this case, states) at the same time. There is no political centre, compared to global empires.
2. A periphery—a synonym for the dependent developing countries. The main reason for the position of the developed countries is economic power.
3. A semi-periphery—states that are located between the core and the periphery. They catch influence from the core area, but there are characteristic features that make them similar to the periphery, too.

It can be said that this division survived for centuries. This historic heritage remained in Europe as a dual structure.[10] The difference can be caught in the following issues: nation state versus global governance, representation of the local or global interests, federalism or strong nation state. The questions of the role of religion and the national language are also remarkable.

There is a difference in the question of the role of the state. The revival of nation states after transition was very often accompanied by strong centralisation efforts, which resulted in the total absence or a weakness of the decentralised institutional system and autonomies of the regions. The judgement of 1989, or the transition process itself differs according to the judges. It can be described as the 'annus mirabilis' when a great political and economic transformation appeared without violence (Kornai, 2005). On the other hand, there is a perception that as the change was so rapid and covered all spheres it can be called revolution. According to rather sceptical Jürgen Habermas, it can be described rather as a "repairing revolution" instead of a regenerative revolution.[11]

There is another phenomenon frequently used to characterize this region. As the assistance of the state, or the government is determinative the initiatives usually come from above. The word is "refolution", which is a compositon of two words: reform and revolution blended together (also created by Ash (Ash, 1990, Frentzel-Zagórska,

[10] If we look at the difference between East and West, semi-periphery can be calculated to the East, too.

[11] Nachholende Revolution. Referring to the fact that the reason of these revolutions was the going back to the democratic legal state and the norms of the developed capitalist Western European region. According to Habermas's theory, bureaucratic Socialism could not be identified as an alternative version of organised Capitalism. It is rather a backward formation of Capitalism. This is why the revolutions of 1989 can be called as "repairing revolutions". This definition implies that this type of revolution does not have any importance or lesson for the developed Western world.

1993)). It referred at first to the role of the participants of the transition. Ash states that the initiators of the reforms were rather the Communists in late Socialism and the ideas of the "inhabitants", the newly organised or reorganised civil society was not so determining. As it is visible, the state, the "upper level" got an enormously great role inherited from previous centuries. [12]

THE SCENARIOS OF TRANSITION

The economic and political transition of the 1990's across the CEE region was simultaneous with the faster expansion of globalisation in Europe. (Gál – Rácz, 2008) The change of the regimes brought to life several scenarios in connection with economic transition. New models were created, new types of identification emerged. At the millennium more optimistic views became widespread according to the success or failure of the transition. The model created by Iván Szelényi[13] distinguished three different types of transition models from which two "belong to" the post-Socialist European states. He estimated the outer-directed capitalism as the better scenario from the two European models with the limited possibility of transition crisis and a realitvely short time frame. However, the crisis that reached Europe in late 2008 pointed out that the deeper a country is involved with foreign capital and foreign direct investment, the greater vulnerability it has to experience.

At the time of the economic transiton in the CEE countries in late 1980's and the early 1990's economic development policies were facing extraordinarily big challenges due to the following circumstances:

1. The transition to market economy was accompanied by the urgent demand of adaptation to a completely different environment of world economy.
2. There was an inappropriate development trend of economy based on depressing structure of obsolate industry and stagnating service sector.
3. There was a significant deficiency in domestic capital funds with high foreign debts. (Gál – Rácz, 2008)

[12] It also has got a Hungarian version: "Reforradalom" that is also the composition of the two words into one. There is another description, the so-called "velvet revolution" which also refers to the fact that the events took place mostly without violence. As Ash remarks, the symbol of the new type of revolution is the "round table" instead of the guillotine that represents the possibility of agreement instead of terrorism.

[13] Iván Szelényi (2004): Kapitalizmusok szocializmusok után. Egyenlítő 2004/4. pp. 2-11.

Table 2. Types of Transition

Transition types	Outer-directed capitalism	Top-down directed capitalism	Building capitalism from below (bottom)
Type of Capitalism	Liberal system (New EU-8 members in CEECs)	Patrimonial system; Politically controlled capitalism (Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria)	Hybrid system (China, Vietnam)
Political strategy of transition (conflicts within elites)	Victory of the technocracy over bureaucracy; collaboration with intelligentsia for the hegemony	Bureaucracy preserved its power, using it for the acquisition of private wealth	Coalition of bureaucracy with the new national bourgeoisie; Bureaucracy preserved its political power
Foreign capital	Predominant	Little	Growing portion of TNCs; many small investors
Political system	Multi-party democratic system	Multiparty system with authoritarianism	Mono-party system
Transition crises	Deep, relatively short period (4-5 years)	Shallow at the beginning, but long lasted (10 years <)	No crises

Source: Iván Szelényi edited by the author

The transition, however, had another face. The major part of the new economy was necessarily built on foreign investment-based or restructured economic organisations. The expansion of multinational firms yielding their profits from their absolute price advantages (cheap products) in the first period of transition served as a basis for this new economy. The new economic development model was primarly centred around the product export-orientated processing industry, and its system of relations and cooperation (both in market and development aspects) were determined by international networks.

János Kornai in his essay of 2005 explained the transition as a miracle that had taken place without any greater wave of violence or foreign military occupation. The transition itself affected all spheres of the economy and the political institutions.

Table 3. Transitional Models

Characteristics	CEE region	Transformation of the Soviet Union from Socialism into Capitalism	Hungary: Horthy restoration Chile: Pinochet restoration	China: transformation after Mao	West Germany: transformation after WW2	The great historical transformation in Europe: from the Middle Ages into modernity, from pre-capitalism into capitalism
In the main direction of the development of the economic system?	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
In the main direction of the development of the political system?	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Parallel in all spheres?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Without violence?	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Without foreign military occupation?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Fast?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No (very long)

Source: Kornai, J. (2005): Közép-Európa nagy átalakulása – siker és csalódás, Közgazdasági Szemle, 52/12 edited by the author

HISTORICAL BORDERS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The change of the regime also raised the question concerning the future of the nation state versus European integration. This issue, we argue, is strongly connected with the problem of identifcation. As a result of the transition, the post-Socialist world experienced the rebirth of nation states on the map of Europe, on one side, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, on the other. The question of national autonomy and the dissolution of the old states in accordance with

the appearance of the process of democratisation of the given societies raised even more new questions. New, or entombed problems occured again, such as dangerous nationalism and xenophobia that led to new conflicts again. If we accept the normative regulation of the nation state that includes its inhabitants, territory and the problem of the legitimacy of sovereignty we have to discuss the problem of becoming an independent nation state or to belong to any other supranational bodies.

The EU membership can be characterized as a final proof that the transformation is over, however, it brought about some problems that need proper solutions. There is an East–West dimension, which could be embraced in the discussion about EU membership, or scepticism about the EU. As Scruton says, the EU tries to demolish the territorial legal authorities such as national faith, all the elements that mean the basis of European legitimacy since the era of Enlightment. (Scruton, 2005)

Among others the following issues have to be mentioned: the problem of "Western overshadowing" which can be detected in the process of economic decision-making, like the question of "delocalisation", or the problem of immigration and competition for cheap labour, "social dumping"[14] or the problem that the East is conceived almost solely through the inflow of EU funds.

In 2004 ten new member states joined the European Union. Eight of them belonged to the group of former Socialist countries, five of them (Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) were relatively young states, the parts of dissoluted states. Three years later two other states joined the European Union, so altogether more than one-third of the EU member states had previously "belonged" to the Socialist bloc with almost 40 years of Socialist heritage. With their EU membership a lot of new problems raised and a number of debates began to focus on the 'multi-speed' Europe. As it became obvious, according to different calculations, the EU membership and the incoming support caused rather diversification than convergence. (Gorzelak, 2010) Different sets of data prove that there is no clear influence on regional growth and regional differentiation in the new member states.

[14] http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/SOCIALDUMPING.htm

Figure 2. GDP per capita in EUROs in 2005



Source: Gorzelak, G. (2010): The regional patterns of the post-socialist transformation in Central and Eastern Europe.

Figure 3. The change in GDP from 2000 to 2009 in NUTS 2 regions



Source: EUROSTAT, 2012

THE CRISIS AND THE REACTION

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 opened a new historical chapter for Eastern Europe. But it also marked a turning point at the heart of neo-liberal globalisation and European construction. The economic crisis in the early 2000's brought to the surface a lot of questions originated in the process of ambiguous transformation. The scenarios for the transformation were different, however, the tasks that had to be solved were almost the same. As Samary argues the problems concerning the success or failure of economic transition already began in the late 1980's.

1. The Hungarian Communist leaders were the only ones to decide to respond to the crisis of external debt by selling the country's best enterprises to foreign capital – which initially made it possible to attenuate an internal austerity policy, and made Hungary, in the first years of the following decade of "transition", the principal host country for foreign direct investment. Nor did they hesitate, following on the new European relations established by Gorbachev, to help bring down the Wall, for a price.
2. In Poland after the repression of Solidarnosc under the regime of the Polish general Jaruzelski, compromise agreements made possible the introduction of liberal shock therapy in the country, backed up by the cancellation of Polish debt decided on by the United States at the beginning of the 1990's: no expense was spared to win over the new elites "who were in power to privatizations … and to NATO." (Samary, 2012)

EU membership—apart from giving the final 'proof' of the member states that they belong to Europe—did not solve a lot of already existing problems. However, it was expected to become even wider. From the late 1980's with the entry of Spain and Portugal in 1986 by the mid 2000's it grew from 1 to 4.9. With the arrival of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, it increased to 20.1. But as Samary sees whereas enlargement towards the countries of Southern Europe and Ireland was accompanied by an increase in the "structural funds" of the European budget, it was the opposite which was decided in the EU's "Agenda 2000". Germany had only given up the deutschmark by obtaining severe budgetary rules; and it did not want to "pay out" for the integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Summarizing the debates on the inner borders of Europe we have to focus on the depth of the integration in several aspects. The heritage of the previous centuries is well known, such as the role of the FDI (foreign direct investment), as well as foreign human capital, or the foreign experience combined with the local initiatives. According to the statistical data collected by Eurostat or the World Bank, the fear of growing inequalities is still alive. The ever-existing periphery or semi-periphery cannot disappear at once. Summarizing our statement it can be said that instead of the Iron Curtain there is a visible 'Wage Curtain' emerging.

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THE EU AS A (HUMAN) SECURITY PROVIDER IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD

Tetyana Malyarenko

INTRODUCTION

Geopolitics was in the core of European security policy towards Eastern European countries during the first ten years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the declarations of independence by the former Soviet republics opened the way to human security. Since the Human Security Doctrine for Europe was adopted in 2004, it has been, in fact, the mainstream ideology for foreign and security policy of the European Union toward the Eastern Neighbourhood (the policy is called "Eastern Neighbourhood Policy", abbreviated as ENP).

The Eastern Partnership is a relatively new project of the European Union. Four platforms of the Eastern Partnership, such as (1) democracy, good governance and stability; (2) economic integration and convergence with the EU policies; (3) energy security; and (4) contact between people, have been based on the human security doctrine in a broad (European) understanding of this concept. The concrete programmes that have been implemented under the Eastern Partnership platforms are logically linked both with the European Security Strategy (2003) and the Human Security Doctrine for Europe (2004). However, the environment for the promotion of European values, including human rights standards and human rights protection mechanisms as well as human security principles in countries of the Eastern Partnership are different from conditions which shaped public/security policies in the 1990's. First, following on deepened contradictions inside the *eurozone* as a result of the financial crisis and *the Arab spring*, the human security concept has been perceived too liberal. The governments of some the EU member states, for example, Denmark, France and the UK declared their intentions to strengthen the national security systems and limit or withdraw to some extent their involvement in cooperative security mechanisms and external actions. In 2012 the eurozone passed through strong fallout caused by the global economic crisis and mass protests in Greece. The consequences of a possible

Greek exit from the eurozone or even from the EU were not predictable. Second, new political elites in Eastern European countries, in particular, in Belarus and Ukraine, are now less inclined to the adoption of the international mechanisms of human rights and fundamental freedoms into the public management systems, in particular, into the practice of judiciary and law-enforcement agencies.

Following Russia's example, the ruling elite in Belarus and Ukraine performs to stay apart from principles of democracy and human rights. It seems paradoxically that the current environment for promoting the liberal doctrine of human security in the Eastern European region is less favourable than it was in the 1990's.

HUMAN SECURITY IN WEAK AND FAILING STATES

In a hierarchy of political goods security occupies a privileged position. Starting from classical definition of the state by Max Weber to more contemporary publications by Robert Rotberg, (strong) states unquestionably control their territories and deliver full range and a high quality of political goods for their citizens (Rotberg, 1989). Human security is crucial for security of all contemporary states. Individuals alone cannot protect themselves from many different threats and attacks. (Strong) states provide protection of the borders and security of their citizens from environmental hazards, violence and crimes. They ensure political freedom and human rights. From a developmental perspective, the human security concept embraces both human rights and socio-economic and human development, because it integrates the economic component—protection from the threat of poverty and vulnerability to global economic crises with a number of societal components—, health security, food security, environmental security and personal security. States may succeed or fail in proving (human) security. Thus, state capacity is crucial for an assessment of the critical ability of the state to provide socio-economic development, human security and human rights.

In policy-making the interplay between priorities given either to the national interests or to human security varies from country to country. As a rule, human security- and human rights-based approach to development are embedded into public and security policies of the democratic strong states.

Initially, the phenomenon of state weakness/failure attracted the attention of international policy and academic communities in the 1990's (as a reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) and later, in the 2000's (due to the 9/11

terrorist attacks). Weak (failing, failed and collapsed) states are considered as a source of instability and insecurity they produce beyond their borders. Robert Rotberg considers state failure as a gradual process and distinguishes strong states from weak states, and weak states from failing, failed and collapsed states (Rotberg, 1989). According to a working definition adopted by the UK's Department of International Development, fragile states are "those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor". A state's propensity to weakness or even failure can be considered as a dynamic feedback among four sets of variables: its baseline level of institutional resilience; the presence of long-term drivers (or 'risk factors') of instability; the nature of the state's external environment (whether positive or negative); and the occurrence of short-term shocks or triggering events (Patrick, 2012).

Most sophisticated assessment of state failure conducted by the Fund for Peace links the gradual process of state failure with the risk of violent conflict. The Failed States Index is calculated on the base of 12 groups of indicators, including demographic pressure, massive movement of refugees or internally-displaced people, group grievance, chronic and sustained human flight, uneven economic development along group lines, poverty, sharp economic decline, criminalization and delegitimisation of the state, progressive deterioration of public services, suspension of the rule of law and violation of human rights, security apparatus operates as 'state within state', rise of factionalized elite and intervention of other states and external political actors (The Fund for Peace, 2011).

More important from a policy perspective is that features of failed states are attributed to both capacity and willingness of the government to overcome weakness. Applied to developing countries, the UK's Department for International Development finds four categories of weak states:

1. Good performers with capacity and will to overcome weakness (for example, countries of Eastern Europe before accession to the European Union). The necessity to correspond to the Copenhagen criteria justified high motivation of the governments in implementation of the principles of good governance, rule of law and international standards of human rights;
2. Weak but willing states where capacity is missing (for example, Georgia or Moldova). Technical assistance of the UN, EU and international organizations is effective tool in overcoming state weakness in this particular group of countries;

3. Strong but unresponsive states where political will is lacking within a usually repressive political regime (for example, Belarus). There is a special group of weak states—always an autocracy that rigidly controls dissent and is (temporarily) secure but at the same time provides very few political goods (Erin Jenne, 1999);
4. Weak-weak states in which there is neither capacity nor will to overcome failure.

It is a particularly difficult task to overcome state weakness, prevent state failure and violent conflict in the latter case due to the unwillingness of government to implement democratic reforms. Systematic violation of human rights results in mass protests and revolts in the repressive and weak-weak states. In the last two categories of countries, state weakness plays as a precipitating factor of violent conflict – in the first case it manifests itself through political repressions and state terrorism; in the second case it favours mass revolts for political power and access to resources. The Eastern Neighbourhood can be described as the region composed by weak states, each of which is 'unhappy in its own way'. According to Robert Rotberg, Ukraine is an endemically weak state where state weakness is pre-conditioned by geographical, physical and structural economic constraints[1]. Moldova is a fragmented state. Belarus is seemingly strong, but a repressive state (Rotberg, 1989). The Failed States Index shows the similarity of state weakness features in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, that manifests itself in the rise of factionalized elites and low legitimacy of the state. At the same time, poverty and economic decline are particular result of low state capacity in Moldova; whereas suspension of the rule of law and massive violations of human rights are the features of weakness in Belarus and Ukraine.

At the both (theoretical and practical) levels, the important strength of the concept of human security is that it embraces economic development together with human development and human rights. Separately, economic development measured as economic growth and performance of the economy is not a sufficient indicator in assessing a country's progress toward human security. A relative progress toward achieving economic development that some of the Eastern European countries demonstrate is not necessarily accompanied with the implementation of the human security doctrine because economic development and human security pursue mutually advantageous, but nevertheless different goals.

[1] 'Endemic disease' (medicine dictionary) - a disease that is constantly present to a greater or lesser degree in people of a certain class or in people living in a particular location

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN BELARUS, MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE: A BRIEF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is a global programme for overcoming poverty and in pursuit of achieving greater human security. The MDGs focus on eight priorities, common for all countries: poverty and hunger, education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, combating disease, environment and global partnership. *Table 1* shows the progress in achieving MDGs that Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine demonstrate.

Table 1. Progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals: Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine

MDG	Belarus	Ukraine	Moldova
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger			
Achieve primary education			
Promote gender equality			
Reduce child mortality			
Improve maternal health			
Combat HIV/AIDS			
Ensure environmental sustainability			
Develop a global partnership			

– achieved; – very likely to be achieved, on track;
– possible to achieve if some changes are made; – insufficient information

However, the MDGs are rather determine provision of economic, social and cultural rights and related priorities of human security, whereas political and civil rights are not covered by them. In accordance with MDG Monitor, Belarus demonstrates higher progress in achieving the development goals—by January 2012 most goals were achieved, whereas Ukraine and Moldova are still far away from planned indicators of development, in particular, in the areas of environment, child healthcare, HIV aids and maternity health. Economic development in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine correlates with social development. In 2010–2011, GDP per capita in Belarus was

significantly higher than in Ukraine and Moldova, which are ranked as the poorest countries in Europe. *Table 2* demonstrates the important components of the Human Development Index for the Eastern Borderland countries and new EU member states. A comparative analysis of indicators in the Human Development Index (UN, 2010–2011) demonstrates higher rank of human development in Belarus in comparison with Moldova and Ukraine despite the absence of democratic reforms and efficient policy of international organizations toward Belarus. On the Failed States Index the Eastern European countries are ranked in the following way: Belarus (83rd position), Russia (82nd position), Moldova (66th position), Ukraine (most stable – 110th position)—as it is shown in *Table 3*. The most strong and democratic states are Sweden, Norway and Finland (175th, 176th and 177th positions accordingly). The examples of 'typical' failed states include Sudan, Chad and Somalia.

Table 2. Components of the Human Development Index for the Eastern Neighbourhood countries and new EU member states, 2011

Country	Education index	Expenditure on health, public (% GDP)	Headcount of MPI poor (% of population)	Life expectancy at birth	Income Gini coefficient	MPI intensity of deprivation	Multi-dimensional poverty index	Population living below 1.25 USD	Under 5 mortality, 1000	Maternal mortality, women 100 000
Eastern European Borderland countries										
Belarus	0.776	4.9	0	0.794	27.2	35.1	0	0	12	15
Moldova	0.716	5.2	1.9	0.778	38	36.7	0.007	0	17	32
Ukraine	0.858	4.0	2.2	0.765	27.5	35.5	0.008	1.9	15	26
Eastern European countries, new EU member states										
Lithuania	0.883	4.5	0	0.824	37.6	n/a	0	0	6	13
Poland	0.822	4.6	0	0.885	34.2	n/a	0	0	7	6
Romania	0.831	3.8	0	0.851	31.2	n/a	0	0.5	12	27
Etalon countries										
Norway	0.984	7.5	0	0.964	-	n/a	0	0	3	7
Chad	0.219	2.7	62.9	0.446	45.6	54.7	0.334	0	209	12000
DRC	0.356	1.2	73.2	0.448	-	53.7	0.393	59.2	199	670

Table 3. The Failed States Index, 2011

	Demographic pressure	Refugees and displaced persons	Group grievance	Human flight	Uneven development	Economy	Legitimacy of the state	Public service	Human Rights	Security apparatus	Fractionalized elite	External influence
Belarus, **83 place**	6.3	3.6	6.8	4.5	6.3	6.2	8.8	5.8	8.0	6.3	8.0	7.0
Ukraine, **110 place**	5.3	3.1	6.5	6.3	5.9	6.0	7.4	4.1	5.5	4.0	8.0	6.8
Moldova, **66 place**	6.1	4.4	6.6	7.5	6.5	6.7	7.6	6.3	6.5	7.8	8.0	7.2
Poland, **145 place**	4.3	3.5	3.5	5.6	4.7	4.3	4.2	3.3	3.5	2.5	3.6	3.9
Lithuania, **149 place**	4.1	3.2	3.7	4.6	5.7	5.3	3.6	2.9	3.1	2.5	2.8	3.8
Romania, **126 place**	5.1	3.2	6.0	5.0	5.8	5.8	5.9	4.5	4.0	4.1	5.2	5.2

Tables 2 and *3* clearly demonstrate that new EU member states—Poland, Romania and Lithuania—can be referred as countries with strong states. In the 1990's this group was belonging to the category "good performers" with governments willing to overcome state weakness and poverty. Low level of state legitimacy and widespread violation of human rights are common features for Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, Moldova can be referred to as the country, the government of which is willing to overcome state weakness, whereas Belarus and Ukraine are referred as repressive state and 'weak-weak' state accordingly. The territory of Moldova is fragmented, indeed. Transnistria (de facto state, whose territory is not under the Moldovan government's control) decreases the rank of Moldova in the list of weak states. In summary, economic growth and human development in the repressive state cannot prevent a country from instability, mass protests and revolutions. The Arab Spring is an example how fragile peace and stability are in countries with repressive and offensive states. In support of this argument, we can assess how the perception of comparative well-being and human security in Belarus will change, if we include human rights into general analytical framework. First, Belarus is the only one country in Europe where the death penalty is not cancelled. In Belarus most human insecurities are related to the limitation of the freedoms of expression and assembly. The leaders of civil society and democratic opposition are consistently repressed. In Ukraine, as shown in the Human Rights Watch report, there is a high level of social

exclusion, which affects socially vulnerable and discriminated groups, for example, HIV-infected, refugees, asylum-seekers, representatives of some ethnic minorities. The share of hate crimes has been dynamically on the increase (*Table 4*). Freedom House in *Nations in Transit 2011 report* gives a comprehensive assessment of the state of affairs in the area of human rights and good governance with usage of indexes: national democratic governance (NGOV), local democratic governance (LGOV), judicial framework and interdependence (JFI), civil society (CS) and corruption (CO). The index of national democratic governance (NGOV) for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine is 6.75; 5.75 and 5.5 accordingly; the index of judicial framework and independence for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine is 6.75; 4.5; and 5.5 accordingly. For comparison, Norway is the most democratic country in the world with NGOV = 9.64; SC = 10. North Korea is the least democratic country with NGOV = 2.5 and SC = 0. Among the post-Soviet states Turkmenistan is the least democratic (NGOV = 0.79; SC = 0.59). Estonia is the first ranked (NGOV = 7.5; SC = 8.82).

Table 4. Human insecurities in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Helsinki Human Rights Movement, local NGOs, 2010-2012)

Ukraine (endemically weak state)	**Moldova (fragmented state)**	**Belarus (strong, but repressive state)**
Tortures in pre-detention facilities; Limitation of mass-media freedom, freedom of expression and assembly; Death in custody under suspicious circumstances; Government monitoring of private communications; Frequent harassment of minorities and hate crimes; Trafficking in person; Unfair trial, selective justice	Poverty and severe economic decline; Chronic and sustained human flight (emigration about 30% since 1991); Armed resistance to governing authority; private armies, territory not under the central government's control (Transnistria)	Death penalty; Limitation of mass-media freedom, freedom of expression and assembly; Unfair trial, selective justice; Political repressions; Tortures and other violent treatment in pre-detention facilities

CONCLUSIONS

1. Eastern Europe is a region which consists of weak states, where citizens cannot feel secure. In one way or another, all human insecurities in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are related to inefficient and corrupt state machinery, ruled by rent-seeking elite. Criminalization of the state and unfair trials bring insecurities to people both in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Systematic violation of human

rights and cross-border threats 'without passport', such as organized crime networks built around illegal trafficking in person, arms and narcotics are common consequences of state weakness in all Eastern European countries.

2. Since no group of the ruling elite in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus is interested in the implementation of the rule of law and democratic reforms, two mutually supportive mechanisms have to be carried out in order to change the current state of affairs. The first mechanism is the rotation of elite. The second mechanism is putting pressure on the current political elite. The pressure "from the top" is put into effect by international organizations for stimulating the governments to follow democratic values. The pressure "from the bottom" comes from civil society for impelling civil control and the human rights-based approach to development. It is obviously a two-fold system of mechanism.
3. For the next decade the European Union has to re-think the ENP's and the Eastern Partnership's actions and measures. The ENP and the Eastern Partnership have to include the above mechanisms and apply them both for the creation of a stable, secure and prosperous environment, and for the protection of human security in partner countries.

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ENHANCING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT DECADE

SVETLA BONEVA

INTRODUCTION

The EU's agenda for 2020 has set out the essential first steps in the transition to a high-efficiency, low-carbon energy system. Still, the EU needs to develop a vision for 2050 and a policy agenda for 2030. The fundamental technological shifts involved in decarbonising the EU electricity supply, ending oil dependence in transport, low energy and positive power buildings, a smart interconnected electricity network will only happen with a coordinated agenda for research and technological development, regulation, investment and infrastructure development.

THE ENERGY POLICY OF THE EU: SHORT OVERVIEW

As early as 1952 with the Coal and Steel Treaty and 1957 with the Euratom Treaty, the founding Member States of the European Community recognized the need for a common approach to energy policy. Since then, energy markets and geopolitical considerations have significantly changed. The need for European action in the sphere of energy, however, is stronger than ever. The world's acute environmental problems, the exhaustion and market volatility of traditional energy resources, the growing energy demand are all issues of current interest that need to be resolved or at least properly tackled as soon as possible. The European Union is strongly committed to dealing with these problems and securing competitive and clean energy for its Member States. The EU energy policy covers the following fields: European energy strategies, sustainable energy, renewable energy, energy efficiency, energy technology and innovation, oil, coal, gas, electricity, nuclear energy, security of supply, external dimension, energy infrastructure, energy market observatory and energy research. Now, the major energy challenges facing the EU ought to be considered from yet another perspective—the global economic and financial crisis.

