**Recent Political Changes
and their Implications in the Danube Region**

Recent Political Changes
and their Implications in the Danube Region

Edited by: István Tarrósy and Susan Milford

Pécs, Hungary

2016

Recent Political Changes and their Implications in the Danube Region
12th DRC Summer School, Vienna, 2015

Published by IDResearch Ltd. and the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) under the intellectual sponsorship of the Danube Rectors' Conference (DRC).

NATIONAL SZÉCHENYI LIBRARY OF HUNGARY, BUDAPEST

Table of contents

Preface

Since 2004 the major aim of the Danube Rectors' Conference (DRC) Summer School series has been to address ideas, issues, processes, together with policies in the making or under reform, all of which affect our Danubian Region. Not only the ongoing changes we need to deal with even on a daily basis, but also the heritage of the past that has been embedded in our behaviour and mentality have offered sufficient questions to investigate so far. We have always done this with the active participation of leading experts of the countries of the Danubian Region and young scientists and thinkers representing various academic disciplines. They are also true representatives of our rich multi- and intercultural community across the regions along the River Danube.

While every year we want to maintain the high-level academic standard we believe our Summer School possesses, we constantly work on how to renew ourselves, or better to say, how to offer intriguing topics for discussion in cities of particular importance for our common "Danubian identity". This is the reason why we ask members of the DRC to become hosts of the annual event – on a rotational basis, covering therefore a wide range of cultural values and pieces of history of the Danubian Region.

In 2015 we had the privilege to enjoy one of the most exciting core cities of Central Europe, the Austrian capital, Vienna. The University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences (BOKU) proved to be a fantastic host again with all its facilities and embracing hospitality. Both the institution and the city provided the perfect location for fine discussions of "Recent Political Changes and Their Implications" across our countries. The 12th Summer School was yet another step towards enhancing and deepening scientific co-operations in Central Europe, most of all among the stable partners of the annual project, i.e. institutions from the V4 countries and Austria, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and some Western Balkan countries.

With the series of the Danube Rectors' Conference Summer School, as well as the Pécs Debate Academy of the University of Pécs (PDA – formerly known as ICWiP), since 2004 and 1996 respectively we have been taking determined steps towards the efficient networking of various institutions, associations

and individuals, who want to contribute to the realization of co-operation in general, and scientific collaboration in particular.

Our strategy covers structures, manifestations and methods of the exchange of views, ideas and hopes in the form of lively discussions in a non-formal, and certainly non-frontal teaching environment. Our series of the DRC Summer School has been made real in close co-operation with our long-lasting supporters, who have been with us for so many years. We clearly understand each other easily, which truly offers a firm and calm background for the organizational work. It is never enough to underscore that: our institutes and colleagues are grateful for all the positive attitudes, academic and financial contributions!

As mentioned many times, for the continuous encouragement within our network to let scholars engage in academic discussions and presentations of research results, we consider our series of edited volumes an important tool. Beyond its primary mission to be a stable outlet for sound academic thoughts and products, our publication intends to serve the very heart of scientific work: the debate over policies, outputs, methodology, theories, data and social achievements in general, which can further explain how people across the Danube Region view their place and role in our global world.

The 12th edited book contains eleven papers of 12 authors, exposing a number of significant topics from our region that all are, one way or another, connected to recent political changes happening in our countries. Former Austrian Vice-Chancellor, Chairman of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM), one of the pillars of our Summer School, *Erhard Busek (1)* opens with a perfect introduction to the current challenges and potentials for cooperation in our region. He basically comments on all the questions other authors of the volume talk about in detail. In his conclusion he points out that some of the problems across our countries are "the differentiated political situation in the countries along the river Danube, the various sets of priorities and the ways of financing." He also wants to say it straight: "there is enough money, but sometimes actors do not find the best way to use it with success." *Irena Markuszewska (2)* investigates whether or not a "Danubian culture" is in existence. She puts an emphasis on art as an integrating force, to which the River Danube offers much to interpret. The river, as she thinks, "brings everything together, cements this region. How-

ever, it is never still or silent. The flow of the river reflects the transience of time; the flight of the waters is as fragile and elusive as life itself with all its irreversibility." A true inspiration for many artists throughout history! *Aneta Skorupa-Wulczynska (3)* of the Polish Academy of Sciences draws attention to how important a tool the Erasmus+ programme of the EU is. She considers Erasmus+ as "an answer of the European Union to the growing educational, social and economic challenges being faced by Europe. It is the Union's tool to contribute to economic development, high level of employment, social justice and social inclusion in Europe through the introduction of a variety of possibilities in the field of education and training." *Tina Schivatcheva (4)* talks about post-socialist Bulgaria and the context of socio-political myths. More closely the analysis focuses on the "socio-political salvific myth of the good 'Saviour-King', which underpinned the rise to power of the ex-monarch." The paper "explores the role of the social imaginary in crafting a coherent social vision of a country's future." *Balázs Brucker (5)* presents an analysis of the "impact of the EU membership on the situation of Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries" via the case of Slovakia. The aim of his study is to "analyse how the enlargement (and the accession negotia-tions) of the European Union have changed the approach of the EU towards national minorities in Europe and, especially, in CEECs, and how this new 'EU minority policy' influenced the situation of Hungarian ethnic minorities living in neighbouring countries." *Gabriela Cretu (6)* draws our attention to "Identity and inter-ethnic relationship in public discourse". She aims to "throw light on the main aspects of the relationship between the image of the Roma minority in Romania, as perceived by the majority of population, and its representation in the public discourse under the influence of raciali-zation." *Enis H. Rexhepi (7)* writes about Ukraine's geopolitical position and states that "Ukraine's political destiny will depend on cleavages since the opposing centrifugal pullout between East and West." The country is divided "between two centrifugal forces; at one side, we have Russia representing the East, at the other side, we have the EU and NATO representing the West," argues Rexhepi, adding that "Ukraine's geopolitical position is evolving in an unknown direction; no one can predict what kind of future is engraved and what could happen." *Iris Rehklau and Sebastian Schäffer (8)* have the firm intention to shed light on smaller events in the regions that deserve

our attention. Based on first-hand field research, illustrated by their own photographs, they focus on "the demonstrations in Chişinău [that] tend to get almost no attention, although these also have relevance for the EU-Russia relations." With their paper they want to "illustrate this relevance, and also try to provide an overview with possible scenarios and further sources to enable our readers to look at the broader picture of this impact on certain events in the shared neighbourhood." Within this geopolitical context *Plamen Petrov (9)* elaborates upon "the geopolitics of gas deliveries in the Danube Region in light of the Ukrainian crisis." He explains "the reasons for the failure of the South Stream project, as well as the prospects of the new pipeline proposed by Russia, the Turkish Stream, to become a new route for Russian gas deliveries to the countries in the Danube Region." With regard to the Ukrainian situation *Victoriia Liepkova (10)* exposes that "paradoxically, the ongoing events in Ukraine open favourable conditions for the realization of some common plans with the countries of the Danube Region." She is convinced that the "comprehensive renewal of the dialogue of Kyiv and Bucharest will strengthen political trust, the establishment and development of business and interpersonal contacts, cooperation in the sphere of production, trade, cross-border cooperation, energy and regional security as a whole." Finally, *Mihai-Bogdan Popescu (11)* brings us the case of Armenia when addressing "The European Union's role in the institution building process within the South Caucasus states." The closing chapter highlights "the institutional transformations within Armenia, after the launch of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP)."

Let us present the 12th DRC Summer School edited volume and wish all our readers to join our debate and series of events in the forthcoming years.

Vienna–Pécs, 2015 December

Dr. habil. István Tarrósy, Ph.D.   Dr. Susan Milford, Ph.D.
Owner-Director of IDResearch   Managing Director of IDM

Chapter 1

Title

**Current Challenges and Potentials
for Regional Cooperation in the Danube Region**

Author

Erhard Busek

Chairman of the Institute for the Danube region and Central Europe (IDM)

Current Challenges and Potentials for Regional Cooperation in the Danube Region[1]

Erhard Busek

The Danube River Basin is an area with long history of bilateral as much as multilateral contacts and cooperation efforts. It has had, as many others, its ups and downs, sometimes dividing the political entities situated along its course, but most of the times connecting the peoples living near its banks and tributaries.

The Danube Region – 14 countries involved Throughout history the benefits that this biggest artery of Europe has offered with its waters have been equally numerous as they are today. Yet, these benefits have rarely been taken advantage of in a most efficient way. Joint efforts for effective solutions to the common and sustainable utilisation of the many opportunities that this basin carries through our countries have been rarely successful, and, very often, blocked by national interests and historically driven disagreements.

In view of the ongoing global financial crisis, the Danube River Basin can represent a valuable source for sustained economic development. The potential of the Danube and its tributaries as a transport route and as a potential renewable energy production source has been quite underused

in the last decades. Although, transport along the river has increased and pre-1990 figures have slowly been restored, the economic potential of the Danube is still quite low and there are still many issues that need to be solved before we are witnesses of the positive economic contributions of an effective use of the resources offered by this river basin.

Now, followers of the environmentally friendly approaches would disagree that an increased use of the Danube and its tributaries for economic purposes would be a desirable development of this region. Nevertheless, the Danube is a public good, access to which should be ensured for all potential users and for all types of activities. One cannot ban access to the river for certain types of users, yet what is important is that an agreement on the most sustainable use of the resources of the Danube River Basin is reached by all types of users and at all the major decision-making and cooperation levels.