In order to enhance the EU's energy market, its energy policy is focused on:

- developing renewable energy sources;
- reducing dependence on imported fuels;
- creating a competitive internal energy market offering quality service at low prices;
- doing more with a lower consumption of energy.

The development of renewable energy is one of the basic objectives of the European energy policy. There are four major types of renewable energy sources:

- Wind and solar energy (also energy from storms, tornados and hurricanes)
- Geothermal energy (also energy from sea and ocean waves, tides, etc.)
- Energy from some chemical reactions-release of hydrogen, ammonia, carbon oxide and others.
- Energy from bio-chemical processes (plants).

Despite all proactive steps encouraging a deeper integration of renewable energy Europe still has an intensive use of traditional energy sources such as of coal, natural gas, and petroleum. The European Commission's Second Strategic Energy Review, unveiled on 13 November 2008, warns that Europe will continue to rely on oil and gas imports until 2020, despite efforts to switch to a low-carbon economy.

In December 2008 the EU leaders adopted a comprehensive package of measures to reduce the EU's contribution to global warming and ensure reliable and sufficient supplies of energy. The most far-reaching reform ever of European energy policy, the package aims to make Europe the world leader in renewable energy and low-carbon technologies. Driving the policy is the EU's bid to achieve a 20 percent reduction in its greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (compared with 1990 levels), mainly by boosting the use of renewable energy and curbing energy consumption. The measures will also reduce dependence on imports of gas and oil and help shelter the economy from volatile energy prices and uncertain supplies. Meeting the 20 percent target requires a growth in all three renewable energy sectors: electricity, bio fuels and heating and cooling. The policy frameworks in some member states have achieved results which show how this is possible. Renewable energy has the potential to provide around a third of the EU electricity by 2020.

Renewable energy sources are expected to be economically competitive with conventional energy sources in the medium to long-term. The EU, however, has to provide a long-term vision of the future of renewable energy within the union. This will help to trigger investments, innovation and jobs. The challenge for renewable policy is to find the balance between installing large-scale renewable energy capacity today, and waiting until the development of technology and research lowers their cost tomorrow. Finding the right balance means taking the following factors into account:

- Using renewable energy today is more expensive than using hydrocarbons, but the gap is narrowing—particularly when the costs of climate change are taken into account.
- The economies of scale can reduce the cost of renewable energy sources but this requires major investments today.
- Renewable energy helps improve the EU's security of energy supply by increasing the share of domestically produced energy, diversifying the energy mix, increasing the proportion of energy from politically stable regions, as well as creating new jobs in Europe.
- Renewable energies emit few or no greenhouse gases, and most of them bring significant air quality benefits.

The European Union has a strong interest in a well-functioning global oil market based on transparency and reasonable, predictable prices. With oil remaining an important energy source EU activities on oil have one main goal: reliable access to energy at reasonable prices for all Europeans. Oil import and prices are heavily dependent on the geopolitical situation in the Gulf region that may bring insecurity in the European Energy System. It is also threatened by the unstable political situation in Iran—the major disrupter of the supplies from both the Gulf and the Caspian basin. Iran also holds the transit point of over 40 percent of the daily world traded petrol. Currently, 2/3 of the imported crude oil in the EU is from the OPEC countries. For gas, however, reliance on pipelines creates interdependence along the supply chain. In response, the EU is seeking a balanced energy partnership with Russia and is pushing for the renewal of a wide-ranging Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which includes energy relations as part of a broader trade arrangement. Recent developments have shown that using energy as a tool, Russia is increasingly able to influence EU decision-making, primarily through „divide and rule" tactics.

Legislation is also in the works to separate (or unbundle) the supply of electricity and gas from production. As of July 2007, all EU households have been free to pick a gas and electricity supplier but their choice is still often limited by one company's domination of a particular region or country. Besides spurring on competition, unbundling would boost the use of renewable energies like wind and solar power.

The European Commission published its energy scenarios called "EU energy trends to 2030" that expect 333 Gigawatt (GW) of new electricity generating capacity to be installed in the EU in the decade from 2011 to 2020.

Wind would account for 136 GW, 41 percent of all new installations – by far the largest of any power technology. The Commission expects 64 percent of new capacity to be renewable energy, 17 percent gas, 12 percent coal, 4 percent nuclear and 3 percent oil. The Scenario calculates wind energy will produce 14 percent of EU electricity by 2020. Currently, 80 GW of wind energy capacity is installed in the EU, producing 5 percent of the EU's electricity.

"The European Commission recognises that wind power will play a very significant role in the European electricity system by 2020, in line with current market reality, EU legislation and industry expectations," said Christian Kjaer, Chief Executive Officer of European Wind Energy Association (EWEA). "It means that wind energy will provide electricity for the equivalent of 120 million EU households by 2020."

GRIDS 2010 represents the backbone of Europe's energy future. GRIDS 2010 will explore the financial, technical, policy and regulatory issues that will shape the development of a grid that meets Europe's energy, consumer and climate needs. On 23-24 November 2010 in Berlin the European Commission President José Manuel Barroso said: "We need to do for energy what we have done for mobile phones: real choice for consumers in one European marketplace."

ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY AND MEASURES AT EU LEVEL

The reduction of energy consumption and the elimination of energy wastages are basic goals of the European Union in the field of energy policy. The support of the EU for improving energy efficiency is a crucial factor for enhancing the competitiveness of the European economy, for the security of supplies and for meeting the commitments on climate change made under the Kyoto Protocol.

A significant potential for reducing energy consumption is available in all energy-intensive sectors that are widely spread across the EU, such as transport, metallurgy,

construction, manufacturing, energy conversion etc. At the end of 2006, the EU pledged to cut its annual consumption of primary energy by 20 percent by 2020. To achieve this goal, it is working to mobilise the population, the decision-makers and the market operators and to set minimum energy efficiency standards and rules on labelling for products, services and infrastructure.

Energy efficiency is especially important in times when the building of the EU internal energy market is slowing down due to a number of reasons. Opening energy markets for competition is key for the competitiveness of the EU economy as a whole. An efficient, interconnected and transparent European internal energy market will offer consumers a choice between different companies supplying gas and electricity and will make the market accessible to all suppliers.

Current energy efficiency policies in the EU are oriented to achieve the European Commission's targets to achieve energy savings of 20 percent by 2020 (Action Plan for Energy Efficiency) and of 9 percent by 2016 (Directive on Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy Services). Are these targets realistic for the European energy agenda? Are they secured with enough financial resources and adequate technological development? In the recent years the above-mentioned energy policies and measures have been analysed by many authors as well as tested within different research projects. Among these projects is for example the AID-EE project (reviewing 20 case studies), according to which, if the proposed European objectives, policies and measures have been applied to all EU Member States, they would only achieve less than half of their target potential (0.3% to 0.8%/year, depending on the field of application and the policies analysed). Until now, in Europe, no country has achieved more than about 1 percent energy savings per year compared to the baseline development, but some countries have set higher targets for running and future periods. Therefore, it needs larger and urgent political effort and good, rational policy design at all political and administrative levels to achieve the 20 percent target.

In order to achieve greater coordination of national and European policies many pieces of energy saving legislation as well as other instruments have been adopted at European and national level. They have been periodically systemized by the European Environmental Bureau (EEA, 2012) and include a number of initiatives summarized below.

The 10-year strategy Europe 2020 proposed by the European Commission in March 2010 to revive the European economy aims at "smart, sustainable, inclusive

growth" with greater coordination of national and European policy. The strategy identifies five headline targets the EU should take to boost growth and employment. One of the five headline targets refers to the previously agreed goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20 percent compared to 1990 levels or by 30 percent if the conditions are right, increase the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption to 20 percent, and achieve a 20-percent increase in energy efficiency. The 20-20-20 consists of an emissions and renewables target which is legally binding while the energy saving target is not. The Europe 2020 process which can help promote efficiency and a sustainable growth agenda should not be used to replace national targets and plans, especially at a time when greater transparency, comparability and commitment is required.

The Energy Services Directive that has been adopted in 2006 requires all Member States to draw up Action Plans (NEEAPs) to meet an indicative target of 1 percent reduction in final energy use per year, until 2016. Intended to encourage delivery of efficiency programmes or measures to end users, and development of energy services market. It is highly discretionary to Member States and the level of ambition and delivery so far has been low.

The Energy Performance of Buildings (EPBD) Directive adopted in 2002 and recasted in 2010 addresses new buildings and those undergoing major renovation (which amounts to 40% of the EU energy use, 36% CO_2 emissions). Both its transposition and implementation have been slow. Its recast in 2009 has strengthened the Directive but less than hoped, in particular regards existing buildings, financing and urgency of deadlines.

The Ecodesign Directive adopted in 2005 sets the framework to decide measures to improve energy performance of products and appliances e.g. lightbulbs, boilers, tvs (=half of EU's C02 emissions). Minimum performance/labeling requirements are set as implementing measures for individual product categories. This directive is aimed to progressively phase out worst-performing products in each category. There is growing pressure from industry to move towards industry-designed voluntary initiatives as basis (or even substitute) for implementing measures.

The Energy Labeling Directive, adopted in 1992 and recasted in 2010, makes mandatory the display of A-G energy label. It is also aimed to direct consumers to best performing products. Lack of rescaling since 1992 means the large majority of products are now in A category. It was recast in 2009 to update and extend its scope.

The CO_2 in cars regulation, adopted in 2009, sets progressive CO_2 emission limit values for passenger cars. The limit values, timetable and penalty arrangements are unambitious. The regulation on CO_2 in vans (drafted in 2009) will set progressive CO_2 emission limit values for vans and utility vehicles.

The Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Directive (adopted in 2008) is a tool to increase energy efficiency and to achieve the energy savings targets. Combined heat and power or cogeneration contributes about 2% towards the 20% annual primary energy savings objective for 2020. It reinforces efforts to fight climate change by reducing CO_2 emissions (100 Mt CO_2 per year) and decreasing network losses. At the same time, it contributes to increasing competition in the electricity market.

The 2006 Action Plan for Energy Efficiency has proved weaker than the actual proposals outlined in the Green Paper—"Doing more with less". Partly the Action Plan has not mobilised what has been intended. The Plan recognises the different sectors and systems that should all be addressed in order to achieve a fully effective and comprehensive energy efficiency programme, however, it does not do so with the depth, urgency and targeted policies and practical measures required.

The Energy Efficiency Plan is a strategy paper that sets out ideas for measures to save energy and increase energy efficiency. On 8 March 2011, the EC adopted the Energy Efficiency Plan 2011 for saving more energy through concrete measures aimed at creating substantial benefits for households, businesses and public authorities: it should transform our daily lives and generate financial savings of up to €1000 per household every year. It should improve the EU's industrial competitiveness with a potential for the creation of up to 2 million jobs. Legislative proposals with very concrete binding measures will follow in the proposed Directive on Energy Efficiency and Savings. Many, including the European Environmental Bureau (EEB, 2012) have dismissed the Plan as flimsy and weak. The impact assessment does not even guarantee that the proposed measures will meet the 20 percent energy savings target. The strength of the few measures that are proposed is left to the individual ambition and efforts of Member States. Leaving an assessment of progress until 2013 is too late.

The EU energy strategy launched in late 2010 makes a case for energy saving as having a huge potential, especially in the case of buildings and transport. The strategy has a box titled 'Achieving an Energy Efficient Europe' that outlines four specific actions needed to tackle energy efficiency. The strategy although useful is not legally binding and does not propose a binding energy saving target.

In order to implement the Europe 2020 Strategy across the EU, national action, based on common objectives, targets and guidelines are being formulated through National Reform Programmes. These programmes include reference to the national progress made so far and national targets and goals on energy efficiency.

A number of national Energy Efficiency Programmes and targets have been accepted by the EU member states. They are different in terms of quantitative indicators and policy measures and depend on the particular natural, ecological and economical conditions of each member state. The World Energy Council and the Global Energy Intelligence periodically summarize and analyze these national programes, measures and targets.

Table 1. Energy efficiency programmes and targets

	Name of the programme/law	**Sector**	**Nature of target**	**Target value**	**Target year**	**Base year**
Austria	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	
Belgium	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	
Belgium	CHP certificates (Flanders)	Final consumers	Energy savings (value)	0.58 TWh/ year	2012	
Bulgaria	National Long Term Energy Efficiency Program, 2005-2015	Final consumers	Energy intensity reduction	-8%	2015	
Bulgaria	National Long Term Energy Efficiency Program, 2005-2016	Overall	Energy intensity reduction	-17%	2015	
Bulgaria	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
Croatia	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	14%	2016	2008
Cyprus	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	10%	2016	2008
Czech Republic	State Energy Policy	Overall	Energy intensity reduction	3.22%	2030	
Czech Republic	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	

Denmark	National Energy Strategy	Overall	Energy consumption reduction	-4%	2020	
Denmark	National Energy Strategy	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	10%	2020	2010
Denmark	Strategy for energy reduction in buildings	New buildings	Energy efficiency improvement	75%	2020	
Denmark	Obligation of energy savings for energy compagnies (white certificates)	Final consumers	Energy savings (value)	0.12 TWh/ year		
Estonia	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	
Finland	National strategy for Climate and Energy	Final consumers	Energy consumption reduction	310 TWh (same level than 2008)	2020	
Finland	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	
France	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	
France	Energy law(2005-781)- Loi POPE	Final consumers	Energy intensity reduction	-2%/year	2010	
France	Energy law(2005-781)- Loi POPE	Final consumers	Energy intensity reduction	-2.5%/ year	2015	
France	Energy law(2005-781)- Loi POPE	Final consumers	Energy consumption reduction	0% (stabili-zation)	2050	
France	Obligation of energy savings for energy companies	Final consumers	Energy savings (value)	54 TWh	2006-2009	2006
France	Grenelle de l'Environment 2008	New buildings	Minimum efficiency standards	15 kWh/ m2/year	2020	
France	Grenelle de l'Environment 2008	Existing buildings	Thermal retroffiting	400 000 /year	2020	
France	Grenelle de l'Environment 2008	Public sector	Thermal retroffiting	120 M m2	2020	
France	EU draft regulation	Lighting	lamps/CFL	Ban	2012	
Germany	Coalition agreement	Overall	Energy intensity reduction	3%/year	2020	1990

Germany	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	
Greece	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	
Hungary	Energy Saving and Energy Efficiency Action Programme 1999-2010	Overall	Energy intensity reduction	3.5%/ year	2010	
Hungary	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
Ireland	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	
Ireland	Energy White Paper	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	20%	2020	
Ireland	Obligation of energy savings for energy compagnies (white certificates)	Final consumers	Energy savings (value)	0.24 TWh		
Italy	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
Italy	White Certificate	Final consumers	Energy savings (value)	3.5 Mtep/ year	2012	2011
Italy	Energy Efficiency in Buildings Law and EE Appliances Incentives	New buildings	Energy savings (value)	56.8 TWh/ year	2016	2010
Italy	Energy Efficiency in Buildings Law and EE Appliances Incentives	Existing buildings	Energy savings (value)	56.8 TWh/ year	2016	2010
Latvia	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
Lithuania	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
Lithuania	National Energy Strategy	Overall	Energy intensity reduction	EU average intensity	2025	
Luxembourg	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
Malta	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008

Netherlands	Clean and Efficient" program	Overall	Energy savings (rate)	2%/year	2020	2011
Netherlands	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
Poland	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
Poland	Obligation of energy savings for energy companies (white certificates)	Final consumers	Energy savings (value)			
Portugal	Directive on energy end-use efficiency and energy services (NEEAP)	Overall	Energy savings (rate)	10%	2015	2008
Romania	National Strategy for Energy Efficiency (2004-2015)	Overall	Energy intensity reduction	40%	2015	2001
Romania	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	14%	2016	2008
Russia	Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation (2009)	Overall	Energy intensity reduction	-40%	2020	
Russia	Federal Law on Energy saving and energy efficiency improvement (2009)	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	15%	2015	
Russia	Federal program Energy Efficient Economy (draft)	Overall	Energy savings (rate)		2020	
Serbia	Energy Strategy Implementation Programme	Industry	Energy savings (rate)	15%	2012	
Slovak Republic	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
Slovenia	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Overall	Energy savings (rate)	9 %	2016	2008
Slovenia	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Public sector	Energy savings (rate)	18 %	2016	
Slovenia	Energy Act					
Spain	Action Plan 2008-2012 (E4)	Overall	Energy savings (value)	87.9 Mtoe	2012	2008
Spain	Action Plan 2008-2012 (E4)	Residential	Energy savings (value)	7.9 Mtoe	2012	2008

Spain	Action Plan 2008-2012 (E4)	Industry	Energy savings (value)	17.3 Mtoe	2012	
Spain	Action Plan 2008-2012 (E4)	Transport	Energy savings (value)	30.3 Mtoe	2012	
Spain	Action Plan 2008-2012 (E4)	Residential	Energy savings (value)	1.7 Mtoe	2012	2008
Spain	Action Plan 2008-2012 (E4)	Public sector	Energy savings (value)	0.69 Mtoe	2012	
Spain	Action Plan 2008-2012 (E4)	Forestry	Energy savings (value)	1.4 Mtoe	2012	2008
Spain	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
Sweden	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
Sweden	Energy Bill	Final consumers	Energy consumption reduction	6%	2010	
Sweden	Energy Bill	Final consumers	Energy intensity reduction	20%	2020	
Sweden	Sweden environmental objectives	Residential	Energy consumption reduction	20%/50%	2020/2050	
Switzerland	SwissEnergy Programme	Overall	Energy consumption reduction	-10% for fuel	2010	2001
Switzerland	SwissEnergy Programme	Final consumers	Cap electricity demand increase	5%	2010	2001
Switzerland	Federal Action Plan under preparation	Overall	Energy consumption reduction	"-20% for fuel"	2020	2010
Switzerland	Federal Action Plan under preparation	Final consumers	Cap electricity demand increase	5%	2020	2010
Switzerland		Lighting	lamps/CFL	Ban	2012	
Turkey	Energy efficiency strategy (2004)	na	na			

United Kingdom	Housing Act	Residential	Energy efficiency improvement	20%	2010	2000
United Kingdom	National Energy Efficiency Action Plan	Final consumers	Energy savings (rate)	9%	2016	2008
United Kingdom	Obligation of energy savings for energy compagnies (white certificates)	Final consumers	na			

Source: World Energy Council, http://www.wec-policies.enerdata.eu/ and Global Energy Intelligence, http://www.enerdata.net/

A resource-efficient Europe is a flagship initiative of the Europe 2020 strategy. This flagship is targeted at bringing action to several different EU policy agendas, including climate change, energy, transport, industry, raw materials, agriculture, fisheries, biodiversity and regional development.

The Roadmap to a Low Carbon Economy (2011) contributes to the Resource Efficient Europe flagship initiative intended to put the EU on course to using resources in a sustainable way. The Roadmap looks beyond the 2020 objectives and sets out a plan to meet the long-term target of reducing domestic emissions by 80 to 95 percent by mid-century as agreed by European Heads of State and Governments. The roadmap is a needed long-term perspective, however, attention should not slip from ambitious action in the short term. The proposal that existing efforts will already bring us to 25 percent cuts by 2020 suggests that going further is all the more possible.

In February 2011, the EU Heads of States and Governments declared the need to complete the internal energy market by 2014. To achieve this, timely and complete transposition of EU legislation on the single market of gas and electricity into national law is crucial. The third energy package includes key provisions for a proper functioning of the energy markets, including new rules on unbundling of networks, rules strengthening the independence and the powers of national regulators and rules on the improvement of the functioning of retail markets to the benefit of consumers.

The Electricity and Gas Directives of the Third Energy Package had to be transposed by the Member States by 3 March 2011. However, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania and Slovakia did not undertake any transposition measures for the two Directives within the set deadline and Estonia did not do so for the Gas Directive. Consequently, the Commission has sent 15 Reasoned Opinions to these 8 Member States to urge them to comply with their

legal obligation. The Member States had two months to respond. If they had failed to comply the Commission might have referred them to the Court of Justice of the EU. This infringement exercise would have addressed non-communication cases of the transposition of the Third Energy Package. At the same time, the Commission is analysing the measures notified by the Member States which have only partially transposed the Directives, and will decide in the coming months on appropriate further steps.

On 11 September 2012, the European Parliament adopted in first reading the Energy Efficiency Directive. The directive brings forward legally-binding measures to step up Member States efforts to use energy more efficiently at all stages of the energy chain—from the transformation of energy and its distribution to its final consumption. Measures include the legal obligation to establish energy efficiency obligations schemes or policy measures in all member states. These will drive energy efficiency improvements in households, industries and transport sectors. Other measures include an exemplary role to be played by the public sector and a right for consumers to know how much energy they consume.

The EU cannot reach its energy saving target. To achieve the overall 20 percent energy savings 394 Mtoe of energy must be saved in 2020 when compared to 'pre-recession' baseline expectations of the 2006 Energy Efficiency Action Plan. According to the study of Ecofys and Fraunhofer (ENERGY SAVINGS 2020 How to triple the impact of energy saving policies in Europe, 2010) at present rates of progress, the EU is on track to achieve only about 200 Mtoe of energy savings by 2020—as compared to the 400 Mtoe target, as presented in the figure below, taken from the report. According to the European Environmental Bureau (EEA, 2012), the EU is falling short of the energy saving target due to:

- Unambitious and fragmented policies, due to lack of high level political drive, accountability and urgency;
- Poor levels of implementation, due to low governmental priority, lack of clarity over responsibilities, and a range of (mostly) non-price barriers;
- An incomplete policy framework; 10 percent of EU primary energy use (freight transport, and heat and electricity transmission losses) is not covered or only covered indirectly by any type of regulation.

On the basis of the literature review on the topic, the following hypothesis can be outlined when comparing the energy demand reduction pathways in the different scenarios, energy efficiency potentials (Thomas et al. 2006) and the potentials mentioned and target set in the Action Plan on Energy Efficiency:

1. *The Action Plan is quite ambitious as it sets a target quite close to the full techno-economic energy saving potentials* that could be harnessed by 2020 (and compared to the most ambitious energy efficiency scenario pathways in the ÖI and WI/WWF scenarios).
2. Although the scenarios start at a comparable level and apply similar general economic and demographic assumptions, their pathways described for the period until 2020/2030 differ substantially.
3. A comparison of the European Environmental Agency scenario and the other three scenarios shows that *increasing energy prices through energy taxation or carbon emission caps and permit trading might be necessary but is in no way sufficient for harnessing the cost-effective energy efficiency potentials*. The reason are the many market barriers and imperfections that are not due to insufficient price signals and that are listed in the AID-EE guidelines for the monitoring, evaluation and design of energy efficiency policies (AID-EE project, 2006).

Finally, the analysis of energy demand reduction scenarios has shown that *the links between "energy demand reduction pathways"—"potentials identified" and "policies—measures to be implemented", are quite weak.*

ENERGY EFFICIENCY AT COMPANY LEVEL

Energy efficiency and the possible ways to increase it at micro-level is a worldwide problem. Plenty of American authors offer ideas for energy efficiency measures and methods of measuring industrial and household energy savings. "Accurate measurement of energy savings from industrial energy efficiency projects can reduce uncertainty about the efficacy of the projects, guide the selection of future projects, improve future estimates of expected savings, promote financing of energy efficiency projects through shared-savings agreements, and improve utilization of capital resources. Many efforts to measure industrial energy savings, or simply track progress toward efficiency goals, have had difficulty incorporating changing weather and production, which are frequently major drivers of plant energy use" (Kissok

2008, Eger 2008). Kissok and Eger offer "a general method for measuring plant-wide industrial energy savings that takes into account changing weather and production between the pre and post-retrofit periods. In addition, the method can disaggregate savings into components, which provides additional resolution for understanding the effectiveness of individual projects when several projects are implemented together. The method uses multivariable piece-wise regression models to characterize baseline energy use, and disaggregates savings by taking the total derivative of the energy use equation. Although the method incorporates search techniques, multi-variable least-squares regression and calculus, it is easily implemented using data analysis software, and can use readily available temperature, production and utility billing data. This is important, since more complicated methods may be too complex for widespread use". The method is demonstrated in Kissok and Eger articles using case studies of actual energy assessments. "The case studies demonstrate the importance of adjusting for weather and production between the pre- and post-retrofit periods, how plant-wide savings can be disaggregated to evaluate the effectiveness of individual retrofits, how the method can identify the time-dependence of savings, and limitations of engineering models when used to estimate future savings."

Moreover, it is not only in the EU that energy efficiency measurement research is stimulated by the Union. In the USA there are 26 Industrial Assessment Centres at universities. Each centre is funded by the United States Department of Energy Industrial Technologies Programme to perform about 25 energy assessments per year for midsized industries, at no cost to the industrial client. Each assessment identifies energy, waste, and productivity cost saving opportunities, and quantifies the expected savings, implementation cost and simple payback of each opportunity. This information is delivered to the client in a report summarizing current energy and production practices and the savings opportunities identified during the assessment. About one year after each assessment, the client is contacted to collect implementation results.

OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS FOR THE ENERGY POLICY OF THE EU — A LOOK AT THE FUTURE

The EU agreed on a forward-looking political agenda to achieve its core energy objectives by 2020. This agenda means very substantial change in EU's energy system over the coming years, with public authorities, energy regulators, infrastructure

operators, the energy industry and citizens all actively involved (European Commission, Second Strategic Energy Review—Securing our Energy Future, 2008). Completing the internal energy market, achieving energy savings and promoting low-carbon innovation are the main vectors to reach the objectives of competitiveness, sustainability and security of supply. An open global business climate and a more coherent and effective approach to the EU external energy relations are also recommended for reaching these objectives.

With the new energy policy, a number of opportunities lie ahead. Firstly, building a decarbonized economy will certainly require great efforts, but will also provide Europe with new jobs, fresh capital, technological advances. This way of development is fostered by the fact that the EU's greatest potential source of indigenous energy is renewable energy.The timely achievement of the energy objectives can put the EU industry at the forefront of the rapidly growing low carbon technology sector. Secondly, the new approach in the energy infrastructure policy and the implementation of modern integrated grids will effectively manage EU's supply dependence and firm its position on global energy markets.

To boost these opportunities, even in a time of economic crisis, the European Energy Programme for recovery (EEPR) was launched, investing to modernize Europe's energy infrastructure and production facilities. The EEPR represents an innovative approach to union financing of infrastructure and technology deployment in the energy sector. In terms of financial effort, it is the first time that such a large amount of funding has been made available under the EU budget (Report from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of the European Energy Programme for Recovery, 2012). The funding is allocated as follows:

- gas and electricity infrastructure projects (2.365 bln euros);
- offshore wind energy products (565 mln euros);
- carbon capture and storage products (1.050 bln euros).