The combination of environmental protection and increased economic potential can be a win-win situation, only if substantial and coordinated dialogue is established by all the involved parties, through which the concerns and the issues raised by other users are voiced, understood and accommodated to the benefit of all. That this is not completely impossible has been shown by several projects of cross-disciplinary cooperation, with which solutions for maintaining or improving good ecological status, but at the same time removing navigation and transport obstacles have been mutually agreed upon and successfully implemented.

This, of course, can be achieved not only with the adoption of a different perspective by the different stakeholders, but also with a more receptive attitude to change by the governments of the Danube countries concerning inherited open issues and their overcoming. The open issues and the necessary steps to be undertaken have so far become familiar to all those who have been involved in Danube Cooperation

in the last decade. Unfortunately, some of them have been solved and some of them it is being worked on, yet many of them remain to cause disagreement as relics of a different era.

In times when international economic exchange is becoming much more an issue of transnational nature and when climate change is a reality that threatens the earth rather than this or that country, change is imminent. In such a context we need to understand that many problems that national governments face are not only their own, and that many problems are transnational impacts. A successful and sustainable approach to future challenges then will have to opt for better change management, integrated policy-making and priority-setting, and joint implementation efforts for better and sustainable development.

It is important to understand that increasing inland waterways transport does not have to mean destroying the environment; that improving inland waterways transport and navigation infrastructure in not always related to decreasing environmental benefits; and that some policies are more important than others. If we take a broader look at the effects of uncoordinated policies, we shall understand that inland waterways transport is much more environmentally friendly than road or rail transport, and that at the same time it will contribute to the decongestion of roads and will make place for passenger transport. We will also understand that industries not conforming to the environmental requirements of wastewater management should be denied the right to perform, rather than pay for polluting the rivers, the cleaning of which will later on cost much more than the price paid for the permission to pollute. We shall also understand that diffuse pollution by agriculture is much more problematic and more difficult to control; nevertheless, it is hardly subdued to respect environmental standards when subsidised.

Until to this point, I was mainly focusing on technical and economic questions. It has to be understood, there are also other fields, where it is necessary to do more than this. For example, it is science and education, because, for example, one of the deficits of the Stability Pact is the fact that science and education is not the focus point and the responsibility of the European Union. By the rules within the EU, it is up to the Nation State to develop here a lot. This is a pity, especially for the region along the river Danube, but also to Eastern and South Eastern Europe. An improvement can only be done if there is more human and financial investment in the education and the development of systems, which are compatible with the other parts of Europe. There are many efforts in this direction, but the job is not yet done. Especially, we need more exchange programs to create possibilities for the gifted people to study outside the EU.

Programs like Erasmus Mundus and so on were focusing on this, but it is not enough for the current situation....

Energy is also a special chapter, which is underlined by the development in the east as well, especially by Russia. Russians are trying to go around Ukraine so that they are not depending on the current political situation. So far, several proposals are coming up like pipeline from the Caucasus and Turkey, from Southeast Europe to the Danube Region, but now, by the development in Turkey, it is not so actual anymore. So far, we are looking for a pipeline going to the Black Sea touching also the Danube Area. We have many politically connected discussions, because Russians are trying to gain more influence in the area by such pipelines. An example is the fact that they have the energy company of Serbia, NIS, to influence the situation there. They bought it quite cheap, but for the moment this strategy is not really working. There has been an energy stability pact in Southeast Europe for the last ten years, which created a kind of improvement, but more can be done

To change the subject, we also have to look to religions. Europe has an interesting mixture of Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Islam, and so on. For a longer time, I think, they were all living together without any conflicts, but then the instrumentalization by politics and competition created many conflicts. This is one of the necessary challenges, especially to create the European Islam, which might come also by the migration coming from the Near and the Middle East. Not too much is done on the subject, but there is a greater concern, so I have the hope that something will develop in the right direction.

Last but not least, we have a look at the conflicts in the region, existing by history. If I follow the river, there are, for example, Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania, which have been creating some concern sometimes also politically used by Hungary. However, it should be possible to develop cohabitation along the river Danube. Other conflicts are some discussions concerning borders, which are also used for politics. In the time of the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Empire in Yugoslavia, there were no borders, so far it was not really a problem, but now everybody is trying to instrumentalize such conflicts or discussions, organizing elections to gain more influence or to block the other. The question of neighbourhood has a great importance. So we elaborate a lot on this subject, for example, by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) to get a better feeling for neighbourhood. We are looking to the history books and teaching a mutual understanding of history in the different countries, and we have created a presentation so-called "Vicinities", which is running on the TV channels of the region.

In this context, we have also some difficulties by frozen conflicts. The most outstanding example is Transnistria concerning Moldova. We have to focus on the fact that

Moldova has only 400 meters of the river Danube, but this is extremely important as a connection to the Black Sea and the Atlantic. Besides, the wounds from the Balkan Wars are not healed. The example here is Eastern Slavonia (Vukovar), where it is still possible to see what is happening because of the ongoing conflicts. Some examples of minor importance can also be added, but here we have to create capacity to gather these functions of the river Danube. At the end I may repeat, that such a river like the Danube has the possibility to divide human beings or to connect them. What we are trying to improve is the connection and ability to live together, because around the river Danube there is both a common romanticism and an interconnected culture, which might help to overcome all the difficulties.

Economic development is the motor of our well-being, but it is not supposed to be the source of our peril. Broader perspective on how we manage the various sectors of our activities on the national level, as well as on the transnational level, needs to be adopted if we are to overcome the challenges lying ahead of us. The biggest challenge is still going to be faced by national policy makers. They will be the ones who will have to agree on how to deal with the imminent changes of our societies and who will have to come up with a sustainable, and most of all doable, plan for getting the most of the available resources, without jeopardising their future potential.

For the Danube Region this has been an ongoing challenge. Forums for political dialogue have been established, but practical implementation is far from any tangible results. Many infrastructure projects are on hold or have been postponed for decades and on many occasions such projects are still very low on the political agenda in many Danube countries. With a missing infrastructure, economic activities are difficult to be sustained. Several entrepreneurs are discouraged by the difficult navigation conditions on many parts

of the river, by other physical obstacles and certain types of economic activities such as tourism or cultural and sub-regional cooperation. The fragmented efforts of the Danube initiatives and organisations are lost in the sea of varying administrative rules and requirements, while financing problems are seldom coordinated from an interdisciplinary perspective, quite often working against each other.

Yet, hope in a sustainable perspective for the Danube is not lost. The Danube countries, on the initiative of Austria and Romania, have expressed their willingness to join efforts and overcome national differences for a sustainable development of the Danube Region as a whole, and its faster and better integration in the European cooperation space. The European Commission thereof mandated to assist the countries from the Danube Region with a proposal of a comprehensive development strategy for the region, and thus provided a comprehensive framework for the integration of the fragmented sectoral activities, creating a meaningful and targeted effort towards Danube-wide economic and political development to the benefit of all its members.

It is our hope that the Danube countries shall seize this unique opportunity providing cooperation processes with a new impetus and vigour and with more tangible development initiatives in the near future.

The EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) is a macro-regional strategy adopted by the European Commission in December 2010 and endorsed by the European Council in 2011.

The strategy was jointly developed by the Commission, the Danube Region countries and stakeholders, in order to address common challenges together. The strategy seeks to create synergies and coordination between existing policies and initiatives taking place across the Danube Region.

This strategy is not about funding but about closer cooperation

Regional cooperation is a precondition for a lot of things, especially for ecological matters. Concerning the river Danube, we have to state clearly that if you do not prepare the ecological conditions at the beginning of a river, you will end up in trouble. Ecological sustainability was not the only reason to start this regional cooperation, in the background there was also a political one. Ecological cooperation started because organisations in this field have already existed for a longer time.

One of the main issues but also one of the difficulties is to create this regional cooperation over borders. The EUSDR started with three no's: no money, no new institutions, no new rules. This was a shock in the beginning, but on the other side, I think, it was a very good decision because we have to use what is existing already and bring the countries along the river Danube together.

The Danube Region Strategy addresses a wide range of issues; these are divided among [4 pillars] and [11 priority areas]. Each priority area is managed by two Priority Area Coordinators (PACs).

PA 1A | Mobility | Waterways
Priority Area 1A "To improve mobility and intermodality of inland waterways" is coordinated by Austria and Romania.

PA 1B | Mobility | Rail-Road-Air
Priority Area 1B "To improve mobility and intermodality - rail, road and air" is coordinated by Slovenia and Serbia.

PA 02 | Energy
Priority Area 2 "To encourage more sustainable energy" is coordinated by Hungary and the Czech Republic.

PA 03 | Culture & Tourism
Priority Area 3 "To promote culture and tourism, people to people contacts" is coordinated by Bulgaria and Romania.

PA 04 | Water Quality
Priority Area 4 of the EUSDR "To restore and maintain the quality of waters" is coordinated by Hungary and Slovakia.

PA 05 | Environmental Risks
Priority Area 5 of the EUSDR "To manage environmental risks" is coordinated by Hungary and Romania.

PA 06 | Biodiversity, landscapes, quality of air and soils
Priority Area 6 "To preserve biodiversity, landscapes and the quality of air and soils" is coordinated by the Land Bavaria (Germany) and Croatia.

PA 07 | Knowledge Society
Priority Area 7 "To develop the Knowledge Society (research, education and ICT)" is coordinated by Slovakia and Serbia.

PA 08 | Competitiveness
Priority Area 8 "To support the competitiveness of enterprises" is coordinated by the Land Baden-Württemberg (Germany) and Croatia.

PA 09 | People & Skills
Priority Area 9 of the EUSDR "To invest in people and skills" is coordinated by Austria and Moldova.

PA 10 | Institutional capacity and cooperation
Priority Area 10 "To step up institutional capacity and cooperation" is coordinated by the City of Vienna (Austria) and Slovenia.

PA 11 | Security
Priority Area 11 of the EUSDR "To work together to tackle security and organised crime" is coordinated by Germany and Bulgaria.

For ecological sustainability, different Priority Areas have a different importance. The priorities are not only technological and ecological results but also the creation of the environmental conditions under which the river and the region is used.

These are examples in which ecological sustainability is touched, but, for example, institutional capacity and cooperation is also one of the results of this demand.

Presently, these structures of the EUSDR are growing while provoking new problems in cooperation. It is not an easy job to create efficiency, because not only the problems are difficult, but also the engagement in cross-border co-operation is a partly new experience for administrations, governments and politics.

Meanwhile, it is quite clear that it will have interesting results for all the partners involved. Some of the problems are, without any doubt, the differentiated political situation in the countries along the river Danube, the various set of priorities and the ways of financing. To say it quite straight: there is enough money, but sometimes actors do not find the best way to use it with success. However, this is also a kind of sustainability, which is extremely important for the ecological situation.

Chapter 2

Title

**The Danube Region Culture
among Versatile Communities
with Emphasis on Art as an Integrating Instrument**

Author

Irena Markuszewska

*"Pedagogium" Higher School of Resocialization Pedagogics in Warsaw
(Pedagogium - Wyższa Szkoła Nauk Społecznych W Warszawie)*

The Danube Region Culture
among Versatile Communities
with Emphasis on Art
as an Integrating Instrument

Irena Markuszewska

There can be no doubt that the Danube Region exists but is there any such thing as Danubian culture? One may pose the question: is not the Danubian civilization like a piece of fiction, a myth or legend just like the "imaginary Middle-earth world"[1] in Tolkien? It was once part of the Roman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. The ancient times of imperial empires and monarchies ended but the nations crossed by the river and their borders have been undergoing constant changes for ages to come.

Years ago, this region was known as *Mitteleuropa.* The concept came from Germany and it is a German word, describing the idea of central Europe – "an over-state above the states, an empire above empires, a German-dominated buffer zone in the centre of Europe, created by the merging of the German and Austrian Empires" (Pilch Ortega and Schröttner, 2012: 119). The Old Mitteleuropa conjures up the concept and hope of a united Europe. The Hungarian novelist György Konrád considers this particular world "…noble, but at the same time vague and generic" (Magris, 2001: 268).

In fact, the Danubian culture exists and it also corresponds to the first agrarian society in Central and Eastern

---

[1] Middle-earth is the setting of much of J.R.R. Tolkien's legendary fantasy world, e.g., *The Lord of the Rings*.

Europe. Australian archaeologist Vere Gordon Childe coined the term and notion, the beginning of which dates back to 5500 BC. The Danube Region nowadays is a real European melting pot undergoing endless metamorphosis due to a constant flow of people. The whole area is embraced by the European Strategy for Danube Region with the aim of integrating it.

Although countries and national supremacy change, there is one thing that is constant in this region – namely, its river. It is the second largest in Europe, but it is also the most important one because it connects the greatest number of towns. The River Danube flows through the vast region of Central and South-East Europe. Two streams, the Breg and Brigach, jointly give rise to the river. The united Danube crosses different lands, cultures, it tells its stories in different languages. People who live around the Danube have created their unique culture, which reflects their life and is passed down in oral stories, folk tales, and artistic creations such as myths, legends, pieces of music, painting or architectural style. Moreover, the culture of the countries in the Danube Basin is also visible in different spheres of life whether it is artistic, sporting, political or social.

Indeed, in the Danube Region, the river plays a crucial role in everyday life. It is literally a source of water, a means of transport and a demarcation line that separates different communities. It flows, gives life and provides a sense of travel with a destination in mind. For many years, it used to be the main trade route across Europe. The river has a duality about it: it is a place of work for fishermen, barge sailors, power plant personnel, shipyard workmen, and a place for leisure attractions like: swimming, sunbathing, boating, as well as dining and tasting wine, for there are many vineyards on the river banks. Metaphorically, the river may be seen as the human longing to reach a destination, one that fulfils dreams and provides them with a meaning

or an explanation. Symbolically, it can be viewed as a flux of water flowing down into the sea, as a current against which one swims, or as fertility, death and renewal. It reminds the journey of Odysseus (known as Ulysses in Roman mythology) who looks for self-fulfilment in search of his roots. Perhaps one needs to experience the vastness and emptiness of the sea to feel like Ulysses on his journey. Sailing on the Danube from the Black Forest to the Black Sea is like meandering from one mystery to another. That is why it is so difficult to grasp. Our world is becoming supranational and this is what is happening to the Danubian Region too, where the differences between nations and countries are merging into one timeless identity. A variety of languages intertwines with its multicultural people speaking a multitude of voices and accents. Even the currency changes across borders in spite of the single currency in parts of the European Union – the Euro. Even though, we all cherish our home, our roots and origins, and we all find it comforting to be part of one tribe and one geographical area, there is a sense of oneness here as the borders and boundaries dissolve and vanish. Variety may breed unity as it does here in the Danubian area. The Danubian culture might be perceived as a unique culture particular to this specific region where the Danube plays a central role. In this sense, "Danubian Culture is a fortress which offers excellent shelter against the threat of the world, the assaults of life and fears of losing oneself in perfidious reality" (Magris, 2001: 155). To acquaint or familiarize oneself with these different countries and understand how they influence each other, one must become the traveller who undertakes this Odyssey. However,

"*A traveller, writes Jean Paul, is like an invalid, poised between two worlds. The way is long, even if we move only from the kitchen to the room facing west, its window-panes catching the blaze of the horizon, because the house is a vast, unknown*

kingdom and one lifetime is not enough for the odyssey from nursery to bedroom, …one lifetime will not accommodate the attempt to say something about this coming-and-going between kitchen and dining-room, between Troy and Ithaca" (Magris, 2001: 85).

The culture of the Danube Basin comprises a vast history of the Celts, the Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Habsburg Empire, the Austro-Bohemian Culture, Ottoman Turks, the Jews, the Roman-Muslim Empire and Nazi Germany. Its history is as rich as its art. Those various, prolific cultures interweave and their art mirrors this.

Art as an integrating instrument Art, which among others reflects culture, might be a uniting force of this region. Some themes of art are universal such as love, time, family ties, friendship, myths etc. Although particular plots are influenced by history, the trauma of war, and a sense of what happened or is happening in the region: conflict, war or migration. These themes have their messages for the various cultures and open the way to cultural dialogue.

As the Danube is a pearl of the region, I would like to stress the meaning of the river with its running water as a recurrent motif used by artists. In fact, the River Danube is reflected in various works of art, and it even goes beyond countries bordering the Danube and their boundaries. The water flows, borders change, people move and travel upstream and downstream. This flow reflects the movement of people. Each one of us might have a secret dream to flow down the river towards the sea, to yield to the current, to keep going forever ahead.

Undeniably, the Danube brings everything together, cements this region. However, it is never still or silent. The flow of the river reflects the transience of time; the flight of the waters is as fragile and elusive as life itself

with all its irreversibility. The Danube has been a source of inspiration for many artists in different forms of art.

Literature   In literature both travelling and the Danube are the subjects of various books, e.g., Jules Verne's book *The Pilot of the Danube*. The story goes beyond the country's boundaries. This journey depicts the Odyssey of the Danubian fisherman, the prize winner of the "Danubian League of Amateur Fishermen", who crosses different countries as he travels down the river.

Travelling represents a longing for metamorphosis. The span of one's lifetime is a journey of one's own odyssey. In this context I should mention Claudio Magris's *Danube,* cited here many times, a large cultural-historical essay. It is also a piece of fiction where one meets different characters travelling and visiting various countries and regions of the Danube Basin. Another travel tale is *The Danube* novel by Hungarian journalist Nick Thorpe depicting the author's upstream journey from the mouth of the river to its sources. On the way he meets various dwellers living on the river banks.

The beauty and charm of the Danube is also reflected in poetry. Friedrich Hölderlin's hymn "The Ister"[2] emphasizes the beauty and uniqueness of this river. Ister is another name for the Danube; both names were used respectively for its upper and lower courses. The hymn glorifies the beautiful dwellings, rich vegetation, singing birds, and the shadow of the trees lining it, helping to rest and relax. Another song related to the Danube is "The Song of the Latin kind"[3] written by a Romanian author Constantin Vasilescu. The ditty is dedicated to

---

[2]   "The Ister" is a hymn written by the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin published in *Hymns and Fragments*. It speaks about the Danube. https://poetry.princeton.edu/2013/05/18/holderlins-river/

[3]   "Cântecul Gintei Latine" is the Romanian title of the song translated into English as "The Song of the Latin kind". You may find a translation at http://lyricstranslate.com/en/c%C3%A2ntecul-gintei-latine-song-latin-kind.html

the Romanian poet Vasile Alecasndri who won a poetry contest. It shows how the Danube inspires artists. Those living in the neighborhood are spiritually influenced by the river's beauty. The music of the river inspires artists to write songs of joy and pain. The poem is sung by other contemporary Romanian artists, such as Radu Cimpoi.