Speaking more hypothetically of opportunities, through its endeavours to get a grip on climate change and resource shortages, the EU could set the pace for new industrial revolution. The key word of this new industrial revolution is eco-innovation. The EU Innovation Panel has defined the term as follows: *Eco-Innovation aims the creation of novel and competitively priced goods, processes, systems, services,*

and procedures that can satisfy human needs and bring quality of life at life-cycle-wide minimal use of natural resources (material including energy, water and surface area) per unit output, and a minimal release of toxic substances". From a European perspective, this means employing a bundle of already proven policies, lessons learned and best practices on the global scale. Thus, Europe's competitive edge will be supported—by a continuous stream of knowledge dividends resulting from the implementation of European sustainable technologies in newly industrialized economies and developing countries. The core elements of eco-innovation, namely sustainable energy, sustainable technology and the vast and ever-increasing knowledge base related to them are Europe's strongest assets in the new millennium. Hence, it is of utmost importance for the future of Europe in a changing world how this asset is employed (European Business Council for Sustainable Energy, 2008).

However, there are some possible threats endangering the success of the EU energy policy. One of them is the possibility that the costs of implementing Europe's global strategy will turn out to be too high. There is an important question: Would the benefits exceed the costs (in money and social terms) of building a wholly new energy system? Would countries relying on traditional energy resources so easily give up to the idea of green energy? There are no exact estimates of the costs that are going to be incurred if the whole European Union is to alter its energy generation practices and industry production patterns. However, there are some numbers available indicating that to achieve a 20 percent share of renewables will cost approximately 18 bln euros per year or around 6 percent of the EU's total expected energy import bill in 2020. Further, if a carbon price of more than 20 euros is factored in, the 20-percent objective will cost no more than relying on traditional resources, but will bring about benefits such as new jobs and new technology-driven European companies.

The other issue carrying a possible threat to the energy policy of the EU is that the EU cannot achieve its energy and climate change objectives on its own. In future, it will account for only 15 percent of the world's CO_2 emissions. By 2030, with the new objectives, the EU will consume less than 10 percent of the world's energy. In order to reach its ambitious ends the energy policy should involve strong partnering and cooperative external relations as well as common actions of Member States.

CONCLUSION

The EU has set the goal of a 20 percent cut in Europe's annual primary energy consumption by 2020. The European Commission has proposed several measures to increase efficiency at all stages of the energy chain: generation, transformation, distribution and final consumption. The measures focus on the public transport and building sectors, where the potential for savings is the greatest. Other measures include the introduction of smart metres (which encourage consumers to manage their energy use better), clearer product labelling and support for production of renewable energy.

Currently, more than 50 percent of the EU's energy comes from countries outside the Union and the percentage is growing. Much of that energy comes from Russia, whose disputes with transit countries have repeatedly disrupted supplies in recent years. This highlights the need for the EU to monitor its oil and gas supplies more closely and be prepared in the event of an energy emergency. Renewable energy sources are expected to be economically competitive with conventional energy sources in the medium to long-term. The EU has to provide a long-term vision of the future of renewable energy in the Union. This will help trigger investments, innovation and jobs. The challenge for renewable policy is to find the balance between installing large-scale renewable energy capacity today, and waiting until research lowers their cost tomorrow.

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ARE THERE ANY DISTORTIONS IN THE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN NON-PROFIT SECTOR? ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DUALITY[1]

László Kákai

INTRODUCTION

The present study may seem quite eclectic because it concentrates on two questions, which can be regarded controversial. One of them is about the effect of the economic potential on the development of the Hungarian non-profit sector, while the other deals with local and regional identity influencing the growth of the organizations, its presence or lack in the world of civil organizations. First of all, I will concentrate on some inconsistencies in the development of Hungarian non-governmental organizations. Before I come to this point, I intend to touch on a number of effects and tendencies, which have significant implications for our subject and serve as a framework to better understand the Hungarian process.

In every developed, democratic country of the world, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are indispensable components of the democratic political systems, playing an important mediator role between society and the political institutions. Their number, role, and influence have been increasing since World War II. The attention directed at NGOs may primarily be attributed to the more than two-decade-long crisis of the state as well as the crisis phenomena of representative democracy based on political parties.

In Europe this crisis manifested itself in various forms. In the developed North, the traditional welfare social policy was questioned; in a considerable part of the developing South, people became disillusioned with state-controlled development; in Central and Eastern Europe, state socialism collapsed.

[1] The material of the presentation was made with the support of János Bólyai Research Scholarship.

CIVIL SOCIETY TENDENCIES IN A HISTORIC CONTEXT

In Central and Eastern Europe, the development of the non-profit sector is essentially linked with the 1989 revolutions. During Communist times, except for a short period, civil society was disrupted. After the 1956 revolution it was only Hungary, Poland and the former Yugoslavia where a limited pluralism was allowed at the universities and in the arts and culture sectors. A newly emerged civil society was prepared by the Solidarity movement in Poland; by a range of small clubs and societies in Hungary; and by peace and green movement groups in Czechoslovakia.

The escalation of the economic, political and social crisis from the mid 1980's generated a "revival" of organisational life in Hungary. At the beginning of the '80's, new types of social self-organization emerged from peace movements to eco-movements, which were later followed by a "new wave" of student movements, a self-directing college movement and the club movement within and outside universities, as well as politically oriented associations and forums. The start of opening up was marked by the re-appearance of the foundation as a legal entity in 1987, then it went on with the ratification of the Associations Act in 1989, and it was concluded with the amendment of Civil Code (enacted in 1990), which abolished the former restriction that a foundation could only be set up with the approval of the relevant government authority. Following the 1989 Act, which guaranteed the conditions of freely setting up organisations, taking advantage of the historical opportunity and the erosion of the political system, the number of organisations was growing continuously. While in 1982 there were 6,570 registered organisations, in 1989 there were 8,514. The internal structure of the sector also changed: between 1987 and 1989 the number of art, city preservation, and cultural organisations increased sevenfold, and the number of other, typically self-starting associations (environmental protection, humane, pensioner, economic/professional) also increased tenfold.

We also need to highlight the counter process during which double transformation of the former state party power took place. By breaking up the former assets of the state party and building on the infrastructure of some of its satellite organizations, new associations and foundations were formed, this time within the legal framework of democratic laws. Their officials were "scattered" but they were able to carry on with their personal networking outside the party. Some of them really worked to establish an independent civil society, while others retained their political connections.

Figure 1. Non-profit organisations in breakdown of fields of activity, 2008



Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2010

After 40 years of state socialism which resulted in the forced abolition of civil society and the erosion of social capital, the self-organizing and representation patterns and conventions of society were not present in all sections of society. So, there were no opportunities for the various social groups to satisfy different social needs. We have to say that the fast economic and constitutional changes could not be followed by the development of the bourgeois society's civil culture. Most of the political elite and the active civilians of the post-communistic countries had been socialized in the old communistic system. Their expectations concerning paternalism, stability and the welfare state are still unbroken, they expect the maintenance of all those along the conditions of market economy, too.

As shown in the figure, the data clearly indicate that there was a highly extensive and continuously expanding sector until 1997.

However, the studies done by Central Statistical Office in 2000 marked a clear slowdown in the sector's development dynamics. It means that since 1997, the number of organizations has not actually changed.

Figure 2. The number of non-profit organisations between 1989 and 2008



Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2010

Moreover, 2000 was the first year when the size of the sector did not increase but actually decreased. Following the decline, or "flatting out" of the development tendency, again there has been a growth trend since 2003.

Hungarian non-profit organizations have nearly 4 million members, which, regardless that one person can be a member of several organizations, is a remarkable achievement in a country of 10 million.

In contrast, looking at the volunteers of non-profit organizations too, statistical data show that less than half a million people carried out such activity, which makes only 5 percent of the population over 14.

Low rate concerning civilian participation and low subjective competence can partly be explained by a tendency, experienced in other Eastern European countries too, indicating that the altered social and economic environment brings new challenges and demands to its citizens.

Besides the sector growth, we also need to consider the role the sector plays in employment. Affected by the transformation crisis and globalization, the state is continuously withdrawing from the fields of education, healthcare and social policy. Many expected that the "space" left empty will be increasingly filled in by a growing

non-governmental sector, together with other players (businesses, entrepreneurs), and thus will dominate the employment and public services. In Western European countries, the size of non-governmental sector is generally large. The rate of labour force it employs is 7.8 percent on average compared to economically active population. In three countries (Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands) this rate exceeds 10 percent.

Hungary does not differ much from Central and East European tendencies, since the non-profit sector can employ less than two percent of full-time employees and only 5 percent of the organisations are contracted to carry out public tasks.

In addition to their size, NGOs' economic indicators have also been rising dynamically in the past years, signalling the sector growing stronger. As shown in the following figure, the sector's income increased eightfold between 1993 and 2008. The annual income of the non-profit sector in 2008 was more than HUF 1000 billion, which appeared to be a huge sum, but it was actually less than 1 percent of the GDP.

Figure 3. The revenues of non-profit organisations, 1993-2008



Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2010

The state contributes 42% to the non-profit sector's income, which is relatively low compared to nearly 60% of Western European contribution; however, it is regarded

high among former socialist countries. I should remark that perhaps the way of financing itself reveals the inherent distortions of the sector.

Figure 4. The allocation of revenues of non-profit organisations in breakdown of sources, 1993-2008



Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2010

From the mid-90's, partly taking advantage of legal possibilities, the government and the local councils were busy starting public foundations whose actual purpose was to distribute state subsidies among various fields and target groups (e.g. public education, sport, roma minority, needy university students, etc.), as well as to carry out prominent activities (mainly in research and teaching).

Within a few years' time, these big public foundations and public benefit companies operating mostly nationally or regionally "absorbed" a significant portion of the rather scarce central (state) subventions directed at the non-profit sector.

As shown in the following graph, the income of public benefit companies and public foundations set up by the state and local governments has been dynamically growing at the expense of other organisations. It all happened while the proportion of these two types of organisation within the whole NGO sector is basically insignificant.

Figure 5. Rate of income and sectoral weight of public of public foundations and public benefit companies, 1994-2008



Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2010

If we look at the distribution of state subsidies in 2008 only, we can see that public benefit companies and public foundations received more than 50 percent of the financial support.

This process reinforces the tendencies that in Hungary a "second" non-profit sphere is evolving (public foundations and public benefit companies)—which could also be called state or municipal non-profit—which are essentially not non-governmental organisations and handle not private but rather public assets.

For a number of different accounting, budgetary, taxing and organisational reasons this type of organisation has become increasingly popular with the state and the local governments as it is basically a disguised way for the state and local governments to finance themselves. This is because tax concessions are in fact savings for the public body assigned with the task and funded from the central budget.

I would like to mention another distorting effect, a so-called regional concentration of resources.

Figure 6. The division of the total amount of revenues within the non-profit branch and its organisations by the settlements types, 2008



Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2010

It means that nearly two-thirds of the income land at certain organisations in the capital city, while only less than a third of them are located there. This tendency forecasts a regional polarisation between "country and capital," as well as a polarisation of resources between the "rich and poor".

All this may result in the division or "duplication" of the Hungarian non-profit sector, where, on one side, we find "grassroots organizations" (mostly associations and private foundations). These constitute the majority, but due to scarce resources they struggle for their daily survival, which depends largely on their leaders' skills and creativity. On the other side, we find a limited number of organisations with substantial resources (public foundations, public benefit companies), which are strongly connected (through contracts and subsidies) with the state and local governments or their institutions.

Due to all these reasons and circumstances, if I had to describe the Hungarian non-profit sector in a single sentence, I would say that its number and membership may be significant though, it is particularly weak in terms of resources and its role to accumulate social capital and to get involved in national and local political decision support and articulation of interests.

Summarizing we could say that the lack, the weakness and the declination of bourgeois and civilian traditions is the inheritance in Europe that makes positions of etatism easier after 20 years.

REGIONAL ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR

It has been ages since economists have been seeking an answer to the following question: why can a country be successful, or rather what the chances of a country are for catching up with the rest of the world? Edmund S. Phelps the 2006 winner of the Nobel Prize in economics tried to answer the question of how much cultural variables affect the growth of productivity, economic activity and employment (Phelps, 2006). He refers to the survey published in 2006 (World Values Survey) in which he divides cultural factors into two groups: individual and public cultural values. Individual values are civil and political freedom, the support of the participation of the individual in public decisions (elections) and its frequency, tolerance to words' non-conform behaviour, the freedom of self-determination and the expression of trust toward other people. Public factors consist of religion, emphasis on national feelings, the strength of authority and obedience, as well as family traditions. The results of the survey show the existence of homogeneous country-groups such as protestant Europe, where both the individual and public cultural values represent great opportunities for choice, Confucianist Far East, Anglo-Saxon and Latin world. A surprising result of the survey is that there are some "odd-ones-out" in some cultural groups regarding geographical locations. For example, Hungary does not show qualities, which characterise the western ex-communist Visegrad Group or the Baltic Group but it is closer to the Eastern and the Balkan[2] ex-communist nations. Maybe I was inspired by this so as to examine the influence of the economic environment on the number and situation of civil organizations regarding the interaction between economic parameters and non-profit organizations.

Comparing the situation of civil penetration with the economic indicators of Hungary of 2000 it can be concluded that *the indicators connected with the individual tax payer such as the number of tax payers, the sum of the basis of assessment and the sum of the tax are strong influencing factors. As regards the sum of GDP per capita and the quantity of foreign working capital the influence is less strong. The factors that*

[2] For example: Romania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, Serbia, Latvia, Ukraine etc.

represent the general situation of enterprises such as the number of incorporated and non-incorporated businesses have a weak effect.

Considering the above-mentioned facts it can be stated that in 2000 the civil sector was mostly dependent on civil conditions besides state supports and the income off enterprises. The situation of the organizations was primarily influenced by how intensively citizens joined the activities of the non-profit organizations and their finances. Moreover, it is important to the state that the effect of the economic sphere has appeared since then. However, it has not been initiated by local enterprises but it has been the result of foreign and multinational businesses.

Foreign companies are paying attention to taking social responsibility all over the world, i.e. they are investing a part of their profits to socially useful purposes. It is very often realised as the support of civil sphere. Multinational companies have introduced this practice in their Hungarian branches and its result is that in 2000 the effect of foreign companies on civil organizations was larger than that of Hungarian businesses. On the other hand, we cannot forget about the fact that these companies were in a much better economic situation than the Hungarian ones, therefore, it was easier for them to donate financial resources for social purposes.

The geographical location of civil organizations also supports these statements. *The number of civil organizations per 1,000 persons is higher in the regions* (especially in the western regions of the country) *where the income of the population is higher than the average and where a great number of foreign companies have settled down.*

The millenary brought about important changes in the Hungarian society and they affected civil organizations in general, as well. In 2006 there was considerable change regarding the relationship between economic conditions and the situation of civil organizations. Population factors are still affecting the situation of the organizations; however, the influence of both international and local companies can be seen strongly. By 2006 the non-profit organizations were supported by every non-state actor, consequently the sector was given significant resources by citizens, local and international businesses.

The regional characteristics did not change between 2000 and 2006: *the number of civil organizations per 1,000 persons was still higher in the regions (especially in the western regions and in the Central Region of the country) where the income of the population is higher than the average and where a great number of foreign companies have settled down* (Kákai, 2009).

It is worth examining what position these above-mentioned resources take up in the income structure of civil organizations nationally, and regionally. If we compare the proportion of supports made by citizens and different companies as part of the whole income, we can see that while the proportion of incomes coming from civil resources is the same, the proportion of company resources has changed considerably. At the same time the graph shows that while civil incomes rose slightly between 2006 and 2007 company incomes dropped significantly by more than two percent.

*Figure 7. The proportion of the civil and company incomes in the whole income of organizations *(2000, 2006, 2007)*



** Calculated from KSH 2007 non-profit database*

The decrease can explain the fact that the first symptoms of the economic crisis were already seen in the data of 2007. Economists agree that the first effects appeared in 2007. Probably it means that the first effects were felt by the Hungarian enterprise sector although this period was not regarded as a crisis, and it started to rationalize its expenses. This rationalization probably started with cutting down expenses, which were not essential parts of the operation of a company, e.g. the support of civil organizations. This scenario seems likely because the pattern of changes does not look homogenous, i.e. it does not mean that companies in a general sense spent less on the

support of civil organizations, but it means that companies of particular regions or those of a particular sector spent less on this purpose.

If we examine the regional level we will find the same trends. The proportion of incomes from civil sources between 2000 and 2006 remained the same in almost all regions. The only exception to this is the region of Northern Hungary, where the quota from this source dropped from 3.1 percent to 2.4 percent.

Figure 8. The Regions of Hungary

The proportion of enterprise incomes from different sources, however, increased significantly in almost all regions except for the region of Central Transdanubia and the region of the Northern Great (Hungarian) Plain. The quota of incomes coming from enterprises a remained unchanged in these areas.

The quota of incomes coming from different companies was considerably higher in 2000 in the Central Region and in the region of Central Transdanubia than the national average. By 2006 this changed a bit, the region of Central Transdanubia showed only average results while in the region of the Southern Great (Hungarian) Plain they were above the average.

The quota of incomes coming from companies especially in the region of West Pannonia and in the region of the Southern Great Plain decreased in 2007, which can be interpreted as a symptom of the economic crisis. It was partly verified by analyses

conducted since the start of the economic crisis according to which the greatest economic decline was observed in the regions that were prospering economically. In the last 10-15 years export-oriented multinational companies specialising in processing industry in the North-West of Transdanubia and their delivery partners had to decrease their production, dismiss some of their employees or stop their activities in 2009. On the other hand, it seems that some regions were not affected, these were badly-developed outlying districts along the north-eastern and the southern borders of the country and some regions in the Great Plain and the south of Transdanubia which do not have bigger towns or cities.[3] These data support the results of economic geography examinations, which deal with the development of local regions which is changing in time (in different periods) and which is moving between extreme values. The bottom line of the process is that the regions which were more developed economically than the average (such as Central Region, the regions of Central Transdanubia and West Pannonia) were developing faster, while the ones which were worse-developed economically than the average (such as the regions of Southern Transdanubia and the Southern Great Plain) were developing but their development was far from the average. The development of the regions of Northern Hungary and the Northern Great (Hungarian) Plain fit the national trend more or less (Pitti, 2008: 55). The economic crisis changed this at the expense of the previously developed regions. Consequently the crisis itself results in the decrease in the regional inequality of development, which can be regarded desirable in itself, however, it is due to the regression of more developed regions and it is not related to the fact that the less developed regions and areas are becoming richer. A further intensification of continuously appearing differences can be expected in the relation of the capital city and the country (Lőcsei, 2009).

IDENTITY IN SOUTHERN TRANSDANUBIA

In the last part of the paper, I am going to deal with a less visible and measurable aspect of success, which can simply be called identity. To start from a bit distant statement, we can assume that in our world of globalization it is more important than ever for everyone to be able to determine themselves. As a result of this, it can be seen that people return to their identity originating from their history and nationality. The county and regional identity (especially the latter) has been gaining importance

[3] As there has not been industrial production capacity.

recently as a consequence of the regional policy of the European Union, the deepening of the integration, and wider and other important factors.

In Hungary regionalism did not have its traditions. Due to the lack of historical and cultural traditions and institutional frames, its establishment seems to be hard work. Moreover, the regionalization of ethnical, religious and cultural differences, which is built on traditions, can cause several problems (A. Gergely, 1996, 1998). Therefore, the forms of the manifestation of local identity can be examined at the level of settlements and counties.

There have been very few researches in Hungary in which the local, regional, or national identity of the leaders of civil organizations has been examined. This question is seemingly evident if we take into consideration the "dry" statistical data that more than half of the organizations perform their activities in their own settlements, and only a quarter of them are linked with local and regional categories (Nagy – Sebestény – Szabó, 2009). Consequently, these organizations identify themselves as local ones. Identity is no longer thought of as a system of relationships which is built on traditions and emotional elements as a result of the continually changing and developing processes of local, national and international spaces. Identity can be defined as a process of modernization, as a conscious reply to how to deal with and substitute the appearance of a direct spatial identity (Ipsen, 1993). The identity that is aimed at larger spatial categories is regarded important so that migration can be stopped and local investment opportunities, cultural and social activity can be encouraged. Nowadays the competition for European Union resources and investments is also based on regional identity. This utilitarian approach does not exclude the socio-psychological and political side of regional identity, which can be positive and negative relationship of the local society and the political élite to space. It means that this relationship is active dynamic; it can be established and destroyed at to the same time (Szabó-Kovács, 2006: 407).

Identity—as Manuel Castells defined it—is primarily a cultural phenomenon which may have several bases such as legitimatization identity which is created by the elite so that they can certify their own views, or which is based on firm basic principles e.g. marginalized nations such as the Palestinians. Another form of identity can be projectional which presupposes strengths and vigour, is open to changes and ready to project itself on other groups as well (Castells, 2006: 74).

The results of our survey which was based on interviewing the leaders of civil organizations of three counties in Southern Transdanubia support the identity-

generating effects or the above-mentioned factors, *in other words settlements show relatively weak identification regarding the greater geographical space*.

Most of the leaders of the civil organizations like living in their home county. Only 8 percent have negative feelings to words their place of living.

Figure 9. Regional identity



Its background relates to the fact that most of them *show a high level of local identity*. Another important factor is the nice landscape as well. The ones who dislike their home county mention economic reasons in the first place (e.g. lack of development, declining of standard of living), although the lack of openness and the migration of the inhabitants also are mentioned among the reasons.

Although this effect is indirect and has not been proved empirically, these data allow us to draw the following conclusion: after the change of the regime local identity became stronger, the county, however, lost its previous attraction. Regarding the regional and county identity, considerable changes took place in a relatively short period (in several years) in favour of the settlements, which can be interpreted as the consequence of division of authority within the local government according to Antal Bőhm (Bőhm, 2000).

Figure 10. Regional identity



The civil representatives who were asked about their identity regarding their settlement are mostly proud of their culture, historical traditions, natural resources, state of their settlement, its tourism and development. Regarding their county, its natural resources seem to have the highest value and the above-mentioned factors are not mentioned so often. In the case of the region there are not any factors that can be considered outstanding: all the factors are more or less mentioned in the same a proportion, which supports the fact that *the region as a factor generating identity is missing from the inhabitants' consciousness.*

In connection with this, a question can be asked: how can regional identity be established more successfully, *(from the bottom or from the top)*? Upwards or downwards (with the help of social initiative or politics and institutions)? Essentially this is a problem of cause and effect since it is not sure whether the establishment and development of regional identity advances from civil society to a political level (the government, local governments and their institutions), or vice-versa, i.e. the level of confidence of individuals and organizations and through this their identity can become lower or higher thanks to a certain government or local government institution.

Figure 11. Regional identity



As I have already stated, the region appears in the way of thinking of the leaders of the organizations to the lower extent, however, it does not prevent them from being able to mention problems, which can only be dealt with in a larger space category. As a matter of fact, each leader of a civil organization is aware of the fact that the region has such problems that could be solved with the cooperation of the three counties. Economic underdevelopment as regarded to be the biggest difficulty. Other problems of significance can be transportation, the creation of workplaces and infrastructure.

Figure 12. Regional identity



The most important purpose of development in the region is the development of tourism, economy, transportation, road network, human resources and infrastructure. Most of the representatives taking part in the survey only mentioned tourism, thermal water and other natural resources as utilizable "treasures". It can seem surprising that more than one tenth of the organizations could not name a resource which could be utilized by the three counties together.

From the point of view of identity the existence or lack of settlement identity can be another essential fact. Almost two-thirds of the representatives have been living in their home county since they were born, the rest moved there in the last 10 years.

Figure 13. Mobility: How long have you been living in your county? (representatives of civil organizations, %)



Almost each of them is loyal to their present home settlement and only 8 percent are planning to move.

Figure 14. Are you planning to move from your present home settlement in the near future (1-2 years)? (representatives of civil organizations, %)



We were also interested in how mobile the leaders of the organizations in the region are in regards of official visits.[4]

Figure 15. Mobility groups (representatives of civil organizations, %)



All this emphasises again the local identity of civil organizations since their cases are mostly conducted in this space category. On the other hand, within this space category they are considerably known as the actors of work-relationships because in this respect the leaders of civil organizations are the third after mayors and university leaders.

CONCLUSION

The research has shown that although county identity has a rather weak political and sociological basis, it is probably the only identity, which can be found. The survival of the county as a geographical unit is not the result of the national county policy but it is due to the fact that the state, society and economy, especially service institutions are still organized in county units within the borders of a county. Thanks to this fact the everyday mobility scope of the elite of the region is much narrower and is defined by the county unit. All this means the following: if the institutions, the political representative mechanisms do not operate in a regional unit it is difficult for the

[4] Mobility was examined on various levels such as visits in their home county, their home region, other regions, the capital city and abroad.

individuals and their communities of the region to create a relationship or a project. Looking back on Castells' definitions of identity it can be stated that in this region we cannot find either projectional identity or identity based on firm principles, however, the elements of legitimatization identity can be felt.

A part of county-consciousness which can still be felt is scarcely linked with the narrow political and administration elite of the county among the inhabitants. This elite is divided and because they lack real networks they are not able to represent county interests (Szabó –Kovács, 206: 409) but because they lack traditions and institutions as well, the chance of establishing regional identity is even lower since it will be hard to build regional identity on the ruins of county identity (Pálné, 2000).

In my opinion, civil society can only become civil mentality in Hungary and other post-communistic countries if it gets rid of the effects of post-communistic etatism. To achieve this, individual initiation and undertaking of pluralism is needed as a real civil basis. The 'civils' are the citizens, and civil organizations are the free associations of the citizens, who carry out public tasks voluntarily. After the end of communism, therefore, civil society has to keep a distance from the trends of 'paternalistic, democratic despotism', and, they have to contrast it with the spirit of autonomy, solidarity and creativity.

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Chapter III

Education, languages, policy challenges

THE REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT OF MID-RANGE UNIVERSITIES IN CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE – SUSTAINABLE UNIVERSITY STRATEGIES IN THE ERA OF POST-MASS EDUCATION

Zoltán Gál

INTRODUCTION

Modern universities are viewed as the core of the knowledge base, acting as key elements of innovation systems, supporting science and innovation-based regional growth (Huggins & Kitagawa 2009). The so-called regional engagement of universities has been developed through an evolutionary process during the last 50 years. Traditionally, universities primarily focused on teaching and, to some extent, research, while university education was elite education. In many European countries, due to the gradual expansion of the higher education sector, the appearance of mass education and lifelong learning, and the declining share of grants provided by the state in the 1970's and 1980's, competition between the universities has become stronger, and they have been forced to perform their research activities on a profit-oriented basis. Universities have had to seek alternative sources of funding from business, industry, civil society and non-national state actors (Harloe & Perry, 2004). Also, public funding became increasingly competitive funding, and research activities often require public-private partnership. This is called the "entrepreneurial turn", or the servicing mission of universities (Tjedvoll, 1997; Inman & Schuetze, 2010).