Moreover, the Danube Basin is rich in folk stories and fairy tales like *The Danube Queen* by Maria Ďurčiková, a Slovenian writer. It is a collection of short stories for children, describing fairy tales and myths related to the river, fishermen and local people living near Bratislava. Another piece of fiction where the characters travel up the Danube valley is *The Earth's Children Saga* by Jean M. Auel. It is also a travel tale where the main characters are in search of their origins and meet children of other nationalities. The story talks about the idea of cultural complexity.

It is not surprising that artists of the Danubian Region are often of mixed origins and represent various nationalities. Among them, there was Franz Kafka – a German-language writer of Jewish parents, born in Prague, or Milan Kundera – a Czech writer who moved to France after the invasion of the Warsaw Pact troops. Apart from these names, it is worth to mention Václav Havel, who was a writer, playwright and the 1st President of the Czech Republic. Many of the artists travelled a great deal during their lifetime. Thus, many artists may agree that life is a journey like an ocean.

Painting and Sculpture The River Danube with its wide spectrum of colours: yellow, green, dark green, blue and indigo endlessly inspires painters of this region. The Danube School or Donau School was popular here with the painters of the 16th century in Bavaria and Austria (along the Danube valley). The major centres were Regensburg, Vienna and its monasteries. The German School Painters are known for landscape painting. Among them were Albrecht Altdorfer, Wolf Huber or Augustin Hirschvo-

gel. They searched for harmony with nature and believed that people should live in compliance with nature. The most important themes here were architecture and landscape: forests and hills of the Danube valley. The river influenced the colourful palette of painters; some works had a fairy tale style. The landscapes with architecture significantly outnumbered the portraits. This style of painting relied on detailed observation of nature, and man was perceived as an integral part of nature.

Other well-known painters from the Danube Valley are Gustav Klimt, Austrian symbolist painter, the most prominent member of the Vienna Secession movement, known for the highly decorative style, or Friedensreich Hundertwasser, Austrian painter, designer and architect – an opponent of straight lines and standardisation. His best-known work is the colourful, extravagant and uneven Hundertwasser House in Vienna. In the Czech Republic everyone will recognise Alphonse Mucha, representing Czech Art Nouveau. He was a decorative artist who produced many illustrations, advertisements, postcards, designs and stained glasses decorating churches.

Nowadays, we may hear about contemporary artists such as Florian Schmidt, painter and sculptor in Krems on the Danube or the avant-garde sculptors in Prague: David Černý, whose controversial eye-catching works are placed in many public locations, and Michal Cimala, creator of alternative musical instruments, painter, sculptor and music performer.

Music Swinging, tinkling river...

The river makes a sound. It trickles, murmurs, hums and gives an echo. To put it simply, it inspires composers and musicians to write melodies of this region. One of the best-known masterpieces of this region is Johann Strauss' waltz '*On the Beautiful Blue Danube'.* This is what usually comes to mind first as we think of the Danube Region. It is definitely

the most emblematic tune inspired by this river. This famous waltz soon became a secret anthem of Austria. It is played every year at midnight on New Year's Eve and is like a lucky charm for the following year. In Vienna, people dance the Viennese waltz at balls each year. The music has had a social role for years connecting people and making them merry. But it is interesting that the river is rarely blue unlike in the title of waltz. It is yellow, greenish, brown, greyish or even indigo, but hardly ever blue.

This region and particularly Vienna is the world capital of music and a homeland of classic composers like Strauss, Mozart, Mahler, Schubert, Haydn or Beethoven. Their roots were often complicated. For example, Ludwig Van Beethoven was born in Bonn and then moved to Vienna. Also, Franz Liszt's history is complicated. He was born in Hungary, received piano lessons in Vienna, then moved to Paris, and on his way there, he visited and composed in Germany and Poland. His ancestors were migrant Danube Swabians. What is surprising is that Franz Liszt did not speak Hungarian.

The Danubian Basin is richly endowed with music. The citizens of the Czech Republic are very musical. The famous composers of this region were Antonin Dvořák and Bedřich Smetana. Among the most prominent composers in Hungary were Ferenc Lehár and Béla Bartók.

Moreover, the Danube delta is rich in traditional folk music. There are many local festivals in each country, e.g., the *Spring Festival* in Budapest or the *Budapest Fringe Festival* where Hungarian and foreign artists meet, a Hungarian folk ensemble – *The Danube Folk Ensemble* is also named after the river, and the *International Prague Music Festival* or the *Prague Jazz Festival AghaRTA*. One should not forget the annual *Festival of Conversation for Culture and Science – "Flow"* organised in different countries of the Danube Basin each year.

However, the waltz tunes and music by Johann Strauss has made the Danube famous around the whole world.

The motif of *The Blue Danube waltz* is the soundtrack of various international films such as *True Lies, Hannibal, Heaven's Gate, The Age of Innocence, Titanic, Anywhere But Here, The Great Santini, White Marriage, The Space Odyssey, The Fateful Adventures of the Good Soldier Švejk During the World War* based on a satirical anti-war novel by Jaroslav Hašek. The widely recognised composition *Also Sprach Zarathustra* by Richard Strauss vigorously opens *The Space Odyssey* directed by Stanley Kubrick.

River or water is inspiration for many musicians and one may hear its influence in Hasidic songs called "dunai", which are mostly lullabies named after the Danube. Moreover, the Danube figures prominently in the Bulgarian national anthem, as a symbolic representation of the country's national beauty.

Last but not least, Vienna, the town on the Danube, organised *the Eurovision Song Contest* in 2015, which invited artists from various countries. Generally, the festival was invented for representatives of countries being members of the European Union. In fact, it has spread beyond to such countries as Israel or Azerbaijan who have performed in it. In addition, there are two more professional Eurovision Festivals, *the Eurovision Young Musicians* and *the Eurovision Young Dancers*.

Film The Danube also provides wonderful scenery for shooting pictures. In fact, it is the subject of various films such as the *Ister* directed by David Barison and Daniel Ross, a documentary film inspired by the lecture of the German philosopher Heidegger on the poem "Ister". It is a documentary where interviewees discuss philosophy on their way upstream the Danube towards its source. In addition, parts of the German road movie *Im Juli* take place along the Danube. The main characters are on their life journey. They fall in and out of love. There is also a British psychological thriller *Bad Timing* directed by Nicolas Roeg, where the border crossing over the

Danube between Bratislava and Vienna is a recurrent site, or *The Blue Danube Waltz* film directed by Miklós Jancsó. Finally, in the *Star Trek* universe, the Danube-class runabout is an airship.

There are many other famous films directed in the Danube Basin known in different parts of the world such as an authorised adaptation *Nonsferatu* based on the novel *Dracula* by Bram Stocker. This German film was directed in 1922 in Oravsky Podzamok, in the village castle erected on a rocky hill. According to the writer's narration, Count Dracula lived in the Transylvania Region. Another important film was the Oscar-winning *Amadeus* depicting the life of Amadeus Mozart directed by Miloš Forman set in Prague. The director is also renowned for Hollywood productions such as *Hair* and *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*. One should not forget the satirical anti-war film about *the Good Soldier Švejk.*

Other local productions are focused on universal subjects such as love depicted in the Czech film *Zelary* based on the novel by *Květa Legátová* (produced in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria), or the Bulgarian epic film *Doomed Souls* (*Осъдени Души - Bulgarian title*) with a Polish actor, Jan Englert, who gained fame and friendship in Bulgaria.

The world-acclaimed artist from Austria and living beyond its borders is Michael Haneke who won an Oscar several times for his productions. The integration of various cultures takes place at an international film festival organised in Karlovy Vary in the Czech Republic. It is the second oldest film festival in Europe after that of Venice.

Architecture The River Danube gives unique form and colour, underlining the significance of blue, ochre, orange and yellow, which resonates with the region's architectural style. One may see many yellow-ochre buildings or blue ones with reddish tiles. The cities around it often reflect

the style of other towns. Budapest is, for example, a happy mix of such, an imitation of other styles. It resembles Vienna and Paris. It has an eclectic style that reminds the mixtures of styles – the archaic meets the most modern skyscrapers. The eclecticism of Budapest conjures up the Tower of Babel. The influence of the Habsburg and Austrian Empires is visible. Such an endless and everlasting mix is visible everywhere in the architectural style, in food traditions, in spoken and written languages.

The poet Wolfgang Schmeltzl "compares Vienna to Babel, because he says he hears people round him speaking Hebrew, Greek, Latin, German, French, Turkish, Spanish, Bohemian, Slovenian, Italian, Hungarian, Dutch, Syrian, Croatian, Serbian, Polish and Chaldean" (Magris, 2001: 176).

What is spectacular about the landscape of the river and its banks are their numerous castles and monasteries erect upon them. The River Danube cements this region, "The Danube threads towns together like a string of pearls" (Magris, 2001: 256). The serpentine river flows through four capitals: Vienna, Bratislava, Budapest and Belgrade. The Danube also hosts other cities of cultural interest such as: Ulm with the world's tallest cathedral spire, antique Pasawa, Melk, Krems, and Vukovar – often called "The Hero Town" for its fate during the war in former Yugoslavia, or Novi Sad – the second largest cultural city in Serbia, where many festivals take place, e.g., the music and the international literature festival. There are beautiful old abbeys in Melk and Krems.