Later, in addition to teaching and research universities started to adapt a third mission or developmental role, which can be described as "community service" mainly by the US literature, and "regional engagement" in Europe (Holland, 2001), "regional innovation organisation" or "academic entrepreneurialism" (OECD, 1999).

The university engagement literature, while accepting that universities may well undertake knowledge-generative activities, proposes that they adopt a broader, developmental focus on adapting their core functions of teaching and research, as well

as community service, to address regional needs (OECD 1999; Chatterton & Goddard 2000). With regard to human capital formation, the university engagement literature focuses on the importance of regionally-focused teaching (Chatterton & Goddard, 2000), which is manifested in a stronger focus on regional student recruitment and graduate retention; the development of programmes that address skills required by regional industries, particularly, small and medium-sized entreprises; and the localisation of learning processes, for example, through workplace-based learning and regional projects.

This third (developmental and engagement) mission is a somewhat indefinite concept, which refers to the economic development role motivated by the social responsibility of the institutions. According to Harloe and Perry (2004), the third role of universities in relation to sub-national (EU regions) economies and societies has been widely justified in terms of the development of the knowledge economy and the significance of the regions in economic development. This "regionalization of the economy" strengthens the links between the universities and the clusters of firms and regionally-based supply chains of small and medium-sized firms (Gunasekara, 2004). Knowledge and innovation have become increasingly important sources of economic development, and there is a pressure from government, businesses and communities for universities to align their core functions with regional needs (Chatterton & Goddard, 2000).

Huggins and Kitagawa (2009) argue that although universities emphasize their international orientation, they are embedded in their region and add to the area's economic and social strength through e.g. preserving local jobs, diversifying the local economy and attracting inward investors. Among many others, these authors state that economic development and the welfare of regions can be enhanced through universities' various engagement with the local economy, including research, infrastructure development, education, effective industry–university partnerships, technological innovation and community development.

This paper tries to adapt the models of universities' regional engagement in the case of a peripheral border region in Central and Eastern Europe, the South Transdanubia Region in Hungary. Although the study applies the concept of mid-range university to Central and Eastern Europe, the term of mid-ranged universities was borrowed from the study by Wright et al. (2009), which is focused on mid-range universities and their links with industry in British, Belgian, German and Swedish regions. In

the UK, for example, mid-range universities are defined as all universities excepting top universities and new (post-1992) universities. For example, the sample of Wright et al. (2008) included universities teaching between 8 thousand and 33 thousand students and employing between 700 and 2,500 full-time researchers. However, in the UK and other European countries there are many first-ranked universities located in non-metropolitan regions, which is not the case in Central and Eastern Europe. As the consequence of a spatial concentration of top universities in Central and Eastern European countries almost exclusively in metropolitan areas, mid-range universities are most often located in non-metropolitan regions (Gál and Ptáček, 2011).

The article examines to what extent regional, mid-range universities may enhance economic development in a lagging area and to what extent European models of the universities' third role may be relevant in this particular region. The hypothesis is that universities' developmental role is much weaker in peripheral regions where mostly mid-range universities are present, and the traditional models designed for first-ranked universities located in prosperous economic environment are not directly applicable due to e.g. the different sectoral structure of the economy and the different nature of the knowledge supply and demand (Gál and Zsibók, 2011).

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly summarize the results of the literature concerning the economic impact of the universities and the methods of the quantitative measurement. Then, the paper presents the relevant theoretical considerations about the developmental role of universities including the traditional theories, the triple helix model and its variants and the regional engagement literature. The following section focuses on the specificities of the mid-range, peripheral universities, which have similar characteristics to those of South Transdanubia. After it, case studies are presented from the region, which may reveal the position of the universities in the system of regional and cross-border development. Finally, some concluding considerations are included in the last section.

UNIVERSITY ENGAGEMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES IN THE REGIONS

The literature on the "engaged university" (OECD 1999; Holland 2001; Chatterton & Goddard 2000) also focuses on the third role of universities in regional development, but it differs from the triple helix model in its emphasis on the responses of universities that adopted a stronger regional focus in their teaching and research missions. The

evolution of the engaged universities ran parallelly with the regionalization of the economy, or "the rise of the regions" which means that the salience of the regional scale increases and the regulatory capacity of the nation-state declines (Arbo & Benneworth, 2007). Essentially, universities' regional engagement means meeting the various needs of the modern client population, such as flexible structures for lifelong learning created by changing skill demands, more locally based education as public maintenance support for students declines, greater links between research and teaching, and more engagement with the end users of research (Chatterton & Goddard, 2000). Also, regional institutions including universities have gained more and more importance in the governance of the regional economy; therefore, universities as important parts of the regional networks have become more embedded in their regional environment.

The engaged university approach encompasses a range of mechanisms by which universities engage with their regions. The literature on the responsive university places less emphasis on academic entrepreneurialism, compared with the triple helix model, and more on community service. Here, community service means that the university is a community-based institution serving the needs of the society in a local area or region (Chatterton & Goddard, 2000). Unlike in the US, European higher education institutions are highly dependent on state support. However, from the point of view of their regions, they function as autonomous institutions and have control over the nature of teaching and research, since they are under national regulations and raise the majority of their funding from national sources. Therefore, regional engagement is not inherent to these institutions. There is an external pressure from government, businesses and communities for universities to align their core functions with regional needs. Universities also need to diversify sources of funding due to the rising relative costs of education, the intensifying competition for students and research contracts in conjunction with fiscal and demographic pressures, in order to maintain their academic standing and in some cases, to even survive. Taking a specific approach, OECD (1999) as well as Srinivas and Viljamaa (2008) analysed the process and motives of becoming an engaged university in the context of institutional change and institutional interactions.

University engagement can incorporate several activities. Together with the shift of the higher education sector from elite education to mass education and the prevalence of lifelong learning, there is a requirement from universities to educate

graduates in compliance with the needs of the regional labour market. This means that universities provide an interface between graduates and the labour market in their region. According to Chatterton and Goddard (2000), engaged universities provide flexible structures for lifelong learning created by changing skill demands; and more locally-based education as public maintenance support for student declines.

In the field of research, universities' engagement means greater links between research and teaching; and more engagement with the end users of research, e.g. in the form of regional research networks and joint research with participants from the academia and the industry (Chatterton & Goddard, 2000). Since university researches are conducted mainly in international academic networks, universities are able to channel the international knowledge accumulated to regional users. A considerable part of the literature, e.g. Varga (2009) build on the notion that knowledge generation becomes localized and agglomeration effects are crucial for the spillover effects to work. Evidence proves (see e.g. Drucker & Goldstein, 2007) the importance of proximity in supporting university–industry joint research efforts and other collaborations.

Universities engage with their regions not only in the fields of education and research, but also in regional institutions and governance systems. This is the consequence of the previously mentioned phenomenon that the regionalization of the state activity has been on the increase in Europe, and administrative and political decisions are increasingly made at the regional level (Chatterton & Goddard 2000). For this reason, institutional capacities have to be built and extended at the sub-national level and sub-national policy networks have to be created. As important regional actors, universities are part of these governance networks (see Arbo & Benneworth, 2007)

In addition, the community service of the universities often takes the form of developing the social and cultural infrastructure of the region in accordance with the specific needs of university students and academics.

Arbo and Benneworth (2007) review the numerous aspects through which higher education institutions are embedded in their regions. These are primarily non-economic aspects including regional policy, national and regional innovation systems, human capital development and governance systems. They concentrate on the numerous interfaces through which the university and its region may be linked.

The impact of local universities is not restricted to the technical sphere, but may spread into wider social and economic effects on their region. Commitment to social and organizational innovation is gaining more and more importance as main

barriers emerge from the social sides even if universities and regions try to introduce adopted technologies. Social and organizational innovation means in wider context the generation and implementation of new ideas and creativity in order to overcome the social barriers of innovation and it requires ongoing social interactions (Mumord – Moertl, 2003). Innovators face many social and managerial barriers, which inhibit innovations. Among others, the inadequate funding, risk avoidance, incorrect measures and forecasts, lack of partnerships and deficiencies in collaboration are the most important social and managerial constraints. Social innovations facilitate the formation of new institutions, networks and building up social capital through collective learning processes (Kitagawa, 2004).

MID-RANGE UNIVERSITIES IN PERIPHERAL REGIONS

Many of the empirical studies on universities' regional developmental role and economic impact derive their findings from investigating large, world-class research universities located in highly-developed economic environment. Nevertheless, Wright et al. (2008) argue that those findings are not necessarily relevant for all the universities, especially for mid-range universities. The main features of the mid-range, regional universities are that they are located in secondary cities where the regional demand for innovation is moderate, the density of contacts are much lower and possible spillover effects emerge more sparsely; they may not possess a base of world-class research; academics work in a smaller local scientific community in which they interact with the industry; and the creation of spin-off companies is different in its nature (Wright et al., 2008).

According to Gál and Ptáček (2011), the model of university engagement can be adopted by those mid-range universities in the less developed East European regions, which do not have the critical mass to engage in world-class scientific research, but instead *these universities* can focus on other than high-technology innovation. For the less developed, reindustrializing Central and Eastern European regions with substantial human capital resources, benefiting from the relocation of European industry but not yet fully developed knowledge creation and transfer capacities, this special situation forces mid-range universities to take on new roles in contrast with other countries/regions where university–state–industry–citizen relations have perhaps had longer time frames to evolve. This new role means a stronger regional engagement in medium-tech innovations and in social and organizational innovation.

In their paper, Huggins and Johnston (2009) compared the economic impact of universities of different types, and they found that there are significant differences in the wealth generated by universities according to regional location and the type of institution. According to their results, universities in more competitive regions are generally more productive than those located in less competitive regions, and more traditional universities are generally more productive than newer ones in the UK. Furthermore, the overall economic and innovation performance of regions in the UK is generally inversely related to their dependence on the universities located within their boundaries. This means that weaker regions tend to be more dependent on their universities for income and innovation, but often these universities underperform in comparison with similar institutions in more competitive regions. Although knowledge commercialization activity might be a source of productivity advantage for universities, markets for knowledge in less competitive regions appear to be weak on the demand side. Huggins and Johnston (2009) emphasize that the regional environment may also influence the actions of institutions, since a relatively strong knowledge-generating university in a relatively weak region may have a greater propensity to engage with firms in other regions. In weak regions the private economy's strength may be insufficient and small and medium-sized entreprises may be unable to exploit the benefits of the engagement with the universities. In the long run this may result in a leakage of knowledge from the home region, which further deepens the disparities in regional competitiveness.

Benneworth and Hospers (2007) focus on how peripheral regions—which are functionally distant from core economic activities—can reposition themselves in the knowledge economy. They argue that such regions are internally fragmented, which reduces their capacity to attract and embed external investment to reduce this distance, and upgrade their status among other regions within a technical division of labour. In regions with sub-optimal innovation systems, it is very hard to lay down the foundations of a sustainable local economic growth. According to Benneworth and Hospers (2007), a governance failure is in the root of this problem, namely the networking deficiencies. They list a range of internal and external barriers that less-favoured regions face when building local networks, which exploit the knowledge spillovers of external investments. Internal barriers include a lack of local institutional capacity, a lack of critical mass or substantive outcome, the lack of entrepreneurial resources, and a mismatch between the science base and the knowledge users.

External barriers to building and integrating local networks are the unfavourable economic specialization (to low-tech industries), externally imposed barriers to local governance integration, antipathy by external firm owners to local innovation, and poor external image discouraging potential investors.

UNIVERSITY ENGAGEMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Limits of economic impact of universities in Central and Eastern Europe

There is a substantial spatial concentration of top universities almost exclusively in metropolitan areas in the Central and Eastern European countries. Mid-range universities are most often located in non-metropolitan regions or to put it in another way, most of the universities outside the capital cities can be classified as mid-range, where the R&D potential and the "density of contacts" are much lower and possible spillover effects emerge more sparsely. For this very reason, mid-range universities represent the keystones of regional innovation systems and are often crucial parts of regional innovation strategies (Gál & Ptáček, 2011). During the transition in the 1990's universities were mostly facing the pressure of the state to increase their educational role. The system of universities' financing in this decade did not motivate them to search for new contacts and collaboration with industry and it was much easier to survive through the rising numbers of students.

The gradual "marketization" of the higher education sector started after 2000 as a result of several factors. In general, it was the recognition of knowledge as a source of economic growth. In the process of the marketization, universities started to use standard tools borrowed from Western Europe, but the result could not be the same because of different history and position of universities in the regional or national innovation systems. EU accession and the possibility to use EU development funds (such as cohesion funds) for building knowledge infrastructure induced an active approach from the side of universities. The establishment of the supporting innovation infrastructure (scientific parks, scientific incubators) was further developed at the universities thanks to the role of intermediaries (mostly technology transfer offices or R&D services) which focused, on the one hand, on the building of ties with industry and, on the other hand, on gaining EU funds for infrastructure building. In that period, the trend of incoming foreign direct investments shifted from the low-paid routine labour towards investments requiring a skilled and university educated labour force. In this sense multinational companies have a pioneering role in the

knowledge spillover from universities to industry (Ptáček, 2009). The regional impact of these processes is leading to the ongoing polarisation of the R&D potential between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas; that is, R&D resources and research capacities are more and more unequally distributed among the regions (Ptáček, 2009; Gál 2005). This resulted in that mid-range universities remain the keystones of regional innovation infrastructure outside of the metropolitan regions; furthermore, their role even increases. Sectoral research institutes set up in the socialist era and sponsored by the indstry and relevant ministries were mostly closed down after the regime change, and so their role was taken over by local universities.

In sum, the role of mid-range universities in CEE countries is weaker than in more developed countries of the EU and the process of adaptation to new social and economic conditions started substantially later than in Western Europe. At the same time mid-range universities located mostly outside of the metropolitan areas have to face similar problems and disadvantages as in their western counterparts such as less intensive university-industry contacts, weak local R&D networks etc. (see Table 1 and Gál & Ptáček, 2011).

Table 1. Main indicators of mid-range universities in Western Europe and their CEE counterparts

	University of Pécs (Hu)	UP Olomouc (Cz)	**Notthingham University**	**University of Karlsruhe**	**University of Ghent**	**University of Antwerp**
N students	28,000	22,000	33,000	15,686	21,160	8,029
N FTE researchers	1051	1158		2500	1401	846
N FTE technology transfer	6	7	4	1	3	4
HERD Mill. Eur	14	19.4	150	83	122	45
N spin-offs	11	7	27	unknown	12	2
Total RSBO	n.a		n.a.		23	4
Regional GDP (Bn Eur)	6.7	11.2	103.8	316.9	157.3	157.3
GRP per capita (Eur)	6,900	9,600	24,145	29,694	26,194	26,194

Note: by the author and Wright et al. 2008

It is often argued that universities are able to generate economic effects based on knowledge spillovers and innovation transfers to businesses (Etzkowitz et al. 2000). The differences between the advanced regions of metropolitan agglomerations and the most backward regions are emphasised in the relationship between universities and their regions (Ács et al. 2000). This means that in most of the non-metropolitan Central and Eastern European regions, where the regional innovation systems and the university–industry linkages are still weak, the role of universities in local development has to be revised and, consequently, the economic impact of universities cannot be unambiguously extended to transition economies. For example, a Hungarian study concluded that the knowledge-producing ability of the academic sector did not increase the knowledge-exploitation ability of the local business sector and, moreover, both universities and the less developed local economy may be responsible for several hindering factors of intraregional knowledge transfer between universities and industries (Gál & Csonka, 2007). Similarly, Bajmóczy and Lukovics (2009) showed that university researches for local economic development may mean an outstanding instrument in case of advanced regions but not necessarily for the less developed regions where the lack of appropriate industrial base is one of the main constraints. They measured the contribution of Hungarian universities to regional economic and innovation performance between 1998 and 2004. The results showed that the presence of universities does not affect the growth rate of per capita gross value added and gross tax base per taxpayer. Therefore, general economic effects of universities and related R&D investments are hardly visible in transition economies such as many Central and Eastern European regions.

Our case study area, South Transdanubia, is a less developed reindustrializing region with lower knowledge absorption capacity and with an underdeveloped research and technology development sector relative to the national average (Figure 1). Basic conditions for change in the technology sphere are rather unfavourable. Its regional GERD was 23 M euros in 2007, which is only 2.5 per cent of Hungary's total. The region has one of the poorest R&D capacities in Hungary (in 2007 with only 4.1 per cent of the Hungarian R&D employees). The region has large public RTD infrastructure mainly based on the two universities[1] absorbing more than four fifths of regional GERD, therefore the HEI[2] sector plays dominant role in R&D performance (Table 1). Unlike the public RTD sector, the visibility and the performance of the business sector is very

[1] University of Pécs (est. 1367) and University of Kaposvár (est. 2000).
[2] Higher Education Institution

low, even in comparison with the national average. The RTD creation of the business sector in Southern Transdanubia is limited (3.4 M € BERD in 2004). Universities are the major employers of RTD personnel. The orientation of the knowledge creation activity of the region is based to a great extent on the profile of its universities, which have the strongest potential in life science (biotech) research and they also have a good reputation with measurable RTD outputs in laser physics, environmental and animal cytology research.[3] However, the strongest barrier in South Transdanubia is the clear mismatch between the knowledge-production specialisation of the universities and the economic structure of the region.

*Figure 1. Key indicators on Southern Transdanubia's knowledge-based development in comparison to the national average, in percentage**



Source: calculated by the author based on EUROSTAT and KSH (Hungarian Statistical Office) data

**BERD = Business expenditure on Research and Development,*

GERD = Gross expenditure on Research and Development

HERD = Higher Education expenditure on Research and Development

GOVERD = Government expenditure on Research and Development

Note: The following years were used for BERD, GERD, HERD, GOVERD 1999, 2003;

R&D personnel 1999, 2004; HR 1997,2004; Patents 199s, 2003 and

Lifelong learning 1999, 2004.

[3] The relative strength of biotech research base is demonstrated by its large share of total input-output indicators and also by the increase of RTD spending in this field (64.8 M in 2004). In addition, the 11 university spin-offs in the biotech sector are tightly connected to the Medical School (MS) which has 48 employees and produces a turnover of €3 million (2004).

The main findings of this section are based on an empirical survey, which listed 92 time-series indicators covering 20 different EU regions, including South Transdanubia commissioned by ERAWATCH S.A. in Brussels (Gál & Csonka, 2007). This research was focused on the constraints of knowledge transfers in the case of mid-range universities in the less developed transition regions with traditional, non-research universities. The survey on South Transdanubia identified the main reasons for the poorer performance in RTD transfers. On the one hand, there is a mismatch between the economic and research specialisations, which is combined with the low share of the business sector in RTD investment, the high share of the traditional lower tech sectors, the small size of local SMEs and the consequent lack of resources to invest into RTD and absorb its results. On the other hand, there is a lack of demand for research results from larger (mainly foreign-owned) companies and, to some extent, the necessary knowledge supply in the region for certain sectors and in certain disciplines is also lacking (Gál & Csonka 2007).[4] It should be also accepted that these regions are specialised in activities that are not highly research intensive, therefore, increased R&D expenditures cannot be easily exploited by local businesses or utilized by HEIs. In these situations, setting up a new research base that is not linked to the needs of the regional economy could be like building "*cathedrals in the desert*", as they are unlikely to be able to develop knowledge transfer and spillovers with local economic actors, particularly for high-tech industries (Dory, 2008; Gál, 2010).

Engaged universities – the Hungarian case

Universities can act as regional actors, developing stronger partnerships between universities and the regional development agencies, emphasising the key role of higher education in regional development. The policy approaches and activities in CEE regions almost exclusively concentrated only on the first two missions of the universities and the notion of regional engagement did not constitute the part of the university strategies up until very recently. Two compelling endogenous and exogenous factors have contributed to the recognition of the importance of stronger regional engagement of the universities these days. Firstly, the accumulated knowledge and the experience of the staff at the higher education institutions provide expertise in various fields, and this can be a very effective way of accelerating progress of collaboration through the

[4] A few large enterprises in high-tech electronics have been engaged in high-tech activities, but their influence on the local RTD sector is considered to be marginal, as they usually rely on the in-house RTD activities of their parent companies importing the technology from outside the region..

exploitation of economic and social interactions transmitted by spin-offs and other university-based consultants within the newly formed regional networks (Schmidt, 2012). Secondly, exogenous pressures are extorted by new market demand and policy goals, which envisage a real regional and social prosperity that integrates knowledge, social and human development. This exogenous factor facilitates connectivity among different institutions including universities and other stakeholders and will provide not only better funding opportunities, but also a collective learning platform for social interactions (Leydesdorff & Etzkovitz, 2001).

In the following sub-sections we present two case studies the author himself participated in, from South Transdanubia, which show the new types of developmental roles and community engagement that local universites can take in a peripheral, border region in order to revitalize the economy of a lagging, de-industrialized area. The first one presents an example of an urban development project based on campus (property) development in conjunction with the European Capital of Culture 2010 Project of Pécs, and a city development strategy of the health and environmental sectors; the second one provides insights into the building of a common cross-border knowledge region in the framework of universities' partnership. It is characteristic of both case studies that the strategies are strongly reliant on the contribution of the local academic sector.

University engagement in the South Transdanubia Region: The European Capital of Culture 2010 Project and the so-called "growth pole" development programmes. In the case study presented in this section we focus on the biggest city of the South Transdanubia Region and its university. The city of Pécs has adopted two strategies in strong collaboration with the University of Pécs to mobilise endogenous resources and enhance its competitiveness (the University of Pécs is the first university in Hungary that was founded in 1367). Higher education has been a strong driver of economic restructuring; in fact, it was probably the university which saved the city of Pécs from the depression experienced by other Central and Eastern European industrial regions after the change of the political regime—even if it could not fully prevent the disadvantageous processes (Lux, 2010). In the 1990's and the 2000's, Pécs, the city with 2,000 years of history dated back to the Roman and medieval times, has lost most of its economic potential which was built on coal and uranium mining and several industrial plants. Due to its peripheral situation and the adverse effects of the war in the former

Yugoslavia, foreign direct investments are insufficient in the region and there is a lack of local economic strength. In an economic environment characterized by a decreasing industrial sector, the city's cultural, educational and market services give a chance for the economy to rise again. Cultural issues first appeared markedly in local development policy in the 1995 city development strategy, which envisaged a growth path built on knowledge-based economy, services and innovation, where innovative tourism and "cultural industry" get priority (Ibid). After the integration of several local universities and a number of smaller higher education facilities in 2000, the University of Pécs has become one of the largest employers in the city and even the region. Although R&D outputs in engineering and natural sciences and the university–industry links are limited, the presence of students and employees has had a multiplier effect on the economy of Pécs, mainly in the field of rented flats, consumer products and services and culture. Of course, the university has contributed to the urban ambience and real estate site development of Pécs, as well (Ibid). One of the strategies is a comprehensive initiative, which aims to reconfigure the economy of the city to utilize the heritage and cultural basis in the framework of a singular large project of the European Capital of Culture 2010 to generate growth. The European Capital of Culture 2010 project tried to capitalize on the idea of culture-led urban regeneration and helped Pécs to reinvent itself through culture. The University of Pécs played a major role in organizing the European Cultural Capital project, which became the largest ever exercise of community service of the local university, being heavily involved not only in the cultural events, but also in the development of the new cultural, community and educational functions of the city's newly built cultural quarter (Ibid). The project is the Zsolnay Cultural Quarter: built on the site of the eponymous ceramics factory, which was originally established as a mixture between production facility, artist's colony and living environment for the owner and his family, it intends to endow a disused area with new cultural, community and educational functions serving as the new training site for the university's Faculty of Music and Visual Arts, and partly for the Faculty of Humanities. Benneworth et al. (2010) describes the universities' urban development role and the major factors conditioning the success of co-operation for both the city and the university in detail.

The strong university engagement in the city's development was also reflected by the development pole programme[5] called "Pécs—Pole of Quality of Life" which has

[5] The development pole-based type of development appeared in France and its main characteristic is that the central motivator of the development process is the university. The overall aim of the pole programme is to promote the formation of internationally-competitive clusters; specialization on high value-added,

three pillars: health industry, environmental industry and cultural industry. The main features of this programme are introduced by—among others—Lux (2010) as follows:

1. Similar to the European Capital of Culture 2010 project, the "growth pole" programme strongly involved the contribution of the University of Pécs during the planning period as well as in the governance and the implementation, especially within the health industry pillar and the environmental industry pillar. (Figure 2)
2. "Health industry" covers health services relying on the university's Faculty of Medicine and its clinics, which have achieved outstanding results in treating movement-related disorders. Several industrial functions are connected to these services including the manufacturing of medical and prosthetic equipment; and other services in the field of human recreation.
3. The "Cultural industry" pillar of the programme is expected to benefit from the European Capital of Culture 2010 programme, and this returns to the idea of promoting the urban culture of Pécs as a complex, innovative product.
4. The "Environmental industry" pillar is both narrower and wider than the "quality of life" concept: it might be helpful in fostering a cleaner, more attractive environment, but the actual elements of the development project have a prioritized focus on alternative energy sources.

Figure 2. The system of cluster initiatives and projects in Pécs



Note: Lux (2010) p. 115

innovative activities; strong cooperation primarily between businesses and additionally between universities and local governments; to strengthen the regions through the increasing competitiveness and better business environment of the pole cities. The expected results (for the period between 2007 and 2013) include that the businesses – through clustering and the cooperation with the academic and university sector – reach the critical size which is necessary for being competitive in Europe and pole cities emerge as centres which are able to strengthen and sustain competitiveness for both themselves and their surrounding regions on an international scale.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has applied the regional and community engagement literature to mid-range universities of Central and Eastern Europe and explored the peculiarities and specificities of these mid-range universities facing a number of extra constraints in the less developed CEE regions. After summing up the ways in which universities may contribute to the economic development of their regions and presenting the measurement methodologies and the theoretical considerations, the paper focused on the problem of adapting the literature on peripheral regions with mid-range universities. From the presented theories, the literature on the universities' regional engagement is the most relevant in the context of our investigation. There are several facilitating and hindering factors concerning the process of becoming a regionally-engaged university, and our main lesson is that the whole regional innovation system should be developed in an integrated manner in order to reach this goal.

The mentioned constraints impede peripheral, mid-range universities to build linkages to the local economy and develop internationally recognized areas of research excellence, with the associated critical mass, and exploit the advantages of global knowledge networks. The research found that not only the position of universities in the collaboration with business sector but their role in the innovation system is quite different, which is mainly due to the different development path of innovation systems and development trajectories in post-communist countries described in the paper. Because of historical path-dependence, mid-range universities, unlike top-universities, are very often located in non-metropolitan regions in CEE countries where the RTD potential and "density of contacts" are much lower and possible spillovers emerge more sparsely than in capital city regions.