In towns, different cultures are blended and interwoven with different ethnicities: German, Austrian, Jewish or Turkish. The Habsburg style is noticeable, e.g., in Prague, Budapest, Bratislava etc. Another oriental influence is visible throughout the whole Danube Basin, for example in Hungary the Turks left behind beautiful minarets and domes. In Prague, one will find many Jewish traces.

There are numerous extremely picturesque bridges on the Danube. They are not only useful in connecting and spanning its banks, but also possess great aesthetic value. The bridges give a unique atmosphere to this area especially when they are illuminated at dusk. Among the many beautiful bridges in Vienna, Budapest, Bratislava, there used to be a friendship bridge in Serbia. However, it was destroyed by the bombings during the Bosnian war.

Versatile communities in the Danube Region The Danubian culture is composed of various nationalities, ethnicities and identities. People who live in this region, and particularly those living in the border regions, have often a complex identity and they often have a 'multi-national mind'. They are often unable to identify their own origin, as it is too complex. The families are composed of mixed couples and their stories are often heterogeneous. Moreover, the number of marriages between different nationalities is on the increase.

As a result of historical migration and war within a particular country, there is a mix of different nationalities or ethnic groups. Minorities are treated differently as for the majority of people immigrants are only considered as passing citizens, not original inhabitants. These people often experience discrimination and feel they do not have equal rights. Moreover, the process of assimilation takes years.

The world has become more and more transnational. We travel without limit as borders are open. The number of people that are on the move due to the conflict in Syria resembles a "human river" which is endlessly flowing with different languages interwoven or entwined on its borders.

Invasions and immigrations have been shaking the Danubian Region for long making it an issue for centuries. What we are currently experiencing is an unprecedented influx of people. It brings to mind the European myth of the wandering Jew[4]

---

[4] The wandering Jew is a fictional figure whose legend began to spread in Europe in the 13th century.

who is cursed to walk on earth until the second coming of Jesus. The exact nature of the wanderer's fault or sin varies in different versions of the tale, as do aspects of his character. The wanderer experiences pain and an everlasting need to change places. The recent migration resonates with this tale.

Migration brings devastation, transformation, but also enables development. The latter comes with time. At the moment Europe is divided on the subject how we should deal with mass immigration. There are countries that are protesting and strengthening their borders against migrants from Africa and the Middle East. This is understandable as throughout history these countries were afflicted by numerous invasions. Hungary for instance, has experienced many migrations: "...Huns and Avars, Slavs and Magyars, Tartars and Kumans, Jazigs and Pechenegs, Turks and Germans are superimposed and deposited one upon another in layer after layer. The migrations of peoples bring devastation, but also civilizations, like the Turks, who not only brought plunder but also the culture of Islam" (Magris, 2001: 242).

Minorities usually try to assert their own identity. Sometimes they fight for independence, language, education, the right to celebrate their religious festivals and practice their faith. Among them, there are also those who want to assimilate. They learn the language of their adoptive country and obey the rules. Past experience shows that this merge and melt is inevitable: "... all histories and all identities are composed of these differences, these pluralities, these exchanges and borrowings of diverse ethnic and cultural elements, which make each nation and individual the child of regiment" (Magris, 2001: 178).

Conclusions The Danube Delta region is a mirage consisting of multiple images, various nationalities, ethnic groups, different architectural styles and castles on the banks. It seems to be united despite its complexity and different history. It could be called

a world without frontiers. However, the current situation is changing the scene. The ongoing crisis in migration divides countries and communities and affects citizens' lives. There are hard-line politicians who are trying to protect their countries against the flood of people. They fear the future and reject new ethnic groups. Yet, changes are inevitable. Soon there will be many more people, many more minorities and ethnicities in every country. The vision of Europe under the influence of other unfamiliar cultures, in this case the Arab culture, may pose a threat. The Arab culture is associated in the collective imagination with fanaticism and terrorism.

Each country has its own traditions. Traditions, customs and beliefs should be treated seriously, as they constitute the citizens' daily life. However, a new culture might add value to a given nation and fructify in the future. The idea that each country has its own distinct culture explains the attitudes and values of its members. It unites but also raises voices of discontent. Supranational culture borrows, imitates and follows other cultures. Culture, in fact, is created in relation to other cultures. What is interesting, the individual in the contemporary world is far more complex, usually collecting various cultural identities throughout his life. It might be the result of various factors: location, race, history, nationality, language and even aesthetics.

One way of bringing people together is by sharing common values and beliefs. It might be achieved, for instance, through culture that by its principal disposition is opening up to contact and carries dialogue within. It is the way we communicate; we get to know each other, learn our differences and the way we form relationships. Art as an element of culture might be a good point of contact between various communities as it may transgress differences by sharing and exchanging ideas. It might also be achieved by education or tourism. Education sets standards for acceptance and toler-

ance, and tourism naturally enables people to meet other societies. Its development could also enable us to learn about lesser-known cultures.

An example of education bringing together the world a little closer, is founding the multinational DANUBIAN UNIVERSITY comprising among others: the Danube University Krems, the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, or the Danube Rectors' Conference and Summer School. Integration might also be achieved by learning other nations' languages and learning about the history of the region. Additionally, there are many artists or scientists who write about different cultures bringing the diverse societies closer. Another idea is creating national cultural institutes with a space for exchanging ideas. Culture comes into nature, as Roland Barthes[5] observed. Our individual stories create myth that with time becomes our tale.

The River Danube naturally cements *the countries and communities living around it with their multinational heritage*. However, it also brings discord as seen throughout history. The upper and lower limits of the river are slightly different. However, it remains a unique river. Despite the numerous political changes in the course of its history, the natural Danubian regions such as the Black Forest, Bavaria, the Wachau Valley, Pannonia, Moravia, Transylvania, the Balkans or the Black Sea are still the same.

Taking into account the current enormous population shifts entering through that part of Europe, the inter-cultural dialogue will be of outmost importance in the near future. This dialogue might be initiated through art, education or tourism. I strongly believe that in times of strife art should not be forgotten as it might bring hope and help solve misunderstandings, as it appeals to values, aesthetics and is at the root of new ideas. Moreover, art mingles with daily life

---

5 Roland Barthes is the French author working on theory of myths. Roland Barthes's Mythologies: A Critical Theory of Myths.

and even materializes in utilitarian everyday items such as souvenirs for tourists.

Bibliography Deyes, M. (2012). *Springs Pilgrim. My pilgrimage in Hungary from Esztergom to Mariagyűd.* Publikon Publishers, Pécs.

Ďurčiková, M. (1989). *Królowa Dunaju. Baśnie, podania i legendy o Bratysławie.* Wydawnictwo „Śląsk", Katowice.

Lebor, A. (2015). Bad Blood in the Balkans. Old enemies in Europe's most volatile region are chasing over the refugee crisis. News-week No. **13**, 12-15.

Magris, C. (2001). *Danube.* The Harvill Press, London, 85-268.

Pilch Ortega, A. and Schröttner, B. (Eds.) (2012). *Transnational Spaces and Regional Localization. Social Networks, Border Regions and Local-Global Relations.* Waxmann, Münster.

Thorpe, N. (2014). *Dunaj. Opowieści o ludziach znad wielkiej rzeki.* Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagielońskiego, Kraków.

Thorpe, N. (2014). *The Danube. A Journey Upriver from the Black Sea to the Black Forest*, Yale University Press, London.

Internet Sources Chahtantinsky, A. (2015). Sharing culture for sharing security. 3rd Word Forum on Intercultural Dialogue, http://www. osce.org/baku/158851, 2015: 4, [Accessed: September 10, 2015]

Tarpy, C. (2002). The Danube: Europe's River of Harmony and Discord, *National Geographic*, March 2002, available at: http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/features/world/   europe/balkans/danube-text, [Accessed: August 12, 2015]

Chapter 3

Title

**Erasmus+ as the EU Answer
to the Educational Challenges Faced by Europe**

Author

Aneta Skorupa-Wulczynska

Polish Academy of Sciences

Erasmus + as the EU Answer
to the Educational Challenges
Faced by Europe

Aneta Skorupa-Wulczynska

Introduction Demographic changes, the adaptation of the education system to labour market needs and the expectations of employers, the high unemployment rate among young and unskilled people - these are the key challenges for the educational institutions in Europe. As the challenges are complex and interrelated, education and training systems have to be appropriately adjusted in order to provide all European citizens with knowledge, skills and competences which help them meet both the demands of the workplace, market and modern life. Erasmus + is an answer of the European Union to the growing educational, social and economic challenges being faced by Europe. It is the Union's tool to contribute to economic development, high level of employment, social justice and social inclusion in Europe through the introduction of a variety of possibilities in the field of education and training.

Legal framework for cooperation in the field of education The issues in the field of education and training have to be dealt with by almost all European states. Within the European Union, education remains in the competences of the Member States, with the EU acting on the grounds of the subsidiarity principle. Under Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Community *"shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States through*

actions such as promoting the mobility of citizens, designing joint study programmes, establishing networks, exchanging information and teaching languages of the European Union. The Treaty also contains a commitment to promote life-long learning for all citizens of the Union." (*OJ C 326, 26.10.2012*)

So as to achieve the above, the competent institutions or agencies of the European Union set objectives, evaluate the progress made on the objectives, and provide soft law mechanisms such as guidelines, indicators and European benchmarks, which serve as points of reference for the Member States and help them measure progress towards the objectives. In the field of education, the EU operates based on the open method of cooperation, which rests on the voluntary cooperation of Member States with no official sanctions imposed for failure to comply with the law. Yet, the effectiveness of the method derives from peer pressure and the reputation of Member States, and brings positive results (Barcz, 2010: 14).

The main educational objectives set by the EU are prescribed in the strategic framework for Education and Training 2020 ('ET 2020'), which constitutes the foundation for the European cooperation in the field of education and training and is an element of the broader European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth for the decade 2010-2020 ('EU 2020'). The framework aims to support Member States in the development of their education and training systems. It sets out four long-term objectives, which include making lifelong learning and mobility a reality, improving the quality and the efficiency of education and training, promoting equity, social cohesion and active citizenship, as well as enhancing creativity and innovation at all levels of education and training ('ET 2020').

EU participation in education projects Moreover, the European Union is also a partner in various intergovernmental projects aiming at the modernisation of education systems and spreading quality education. The flagship example is the Bologna process, the objective of which was to create a European higher education area by harmonising higher education degrees as well as academic quality assurance standards throughout all EU Member States. The process was affirmed by signing the Bologna Declaration by education ministers from 29 countries in 1991 and later was opened to other states, i.e., the signatories to the European Cultural Convention of the Council of Europe. Although the Bologna process was created outside of the EU institutions, the Commission played an important role in its implementation by supporting the project connected to quality assurance. Although the participation in the Bologna process is completely voluntary, so far it has attracted 47 participating countries and 49 signatories, as the system creates transparency in terms of qualifications in education and facilitates transnational cooperation.

Within the framework of education policy the European Commission and Member States have also created the Eurydice network aiming at the facilitation of European cooperation in the field of education systems and policies. The network encompasses 37 countries, including 28 Member States, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey. Under the motto of better knowledge for better policies, Eurydice prepares and publishes analyses, studies and comparable data on issues common to European education systems. The network is coordinated by the EU Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency in Brussels, which in terms of education is supervised by the Directorate-General of the European Commission responsible for Education and Culture.

Erasmus Plus - scope and objectives of the programme The work of the network is currently co-funded by the Erasmus + programme, one of the most important tools of the EU for the achievement of the objectives and benchmarks set in the strategic framework. Built upon the experience of more than 25 years of European programmes such as *Lifelong Learning, Youth in Action, Erasmus Mundus, Tempus, Alfa, Edulink,* Erasmus + promotes synergies and cross-fertilisation between various fields of education, training and youth, and removing artificial barriers. The programme aims at becoming an effective instrument addressing real needs related to human and social capital development in Europe. The main objectives of Erasmus + include the modernisation of education, training and youth work across Europe as well as boosting skills and contributing to the increased employability. The budget of €14.7 billion reflects the EU's commitment to investing in the area of education and research. Erasmus + has been created to give opportunities for over 4 million Europeans to study, train, gain work experience and volunteer abroad. The programme is addressed to institutions and organisations operating in the area of education, training, youth and sport in Europe (Erasmus plus Programme Guide, 2015: 8-9).

The Erasmus + programme has been divided into sectors covering school education, vocational training, higher education, adult education, youth, central projects and sport. What is more, the programme covers three main types of actions in each sector: 1. Mobility for educational purposes – the largest project in terms of scope, 2. Cooperation and exchange of good practices as well as international initiatives, and 3. Support of reforms in the area of education, with the first two actions being decentralised and conducted by the National Agencies. In addition to the actions, some sectors include additional activities, like the adult learning sector also includes a multilingual, open electronic membership-based platform for teachers, instructors, researchers, academics, policy

makers and anyone professionally involved in adult learning in Europe called EPALE. The platform is to facilitate sharing resources, courses, events as well as the improvement of the quality of adult learning provision in Europe.

As a general rule, Erasmus + projects are addressed to participants including individuals called participants and participating organisations established in a Programme Country. Programme Countries can fully participate in the programme. Some actions of the Programme are also addressed to Partner Countries, subject to specific criteria and conditions specified in the Programme Guide.

The tables below present a list of Programme Countries and Partner Countries (Erasmus + Programme Guide for 2015: 24).

Table 1. Programme Countries

Member States of the European Union (EU)			
Belgium	Greece	Lithuania	Portugal
Bulgaria	Spain	Luxembourg	Romania
Czech Republic	France	Hungary	Slovenia
Denmark	Croatia	Malta	Slovakia
Germany	Italy	Netherlands	Finland
Estonia	Cyprus	Austria	Sweden
Ireland	Latvia	Poland	United Kingdom
Non-EU Programme Countries			
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia			
Iceland			
Liechtenstein			
Norway Turkey			

It is worth noticing that Partner Countries are subdivided into two groups: Partner Countries neighbouring the EU and other Partner Countries, with the former meeting the same eligibility criteria implemented through the Erasmus + Programme Guide and formulated in the Commission Notice (OJEU C-205: 9-11), and the latter regrouped according to the financial instruments of the EU external action (Regions 5 - 13).

Table 2. Partner Countries neighbouring the EU

Western Balkans (Region 1)	Eastern Partnership countries (Region 2)	South-Mediterranean countries (Region 3)	Russian Federation (Region 4)
• Albania • Bosnia and Herzegovina • Kosovo • Montenegro • Serbia	• Armenia • Azerbaijan • Belarus • Georgia • Moldova • Territory of Ukraine as recognised by international law	• Algeria • Egypt • Israel • Jordan • Lebanon • Libya • Morocco • Palestine • Syria • Tunisia	• Territory of Russia as recognised by international law

Actions in order to meet market expectations and reduce unemployment

The report published by Eurydice *Key Data on Education in Europe 2012* shows that young people's entry into the labour market is a concern in many countries, with a growing number of young people to be overqualified for the type of employment they find. On the other hand, high risk of being unemployed and marginalised is run mainly by young people leaving school prematurely and adults with low skills. This situation implies both a need for a more efficient forecast process aiming at more reliable educational guidance so that educational qualifications could match actual employment opportunities, and a need for measures to prevent early school leaving and to reach unskilled or low-skilled adults in order to provide them with the skills in demand on the market. Only well-performing education

and training systems can help tackle the challenges by providing people with the skills required by the labour market and the economy, while allowing them to play an active role in society and achieve personal fulfilment (Key Data on Education in Europe, 2012: 11).

Although there are no official data summarising the results of actions undertaken so far under the Erasmus + programme, it may be assumed, based on careful analysis of the Lifelong Learning Programme, that mobility projects significantly contribute to the improvement of linguistic skills, the development of all types of soft skills raising multicultural awareness and tolerance. Hence, mobility, which is a top-priority project within the Erasmus +, affects not only the personal development of a beneficiary, but also raises individuals' chances on the labour market. For a large group of beneficiaries, e.g. students or graduates, a stay abroad to study, do traineeship or attend a language course is the first chance to be exposed to the real language and be totally immersed in the foreign-language setting, to check actual language skills and to use the language for real communication, not the one used in the classroom. It is worth mentioning that Erasmus + also helps increase the language skills and the multicultural competences of academic personnel, which, in the light of demographic changes and uncertainty of employment at higher education institutions, may in the long run strongly affect the position of academics on the market.

Although Erasmus + is a continuation of previous programmes, including the abovementioned Lifelong Learning programme, it introduces some vital changes resulting from the EU strategy ('EU 2020'). It introduces a new possibility of stays abroad oriented at gaining professional experience. Universities participating in the programme offer not only stays for study but also professional traineeship abroad lasting at least two months addressed to fresh graduates helping

them find themselves on the labour market and have a good start. Another novelty of Erasmus + is a tool OLS (Online Linguistic Support), which allows Erasmus + beneficiaries to assess their language skills before going abroad, and if the language skills of a person are insufficient, the tool enables the beneficiary to participate in an online language course before leaving for a stay abroad. It is a requirement under Erasmus + that every beneficiary has to take a language test before leaving and after comeback, with the aim being to check how mobility affects language skills.

Actions in order to increase efficiency of education systems
Raising efficiency of educational systems is one of the key elements determining the success in coping with educational challenges in Europe. Changing circumstances, including the internationalisation of education and the growing use of digital learning require more flexible learning pathways adapted to learners' needs and objectives as well as innovative solutions. Changing reality poses a need to upgrade education systems in order to use their full potential. First, there is a need for uniform and transparent recognition tools which will assure easy understanding of skills and qualification within the EU internal market. Second, new technologies should be adapted to the way society operates and, in this way, used more effectively. Last but not least, there is a need to share and disseminate best practices among Member States and all stakeholders, as this will accelerate the progress of others by setting good examples of practice.