We argued that in these regions, setting up new university-based research directions that are not linked to the needs of the regional economy are unlikely to be able to develop knowledge transfer and spillovers with local economic actors. In peripheral situation the lack of research capacity in science and engineering RTD can be also a serious obstacle to the modernisation of the industrial structure. Universities are looking for contacts out of the regions and their contribution to the regional innovation infrastructure cannot fulfil the possible expectations. Rather, these universities need to take careful strategic decisions to build up those areas and the related intermediaries where they have the scope to make an international impact but also to differentiate investment in those areas where they can make a regional contribution.

Economic policy practices suggest that the support of university researches for stimulating local economic development may be an outstanding instrument in case of advanced regions but not necessarily for the less developed CEE regions where the lack of appropriate industrial base is one of the main constraints. It can be also argued that business-led networks connecting different actors have much higher importance in economically-advanced regions while in the less advanced ones universities and public agencies play more significant role in network building and in catalysing activities of the key actors. If universities are embedded in a region it has a clear impact upon the intensity and nature of the relationships and, hence, their ability to effect tacit and codified knowledge transfers. Regionally-focused teaching and research are manifest in a stronger focus on regional student recruitment and graduate retention (in order to combat brain drains in R&D), the innovation-oriented regional development programmes addressing skills required by regional industries and the localisation of learning processes.

The paper also argued that mid-range universities in the reindustrializing CEE regions have to take on new roles, which means a stronger regional engagement also in medium-tech innovations and in social and organizational innovations. Universities have to be practically relevant in the development and evaluation of regional policy that fosters 'new combinations' of partnership-based, innovation-centred approaches, which maximise the development of human capacities such as skills and mobility, and the formation of social capital through networking, collective learning and building up trust. In the less developed CEE regions there is a need for much more comprehensive and complex economic policies initiating not only the support of the university sector but also the starting of developing high-tech industries, small-scale enterprises and constructing regional advantage with the stronger developmental role and community involvement of universities. This contributes towards the third mission of universities through meeting learning needs of the region. This might be achieved by exchanging knowledge between higher education and the business community or through outreach to local communities to combat social exclusion and to improve cultural understanding.

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EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS OF MULTILINGUALISM POLICY

Aneta Skorupa

As many languages you know, as many times you are a human being.
(Czech proverb)

INTRODUCTION

Today the European Union is home for almost 500 million people of diverse linguistic, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The linguistic patterns resemble a mosaic, differing from member state to member state, and from one region to another. Such patterns have been shaped by history, geographical factors and the mobility of people. The European Union recognises 23 official languages and approximately 60 minority languages spoken over its geographical area. One the one hand, the European Union is a truly multilingual organisation which fosters linguistic diversity and facilitates foreign language skills by indicating benefits of knowing foreign languages such as better understanding, intercultural communication and tolerance, enhanced mobility and, last but not least, higher competitiveness. On the other hand, the EU recognises one's right to national and personal identity and actively promotes freedom to speak and write one's own language. Promotion of diversity and concurrent respect for individuality and identity are complementary aims of the EU embodied in the EU's motto 'United in diversity' (European Commission, 2006).

Leonard Orban, European Commissioner for Multilingualism very aptly described the benefits of knowing foreign languages by saying that "the ability to communicate in several languages is a great benefit for individuals, organisations and companies alike. It enhances creativity, breaks cultural stereotypes, encourages thinking "outside the box", and can help develop innovative products and services" (European Commission, 2008).

One of the indications of the growing importance of multilingualism was the *Special Eurobarometer*, a survey carried out between 5 November and 7 December 2005 in the then 25 Member States and Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey. The main goal of the survey was the assessment of national procedures in education and progress in language teaching/learning and, above all, a holistic evaluation of

foreign language knowledge (European Commission, 2006). A key message of *Special Eurobarometer*, presented in the table below, and a starting point for further analysis was the level of general communicative knowledge of a foreign language allowing one to hold a conversation.

Figure 1. Percentage of citizens speaking foreign languages



Source: Eurobarometer. Europeans and their Languages. 2006.

The above table shows that 56 percent of the respondents of *Eurobarometer* were able to hold a conversation in one foreign language, 28 percent in two foreign languages, but still almost half of the respondents admitted not knowing any language other than their mother tongue. *Eurobarometer* also showed that EU citizens widely supported the idea of foreign language learning and a great majority believed that young Europeans should learn two languages, with English as the first foreign language (European Commission, 2006).

DEFINITION OF MULTILINGUALISM

A clear definition of the term multilingualism is required for complete and proper understanding of the EU linguistic policy. In the European Union multilingualism stands for i) the individual's ability to communicate in several languages, ii) the co-existence of different language communities in one geographical/political area, and iii) the EU's policy to operate in more than one language (European Commission, 2012).

Easily, one may notice that the first two definitions refer to the knowledge and use of two or more languages by an individual or community, the third one does not refer to language skills or abilities of a person or group but to the EU-specific policy aiming at the promotion of language diversity. The first two meanings of the word

multilingualism are, however, firmly embedded in the third one, as the principal goal of the policy of multilingualism is to enhance linguistic skills of EU citizens in the interests of mutual cross-border understanding and communication. It should also be noted that whereas the EU understands multilingualism as both individual and societal phenomenon, the Council of Europe's language policy distinguishes the two terms. The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages clearly defines multilingualism as "the presence in a geographical area, large or small, of more than one variety of language" and plurilingualism as "the repertoire of varieties of languages which individuals may use, and is therefore opposite of monolingualism" (Council of Europe, 2001: Chapter 1.3). Despite the Council's focus on plurilingualism, the EU does not apply a clear-cut division between multilingualism and plurilingualism and applies the term multilingualism in a broader meaning. This article discusses educational aspects of multilingualism within the EU's understanding of the term.

The European Commission's multilingualism policy is deeply rooted in the language policy of the European Union and constitutes its inextricable part. However, language policy, being an official social policy of the European Union, by definition encompasses a wide range of actions aiming at the protection of rights arising out of national identity and language equality, and the policy of multilingualism, established by the Lisbon European Council of 23 and 24 March 2000 and subsequently implemented by the European Commission, was originally designated for the promotion of foreign language learning in the lifelong perspective and linguistic diversity.

LEGAL BASIS FOR LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The significance of language policy within the European Union was noticed very early after the establishment of the Economic Community (1957). Nevertheless, linguistic aspects of the Community operation had been gaining importance gradually until the first decade of the 21st century when the actions of the European Commission made it clear that multilingual language policy became one of the European Union priorities.

The European Union language policy found its basis in the Treaties, i.e. the Rome Treaty (1957), the Treaty on European Union (1993) and in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2009), the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953), as well as in the secondary law and case law of the European Union. The Treaty of Lisbon guarantees

the respect for cultural and linguistic diversity and "the equality of Member States before the Treaties, as well as their national identities" (Foster, 2011: 3) (TUE, Article 4.2). It also obliges the European Union to safeguard and enhance Europe's cultural heritage" (Ibid) (TUE, Article 3.3). Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon vests citizens of the Union with a right to petition or address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language (Ibid: 25) (TFUE, Article 20).

In addition to the Treaty guarantees, the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides clear provisions regarding language policy. First and foremost, it prohibits any discrimination based on language (Article 21) and assures respect for linguistic diversity (Article 22). Moreover, similarly to Article 20 of TFUE, the Charter provides a guarantee that every citizen of the Union has a right to good administration, including possibility of addressing institutions in one of the languages of the Treaties (Council of European Union, European Commission, European Parliament, 2000).

The guarantees enshrined in the Treaties and the Charter are reinforced by the stipulations of the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by the European Union under the Treaty of Lisbon (Foster, 2011: 3) (TUE, Article 6). Not only does the Convention prohibit discrimination on the grounds of language (Article 14) but also guarantees that an arrested or charged person has a right to obtain information in a language understandable for him (Article 5.2, Article 6.3) and an entitlement to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court (Article 6.3) (Council of Europe, 1950).

The stipulations on the protection of language diversity and national identity, as well as the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of language are also reflected in the secondary legislation, most significant of which is Regulation No. 1 of 1958 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community, amended each and every time after the new accessions. The European Union case law also displays a good deal of legal disputes related to discrimination on the basis of language, for example *379/79 Groener, 271/98 Agonese*, or respect for national identity, such as C 391/09 *Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn*. The analysis of the relevant legal provisions and of the case law are beyond the scope of this article and, thus, will not be discussed in detail. Yet, they have been cited with the purpose to demonstrate that the language policy of the European Union is a wide and complex area, which is well

grounded in the primary and secondary law and provides any EU citizen with an opportunity to claim if the law is infringed.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MULTILINGUALISM

The Lisbon European Council of 23 and 24 March 2000, which included the knowledge of foreign languages into key competences to be provided through lifelong learning, established the roots of the current policy for multilingualism. This decision, commonly known as the Lisbon Strategy, rapidly increased the importance of foreign language knowledge. In March 2002 it was upheld by the Barcelona European Council, which called for actions to improve the mastery of key competences, in particular by teaching two foreign languages to all from a very early age. The consequence of this new approach was the publication of the Commission's Communication of 24 July 2003 *Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: an Action Plan 2004-2006* and the Commission's Communication of 22 November 2005 *A new Framework Strategy for Multilingualism*. The former was published just before a large enlargement and stressed that the ability to communicate in a foreign language would become more important than ever before. The latter confirmed the engagement of the European Commission in the multilingualism policy and outlined the first ever EC strategy in this regard, predominantly aimed at the promotion of multilingualism in society and the economy. Having implemented the first assumptions of the multilingualism strategy, the European Commission published the next Communication of 19 September 2008 *Multilingualism: an asset for Europe and a shared commitment*, which not only reaffirmed the value of linguistic variety, but also underlined a need for a broader and more complex policy to promote multilingualism. This new more comprehensive approach was the outcome of work of the High Level Group on Multilingualism appointed by European Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism Ján Figel in 2006 and was confirmed by broad social Internet consultations carried out in 2007–2008 and two reports prepared by expert advisory groups (Rapid, 2006).

AIMS OF MULTILINGUALISM POLICY

There are three major goals of the European Commission's multilingualism policy, i.e. to encourage language learning and promote linguistic diversity in society; to promote a healthy multilingual economy; and to give citizens access to European

Union legislation, procedures and information in their own languages. The main focus of attention within this article is given to the first mentioned goal, which is of fundamental importance for educational systems of the EU Member States. Promotion of language learning and linguistic diversity is deeply set in the education and training policy, as education institutions are the principal sources of contact with foreign languages for the majority of learners. Therefore, the enhancement of quality and effectiveness of teaching and learning, which is a complex and challenging task and which encompasses a multitude of measures to be undertaken for a final result to be satisfactory, plays an extraordinarily important role (Commission, 2005).

Successful language learning and effective promotion of linguistic diversity are predetermined by adequate teachers' skills. Obviously, high-quality teaching is essential for successful learning at any age and efforts should therefore be made to ensure that language teachers have a solid command of the language they teach, that they have access to high quality initial and continuous training and possess the necessary intercultural skills. As a part of language teacher training, exchange programmes between Member States should be actively encouraged and supported (European Council, 2009).

EDUCATION AND TRAINING POLICY

The Barcelona European Council of March 2002 endorsed the 'Education and Training 2010' programme and in this way—in the context of the Lisbon Strategy—for the first time established a solid framework for the European cooperation in the field of education and training. This cooperation was based on common objectives and primarily aimed at the improvement of national education and training systems by way of the development of complementary EU tools and exchange of good practice. The cooperation, which so far resulted in noticeable progress in modernisation of higher education, development of common European instruments promoting quality, transparency and mobility, included the Copenhagen process, i.e. closer cooperation with regard to vocational education and trainings, and the Bologna process ensuring compatibility in standards and quality in higher education qualifications (Council, 2002).

One of the principal actions initiated by the European Commission within the Lisbon Strategy consisted in the creation of evidence-based series of reference levels of the European average performance in education and training ('European benchmarks'), which would help to measure overall progress and show achievements.

Such benchmarks were first introduced in the Council Conclusions of 5-6 May 2003 (Council, 2003) and adopted under the 'Education and Training 2010' work programme and later reaffirmed in the *Council Conclusions of 12 May 2009 on strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training 'Education and Training 2020'* (Council, 2009). The Council Conclusions of 12 May 2009 included four strategic objectives: 1) making lifelong learning and mobility a reality; 2) improving the quality and efficiency of education and training; 3) promoting equity, social cohesion and active citizenship, and 4) enhancing creativity and innovation, including entrepreneurship, at all levels of education and training (Ibid). Each strategic objective identified priority areas and reflected individual needs of Member States.

MULTILINGUALISM IN EDUCATION & TRAINING POLICY

The introduction of strategic objectives at the European Union level proves that the place of multilingual education plays an incrementally important role within the education and training policy. Strategic objective 2 of the 'Education and Training 2020' is an interface between the multilingualism policy and the education and training policy. The priority area of this objective comprises language learning/teaching, i.e. enabling EU citizens to speak two foreign languages, promoting language teaching in VET (Vocational Education Training) for adult learners and providing migrants with opportunities to learn the language of the host country, and professional development for teachers and trainers (Council, 2009, Annex II).

The above shows that language learning/teaching became priority of the education and training programme of the European Union. This is also confirmed by the fact that language skills began to be perceived as key competences, which should be mastered in lifelong learning. According to the definition, key competences are those, which all individuals need for personal fulfilment and development, active citizenship, social inclusion and employment (Recommendation, 2006). The reference framework of the Recommendation (2006) includes eight key competences, where the first two places are taken by communication in the mother tongue and communication in foreign languages respectively. This confirms the fact that knowledge of languages is one of the basic skills European citizens need to acquire in order to play an active part in the European knowledge society, and one that both promotes mobility and facilitates social integration and cohesion (Recommendation, 2006). The pivotal role of language education was also stressed by the Barcelona European Council of March 2002, which

called for the creation of the European Indicator of Language Competence (European Council, 2002). The intended indicator was to be achieved through the European Survey on Language Competences (ESLC). The underlying goal of the indicator was to provide participating countries with comparative data and give them insights into good practice in language learning and share experience and, in the end, to measure overall foreign language competences according to predetermined parameters, methods and skills: reading, writing and listening in each Member State. The measurements were based on the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) for Language (Council of Europe) and relied upon five levels of the scales: Pre-A1, A1, A2, B1, B2, C1 (European Commission, 2005).

Table 1. ESCL levels based on CEFR

ESLC level		CEFR level	Definition
Independent user	Advanced independent user	B2	A learner can understand the main ideas of complex, including technical discussions in his/her field of specialisation; can interact with a degree of fluency and spontaneity that makes regular interaction with native speakers quite possible; can produce clear, detailed text on a wide range of subjects and explain a viewpoint on a topical issue.
	Independent user	B1	A learner can understand the main points of clear standard input on familiar matters regularly encountered in work, school, leisure, etc.; can deal with most situations likely to arise whilst travelling, can produce simple connected text on topics which are familiar; can describe experiences and events, dreams, hopes & ambitions and briefly give reasons and explanations for opinions and plans.
Basic user	Advanced basic user	A2	A learner can understand sentences and frequently used expressions related to areas of most immediate relevance (e.g. very basic personal and family information); can communicate in simple and routine tasks requiring a simple and direct exchange of information on routine matters; can describe in simple terms aspects of his/her background and immediate environment.
	Basic user	A1	A learner can understand and use familiar everyday expressions and very basic phrases, can introduce him/herself and others and can ask and answer questions about personal details, can interact in a simple way provided the other person talks slowly and clearly.
Beginner		Pre-A1	A learner who has not achieved the level of competence described by Al.

Source: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/portfolio/?m=/main_pages/levels.html, edited by the author.

The main ESCL study was carried out in 2011 by the SurveyLang Consortium and it included 14 European states: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, France, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and UK-England. The survey was conducted among the last-year pupils of lower secondary education. According to the executive summary of the European Survey on Language Competences, language competences provided by educational systems need to be improved, the level varied greatly among educational systems of examined countries and that English was the language pupils are most likely to master (Commission, 2012). The tables presented below display an overview of educational system performance in the first and the second foreign language. The tested foreign language (EN – English, FR – French, GE – German, IT – Italian, ES – Spanish) is indicated in brackets.

Figure 2. First foreign language. Percentage of pupils at each level by educational system



Source: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/eslc/docs/en/executive-summary-eslc_en.pdf, p.12

Figure 3. Second foreign language. Percentage of pupils at each level by educational system



Source: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/eslc/docs/en/executive-summary-eslc_en.pdf, p.12

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate surprising differences in the level of first and second foreign language knowledge and provide extremely helpful indications for each participating state. Moreover, the ESCL also maps out differences within and between educational systems in number of areas: exact onset of foreign language learning, number of languages offered and number of lessons taught. Clear differences between educational systems are also seen in the informal language teaching opportunities available to pupils. The amount of student's talking time in a foreign language during lessons also significantly differed in individual educational systems.

CHALLENGES AND DANGERS

The results of the survey highlight the challenges, which still need to be tackled in order to improve language competence in the European Union. Although the aims have been clearly indicated by the European Union, a huge part of work needs to be done by the Member States. Many activities carried out to date have already shown impressive progress in a number of areas, yet, there are still spheres which lack relevant and

comparable data for monitoring processes in relation to the objectives set. Firstly, the quality and comparability of the existing indicators still must be improved. The ESCL is the best example that the data obtained though research and studies is the only way to identify problems and apply appropriate measures. Secondly, educational systems need to step up their efforts to prepare pupils for further education and the labour market. Thirdly, Member States and regions should create language friendly living and learning environment inside as well as outside schools. Next, the importance of the English language should be addressed and competences in this language should be further improved. Apart from general problems and struggles, there are more specific ones, which have to be handled by teachers, educators and linguists. As already mentioned, an exemplary EU citizen should speak three languages, including their mother tongue. A person speaking three languages is trilingual. Trilingualism is a new phenomenon not only for linguists but also for teachers. So far nobody has presented a special selection of didactic materials, which could eliminate negative and positive inferences hindering or accelerating the process of learning. This area requires special attention and cooperation among didactic personnel and academics from different Members States (Widła, 2008).

CONCLUSIONS

The multilingualism policy, widely approved by EU citizens, has been promoted and implemented by the European Commission for more than ten years now. Although the outcome of efforts is noticeable in some areas, e.g. benchmarking and creation of some European indicators, establishment of framework strategy on multilingualism, defining language knowledge as key competence, raising awareness of EU citizens etc., new challenges have to be met and continual actions must be initiated if the multilingualism policy is to be fully successful. Undoubtedly, the success of multilingualism policy is greatly conditioned by successful implementation of the education and training policy. This, in turn, depends crucially on the initiatives and concrete measures undertaken by individual Members States, regions and localities.

In conclusion, the cooperation at the local, regional, national and EU level is of utmost importance for multilingual development in the EU. Only extensive cooperation may make EU citizens fully aware of possibilities and opportunities they have, as well as teachers and linguists of obstacles they have to face. Whereas numerous initiatives conducted at various levels seem to be the only way to attract and motivate

citizens at different age to learn foreign languages, to stress the weight of multicultural dialogue, to become more conscious about their culture and language and, last but not least, to pinpoint personal benefits flowing from good language command, only close and well-organised cooperation between education personnel may help obtain tools and measures to effectively teach trilingual students.

Both citizen-oriented and teacher-oriented regional/interregional cooperation plays an extraordinarily role in the entire process of multilingual development strongly embedded in the education policy, mainly due to the fact of acting as a link between the EU level and a grass-root level. Such cooperation may exert direct influence on any European citizen and any ambitious language teacher. In my view, this is the only way to make citizens feel that multilingualism is as an outstanding feature of the European Union and it is a symbol of its identity and a way for a full integration of European Union citizens.

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LANGUAGES AND LANGUAGE LEARNING IN CENTRAL EUROPE: THE CASE OF CROATIA

Melita Aleksa Varga

INTRODUCTION

There are different types of communication known to humankind. In order to communicate, we do not necessarily have to use words but gestures and mimicry, the most important thing is that we convey a meaning and fulfil our task, i.e. to pass on messages or information to the recipient. Some people actually say that communication is the essence of human beings. We communicate with nature, with animals, and even though some of us are challenged or deprived of some communication abilities, be it sound or sight, people found a way to express their ideas and pass them on to other generations (Pinker, 2007). It is this ability that makes us unique and all the signs, words and sentences we utter are parts of the infinite number of sentences, which belong to a great linguistic corpus and heritage. Therefore, in the course of this paper I am going to try to describe this great phenomenon, the language, and concentrate in certain issues on this part of the world, namely Central Europe. Some of the questions we are going to discuss are: What do we consider a language? How does the language map of Central Europe look like? How many languages do people speak generally and who can be referred to as a bilingual or a multilingual? Last but not least we will discuss what the language situation in Croatia looks like and how have languages been taught and learned in Europe.

WHAT IS A LANGUAGE AND HOW IS IT BEING LEARNED AND ACQUIRED?

Every human being has encountered the question of how a language comes into being and how we define the term language. How can we differentiate between the terms *language* and *dialect*? How are languages acquired, and learned?

There are several theories and linguists have been trying to answer these questions throughout history. Starting from the behaviourists who thought that language was being taught and learned by imitating the sounds, Chomsky's Universal Grammar and

Language Acquisition device to Steven Pinker, who started from the human instincts, all these theories have arguments which can be observed as pro or contra. We can do nothing but speculate about this miraculous phenomenon. Generally speaking, we can say that a language is a system of signs for encoding and decoding information. Nowadays, there are different languages and one can differentiate between natural and artificial languages, the latter being e.g. programming, formal, controlled languages etc. Human languages are referred to as natural languages and the common progression for them is that they are considered to be first spoken and then written. Languages live, die, they polymorph and change with time. If a language ceases to change or develop, it is categorized as a dead language[1]. But what defines a language and how are languages being "born"? In order to qualify for inclusion, the language must have a literature, a history and be designed for the purpose of human communication. The only exceptions are pidgin and creole languages. A pidgin language is a simplified language developed as a means of communication between two or more groups that do not have a language in common. It is in linguistic terms a simplified means of linguistic communication. A pidgin is not the native language of any speech community and it usually has low prestige with respect to other languages. The language, which originated from the pidgin, is a creole, a stable language that has been acquired by children. According to Pinker (2007), the creole languages are the clear proof that we have a language instinct because children have learned a simplified language from their parents, and added a grammatical pattern to it, developing it to a higher stage. Apart from languages, there are also many dialects present in the world. However, there is no universally accepted criterion for distinguishing a language from a dialect.

If we consider the differences between the points of view of language acquisition, we can see there are several types of languages: L1 (mother tongue or native language), L2 (second language, which can be the official language of the state a person lives in, if it is different from the speaker's L1) and a foreign language (sometimes described as L3). It is important to note that L1 is being acquired, L2 is being either acquired and learned (or both at the same time) and L3 is mainly being learned.

Examining further the speakers of these languages, based on these language types, we can differentiate between monolingual and bilingual, i.e. multilingual speakers. Taking into account the fact that most people can speak one or more languages, the questions that arise here are what we mean when we use the terms "bilingual" and

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language

"bilingualism". According to François Grosjean (2008), bilingualism is the regular use of two or more languages (or dialects), and bilinguals are those people who use two or more languages (or dialects) in their everyday lives. The bilingual is not the sum of two complete or incomplete monolinguals, but s/he has a unique and specific linguistic configuration. (Grosjean, 2008: 13)

THE LANGUAGE MAP OF THE WORLD AND CENTRAL EUROPE

A language family is a group of languages related by a common ancestor or the proto-language of that family. As of early 2009, there were 6,909 living human languages catalogued, but the exact number of known living languages varies from 5,000 to 10,000, depending generally on the precision of one's definition of "language", and in particular on how one classifies dialects[2]. It is interesting to note that only in Nigeria there are more than 300 different languages, not dialects. The language map of Central Europe would therefore look like this.

Figure 1. Excerpt from the language map

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template: Distribution_of_languages_in_the_world, First accessed by the author on October 9, 2010

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_family

If we closely examine the language map of Central Europe, we can see that even in 2010 there was the term *Serbo-Croatian* labelled for the two languages of the former nation of Yugoslavia—Serbian and Croatian. If we consider the fact that more languages have come into existence since the fall of Yugoslavia, the ignorance of the language situation in Central Europe and the dissemination of false facts like this on the worldwide web remains a sad story. There is therefore a concerted need or struggle for correction and affirmation.

Table 1. Number of Croats living abroad

1.	USA	1,000,000-1,200,000
2.	Germany	350,000-400,000
3.	Australia	250,000
4.	Argentina	200,000-250,000
5.	Canada	200,000-250,000
6.	Chile	150,000-200,000
7.	Hungary	90,000
8.	Switzerland	80,000
9.	Austria	80,000-100,000
10.	Italy	50,000-60,000
11.	France	40,000
12.	New Zealand	40,000
13.	Sweden	25,000
14.	Brazil	20,000-30,000
15.	South African Republic	8,000
16.	Belgium	6,000
17.	Ecuador	6,000
18.	Netherlands	6,000
19.	Peru	6,000
20.	Uruguay	5,000
21.	Great Britain	5,000
22.	Venezuela	5,000
23.	Norway	2,000
24.	Denmark	1,000
25.	Luxemburg	1,000
26.	Paraguay	1,000
27.	Bolivia	500-1,000

Source: http://www.mvpei.hr/hmiu/tekst.asp?q=osi001, February 4, 2008

LANGUAGE SITUATION IN CROATIA

Croatia has a territory of 56,594 km^2 and a population of about 4.5 million. Based on the size of the area, it takes up the 127th place on a world map. The official language

of Croatia is Croatian, and the majority of the population is Croatian. However, there is a large number of Croats living abroad who declare themselves as Croats, having a Croatian citizenship or belonging to the Croatian minority (Table 1).

If we closely examine Croatian minorities, we can see that there have been 23 different minorities recorded in Croatia from 1981 till 2001 (Table 2).

Table 2. Ethnic structure of Croatia.