The internationalisation of education systems contributes to their higher efficiency. Erasmus + emphasises a strong international dimension, in particular in the field of higher education and youth. It is worth noting that most actions in the field of higher education and youth are also open to Erasmus + Partner Countries. Actions with international dimension involve cooperation with Partner Countries and include the following actions: International credit mobility

and Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degrees (Key Action 1) which aims at promoting the mobility of learners and staff, Capacity Building (Key Action 2) promoting cooperation and partnerships affecting the modernisation and internationalisation of higher education institutions in Partner Countries, and Policy Dialogue (Key Action 3) consisting in cooperation within the network of higher education reform experts in Partner Countries, international activities and promotion events. A similar structure of activities is promoted in the field of youth, and they include mobility for young people and youth workers (Key Action 1) promoting Youth Exchanges and European Voluntary Service, Capacity Building (Key Action, 2) promoting cooperation and mobility affecting qualitative development of youth work, youth policies and youth systems, as well as Structured Dialogues (Key Action 3) aiming to involve young people and youth organisations from Partner Countries neighbouring the EU through international meetings, conferences and events. The multitude of actions initiated by the EU designed to internationalise education not only proves the significance of this aspect in the light of the efficiency of domestic education systems, but also shows that although the internationalisation of education has already become a reality, there are still many areas to be improved (Erasmus Plus Programme Guide, 2015: 12).

Recognition and transparency tools encourage wider cooperation between education systems and through that affect their efficiency. Erasmus + supports EU tools which guarantee transparency and recognition for skills and qualifications, such as *Europass, Youthpass, the European Qualifications Framework (EQF)*, as well as EU-wide networks supporting such tools, an example being Euroguidance networks or EQF National Coordination Points. For instance, the European Qualifications Framework is a translation tool aimed at helping communication and comparison between qualification systems in Europe. The tool is based on eight

levels which are used by learners, graduates and employers for understanding and comparing qualifications awarded in different countries and by different education systems. Such tools also help better understand the labour market in view of expected qualifications. As a result, these tools help reach the education targets of ET 2020 and contribute to Europe 2020 objectives concerning competitiveness, employment and growth.

Last but not least, the efficiency of education systems is also enhanced by mobility. Erasmus + is an opportunity for transnational mobility for educational purposes for pupils, students, teachers, and supports building partnerships between universities, secondary schools, enterprises and non-profit organisations in order to strengthen innovations and build knowledge. Universities employing teachers or academic personnel having multicultural and multilingual skills are more attractive to potential students also from abroad. The mobility of university employees translates into the development of the university and, in turn, strengthens the position of a university in the region or even on the international stage. Mobility contributes to raising the efficiency of education systems as it allows taking advantage of observing and participating in education systems of other participating countries. Beneficiaries of the programme after their comeback to the homeland often take initiatives based on the experiences from their stay abroad.

Exchange of good practices According to the main assumptions of Erasmus +, the outcomes and deliverables of the projects carried out within the programme should be communicated, and, thanks to that the impact of such projects, extended. The results achieved in particular projects may be highly relevant in fields not directly related to the project. The proper dissemination of project results requires the adoption of appropriate activities of the organisations involved while designing and

implementing the project. Moreover, Erasmus + promotes open access to educational materials produced by projects funded by the programme. By principle, the materials should be freely available to the public in digital form.

The University of Warsaw is a very good example of an institution sharing best practices. The University has already been honoured by the European Commission and the Polish National Agency – the Foundation for the Development of the Education System – for its innovative solutions. The University received the title Erasmus Success Story for the years 2000-2006 granted by the Commission for being a leader in educational mobility. The Bureau for International Cooperation at the University created IT USOS, a system used for mobility management, which was later adopted and is still used by other Polish universities. In the light of the fast-growing number of students and academic personnel benefiting from the programme – to compare, in 1999 there were 23 Erasmus students at the University, and in 2015, there are 1500 students going abroad to study or do traineeship. 300 teachers going abroad and about 800 incoming students and teachers – the efficient management of mobility would not be possible without the system.

After the first year of implementation – The experience of the University of Warsaw

The reflections and conclusions regarding the first year of Erasmus + implementation presented in this paper refer to the sector of higher education and are based on the experiences of the Bureau for International Cooperation at the University of Warsaw (Interview with the Head of the Bureau held on 28 September 2015). At the University, mobility is the largest and the most important project out of all actions covered by Erasmus +. It affects the largest group of beneficiaries, students and teachers, academic staff or University employees. From the point of view of a higher education institution, the programme is not perfect. Especially at the early stages of its implementation there was much disorder as regards the

requirements imposed by the EU. When Brussels imposed extremely strict conditions, the EU officials did not comply with some rules, failed to provide fully developed and tested tools which were to be used. To give an example, the mobility tool was not properly prepared, information about the OLS system was provided late, and licences were granted to education institutions at the time when beneficiaries had already gone abroad. Still, after one year and a half since the launch of the programme there are matters which have not be clarified in the EU guidelines, e.g. a method of calculating remuneration for the personnel working in the project. A daily fee amounts to 37 Euro in Poland and despite raising a lot of objections, the issue has not been solved to date.

Initially, there was also much confusion concerning a matter of taxing individual support which caused education institutions to wait with the implementation of the mobility project. As late as in August 2015, a regulation on the abandonment to impose income tax was issued by the minister of finance, which means that for more than a year there was a gap in regulations regarding the fundamental matter of financial settlements with the tax office. During that period plenty of questions on how Erasmus + funds should be paid out remained unanswered. Although on 20 December 2013 the European Parliament issued the Regulation encouraging Member States to exempt Erasmus + beneficiaries from tax, the decision remained within the competences of Member States. In Poland only after active campaigns, the engagement of the Conference of Rectors of Academic Schools (KRASP), and the pressure exerted on the Foundation for the Development of the Education System – the National Agency of the Erasmus + Programme – and the Ministry of Education,, were tax issues related to the financial support within Erasmus + finally settled. Clearly, the lack of transparency resulted in a lower number of applications submitted in the period between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2014. No-

tice should be also taken of the fact that the current Polish regulation is effective until the end of 2016 and it is not clear how tax will be settled afterwards. Moreover, the regulation has some gaps as it does not specify if social insurance contributions should be paid, and interpretations of the Polish National Social Institution are ambiguous.

Based on the example of the University of Warsaw, it must be stated that the first months of the programme implementation seemed to be challenging. Yet, the brand Erasmus is already so known in Europe that it is certain that it will not discourage anyone from taking advantage of the programme in the future.

Conclusions 1. The EU institutions contribute to the development of education systems acting within their limited competences and have mainly guiding role.

2. The initiatives of the EU in the field of education include the Bologna process, Eurydice network and the Erasmus + programme.

3. The Erasmus + programme (2014-2020) is a comprehensive programme replacing all previous EU education programmes and with its scope covering many groups of beneficiaries.

4. Erasmus + was created in order to face the educational challenges of Europe. As the previous programme it continues to promote language learning, but it also includes new elements which serve for coping with the current European problems such as demographic changes, the adaptation of education systems to the labour market and the expectations of employers as well the high unemployment rate among young and unskilled people.

5. So as to meet the expectations of the labour market, Erasmus + strongly promotes mobility not only to study, but also to do professional traineeship. In order to make mobility more effective, the EU launches a new tool, OLS,

which serves for the assessment of language progress after a stay abroad.

6. The programme introduces a number of initiatives aimed at the internationalisation of the education systems, including Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degrees, Capacity Building or Policy Dialogue.

7. A lot of attention is paid to the introduction of recognition tools and transparency as well as to the exchange of good practices, which should contribute to the higher efficiency of the education systems of the participating countries.

8. The first year of the programme implementation shows a number of deficiencies both on the part of the EU and the Member State – based on the example of the University of Warsaw.

Bibliography Barcz, J.,(ed.), *Polityki Unii Europejskiej: polityki społeczne.* Vol. XXVII. Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Europrawo, 2010.

Bologna Process – European Higher Education Area, http://www.ehea.info/ [8 October 2015]

Council Conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (ET 2020) [Official Journal C 119 of 28.5.2009].

Communication from the Commission. Europe 2020. A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET_20EN_20BARROSO_2020_EN_version.pdf [9 October 2015]

ePlatform for Adult learning in Europe, https://ec.europa.eu/epale/ [7 October 2015]

Erasmus Plus Programme Guide. Version 3(2015): 14/11/2014, http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/documents/erasmus-plus-programme-guide_en.pdf

Eurydice network home website: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php?title=Home [8 October 2015]

European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2015. The European higher Education Area in 2015: Bologna Process. Implemen-

tation report. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. http://www.ehea.info/Uploads/Submited-Files/5_2015/132824.pdf [28 September 2015]

Key Data on Education in Europe 2012, EACEA P9 Eurydice http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice

Nowe wyzwania stawiane przed europejską edukacją [New Challenges faced by the European Education] www.erasmusplus.org.pl; [8 October 2015]

Special Eurobarometer 386: Europeans and their languages, published in June 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_386_en.pdf [30 May 2015]

Chapter 4

Title

**The King and Us –
The Role of Socio-political Myths
in Post-socialist Bulgaria**

Author

Radostina Schivatcheva

Department of European and International Studies
Kings College London

The King and Us

The Role of Socio-political Myths
in Post-socialist Bulgaria

Radostina Schivatcheva

Abstract The paper discusses the dynamic constitution of political myths within the context of post-socialist Bulgaria of the early 2000s. In 2001 the party of the former Bulgarian Tsar Simeon II won the national elections and formed a majority government. Paradoxically, unparalleled by another former member of the Eastern Bloc, the democratic vote had brought to power an ex-king. The analysis focuses on the socio-political salvific myth of the good 'Saviour-King', which underpinned the rise to power of the ex-monarch. Thereby the analysis explores the role of the social imaginary in crafting a coherent social vision of a country's future.