Nationality	1981		1991		2001	
	No	%	No	%	No	%
1. Albanians	6,006	0.1	12,032	0.3	15,082	0.3
2. Austrians	267	0.0	214	0.0	247	0.01
3. Bulgarians	441	0.0	458	0.0	20,755	0.47
4. Montenegrins	9,818	0.2	9,724	0.2	331	0.01
5. Czech	15,061	0.3	13,086	0.3	10,510	0.24
6. Greek	100	0.0	281	0.0	-	-
7. Hungarians	25,439	0.6	22,355	0.5	16,595	0.37
8. Macedonians	5,362	0.1	6,280	0.1	4,270	0.1
9. Muslims	23,740	0.5	43,469	0.9	-	-
10. Germans	2,175	0.1	2,635	0.1	2,902	0.07
11. Polish	758	0.0	679	0.0	567	0.01
12. Romani	3,858	0.1	6,695	0.1	9,463	0.21
13. Romanian	609	0.0	810	0.0	475	0.01
14. Russian	758	0.0	706	0.0	906	0.02
15. Rusyns	3,321	0.1	3,253	0.1	2,337	0.05
16. Slovenians	25,136	0.6	22,376	0.5	13,171	0.3
17. Serbs	531,502	11.5	581,663	12.2	201,631	4.5
18. Italians	11,661	0.3	21,303	0.4	-	-
19. Turks	320	0.0	320	0.0	300	0.01
20. Ukrainians	2,515	0.1	2,494	0.1	1,977	0.04
21. Vlachs	16	0.0	22	0.0	12	0
22. Jews	316	0.0	600	0.0	567	0.01
23. Croats	3,454,661	75.1	3,736,356	78.1	3,977,171	89.6
other nationalities	1,553	0.0	3,012	0.1	21,801	4.49
undecided	17,133	0.4	73,376	1.5	89,130	2.61
regional ethnities	8,657	0.2	45,493	0.9	9,302	0.2
unkown	64,737	1.4	62,936	1.3	17,975	0.4
Sum	**4,601,469**	**100.0**	**4,784,265**	**100.0**	**4,437,460**	**100.0**

Source: http://www.vsnm-ri.org/izvjesce_MRG_1.htm (October 9, 2010).

The Croatian law gives the minorities the ability to have a cultural autonomy, which means using their language officially, the symbols of the minority (coat of arms

and the flag) and toponyms (the name of the residential area, educational facilities, cultural societies, publishing companies, libraries, media, means of protecting the cultural heritage etc.). The level of cultural autonomy depends also on the local government. Examining closely the language situation in Croatia, based on Table 3 we can assume that the members of the different ethnic groups in Croatia would be at least bilingual.

Table 3. Number of students, members of the ethnic minorities in Croatia, who were attending schools in the minority language in the school year of 1998/1999

Minority language	Number of students attending school in a minority language in Croatia
Italian	13,653
Hebrew	40
Serbian	11,487
Hungarian	1,033
German	50
Slovakian	435
Czech	921
Romani	889
Rusyn	18
Ukrainian	12

Source: Tatalović 2001.

The next huge question, therefore, is the issue of preserving the minority language and the problem of assimilation, which will be the topic of some other papers. It is evident that many members of the minorities in Croatia have already assimilated and are therefore learning their minority language as a foreign language, which brings us to the question of history and the contemporary state of language learning in Central Europe.

LANGUAGE LEARNING AND LANGUAGE TESTING IN CROATIA AND CENTRAL EUROPE

The history of language teaching in Central Europe is rich in different methods and their various applications. Starting from the grammar-translation method, through the direct method, behaviourism, audio-lingual method, silent way, suggestopedia and the community language learning, we have reached the contemporary times and the communicative method. In Croatian schools it is obligatory to learn at least one foreign language. Children are starting to learn a foreign language at grade 1

of primary school. Most of them after finishing their secondary school have been learning at least one foreign language for 12 years, since the second foreign language is not obligatory in every secondary school type, which can be seen in Table 4. It is important to note that the most frequent languages taught in Croatian schools are English and German, in a communicative method (Aleksa-Bagarić, 2009).

Table 4. Croatian school types and the languages taught

School type	Education type	Age of entry	Duration of education in years	Foreign languages possibilities (at least)
primary	compulsory	6	8	first foreign language, second foreign language
secondary	optional	14	4	first foreign language, second foreign language
specialized secondary	optional	14	4	first foreign language
vocational (3-year programme)	optional	14	3	first foreign language
vocational (4-year programme)	optional	14	4	first foreign language
university	optional	18	(3+2) or (5+0)	first foreign language (in the first two academic years)

The level of the students' foreign language knowledge after having finished the secondary school is, according to the Common European Framework[3], estimated to be B2, whereas the level of their foreign language knowledge after finishing the

[3] "The Common European Framework provides a common basis for the elaboration of language syllabuses, curriculum guidelines, examinations, textbooks, etc. across Europe. It describes in a comprehensive way what language learners have to learn to do in order to use a language for communication and what knowledge and skills they have to develop so as to be able to act effectively. The description also covers the cultural context in which language is set. The Framework also defines levels of proficiency which allow learners' progress to be measured at each stage of learning and on a life-long basis. The Common European Framework is intended to overcome the barriers to communication among professionals working in the field of modern languages arising from the different educational systems in Europe. It provides the means for educational administrators, course designers, teachers, teacher trainers, examining bodies, etc., to reflect on their current practice, with a view to situating and coordinating their efforts and to ensuring that they meet the real needs of the learners for whom they are responsible. By providing a common basis for the explicit description of objectives, content and methods, the Framework will enhance the transparency of courses, syllabuses and qualifications, thus promoting international cooperation in the field of modern languages. The provision of objective criteria for describing language proficiency will facilitate the mutual recognition of qualifications gained in different learning contexts, and accordingly will aid European mobility." (*Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR),* http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/Source/Framework_EN.pdf)

vocational school would be A2-B1, depending on the school type. In order to closely explain the competences of the language users on the levels mentioned, here is an excerpt from the description of the levels from the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (see footnote 1).

It seems that an outline framework of six broad levels gives an adequate coverage of the learning space relevant to European language learners for these purposes.

- Breakthrough, corresponding to what Wilkins in his 1978 proposal labelled 'Formulaic Proficiency', and Trim in the same publication 'Introductory'.
- Waystage, reflecting the Council of Europe content specification.
- Threshold, reflecting the Council of Europe content specification.
- Vantage, reflecting the third Council of Europe content specification, a level described as 'Limited Operational Proficiency' by Wilkins, and 'adequate response to situations normally encountered' by Trim.
- Effective Operational Proficiency which was called 'Effective Proficiency' by Trim, 'Adequate Operational Proficiency' by Wilkins, and represents an advanced level of competence suitable for more complex work and study tasks.
- Mastery (Trim: 'comprehensive mastery'; Wilkins: 'Comprehensive Operational Proficiency'), corresponds to the top examination objective in the scheme adopted by ALTE (Association of Language Testers in Europe). It could be extended to include the more developed intercultural competence above that level which is achieved by many language professionals.

When one looks at these six levels, however, one sees that they are respectively higher and lower interpretations of the classic division into basic, intermediate and advanced. Also, some of the names given to the Council of Europe specifications for levels have proved resistant to translation (e.g. Waystage, Vantage). The scheme, therefore, proposed to adopt a 'hypertext' branching principle, starting from an initial division into three broad levels – A, B and C:



User C2 can understand with ease virtually everything heard or read. S/he can summarise information from different spoken and written sources, reconstructing arguments and accounts in a coherent presentation. S/he can express him/herself spontaneously, very fluently and precisely, differentiating finer shades of meaning even in more complex situations.

User C1 can understand a wide range of demanding, longer texts, and recognise implicit meaning. S/he can express him/herself fluently and spontaneously without much obvious searching for expressions. S/he can use language flexibly and effectively for social, academic and professional purposes. S/he can produce clear, well-structured, detailed text on complex subjects, showing controlled use of organisational patterns, connectors and cohesive devices.

User B2 can understand the main ideas of complex text on both concrete and abstract topics, including technical discussions in his/her field of specialisation. S/he can interact with a degree of fluency and spontaneity that makes regular interaction with native speakers quite possible without strain for either party. S/he can produce clear, detailed text on a wide range of subjects and explain a viewpoint on a topical issue giving the advantages and independent disadvantages of various options.

User B1 can understand the main points of clear standard input on familiar matters regularly encountered in work, school, leisure, etc. S/he can deal with most situations likely to arise whilst travelling in an area where the language is spoken. S/he can produce simple connected texts on topics, which are familiar or of personal interest. S/he can describe experiences and events, dreams, hopes and ambitions and briefly give reasons and explanations for opinions and plans.

User A2 can understand sentences and frequently used expressions related to areas of most immediate relevance (e.g. very basic personal and family information, shopping, local geography, employment). S/he can communicate in simple and routine tasks requiring a simple and direct exchange of information on familiar and routine matters. S/he can describe in simple terms aspects of his/her background, immediate environment and matters in areas of immediate basic need.

User A1 can understand and use familiar everyday expressions and very basic phrases aimed at the satisfaction of needs of a concrete type. S/he can introduce him/herself and others and can ask and answer questions about personal details such as where he/she lives, people he/she knows and things he/she has. S/he can

interact in a simple way provided the other person talks slowly and clearly and is prepared to help. (CEFRL, 2001: 24)

Unlike Central Europe, there is no system of acknowledging the language exams in Croatia. However, the only language exam in Croatia, known to me so far, which makes it possible to test one's knowledge of a language spoken in the European Union is the exam of the European Consortium for the Certificate of Attainment in Modern Languages, known as the ECL exam.

It can be taken in English, German, Hungarian, Italian, Polish, Slovak, Spanish, Serbian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Russian, Czech and Croatian.

CONCLUSION

The history of languages and language learning and teaching in Europe is rich and very complex, as could be seen above. Croatia, as a new member of the European Union, has already adopted the regulations issued by the Council of Europe, as well as the contemporary language teaching methods and the foreign language learning and teaching policies. Regarding the present language map of Croatia, it can be stated that it shows a European country with a Central European language heritage, yet to make its new history as part of the EU in the near future.

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MANAGEMENT OF EDUCATION POLICY IN ITALY AND ROMANIA

GABRIELA CRETU[1]

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to highlight the changes in the management of education policy at primary and secondary levels, in Romania and Italy, during the last decades. Drawing on the evolution of education systems it is possible to understand their change from a model of rational planning and control to a model of self-regulation (Van Vught *cf.* Fedele, 2002). Typical for centralized systems, the model of rational planning and control is developed on the premise that the central government has the skills and information required for managing the education system. Instead, the self-regulation model is based on the opposed idea, claiming that only a limited control should be realized at central level through monitoring and feedback analysis.

Due to its recent evolution from a strongly centralized system to network-type organization, which led to important changes at management level, the Italian case is peculiar. Although after 1990 the education system in Romania has been one of the most dynamic in Europe, there is a lack of literature on the managerial issues related to education. Both Romanian and Italian administrative systems fall into the Napoleonic model, but Romania shares common features the former Communist countries show. However, Romania does not reflect a single administrative tradition, but has specific characteristics of the Napoleonic administrative system type reflected by particularities such as: 1) functioning of the state, in general, and public administration, in particular, is based on law; 2) the existence of a complex classification of legal documents that define and regulate the administrative actions; 3) a unitary and rather centralized state organization, despite that the principle of decentralization is clearly stated in the Romanian Constitution (*The Constitution of Romania*, 2003, art. 120, 1st comma).

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The reformist trends of the past 20 years have led to changes in education, reflected by figures. In the case of Romania, the figures show that the percentage of GDP allocated to education has slowly increased, but the data series do not allow establishing an upward trend. Over a 10-year time span, from 1999 to 2008, in Italy, no major fluctuations of expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP were recorded (*Figure 1*).

Figure 1. Education as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Romania and Italy



Figure 2. Teacher/student ratio in Italy and Romania



In Romania, at primary and secondary education levels, the teacher–student ratio is much higher than in Italy (*Figure 2*). In Italy there are on average 10 to 11 students per teacher, while in Romania the average is around 17 students per teacher, but since 2007 a downward trend has been registered.

An important indicator, which reflects the situation of education, is the expenditure for students in public and private institutions[2]. Unfortunately, the figures for Romania are incomplete and this does not allow examining the evolution trend. However, in 2005, the expenditure per student in Romania was of Euro 1,437.9, while in Italy the amount was several times higher, reaching the amount of Euro 5,901.6.

THE ITALIAN CASE

The National Education System that currently exists in Italy is the result of an ongoing process which transformed the "state school" organized on the principle of hierarchy and centralism in an education system characterized by a polycentric organizational pattern, based on a balanced allocation of functions between actors in the system (Sandulli, 2003: 75). The changes started in the early 1970's, by devolving powers to local authorities and emphasizing the role of collegial bodies in order to achieve management in schools. The system change has led to the development of regulations, which reflect a new conception of education, rooted in polycentrism and functional diversity, contrary to the traditional model based on isolation and hierarchy. These principles can be found in the reforming legislation of the early 1990's (i.e., 4th article, 1st comma of the Directive no. 133/1996, stating that "schools promote all initiatives that achieve the school function as a centre of cultural, social and civic promoter of the community").

The changes have created the impression that a "rupture" with centralism was made, but the multiplicity of organizational models through which the state manifested its role in education once the Ministry was established did not seem compatible with the end of state supremacy as policy-maker in education. The 1970's and 1980's did not draw a reform trend as the only innovative project (not adopted though) was proposed in 1989 by Minister Giovanni Galloni[3]. In the early 1990's,

[2] This indicator is calculated in euro currency and represents the cost of education per pupil/student, namely the expenditure made by the state, the local authorities, the private institutions, including religious organizations and business companies.

[3] The project provided a redefinition of ministerial positions and a system of evaluating the results of regional research institutes.

the Italian education system was underdeveloped if compared to other European countries such as Britain, France, Germany, but also Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland. In Italy, the legislative premises of enacting the reform of education were the adoption of art. 4, Law no. 537 of 24 December 1993, enacted by the Azeglio Ciampi's government, that provided educational institutions with major autonomy, especially financial, and with legal personality. It took another three years before the reform was implemented, during Romano Prodi's government, after the enactment of Law no. 59 of 15 March 1997. This law represented the end of centralized management of education system, a similar phenomenon to what in France was considered to be the end of state exclusiveness (Louis *cf.* Sandulli, 2003: 75).

The "State School" was replaced by the National Education System, and the state monopoly was replaced by a "networked" model, where the state, regions, municipalities, schools, other non-state actors operate in an integrated system. The model, however, was characterized by asymmetry in the relations between actors operating within the system. A privileged interaction between the Ministry and educational institutions was established by the law, which defined the distribution of powers from the central level to school level (Law no. 59/1997, art. 21). The functions meant to preserve "the unity of the system and to ensure the access to education" as well as to determine "the common elements within the system in the field of planning and programming, as defined by the state" were preserved by the state (Sandulli, 2003: 76). Education management powers were conferred to schools. Similarly, it is inferred that local and regional authorities received limited powers resulting from the exclusion of the powers conferred to state and schools. This fact seems to contrast with the dynamics of administrative and institutional reforms enacted in Italy, in the 1990's, focusing on empowerment of sub-national public authorities.

In education, the negative effects of functions' asymmetry were mainly due to the fact that the state did not preserve management functions only, but, contrary to the spirit of the law, continued to perform executive functions, as well. The duality state schools as key players in the education system has a twofold explanation: on the one hand, the state continued to play the strategic role in education policy-making and, on the other hand, increased autonomy was provided to schools. The Law 59/1997 updated principles such as: subsidiarity, functionality and responsibility through maximum surge of school autonomy. However, broader autonomy to schools can be seen as an excuse for overlooking the disparities among the actors within the system.

According to the constitutional changes, the state should stop being an exclusive initiator of actions and should become a guarantor of local and regional freedoms exercise (Falcon, 2001).

Asymmetry was exacerbated by two factors: 1) law enforcement procedures were not fully followed as prescribed by law; 2) reiteration of centralism, contrary to the principles stated by the administrative reform.

The Ministry of Education experienced two reformist tendencies. The first concerned the complexity of functions performed. The Ministry had to keep only those functions necessary to establish the general framework by defining criteria, parameters, standards and monitoring the system functions, performance evaluation, promotion of innovation and by ensuring harmonization with the EU legislation. The second, complementary to the first one, consisted of reforming the functions and organization of the Ministry, possibly by merging other ministerial structures and rationalizing structural components (Sandulli, 2003: 81). In autumn 2012 the Ministry was made of three departments, two of them with competence in the field of primary and secondary school education: one of them, dealing with development, was organized into three general directorates while the other one, dealing with services in the territory, was divided in four general directorates. The current structure was designed according to the Ministry's connections with the state apparatus at territorial level, but not with the decentralization principle. The General Services, established for serving the common interests of ministerial departments, were considered redundant; their work could be carried out inside departmental offices or by structures subordinated to the Minister. The incongruence between the principles of decentralization in education and their implementation is confirmed by the analysis of state functions, considering that the Ministry should give up executive functions and preserve only strategic management functions. There is no explanation to why the state still exercises disciplinary authority on the teaching staff. Although the law provides regional programming function in education (art. 138 of Legislative Decree no. 112/1998), the state is still in charge with programming. Another legislative provision (Decree no. 347/2000) on the reorganization of the Ministry of Education is considered a return to centralism because it showed that the education system was not only driven by the Ministry, but also operated by this institution.

During the last decades, Italy has experienced two antagonistic tendencies, which, paradoxically and due to legislative contradictions and flaws implementation rules have worked together:

1. the return to centralism by increasing the role of the state not only in the development, steering and management of educational policy in Italy;
2. the administrative reform towards decentralization and increased powers for regional and local authorities and schools.

This so-called reformed system and the implementation process that gives an important role to de-concentrated administrative structures represented the engine of return to centralism. The scenario foreshadowed by the establishment of regional school offices aimed at reducing to a mere formality the programming and control functions assigned to regions by Legislative Decree no. 112/1998. The exercise of competences at regional level was conditional by the regional school offices, on one hand, while the competences at central and regional level were overlapping. At the provincial level the situation was similar, consultancy services was just a different name given to school inspectorates officially disbanded, but recreated in an apparently changed form.

In 2001, the revision of Title V of Part II of the Constitution introduced institutional pluralism and produced significant changes in the relations between different levels of government. Thus, the sub-national administrative authorities, mainly the regions, have become headquarters for territorial educational policy-making, being enabled to formulate their own strategy, even if different from the state strategy. The regions could also negotiate with the government on equal positions, establishing the directions for education policy-making in the territory. An enhanced role for the regions led to transformation of the highly hierarchical relations of various administrative levels into a network of horizontal distribution of power, which allowed territorial communities to express their interests. Due to the subsidiarity principle, the role of local government regarding all those functions that do not require coordination unit has increased. In addition, two significant tasks have been assigned to the regions: the first is to determine the resources allocated to non-state schools, and the second stems from two types of programming activities—one refers to integrating education and training activities, and the other one refers to school network. However, these seemingly important attributions were not sustained by providing effective powers for

financial and human resource allocation to schools. The reform of education system made possible a new interpretation of the role of public authorities in education regarding the legislative competence and the administrative tasks. By conferring legislative powers to regions, the state monopoly in education stopped, regions gained the ability to autonomously update and implement the provisions on education set by the Parliament. This change was a major impetus for the regions to develop an active role in the management of education at regional level. Thus, the regions were provided with the possibility to integrate fundamental directions established by national law into the regional normative order and to operate interventions in education management according to their specificities and needs.

In Italy, the polycentric model, as a result of reform initiatives being grounded in separation—cooperation dualism, emphasized specific functions and responsibilities for administrative authorities and aimed at increased collaboration. Besides, since the modalities of cooperation between actors became more diverse and multiplied, the need for coordination was less obvious, while the focus was on collaboration between the actors involved in the management of education policy.

THE ROMANIAN CASE

Since 1989, in Romania, the education system passed through a sinuous evolution, with gradual attempts towards the development of a public policy approach. Thus, the transformation of the system through public policy and public management required also legislative and institutional changes. From an institutional perspective, the centralized nature of the system was preserved after 1989, the management was accomplished by the Ministry, currently called the Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sport. According to the law, the Ministry designs and substantiates the national strategies in the education field. The fundamental role of the Ministry of Education is to develop and achieve effective sectoral policies, thus the Ministry has established formal structures responsible of conducting activities that concern education policies (i.e. the Department of Educational Policies and Strategies, founded in 2005, under the coordination of the Minister, the Public Policy Unit, a specialized structure whose mission is to implement public administration reform at ministerial level, to improve public policy and management). The changes at ministerial level have reflected mainly a focus on changing the organizational structures despite the needed functions, each new administration focusing on organizational change and functions

redistribution without elaborating a clear institutional vision. The core institutions dealing with education policy management are the Ministry and its subordinate agencies while at sub-national level the management is provided by the School Inspectorates of each county and the institutions they rule and coordinate. However, the education policies that are aimed at organizing the entire system are formulated by specialized departments within the Ministry and its subordinate agencies.

There are numerous problems that cause failures in the system and problems in the management of education policy. One main issue is an exacerbated focus on reorganization not on functional needs. Since 1990 every new Minister of Education took care of compiling a new organizational chart, which did not always resemble the functional necessities of the Ministry. The de-structuring process that preceded each new restructuring and elaboration of a new organizational chart was not based on a serious assessment of structural and functional needs of the Ministry. For many years the ministry restructuring process was not based on a functional analysis. Thus, changing the structure of the Ministry and its agencies was a result of political games without tracking the performance neither the management efficiency. This situation has created tensions at ministerial and agency levels, which resulted in inappropriate interventions and overlapping institutional competences. An example of this was the overlapping competences of the National Centre for Staff Training in Pre-university Education (located under the then Ministry of Education and Research) and the National Council for Adult Vocational Training (located at the intersection responsibilities of the Ministry of Education and Research and the Ministry of Labour, Family and Equal Opportunities) on accreditation and certification of training providers and of participants in job training for education staff.

Another main problem is the lack of an integrated and functional database, which did not allow an efficient management of information on education management. Therefore, the development of education policy documents could not always be based on data from within the education system. The low capacity in education policy is highlighted also by the preference for certain policy instruments such as over-regulation (ministerial orders, notifications, emergency ordinances), by the high number of working committees with overlapping attributions and by the lack of specialists in education policy (Craciun & Collins, 2008: 378).

The transfer of management to the local level is provided by the School Inspectorates and the institutions under their direct subordination or coordination. The County

School Inspectorates and the School Inspectorate of Bucharest are de-concentrated public services of the Ministry, with legal personality, performing tasks such as: 1) implementing policies and strategies formulated by the Ministry; 2) monitoring the quality of teaching and learning according to national standards/ performance indicators, by school inspection; 3) controlling, monitoring and evaluating the quality of management in schools. The organization of School Inspectorates is established by the Ministry but their operation is carried out under its own rules, drafted and approved by the Board within the regulation framework approved by the Minister.

In 2005, the Ministry has adopted a Strategy Paper on Decentralization of Pre-university Education, which defines the school education decentralization as the transfer of authority, responsibility and resources regarding decision-making and general and financial management to the schools and to the local community (Strategy Paper, 2005). Decentralization in education has the following components: 1) redistribution of responsibilities, decision-making authority and accountability for specific education functions from the central to the local administrative level; 2) participation of non-governmental organizations and civil society representatives in the decision-making process; 3) transfer of decision-making powers from central to local levels of public administration in order to better meet the needs of education beneficiaries.

The local administration's role in education is mostly a patrimonial one, the school buildings belong to the public domain of villages, towns and cities and are managed by local/county councils in whose jurisdiction they operate. However, the state schools may administer public assets, the private education is grounded in private property and the religious education deals with one of the two forms of ownership – public or private, according to the entity that founded them. The territory and the buildings, where state special schools and county centres of educational assistance operate, belong to the public domain of the county or to the public domain of Bucharest and are managed by the county councils or, respectively, the local councils of Bucharest Municipality Districts. Although the Ministry has the initiative in the area of financial and human resources, the local authorities may also contribute, from their own budgets, to school funding.

In the Romanian education system, an important item of decentralization is the curriculum, which has two components: core curriculum, approved by the ministry (regards the mandatory disciplines), and school curriculum (refers to

the optional disciplines only). In consultation with students, parents and based on available resources, the Board of the school establishes the school curriculum. The role, responsibilities and management in schools are clearly mentioned in the Law of Education; schools are run by the Boards, Directors and Deputy Directors, as appropriate. In exercising their duties, the Boards and the Directors collaborate with the Teachers' Council, the Committee of Parents and the local administrative authorities. The Board is the main management body of the school.

Although the Law of Education provides for the possibility of collaboration between the Ministry of Education with local authorities and other stakeholders to improve the management of education, the Romanian education system is mainly centralized. The local authorities are not provided with the capacities and financial tools for an effective decentralization in education.

CONCLUSIONS

In Italy, the results of education reforms varied between return to centralism and decentralization. However, the last decade showed a decentralizing trend and increased roles for actors from territorial administrative levels, as well as for schools. In Romania, despite that the law claims for decentralization and stipulates the collaboration of the Ministry with local administration and other stakeholders in order to improve the management of education, the system remained rather centralized. Although both countries have enacted reforms of their education systems, that regarded mostly the decentralization process, the evolution was different.

Centralism and high hierarchy were the baseline characteristics common to the two educational systems, in fact features of systems of Napoleonic origin. However, the further development of the two educational systems revealed significant differences in the organization and management.

In Italy, the network system made possible the transformation of the "state school" into a polycentric system with multiple actors, which collaborate in functional diversity. Changes in the Italian educational system during the last decade were due mainly to legislative and managerial power allocation to the regions, which have become important players in the management of education policy. Sub-national administrative levels obtained legal and management tools to engage in education policy, the role of schools increased, while the Ministry received legislative and strategic management functions to ensure the system harmonization. Thus, the

reforms envisaged the importance of redefining and reallocating the competences, aiming at system decentralization, but at the same time, ensuring its cohesion. The evolution of the educational system was marked by the public administration reform started in the 1990's, aimed at decentralization and streamlining of administrative activity.

In Romania, instead, although multiple attempts of reform were initiated, the education system could not get out of the centralism inertia. Reforms aimed particularly at operating organizational changes focused on the transformation of structure not functions and competences, mainly as a result of political changes. The transformation of the system through functional rather than structural aspects is necessary for a real and effective decentralization of educational management. The reform of functions and competences turns out to be a central factor in educational systems change in the two countries.

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Chapter IV

Glimpses on the city

THE URBAN LANDSCAPE IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN LITERATURE

Biljana Oklopcic

INTRODUCTION

The essay explores how contemporary Central European literature as cultural medium both describes and self-creates the urban space. By focusing on the novels written by contemporary Central European writers (Robert Schindel, Michal Ajvaz, and George Konrád), the essay opens a discursive space on the city as different but at the same time uniform space that is marked by particular places and buildings as well as people who inhabit them. Polis, urbs, civis, city, die Stadt, miasto, város, město, or grad thus represent not only the places where people live but the idea of how they live and how they wish and they could live. In so being, the city becomes the image of world, time, society, and (multi)national culture. The essay further asserts that the city novel[1] uses space as a means of examining the interrelation of self and other, foreign and familiar, subjectivity and anonymity, the individual and the crowd, centre and periphery. Centre/periphery opposition as spatial category is direct characteristic of urbanity, of making order in space and its organization. The notion of centre/periphery determined urbanity in contemporary Central European literature thus becomes the way of life, the standard/norm by which life is lived, the analytical category...

In what follows, I will examine the construction of the urban landscape in the works of contemporary Central European writers to show that an analysis of it is important to understanding European urbanity. The first part of the essay will point out the features of the urban landscape in Central European literature; in the second section, I will discuss its construction in Michal Ajvaz's *The Other City* (1993), George Konrád's *The City Builder* (1977), and Robert Schindel's *Gebürtig* (1992). I will conclude by considering, in the light of possible objections, some consequences of my argument: the urban landscape in Central Europe is both a literature-generating principle, often supporting the very concept of Central European fiction, and a

[1] The other term is the urban novel. Both terms—the city novel and the urban novel—are interchangeable.

social construct, supporting the writing of Central European history and culture. It is inseparable from our personal life and national identity and legitimizes and authorizes the interpretation of self and other, culture and nature, superiority and inferiority, power and subordination, centre and periphery.

THE CITY IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN LITERATURE

The rise of the city cannot be separated from various kinds of literary movements—especially the development of the novel and subsequent narrative modes: comic realism, magic realism, naturalism, modernism, and postmodernism. On the one hand, cities depicted in literature are imaginative constructions; on the other, literary cities tend to reflect the material reality of their originals so precisely that from it for example Budapest, Warsaw, Prague, London, or Osijek could be rebuilt. As a highly distinctive feature of contemporary Central European literature, the city novel includes (but is not limited to) the following features and characteristics:

1. the image of the city is created from the point of view of narrator or other characters;
2. the figure of the flâneur is the recurring motif in narrative space of the city novel;
3. the city is represented as place/space determined by its inhabitants;
4. the city is described as symbolically different but at the same time unchangeable space that is marked by particular well-known places and monuments;
5. the city is depicted as a historical memory space;
6. people who inhabit the city possess certain features that correspond with the described space/place;
7. the city can be seen as Bakhtinian, open, socially and culturally heterogeneous, polyphonic, multiple, and multi-perspective space/place;
8. the city is occasionally described in terms of centre and periphery;
9. the city is the image of world, time, society, national, or multi-national culture.

Cities such as Prague, Vienna, Bratislava, Budapest, Pecs, Warsaw, even Osijek have formed living examples of imaginative constructions as well as of the material reality of their originals in the works of writers who have attempted to portray them. Some of the most intriguing representations of the contemporary city in Central European literature can be found in the novels *The Other City* by Michal Ajvaz, *The City Builder* by George Konrád, and *Gebürtig* by Robert Schindel.

The Other City

Czech literary production in the last twenty years has undergone a series of dramatic changes and embraced a set of subversive tendencies. Some of them – "a predilection for postmodernist metafiction and games aimed at destabilizing the text, an inclination for weaving fantastic and dreamlike elements into the narrative, in ways evocative at times of magic realism and at times of the gothic novel, … [and] stylistic experiments aimed at attaining a kind of authenticity of expression" (Harwood, 2003: 64) – can be traced in Michal Ajvaz's novel *The Other City* as well. Written in the literary tradition of Gnosticism and magical Prague, *The Other City* is a first-person narrative in which "the present-day city and its fantastic or legendary alter-ego are as much the main characters as the somewhat puppetlike human protagonists" (Harwood, 2003: 66). The inspiration for the novel, as Ajvaz explains to Erika Zlamalová in the interview preceding the Prague Writers' Festival 2010, came from

> a feeling that … [he] had in snow-covered Pohořelec, and at the beginning of Empty Streets, the feeling that … [he] had one hot summer day when … [he] walked along an empty street in Nusle from the Vršovice train station. This feeling came to … [him] from a white fog, in which tens of indistinct shapes and individual stories flickered, and those shapes and stories challenged … [him] to liberate them from the fog, to give them some kind of form. (Zlamalová, 2010)[2]

The novel is thus set in various locations about Prague:

- in Prague streets: Karlova Street, Kaprova Street, Žatecká Street, Železná Street, Celetná Street, Maisel Street, Široká Street, Lilová Street, Seminary Street, Neruda Street, Letná Street, Bridge Street, Úvoz Street, St Thomas Street, Jerusalem Street, Seminary Lane, the lane of Nový Svét, and Paris Avenue;
- in Prague churches: St Savior's Church, St Nicholas's Church, St Vitus's Cathedral, and the Týn Church;
- in Prague pubs, coffee houses, and restaurants: the Malá Strana Café, the Café Slavia, the "U hradeb" milk bar, the Snake wine restaurant, the Blue Pike Tavern, the café of the Hotel Evropa, and the Excelsior restaurant;

[2] The complete interview can be found on the web page: http://www.pwf.cz/en/authors-archive/michal-ajvaz/2984.html. The author of the essay made some grammatical changes in the body of the paragraph.

- in Prague palaces, towers, and around/near famous monuments and statues: the Kinsky Palace, the Clam-Gallas Palace, the Martinitz Palace, the Castle, the Town Hall, the monument to Jan Hus, the statues of SS Cosmas and Damian, St Wenceslas, St Augustine, St Francis Borgia, St Christopher, SS Barbara, Margaret and Elizabeth, the Old Town bridge tower, and the Malá Strana bridge tower;
- on Prague bridges: Charles Bridge, Jirásek Bridge, the Legions Bridge, Mánes Bridge, and the Powder Bridge;
- at Prague squares: Pohořelec Square, Hradčany Square, the Old Town Square, Marian Square, Crusaders' Square, Malá Strana Square, and St Anne's Square;
- in Prague parks and near its rivers: the Strahov Gardens, Kampa Park, the Botič river, and the Vltava;
- in Prague academic institutions: the University Library, the Clementinum, the Arts Faculty, and the Týn School;
- in and at other Prague locations: the Old Town, Smetana Embankment, Petřín Hill, Radlice, Bakov nad Jizerou, Újezd, Všenory, Janáček Embankment, the Main Station, Vinohrady, the Nusle Steps, Nusle Vale, and Pankrác.

The material reality of Prague—the places where a lone young man walks at the ghastly hours of night—provides the basis for the imaginative construction of Prague's other city which starts unexpectedly popping up in hints and flashes and "from the things … [the narrator] heard" (Ajvaz, 2009: 12). Unwilling to disentangle himself from the curious need to reveal Prague's otherness in which he himself is enmeshed, the narrator gradually develops "the feeling that in our immediate vicinity there lies some strange world" (Ajvaz, 2009: 12). Its presence arouses the narrator's dilemmas and makes him wonder if he

> had found … [himself] on the frontier of an unknown city adjoining our own? Is it a city growing out of the waste that our own order has not been able to consume and throw away, or is it a community of autochthons, who were here before we arrived and to whom we are of so little account that they will not even notice when we depart? What is the ground plan of that city? What districts is it divided into and what are its laws? Where are its boulevards, squares and gardens, where its gleaming royal palace? (Ajvaz, 2009: 22)

Gradually, the glimpses and flashes of the Other City emerge mingled with real Prague and the narrator realizes that there are always two cities at work: one visible, the other invisible, one of the surface, the other underground or hidden; one a realm of mastery and control, the other of mystery and turmoil. He even discovers that the basic units of urban way of living—apartments

> are much bigger than we imagine, that the dwelling areas and known spaces constitute only a small part, that the totality of the apartment includes dank stone halls whose walls are covered in dreary frescoes, paradise gardens overgrown with luxuriant vegetation, and atria, in whose midst the cold water of fountains gushes high into the air. The secret spaces are linked with the living areas of the apartment by camouflaged passages in nooks and crannies and behind wardrobes, but usually we never set foot in them in our lives—and yet we sense that the decisions whereby our lives are transformed and renewed ripen in the breath that wafts from these places whose existence we deny. (Ajvaz, 2009: 52)

In this way, the narrator, too, recalls, in the most realistically presented scenes, "the pictures of ancient world cultures, thereby broadening local experience with the experience of humankind, giving it a metaphysical dimension" (Janaszek-Ivaničkova, 2006: 29).

In discussing the ideas of the real and the symbolic, the visible and the invisible, the surface and the underground, the ancient and the modern, Ajvaz's *The Other City* touches on one of the major issues of urbanism and social space, that of the definition of center and periphery and, by extension, the relationship of centre and periphery. Ajvaz thus maintains that there are no such terms as centre and periphery in the urban space (at least of his novel) and illustrates this point by insisting that "by searching for the centre you move further away from it. The moment you stop looking for it and you forget about it, you'll discover that you never left it" (Ajvaz, 2009: 82). In accord with this is Ajvaz's definition of the mentioned terms: "The places we call the fringes are the secret centre on whose fringes we dwell" (Ajvaz, 2009: 110) and his idea that "all cities are mutually the centre and periphery, beginning and end, capital and colony of each other" (Ajvaz, 2009: 156).

Further investigation helps to reveal one more feature of the city novel in the narrative space of *The Other City*: the character of a *flâneur* and/or the motif

of flânery. Originally, the flâneur was a well-dressed man marked by the traits of wealth, education, and idleness who strolled leisurely through the Parisian arcades of the nineteenth century to pass the time that his wealth afforded him. He treated the people who passed and the objects he saw as texts for his own pleasure. In being so, the flâneur becomes a personification of the urbanity itself and operates as the metaphor of closeness between the individual and his/her urban surroundings. The scholarship surrounding the subject of the flâneur always in some way refers to Walter Benjamin's writing on Charles Baudelaire—*The Arcades Project*[3] (1927–1940). Besides in Benjamin's, the figure of the flâneur appears in the works of Chris Jenks and Michel de Certeau who use it as the metaphor and methodological tool for the analysis of urban culture. In literature the flâneur operates as a creative principle and a prose writing strategy of modern and postmodern fiction. Portrayed as a kind of a stroller, walker, idler who walks through urban landscapes, the flâneur experiences mysterious encounters and revelations mainly produced by visual effects. His/her walks are without particular motivation and usually turn into adventures bringing him/her aesthetic or erotic pleasures. In this way s/he becomes a kind of a narrator fluent in deciphering the vocabulary of visual culture.

In Ajvaz's *The Other City* there is also a man walking through Prague, a flâneur following the secret paths, chance meetings, and curved streets of the Czech capital. His narrator takes his place "in a long tradition of 'Prague walkers', stretching all the way from the pilgrim in Jan Amos Comenius's seventeenth-century allegory *The Labyrinth of the World* to the twentieth-century poetry of Guillaume Apollinaire, Vítezslav Nezval, and Vladimír Holan" (Bolton). In addition, Ajvaz's Prague is repopulated by ghosts, eccentrics, talking animals, and statues that confront his flâneur on his wanderings forcing him to notice more and more cracks in familiar places, until "the other city" begins to open up, parallel with real Prague but invisible to its inhabitants. As Jonathan Bolton notices, *The Other City* can be seen as a

> guidebook to this invisibility, reminding us that we see least clearly what is most familiar. Only when we remove objects from "the network of purposes" that

[3] The character of the flâneur first appeared in Walter Benjamin's "Die Wiederkehr des Flâneurs" (1929), a work reviewing Franz Hessel's *Spazieren in Berlin*. In his later work on nineteenth-century Paris, Benjamin reexamines the figure in what he considers its true dwelling place: Paris. The flâneur is also depicted in his 1935 sketch "Paris - Capital of the Nineteenth Century" (1935) and in the two studies on Baudelaire written in 1938.

> entangle them, will we awaken to the possibility of seeing them anew; only then will libraries turn into jungles, only then will we notice hatchways leading inside statues and ocean waves lapping at our bedspreads. (Bolton)

The City Builder

Underneath the surface of his novels set in Arrow-Cross and Communist Hungary, George Konrád mirrors his memories as Jew and dissident. The autobiographical component of his novels is brought into being through plot and characters that disentangle the threads of revealed past. In much the same way, the setting in Konrád's novels is just "foil and metaphor for the memories that lie within" (Marcus, 2008: 120). To tell his semiautobiographical narratives Konrád, like other Central European novelists, uses both structure and plot and is "careful to build a proper formalistic edifice to match its internal contents" (Marcus, 2008: 121). In addition, his early novels show "the inner deterioration of their protagonists with an ever increasing narrative evasiveness" replacing "psychological realism … with garrulous stream of consciousness" (Marcus, 2008: 121).

Konrád's early novel *The City Builder* is semiautobiographical as well and recalls his work at the Budapest Institute of Urban Planning. Although shifting in time and space, the novel does not exhibit narrative progression. Continuity of structure and plot is thus provided by the first person narrator who is brought into being through his memories and views on people and world around him. The narrator of *The City Builder* is a city planner, an architect, a city builder in an unnamed provincial Eastern European city who comes from a long line of city planners and builders. But while his great-grandfather "selected the bricks himself, testing them for a steely ring with a hammer … [and] toppled over rooftrees with a long-handled axe, and when it came to lifting and crushing stone, he outdid his day labourers" (Konrád, 2007: 54), the narrator does not possess his determinacy and ruthlessness. He is instead a

> city planner in the early phase of socialism. From bourgeois … [he] became a member of the intelligentsia, and was servant of law and order, agent of an open future, wizard of upward-soaring graphs, and self-hating hawker in an ideology shop, all in one. … [His] father was a private planner, … [he] was a planner employed by the state. To make decisions about others … [his father] needed money, … [he] … [has his] office. What makes others envy … [him], what enables

> … [him] to imagine in arrogant moments that … [he is] what … [he is], are wealth and power, and of these … [they] both had more than … [their] share. (Konrád, 2007: 75)

As a young city planner he "wanted to build a great city, … a new city … in whose identical neighbourhoods families, equal in social position, would no longer disdainfully keep apart" (Konrád, 2007: 79); as a middle-aged man he became "state-owned, and a loyal socialist, … a technician of a centrally prescribed military strategy, at middle level in the pyramid of decision making" (Konrád, 2007: 80-81; 83), satisfied with his modest share of power and glad that he has not completely been dehumanized by the repressive system that had made him.

The City Builder allows one more reading, one in which the novel is elevated to the position of a series of "universal life situations and archetypal confrontations" (Sanders, 1983: 211). In this reading, the narrator is a kind of "Everyman" (Sanders, 1983: 211): he is husband, lover, father, son, bourgeois, revolutionary, socialist, and technocrat. He has a vision of the city that is unique and universal, utopian and real, the vision that could be shared by an individual and a mass alike - an Everyman's vision:

> I dream of a city in which action is synonymous with change, where I have a right to my surroundings, where I don't exist for the city but am wooed by it; where only after consultation with me could decisions be made about me; … where I am a reformer because of my ideas, not because I have been appointed; … where the front pages of newspaper contain intellectual revelations, and the community rewards those who are different; where a high school is run differently from a chicken farm, and a teacher teaches by sharing his interests with his students; … where entire streets are bulletin boards, and everyone can paint the sidewalks and address passers-by; where there is music in public squares and people take pleasure in shaping their environment. (Konrád, 2007: 120-122)

Similarly, the city builder's cynicism and quiet despair, his anguished litanies, appeals, and exhortations on the limitations of the city life can be read not only as his own or his fellow citizens' in an unnamed provincial Eastern European city but as all peoples' dreaming for a more meaningful life.

> I don't want a city in which pedestrians are chased by warning signs amid ruined or abandoned walls; where nothing is allowed, nothing is possible, nothing is worth the trouble; where ready-made regulations stare at me from shopwindows. I don't want a city where everything stays the same, where suspicion oozes from plaster walls, squares are contaminated by idiotic monotony and a heap of garbage on the corner reminds me of my deformities. I don't want a city where I cower to avoid being snapped at, until I am snapped at for cowering; where greatness is an obtrusion, cowardice is peace, and talk is conspiracy; where I have to like the way things are because they cannot be otherwise; where cunning nobodies search the bunkers of wasted years, and humanity is an irritable substance, a graphic illustration of inattention, the refutation of my hopes, where street-corner lottery-ticket vendors represent transcendence. (Konrád, 2007: 119)

Seen in this light, even his profession is "a curiously ambivalent, all-inclusive metaphor. On the one hand, the planner is the artist, the creator, the preserver of civilization; but obsessed with his goals, he is also a ruthless and amoral manipulator" (Sanders, 1983: 211).

Finally, *The City Builder*, too, is the novel in which the city is as much the main protagonist as the city builder. Even though a "coupling of stone and light", the city is presented as a living organism, "a stretched-out body in the folds of a mountain" (Konrád, 2007: 29) whose "white-stoned City Hall" and a "Central European Square", with its impressive public buildings and statuary "mentioned in histories of architecture" (Konrád, 2007: 176), remind the narrator that he is actually there because of the city and not the other way around. This is one of the reasons why the narrator finds his "gossipy provincial" (Konrád, 2007: 22) city at the same time comforting and imprisoning, irreplaceable and loathsome, "an Eastern European showcase of devastation and reconstruction" that "can welcome the enemy with salt and bread, and, having taken crash courses in the art of survival . . . change its greeting signs, statues, scapegoats – its history" (Konrád, 2007: 22).

Gebürtig

When in a reading at the Hamburg Literaturhaus in 1992 asked what inspired him to write the novel, Robert Schindel pointed out that his novel is "very much a book

about Vienna [and] that he strongly feels his rootedness there" (Freeman, 1997: 121). Schindel's "rootedness" in the city of Vienna is thus reflected in the setting portrayed in the novel: (1) the period between 1981 and 1986, the years 1968, 1934, 1938, the time of the Shoah, and (2) the urban space of Vienna, in particular the 2nd, 6th, 8th District of Vienna, and the city centre. Even the plot of the novel echoes Schindel's statement that *Gebürtig* is the city novel, the Vienna novel: he describes urban milieu[4] dominated by Jewish, non-bourgeois, left-wing intellectuals whose relationship with the City of Vienna and the non-Jewish city dwellers represents from the beginning the centre of the plot.

Unlike the above-discussed novels that are exclusively bound to one urban landscape—that of Prague and an unnamed provincial Eastern European city, Schindel's novel is not limited to one urban landscape only. To achieve this, Schindel constructs the multi-urban setting of the novel in the following way:

- through Vienna streets, parks, bridges, and squares as public spaces and places: Halmgasse, Florianigasse, Doblhoffgasse, Friedensgasse, Löwengasse, Rotundenbrücke, Reichsbrücke, Gumpendorferstraße, Josefstädter Straße, Prater, Swiss Garden, Schlesinger Platz, Luegerplatz, Liechtenwerder Platz, and Lainzer Tor;
- through Vienna pubs and coffee houses as semi-public spaces and places: Café Zeppelin, Café Zartl, Prückl, Diglas Meierei, Bräunerhof Café, Café Hummel, Eiles Café, and Blauensteiner;
- through Vienna cultural, political, religious, economic, and academic institutions: Galerie Alte und Neue Kunst, Hauptbücherei, Universität, Burgtheater, Oper, Stephansdom, Votivkirche, Börse, Rathaus, and Parlament;
- through Vienna public transportation: D-Wagen, J-Wagen, and 13er;
- through Vienna city districts: Margarethen, Josephstadt, and Leopoldstadt;
- through other Austrian topographies: Rax, Aflenz; Lilienfeld, Mauthausen, and Altausseer;
- through other urban spaces and their relationship to the urban space of Vienna: Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich, New York, Turin, Paris, Venice, and Osijek.

[4] The main characters of the novel are: the book editor Daniel Demant who starts a relationship with the doctor Christiane Kalteisen, his "twin-brother" and the occasional first person narrator Alexander (Sascha) Graffito who in the course of the novel befriends Mascha Singer, an unemployed sociologist. There are also a Mauthausen-born designer Eric Stieglitz, a bank manager Emmanuel Katz who is also a writer and dates a young North German (Käthe), and the poet Paul Hirschfeld.

Being only named, but never described, the mentioned districts, streets, and squares are symptomatic of (1) the milieu of the protagonists who are presented as the keepers/preservers of the specific urban tradition, (2) the upscale bourgeois milieu, or (3) the milieu where the Jewish population of Vienna used to live. Similarly, as sites of personal and intellectual exchange pubs and cafés are presented as a lifestyle of a generation and have cultural, social, aesthetic, and economic dimension.

The multi-urban setting of the novel provides the context for two stories dealing with the question of perpetrators and victims and the memory of the Shoah as well. The first is focused on Hermann Gebirtig, the American-Austrian writer living in New York. He is asked by a young critic, Susanne Ressel, to come to Vienna as a witness against a Nazi criminal. After a few unsuccessful attempts, she eventually manages to bring Gebirtig to Vienna, but the perpetrator, who was recognized by Susanne's father, was not found guilty. The second story is set in Hamburg and describes a successful liberal journalist Konrad Sachs who has an agonizing secret: he is in fact the Prince of Poland, the son of the Nazi Governor in Poland. After an exchange of letters with Emmanuel Katz and a ride with Daniel Demant, Sachs comes out as a son of a Nazi not only to the Jewish intellectual who lost most of his family in Poland but to the whole German and Austrian public. The novel even contains an epilogue: Demant goes to Osijek in Croatian Slavonia to act in a movie about Theresienstadt.

The above-given plot summary, too, reveals that Schindel's novel treats the urban landscape of Vienna as a historical memory place that is merged with other places/spaces. The starting point for this kind of semantic construction of the urban space of Vienna is the present of the novel that provides a very detailed picture of Vienna as the city with the past. This past includes the interest in the victim and perpetrator narratives in Austria and Germany in the 1980's, many often failed trials of Nazi criminals in Austria, the attempt of the official Austrian politicians to bring back the victims and to honour them, the self-critical memory discourse in Austria, and the question of the identity of Jews in Austria after the Shoah.

Semantically constructed as a cultural, political, and historical memory space, the multi-urban setting of *Gebürtig* exhibits one more feature of the city novel – flânery. As in Ajvaz's *The Other City,* in Schindel's *Gebürtig*, too,

> a man goes through the streets of a city. Behind him there are many people walking, in front of him some are walking too. The city is wet from melted snow,

> the light is the mixture of recent frosts and future sunny days, the traffic lights, the cars, the buses, the man walks and walks. He started walking early in the morning. He walks from one part of the city to another. (Schindel, 1992: 181)[5]

Throughout most of the novel, Daniel Demant and his (ex)girlfriend Wilma, Konrad Sachs, Christiane Kalteisen, and Hermann Gebirtig are the flâneurs surrendering themselves to the chance meetings and crocked streets of Venice, Munich, Frankfurt, Paris, and Vienna. They stroll leisurely through the arcades of the twentieth century Venice, Munich, Frankfurt, Paris, and Vienna – shoppers with no intention to buy, people and object observers, intellectuals in search for spiritual and mental challenges, and occasional tourists with an affinity for architectural achievements of the place they find themselves at. Sometimes flânery—being a member of the crowd that populates the streets and an active and intellectual observer — brings revelation or peace of mind, as it is the case with Konrad Sachs or Hermann Gebirtig. More often flânery operates as turmoil in disguise: on the surface Daniel Demant and his friends "feel at home in the streets and cafés of Vienna", yet deep inside they "are aware of their foreignness and the illusion of belonging which they themselves foster" (Feinberg, 1997: 175).

CONCLUSION

Literature, in being at least in part the reflection of life, also shares its affinity to employ and examine similar subject matters. The interest in the city in literature firstly occurred in the Bible and has regularly re-emerged in each and every national literature. It occupied Daniel Defoe, Charles Dickens, Émile Zola, Joseph Conrad, and T.S. Elliot on the Old Continent as well as Theodore Dreiser, Frank Norris, Ralph Ellison, and Thomas Pynchon on the New. It has become one of the main existential dilemmas in the works of Central European writers as well. Sharing a number of features such as the first-person narrator, the centre–periphery opposition, the figure of the flâneur, the Bakhtinian perspective, the use of particular well-known places etc., Central European writers open a discursive space on the city as the image of world, time, society, national, or multi-national culture and give it their own flair. Some, like Michal Ajvaz, use the character of the flâneur strolling through the present-day city and the creative principles of magic realism to draw attention to "the other

[5] Unless otherwise noted, all translations from German to English are made by the author of the essay.

cities" invisible to us because we are caught in our own habits of seeing. Others, like George Konrád, imbue their portrait of the city with their own memories successfully avoiding the impersonality of the modernist fiction. The rest, like Robert Schindel, relies on the image of the city as cultural, political, and historical memory space in the context of other major cities.

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THE CITY AS AN EXPERIENCESCAPE: ARCHITECTURE'S ROLE IN TRANSFORMING THE CULTURAL EXPERIENCE OF THE URBAN SPACE

Zuzanna Dziuban

THE 'PLACE' OF ARCHITECTURE: ARCHITECTURE AND ITS URBAN CONTEXT

Any attempt to articulate the problems of contemporary architecture in terms of its cultural experience, and thus not solely in terms of its formal and artistic qualifications (which as well are, it is proper to add, always culturally relativised), demands to locate it within some kind of a broader framework. Only the choice and operationalisation of it make it possible to answer the question about beyond aesthetic, and therefore, social, political, or cultural functions that it can fulfil. Therefore, also the concentration on the urban problematic aspects, while undertaking analytical approach towards specific architectural projects, is to be connected with a basic theoretical assumption that architecture cannot be deprived—even in the field of philosophy—not only from its social and cultural, but also spatial context: the city itself. The matter of concern is, however, not the lack of independence of architecture resulting from its definitional functionality, as criticized by Kant in the *Critique of Judgment* (Kant, 1914), analyzed by Gadamer in *Truth and Method* (Gadamer, 1989) and warming the heart of Gianni Vattimo in *Transparent Society* (Vattimo, 1992). (And that, for a while now, has been problematised and challenged by the deconstructivist architecture), but rather the irreducible, reflexive, and mutual relationship between urban and architectural, between the ways in which city and architecture are being culturally constructed, understood and experienced as an effect.

This specific interrelation, however, which was realized already in architectural modernism, and, in a completely different way, has become the main object of interest of postmodern architecture (justifying the utopias of complete transformation of the urban space related to it), has not been explicitly characterised in theoretical studies

of urban space. Here, the place of architecture is proving to be extremely mobile: its position at the centre or on the margins of urban reflections varies with the changing perspective of thinking about what determines and creates the character of the city and urban texture. Paradoxically, however, it is not the object-oriented reflection, concentrated on the functional and socio-economic characteristics of the built environment, which highlights the reciprocal and reflexive relationship between the city and architecture that interests me here. It rather plays an important role in the subject-oriented reflection on urban space, main focus of which is not so much the mechanisms governing the development of the city, or its structural characteristics, but its cultural experience. For in this perspective, important, but not central to the urban reflection, the question, inter alia, of architecture's role in the process of constructing diverse experiences of the urban space, becomes problematic. Therefore, it remains closely related to the initial belief that the city must be treated primarily as a cultural space: the space ordered and constructed by the cultural—and thus culturally defined—experiences of its users. Therefore, I am referring to the experiences that are co-created and co-determined by urban architecture: the nature of its intellectual and sensory impact, its meaning and the influence on the urban landscape it is located in.

It is worth noting that this assumption accompanies not only the concept of humanist principle, according to which and in accordance with Florian Znaniecki's anti-naturalist theses, one should study urban space precisely as experience space, expressed in terms of cultural values and constructed by architectural, symbolic points of reference (Znaniecki, 1934), or the revolutionary articulation, proposed by Henri Lefebvre, and constantly referred to by Edward Soja, of categories of the urban, social space in lived space terms, and therefore the space of its cultural, mentally and emotionally coloured experience, in which both characteristics of the built environment and theoretical, artistic images of the urban space are subject to mediation (Lefebvre, 2003: 43; 2005; Soja, 1996: 76). It also plays an important role in the pioneer "urban" considerations of critical school representatives, such as Georg Simmel, Walter Benjamin or Siegfried Kracauer, where the notion "urban"—what will become one of the fundamental points of reference for my considerations—is to be interpreted simply as the space of experience, space "architecturally framed and founded", to put it in Benjamin's words (Benjamin, 1979: 364).

In this perspective, the architecture is therefore not, as Kant would have it, imperfect, because subordinate art, or a necessary, though aesthetically just a side,

effect of the urban development. As a tool for framing and founding of the city, it is rather a catalyst and a symptom of transformation of the urban space experience. Its changes and reinterpretation of the role played by it, reflect, therefore, the transformation of the understanding of the city itself and metaphors used to describe it—and hence, its cultural experience as well.

CHANGING FUNCTIONS: FROM GROWTH TO THE ENTERTAINMENT MACHINE

Therefore, it is not surprising that this, discovered at the end of the nineteenth century by the early urban critics, experience- and city-creating role of architecture has been forgotten for many years, when the basic metaphor for describing the city and the nature of its transformation was the metaphor of a city as a growth machine (Logan, Moloth, 1987). This perspective, prevailing in American urban studies (urban sociology, urban political economy), even if it was very critical, claimed to understand the city as a machine functionally subordinated to processes of economic growth and wealth creation, where the manipulation of space is focused only on its exchangeable and not on its symbolic or at least utilitarian value. This way of thinking about the city, also reflected in the architectural works—just to mention the achievements of modernist, utopian functionalism—dominating until, more or less, 60s of the twentieth century, together with the dominant role of the industrial city, challenged not so much the assumption that the city is a socially produced space (Castells, 1977; Gottdiener, 1997), but rather with reductionist spirit—implying radical, unilateral determination of social space by socio-economic formations generating it—marginalized, on the one hand, the question of the role of experience as a "tool" of cultural production of space, its recipient and the starting point of theoretical analysis. On the other hand, it deprived architecture—understood primarily as "building", which fulfils social and economic needs—of the culture-creating function of its generating, transforming and problematising (something the modernist architects would surely not agree with). The city, being a growth machine, therefore, a profit-oriented body, was thus symbolically absorbing both its inhabitants and its architecture.

It is also not surprising that the focus on the importance of architecture for what the city is and how we should understand it is back in fashion in the urban studies, with the cultural turn occurring within them. For it involves the opening of the sociological, geographical or economic reflection on the city to issues that go beyond the so far

reductionist paradigms, while condemning them to interdisciplinarity, which is definitional for contemporary urban studies. For the appreciation of the role of culture and the issues related to it, is, on the one hand, an effect of changes in metaphors used to describe the city, which are forced by the actual and real transformation of the industrial city to the post-industrial city. The growth machine category loses its heuristic capacity. The end of heavy and centralized industry and return to the decentralized industry, based on symbolic production, demands a revision of the models used to describe and explain both the problems of urban development, as well as ways to "use" the city. This is primarily because the new determinants of urban development that arise with the creation of a post-industrial city give new value to its so far absent or marginalized aspects such as style or quality of life, or its experience, defined by Charles Landry in The Art of City Making in 'soft' urban infrastructure terms (Landry, 2006: 281). In this perspective, the city appears to by an entertainment machine (Lloyd, Clark, 2001), not only space for investors, but also for consumers, tourists and symbolic consumption-oriented inhabitants. This in turn is reflected in the often criticised for this reason post-modern architecture (Girardo, 1996). As Richard Lloyd and Terry Clark note, "The features of the entertainment machine are not altogether new, as cities have long been sites for consumption and aesthetic innovation. What is new is the degree to which these 'cultural' activities have become crucial urban features" (Lloyd, Clark, 2001: 356).

On the other hand, the emphasis on cultural factors in the theoretical and more practical reflection on the city is a result of the necessary review of the questions about how in the post-industrial era the city can be guaranteed to successfully compete in the economic market. This success is, as many researchers agree, primarily a cultural one. It is, therefore, the increase of the role of culture in defining the economic position of the city, analysed by Richard Florida (Florida, 2005) within the concept of creative cities, or by Sharon Zukin, who refers to the categories of urban, cultural economy (Zukin, 2002), that demands that it is treated as a primary interest of the cities, their economic base. "Cultural strategies that initially represented the result of economic development turned into strategies aimed at stimulating economic growth", as Zukin notes in *The Cultures of Cities* (Zukin, 2002: 280). They aim not only to attract investment and trade—a city with a good museum of contemporary art is often automatically seen as a city flourishing economically—but also to attract interest of professions defined by Florida as the creative class: artists or intellectuals whose

presence in urban space, according to the author of *Who's your City*, is a guarantor of their successful development (Florida, 2008).

And what determines both the investment, and the significant for the quality of life, attractiveness of the city, is precisely its openness, cultural innovation, and, or that perhaps above all, its recognition. The latter can be guaranteed by cultural uniqueness that is distinct and largely based on, and represented by a specific and well "matched" iconography. "Increasingly significant in understanding the new competitive environment is the play of *urban iconics*, through which the intention of physical structures or events can be grasped all at once. (...) What this does is help and reinforce the resonance of the city. And resonance generates drawing power, which in turn can override underlying real economic potential", states Charles Landry (Landry, 2008: 286).

In this context, one of the key elements of the city's attractiveness is thus its architecture. Therefore, it is not only understood as building that fulfils needs. On the contrary, moving beyond its purely functional approach, involves rather the tendency typical for contemporary reflection on the city to define architecture in terms of city's cultural capital or the stake in a game of city's symbolic economy, as Zukin or Florida would put it. From this perspective, architecture's utility is underestimated or even entirely neglected, whereas architecture is to be understood as a leading actor in the process of creating city's cultural identity and its cultural representations, and, importantly, its brand. The changing contextual, socio-economic reflection on architecture is, therefore, not describing it in the spirit cited above any longer – as a phenomenon reflecting capitalist relations of production. It turns out to be an extremely important, strategic tool, which allows the city to appear on the global cultural market and, consequently, to succeed in the competitive marketplace.

Hence, way too often, as a consequence, architecture seems to be treated exclusively as a catalyst of culture driven urban renewal (Zukin, 2002), of redefinition of the image of the city (Landry, 2009), or simply city's promotion tool. "Bilbao effect" can function here as the best, but at the same time rather alarming, example: Gehry's Guggenheim Museum is to be understood, by the representatives of the urban and cultural studies, in the first place as Bilbao's logo, a marketing tool, not as museum (function) or interesting architectural project (form). This fact affects, obviously, humanistic approach towards the problem of architecture's role in "framing and founding" of the urban space. Architecture, "stylistic hallmark of late capitalism",

(Klingmann, 2007: 5), as Anna Klingmann would put it, is aimed at increasing consumption, transforming the city into a theme park or simply a brandscape.

Yet the place branding or urban branding perspective, as characterized by scholars such as Klingmann, Robert Govers and Frank Go (Govers, Go, 2009), allows posing anew the question concerning relation between architecture and the city conceived as the space of experience. Since, according to above mentioned scholars, the process of urban marketing has to be strictly connected with so called "experience economy", brands do not anymore relate just to products, but to aura of meaning—added or symbolic value attached to them, and, as a consequence, to the realm of their experience. "Consumption is more about co-creating experiences than the exchange of goods and services" (Govers, Go, 2009: 44), note the authors of *Place Branding*, illustrating the indicated change. Therefore, the value of architecture – treated as a branding tool—"is no longer appraised merely as a formal object but by its ability to elicit relevant transformation in people and places" (Klingmann, 2007:318)—states Klingmann in *Brandscapes. Architecture in the Experience Economy*. Hence, not only its point-wise, architecturally transformed fragments (icons), but the city as a whole, the brandscape, is to be understood in terms of an experience environment (Govers, Go, 2009: 136). The category that reflects the character and effect of thus understood urban environment in the most adequate manner is the experiencescape category: the utopic—not in modern, but in post-modern manner—space of hedonistic, consumption-oriented experience of aesthetic pleasure.

ATOPIC EXPERIENCESCAPE: ARCHITECTURAL WARPING OF THE URBAN SPACE

Although the answer to the question concerning architecture's role in "framing and founding" the space of experience, with which place branding perspective provides us, does not seem to be satisfying, it can be treated as a valuable lesson. For it demonstrates, that the perspective of experience, often marginalized in the reflection on the city and architecture, can now not only play a decisive role in the reflection on the city, but it also requires widening of conceptual framework used in characterising its phenomenon and changes. Therefore, it primarily calls for asking which experience is to be included in the urban experiencescape and which is actually the most dominant in the urban landscape, and what is the role of contemporary architecture in its creation. Since, as it was argued, contemporary architecture is above all to be aimed

at generating various experiences, transforming the experience of the city itself, it is worthy to focus on those of them (even though they continue to play marginal role) that not only repeat and preserve the image of a modern city a space of consumption, entertainment or leisure. The actual transformation assumes after all, a critical or at least problematising picture of what city is or could be, viewed from the perspective of its experience, mediated and shaped by architecture.

Thus, this assumption allows one to concentrate on the experience of contemporary architecture that falls outside the reductive logic distinctive for American urban studies, where the city is defined either as the growth or as the entertainment machine. It also helps to draw one's attention to architectural projects, which, in a new way, put the question about urban utopia and the real possibility of its development. Thus, they function as an alternative to modernist and postmodernist reflection on the city. I am, therefore, referring to such ideas as Peter Eisenman's projects, which, as their author claims, are to be freed from the rule of the criteria of functionality and, at the same time, are not supposed to provide any comfortable experience of visual pleasure. It is enough to mention the *Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe* (*Holocaust Monument* in Berlin) or unbuilt *Max Reinhardt Haus*: buildings, whose transformational impact on the experience of urban space cannot—in case of Max Reinhardt Haus, potentially, of course, due to the fact that the project was not implemented—be overestimated. In this case, it is rather philosophy of culture and its categories, e.g. atopia that can play an important role in describing the experience of the urban space transformed by them.

It is so, because the notion 'atopia', or 'atopic experience' may be treated as a more adequate tool for characterising the cultural experience of contemporary 'stressogenic' rather than comforting urban architecture. The category 'atopic'—according to scholars such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida or Roland Barthes (Dziuban, 2009)—relates to the characteristics of experience of that, what is not-classified, alien, uncanny, and unintelligible or anxietygenerating. However, as the name suggests, atopia, *a-topos* relates to spatial metaphors such as utopia or heterotopia – the ancient Greek *topos* means, after all, "place" or "discourse" among other things. Consequently, as a privative, a negation of *topos* (a-topos), atopia ought to be understood as non-place, something outside the place or out-of-place. This broad semantic field of the category of atopia, which links the possibility, or rather impossibility, of understanding and classification with the reflection on space, allows one to pose the question on spatial

experience that could be described in such terms. Therefore, it can be productively applied in the context of the contemporary thought on architecture, which seems to be, as it is argued, of primary importance for the experience of urban experiencescape.

Therefore, the reflection on the architecture, and the fact that it can play an entirely new role in the process of "framing and founding" of the experience of the urban space, can rely on the idea of 'spatial warping', as introduced by Anthony Vidler in *Warped Space: Art, Architecture and Anxiety in Modern Culture* (Vidler, 2001). It allows one to not only revisit Richard Sennett's category of "resistance" – according to the author of *Flesh and Stone*, the main notion describing man's relation to the urban space, lost in the modern era (Sennet, 1996). But also enables one to concentrate on the variety of *malaria urbana*, as described by Walter Benjamin, Georg Simmel or Siegfried Kracauer: problematic and unpleasant experiences of the urban space. Hence, the warped space of metropolis is to be treated not as hedonistic experiencescape, but as a source of fears, phobias and neurosis of its inhabitants: *horror vacui*, agoraphobia, claustrophobia or *das Behrührungsangst*, haptophobia – the fear of being touched. *Malaria* caused and generated nowadays not as much by the emergence and the difficulties of the urban life, as argued by the representatives of critical school—we had enough time to get used to it already—as by contemporary stressogenic, uncomfortable architecture.

Thus, architectural warping can be reflected precisely in architecture's moving forward of dysfunctionalization and problematisation of its formality, mirrored for instance in the fact, that the boundary between architecture and sculpture is frequently being erased. The following may serve as an example: Kapoor's disturbing metro stations in Naples, which once and for all re-contextualise and transform the experience of users of public transport or Rachel Whiteread's uncanny *House* in London or *Holocaust Memorial* in Vienna, which with ruthless brutality enters memory experiences into the urban space, destabilising its unproblematic perception. Therefore, stressogenic architecture seems to engage not so much optical, as tactile dimension of the experience. But this haptic model of architectural experience challenges not only the distance characteristic of visual perception of the architecture, assumed by the place branding perspective. Since it is constructed not for seeing, but above all for moving subject, and, therefore, its often very enigmatic form enables understanding from one, privileged point of view. Haptic-oriented architecture (such as for instance Daniel Libeskind's *Jewish Museum* in Berlin) battens also or

above all on the tactile anxiety of the moving subject generated by destabilisation of surfaces, claustrophobic spaces and dead end streets causing anxiety, fear, incertitude, or instability of its "user". From this point of view architecture—to quote Vidler's *Warped space*—is to be conceived primarily as a "vertigo machine", or, while posing the question about its relationship with the city's space: a spatial sabotage.

After all, architectural warping can be approached here not merely as an experience-problematising or anxietygenerating mechanism, but also as a tactic—and therefore not a top-down, overall urban strategy—in the sense that Michel de Certeau has attributed to this term (Certeau de, 1984). That means that it chooses the actions aimed at local, small-scale subversions: transformations and problematisations of the character of the urban texture, by destabilising its elements or fragments. Yet, since both, modern and post-modern urban and architectural utopias failed partly because they were supposed to lead to total and complete transformation of the urban space, contemporary stressogenic architecture is well aware of its unfeasibility. This is why, current architectural projects, according to Vidler, "are honed into tools, weapons and instruments of insertion, opening rifts and faults in the apparently seamless fabric of the city" (Vidler, 2001). Therefore, its deviations, ruptures and discontinuities generated by the architecture are to be treated not only as integral elements of its texture, but also a point of reference for the atopic experience of the warped urban experiencescape.

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Chapter V

Programme – Sponsors – Authors

9th DRC (Danube Rectors' Conference) Summer School on Regional Co-operation



Challenges for the European Union in the Next Decade

A View from the Danube Region

2012, Maribor



www.drc-danube.org

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The DRC Summer School project was initiated by the IDM (Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe/Institut für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa) and International House Pécs in 2003 to promote regional co-operation among young social scientists. Its general aim is the establishment of a network of young scientists who deal with the issue of regional co-operation as Central European perspective, and thus the institutionalisation of the Summer School for the future. The 9th Summer School is another step towards enhancing and deepening scientific co-operations in Central Europe, among the project partners, i.e. institutions from the V4 countries, the Ukraine, Austria and some Western Balkan countries. Since 2006 the IDM is represented in the project by Dr. Susan Milford, managing director, whereas IDResearch Ltd. is represented by Dr. István Tarrósy, managing director, and former managing director of the Regional European Information and Education Centre PBC who has been implementing the project with the Austrian partners for six years.

The 9th edition of the Summer School puts its focus on the Challenges for the European Union in the Next Decade. The Danube Rectors' Conference provides a platform for the collaboration of 51 institutions of higher education from 12 countries in the Danubian Region.

Main aims of the project:

- to enhance the awareness for the significance and possibilities of regional co-operation;
- to discuss and develop strategies for the improvement of co-operation in the region;
- to bring young scientists from the countries of the Danube Region and Central Europe together in order to establish a regional scientific network within the European Research Area;
- to foster relations between the partner universities of the Danube Rectors' Conference and between other regional actors, e.g. the V4 community;
- to promote the mobility of young scientists, especially in South East Europe;
- to prepare a sustainable series of events to be able to meet the tasks mentioned above.

As it was the case at the first eight Summer Schools, the results and best quality papers of the 9th Summer School will be published in a proceedings volume by the end of 2012.

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DANUBE RECTORS' CONFERENCE

Programme

1 July Sunday Arrival in Maribor

16.00-17.00 Registration
DORM7 Hostel: Accommodation for participants

17.00-18.00 Introduction, First meeting
DORM7 Hostel

19.00 Dinner

2 July Monday

08.15-09.00 Registration

09.00-09.15 Welcome
Daniel REBOLJ
Rector of the University of Maribor

09.15-09.30 Opening
Susan MILFORD
Managing Director of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe / Institut für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa – IDM

09.30-12.45 Plenary lectures

09.30-10.15 **Brain Drain and Brain Gain – The Austrian Example**
Heinz FASSMANN
University of Vienna

10.15-11.00 **Challenges and Opportunities for Co-operation in Research and Education in the Danube Region**
Verena WINIWARTER
University of Klagenfurt

11.00-11.15 Break

11.15-12.00 **A Europe of the Regional Initiatives?**
Sebastian SCHÄFFER
Center for Applied Policy Research, Munich

12.00-12.45 **Europe as Normative Power in Light of the EU Enlargement Policy. Perceptions and Misperceptions**
Grzegorz POŻARLIK
European Institute Krakow

13.00-14.00 Lunch

14.30-17.30 Workshop sessions

19.00 Dinner

3 July Tuesday

09.00-09.15 Welcome
Klaus FIESINGER
Hanns Seidel Foundation, Munich

DANUBE RECTORS' CONFERENCE

09.15-12.30 Plenary lectures

09.15-10.00 **How to Move Europe Forward!**
Erhard BUSEK
Chairman IDM

10.00-10.45 **Brain Drain and Brain Circulation in Europe and Beyond**
István TARRÓSY
University of Pécs

10.45-11.00 Break

11.00-11.45 **Topical Issues of the Legal Regulation of Migration in the European Union**
Ágoston MOHAY
University of Pécs

11.45-12.30 **Why is Environmental Management Important for the Banking Industry?**
Klaus BERGSMANN
Erste Group AG

12.30-13.30 Lunch

14.00-17.30 Workshop sessions

18.00 Dinner

19.00-20.00 Concert by DANUBE GUITAR DUO
(Ballroom of Rectorate of the University of Maribor)
Franz Helfersdorfer, Karin Zimmermann (A)

4 July
Wednesday

10.00-13.00 Sightseeing in Maribor

13.00-14.00 Lunch

14.00-19.00 Free time

19.00 Dinner

5 July
Thursday

09.15-12.30 Plenary lectures

09.15-10.00 **Labour Migration and Mobility in South Eastern Europe after 1989**
*Tanya **DIMITROVA***
University of Jena

10.00-10.45 **The Role of Mid-Range Universities in the Regionally Embedded Knowledge Transfer in Central & Eastern Europe**
*Zoltán **GÁL***
University of Kaposvár

10.45-11.00 Break

11.00-11.45 **Reasons and Possible Get-Outs of the Crisis**
*Annamária **ARTNER***
ELTE, Budapest

DANUBE RECTORS' CONFERENCE

11.45-12.30 **EU Enlargement and the New Borders of the EU**
Andrea ***SCHMIDT***
University of Pécs

12.30-13.30 Lunch

14.00-18.00 Workshop sessions

19.00 Dinner

6 July Friday

09.00-18.00 Field Trip

Piran

Piran is a town in the eponymous municipality in southwestern Slovenia on the Gulf of Piran on the Adriatic Sea. It is one of the three major towns of Slovenian Istria. The town resembles a large open-air museum, with medieval architecture and a rich cultural heritage. Narrow streets and compact houses give the town its special charm. Piran is the administrative centre of the local area and one of Slovenia's major tourist attractions.

18.30 Dinner

7 July Saturday

10.15-13.00 Workshop sessions – Final reports

13.00-14.00 Lunch

15.00-16.30 Closing session: Presentations and discussion of the workshop results

17.00-17.30 Closing ceremony

18.00 Dinner

21.00 Farewell party

8 July
Sunday

Departure

DANUBE RECTORS' CONFERENCE

Workshops and informations

Combined workshops

Leader: Áron Bánáti, IDResearch Ltd.

1. Migration: Brain Drain and Brain Circulation
2. Environmental and Economic Challenges: A Chance for Sustainable Development?

Leader: Silvia Nadjivan, Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM)

3. Research and Education: Opportunities to Foster (Inter)regional Co-operation
4. EU Enlargement: Limits and Chances

Workshop sessions

2 July, Monday	14.30-17.30 – First meeting
3 July, Tuesday	14.00-17.30
5 July, Thursday	14.00-18.00
7 July, Saturday	10.15-13.00 – Final Reports

Please note, that all of the participants will have to present their researches, papers on one of these occasions. The presence is obligatory. The WS-leaders are responsible for keeping the accurate time frames and for assigning the presentations.

Information for the students

Requirements for obtaining the certificate:

Participants who fulfil all the requirements mentioned below will receive a certificate at the end of the DRC Summer School with 10 ECTS points granted by the University of Pécs, Faculty of Humanities.

The following conditions must be met:

1) Presence at not less than 90 % of the lectures and excursions. The presence will be controlled by the organisers.
2) Presentation of a paper within the workshops and participation in the workshop activities.
3) Payment of the participation fee.

Proceedings volume:

The results of the DRC Summer School will be published in a proceedings volume that will be presented to the public at the DRC Summer School in 2013.

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50 Years of Research for the Danube Region

The IDM was founded in 1953 as the "Research Institute for Issues of the Danube Region". As an Austrian scientific institution, it was dedicated specifically to research on the Danube region.

In 1993 the Institute was renamed as the "Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe" (IDM).

Today the IDM is an extramural research institution based on an association – constituted by individual and corporate members – with its head office in Vienna.

As of April 1, 2011, IDM started a strategic cooperation with the University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences (BOKU), Vienna.

The Institute is funded by the Austrian Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministries of Science and Research, of Education, the Arts and Culture, of European and International Affairs and of Economics, Family and Youth as well as by individual provinces, cities, the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, the Federation of Austrian Industry, the Austrian Central Bank and private sponsors.

Facilitator and clearinghouse

As a gateway and a facilitator institution the IDM makes an important contribution to co-operation in the fields of research, culture, politics, economics and administration. At the same time the IDM sees itself as a clearinghouse for concerns of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe, supporting the work of embassies, trade missions, cultural institutes and national tourist offices of the countries of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe in Austria, as well as the work of Austrian missions to these countries.

Since 1995 the chairman of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) is the former Austrian vice-chancellor Dr. Erhard Busek.

Groundwork

As a think tank the IDM performs basic groundwork for government agencies and institutions in the fields of politics, education, research, culture and business and supports efforts in the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe.

PR work

The IDM performs PR work and serves as a lobbyist for the region.

Research

The IDM carries out research projects dealing with current political, sociological, social, economic, cultural and ethnic issues of the countries of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe. The results are publicised by means of events and publications.

Next generation support

The IDM supports recent graduates and young professionals in research and practice.

Educational activities and events

In seminars, symposiums, summer schools and the post-graduate course "Interdisciplinary Balkan Studies" in co-operation with the University of Vienna, all with international participation, the IDM also serves as an institute of learning and training. In addition, the IDM organises expert meetings, conferences, workshops and lectures. In this context, cooperation with institutions that share the IDM's goals is of particular significance.

Corporate services

On request the IDM will organise custom-tailored introductory and advanced seminars for companies (executive briefings).

Publications

- "Der Donauraum" ("The Danube Region") – scientific journal of the Institute (quarterly/price per copy: € 9.60/subscription: € 34.50) – Böhlau publishing house, Sachsenplatz 4-6, A-1201 Vienna)
- "Buchreihe des Instituts für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa" ("Book Series of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe") – Böhlau publishing house
- "Das Magazin für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa" ("The Magazine for the Danube Region and Central Europe") – issues on individual countries
- "IDM-Studien" ("IDM Studies") – on topical issues
- "Info Europa" – journal on the enlarged EU (5 issues per year, subscription: € 40, reduced price € 15)
- "IDM-Info" – newsletter of the Institute including the programme of events (5 issues per year/subscription: € 15/free of charge for members of the Institute)

Documentation

The IDM maintains a documentation centre and a magazine reading room with specialised publications on current developments in the countries of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe. Documentation is supplemented by regular reports provided by country correspondents working for the Institute on a voluntary basis.

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ID in the name of our enterprise indicates first the significance of possible research and co-operation between different disciplines (InterDisciplinary) in today's globalising world; second, refers to the ability of developing creative ideas (Idea+Development) and third, covers Innovative power and Dedicated aspect of the enterprise.

Since 1997, a team of young researchers, students and Ph.D. aspirants from the University of Pécs have been organising various national and international symposia, conferences, seminars and summer schools about different aspects of social and political changes in Central and Eastern Europe (ranging from regional co-operation, the place and role of the V4 countries to security dilemmas of our global world). IDResearch is a young company based on the experiences and achievements of the past years, with a special intention of generating and shaping collaborations among young researchers in Central Europe. The aim of the company is to become a well-known generator of co-operations between national and international actors in the field of human sciences and research, project development and training. IDResearch Ltd. is interested in strengthening a new generation of social scientists who can search for and interpret affects of global processes appearing on the local level, and contribute to expressing social demand by establishing a new co-operation culture. For this aim the company plans to develop accredited trainings for young scientists to help them obtain complementary and pragmatic skills useful for their future work.

Current projects include

- the DRC (Danube Rectors' Conference) Summer School series on Regional Co-operation (www.d-r-c.org; www.drcsummerschool.eu);
- the Publikon project (portal for social science research and publishing house (www.publikon.hu);
- think tank and project leader on migration-related issues in the form of the European Integration Fund-supported scheme 'Black and white - Here we are!' and 'Immigropoly' (www.ittvagyunk.eu);
- publisher of the Hungarian African Studies (Afrika Tanulmányok) periodical and initiator of several researches, conferences and workshops on African issues (www.afrikatanulmanyok.hu);
- publisher of the journals of Modern Geográfia (Modern Geography; www.moderngeografia.eu) and the Central European African Studies Review (CEASR);
- collaborator in the International Cultural Week in Pécs international studies summer school series (www.icwip.hu);

We offer complex services

Scientific Research, Market Research
Conference Organisation
Project Management
Publishing Books and Journals
Grant-writing and Fundraising
International Partnership (network) Building
Media Analyses, Promotion Campaigns, Campaign Communication Trainings
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