Introduction and analytical objective In the twenty years since the collapse of communism, Bulgarian democracy has seemingly achieved its objective goals – the democratic institutions have been established and there is a functioning multi-party system (Peeva, 2001). Bulgaria is considered a consolidated democracy, with a stable parliament, sound government structures, an active civil society and free media (EBRD, 2007). The country is defined as 'a democratic, law-governed and social state,' and the Bulgarian constitution includes a wide range of social rights. However, Bulgaria has been characterized as 'chronically incapable of coping with its social problems or improving its level of economic prosperity' (Gati, 1996; Ganev, 2001: 186; Clark, 2002; Vassilev, 2010).

In Bulgaria the transition towards democracy and market economy has been a modernising project, aimed at creating an 'open society,' wherein certain necessary trade-offs between 'social security'-stability versus social opportunities have been resolutely shifted toward the latter. The modernity aspect of this project has also been aimed at dismantling some of the obviously traditional socio-economic aspects that the communist regime has preserved and even reinforced. However, the feasibility of the transition was also predicated upon a spontaneously emerging vision of the society, yet it is this vision that remains underexplored and obscured (Lechner, 2004).

Consequently, the analysis aims to explore new parameters for reflecting on democracy that go beyond the limits of the prevailing theoretical frameworks of 'formal democracy'. Whereas 'revolution from above' and 'elite-led, top-down transition' have been the guiding paradigms of the theory and praxis of the post-communist period (Wydra 2000; Woell and Wydra, 2008), the discussion argues about the importance of recognizing the socio-political dimension of the democratization process, as emerging from the bottom-up. Thus, the analysis argues that understanding democracy within Bulgarian context should take into account the issues beyond the formal creation of liberal rights, and consider the myths and narratives of the social imaginary as essential in the process of identity formation, and therefore, for the process of democratization. In particular, the essay will focus on a transient, yet powerful socio-political myth – the myth of the saviour-king.

Identity and political myth

Collective identity is defined as a 'group self-understanding,' 'group consciousness,' collective 'we' feeling (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 51). As Eder argues, constructions of identity are formed within social relations of the present and are created in a way which allows permanent change of social relations

to be written into identity so that society could see itself and be seen from the outside as having a constant (Eder, 2009: 428). Societal identities also refer to self-understanding of a society (Anderson, 2006). Identities are articulated as the reason for particular political praxis, yet they are also (re)produced through these very policy discourses: they are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and product (Butler, 1990: 25).

However, it is only a common narrative that can make 'a single set' out of a multiplicity of principles, values, memories, symbols that constitute identities. Myth, as a particular kind of narrative, can fundamentally contribute to this end. Myth implies the possibility of encompassing different stories, stemming from different narrative voices, which can be re-comprised in a common mythologem (Levi-Strauss, 1978: 25-27). Thus, myth can contribute to a delineation of the always problematic idem of any form of group identity.

A simple narrative becomes a political myth when it creates significance of political conditions and actions shared by a group (Botticci, 2007: 178). A political myth 'tells the story of a political society' (Tudor 1972: 138). Political myths reduce the complexity of social life to the relative simplicity of its narrative plot, thereby providing fundamental cognitive schemata for mapping the social world (Flood, 1996; Shcherbinina, 2011; Sakwa, 2004). It is in this way that myth can be considered poetic - a poetry not written for aesthetic reasons, but which imagines forth, shaping the several features of the external world into a concrete image (Munz, 1973: 197). The poetic aspect of political myths enables them to act as 'motivating social myths' in being the direct means for questioning what is given (Sorel, 1950). Indeed, as narratives that provide significance, political myths not only make sense of experience, but they also provide orientation and stimulation for action: they are an invitation to act 'here and now.'

Myths are essential for the political imaginary, and they are also indispensible for the constitution of legitimacy and

civic identity in post-communist democracies (Woell and Wydra, 2008). Myths cannot just be invented; they need to resonate with the society. They do not represent false information, rather they contain beliefs of the community about itself. An essential component of identities, myths are powerful in shaping the definition of public interest (Goldstein and Keohane, 1996: 85).

In the fluid socio-economic and socio-political space of post-socialist Bulgaria, myths have given order and meaning. In the radical uncertainty of the wide-encompassing Bulgarian transformation, the major myths of the period have also been motivating social myths, inviting a set of policies and action.

The post-socialist 'transition' and salvific myths Twenty years after the fall of the Eastern European bloc, Bulgaria is amongst the most disappointed EU nations, when it comes to assessing the transition from totalitarianism to democracy (Dnevnik, 2009). The transition in Bulgaria has been called the 'cold war of the civil society,' and it has been marked by its confrontational character. Although the confrontation contributed to and in greater degree imposed a confrontational and irresponsible model for public behaviour and communication, the very model of the transition generated socio-political contestation. Bulgarian people expected that the transition would be something organized, planned and constructive. Although politically segmented, the society trusted political elites to realize controlled, and at least partly safe transition, and the vast majority of the people expected fast changes for the better. These expectations turned out to be misleading, as the uncontrolled character of the transition was initiated from the very beginning. While in the early nineties, the transition was considered as an instrument for a one-way public benefit; ten years later the view of the transition was dominated by the perception of chaos, lack of perspective, illogicalness, catastrophe – these

perceptions were seemingly aptly captured by the Russian description of the Nineties as 'the Wild Nineties' (Ledeneva, 2006; Ryabchuk, 2007).

The expectation that the transition will be a quick process leading to greater socio-economic prosperity, modernization and increased socio-economic opportunities, was transient and quickly faded away. However, emergent socio-political myths continued promising salvation and quick resolution of Bulgaria's socio-economic and socio-political problems, thereby foresting for brief periods social unity and consensus. One of the most powerful salvific myths was the one of the good (ex-)King, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. The former monarch triumphantly won the elections in 2001 (Barany, 2001; Peeva, 2001). Simeon's electoral success marked a shift from traditional political parties to personalistic parties – a trend which has continued being a defining characteristic of Bulgaria's political landscape (Gurov and Zankina, 2013; Levitt and Kostadinova, 2014).

The myth of the good (ex-) king– Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha

A bipolar model of confrontational politics, pitting 'left' versus 'right' was a characteristic of the Bulgarian post-socialist transition of the 1990s (Todorov, 2007). This model mired Bulgarian politics in social and political instability and mistrust. Amidst a 'chaotic transition' and political hostility, the public perceived the traditional parties as having failed their public mandate. Disillusioned and tired by the party politics dividing the nation, the Bulgarian public sought a unifying figure, a source of authority and national identity that would stand apart from political squabbles. Paradoxically, the Bulgarian ex-monarch became this impartial and uniting symbol. The prestige and popularity of the long-exiled tsar were also a function of the public's discontent with the disastrous economic downturn and the chaotic politics of the post-communist period (Nikolaev 1991: 1-5). Unhappy with the privations and hardships of the transition, many

Bulgarians have pinned their hopes on Simeon II as a kind of messiah to lead their country out of its desperate socioeconomic situation (Vassilev, 2003: 2).

Simeon II, former king (or tsar) of Bulgaria was born in 1937 and formally reigned in Bulgaria in the period of 1943-46. Since he ascended the throne at 6 years of age, the royal authority was exercised over the kingdom on his behalf by a regency council. A referendum held in 1946, just as Bulgaria became a member of the Eastern Bloc, resulted in the abolishment of the monarchy. Simeon was forced into an exile abroad, eventually permanently settling in Spain. He returned to Bulgaria only in 1996. At that time the former monarch formed the political party National Movement for Stability and Progress (abbreviated in Bulgarian as NDSV), initially established as the National Movement Simeon II. After the party won the elections, Simeon became prime minister of the Republic of Bulgaria from July 2001 until August 2005. In the elections that followed, NDSV lost its parliamentary majority and participated in a coalition government with the Bulgarian Socialist Party. In 2008 after the electoral defeat of NDSV in the national parliamentary elections, the former tsar left politics. At that time the ex-monarch became the subject of numerous property-related scandals and accusations of corruption and greed. As a result, in the public's eyes he was no longer a hero but a greedy old man.

However, in the mid-nineties the myth of the good saviour-monarch was in its ascendancy. Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was perceived as the unifying figure in the Bulgarian political landscape, an appeal further aided by nostalgic monarchism. Thus, well before the electoral victory of the ex-monarch's party and his appointment as a prime minister on the 17th of June 2001, a new political myth has already appeared - the myth of the saviour-king (Petkov, 2005: 209). Reflecting on this period, which marked the height of his popularity, Simeon shares: 'For the Bulgarians I was the king and this

was a connection with the past, and also an opportunity for a more promising future' (Saxe Coburg Gotha, 2014: 232). Indeed, when Simeon returned to Bulgaria in 1996, he was given a welcome fit for a king. Enthusiastic crowds cheered: 'Simeon!' and 'We want our king!' Reportedly, half a million people gave a warm welcome to the ex-king on his arrival in Sofia on 26 May 1996. Opinion polls suggested that, while less than 20% of Bulgarians wanted the monarchy restored, some 40% wished the ex-monarch to play an important political role in the national affairs, especially at a time when Bulgaria was on the verge of its worst post-1989 economic debacle (Vassilev, 2003).

The ex-king states: 'My compatriots came to me to make confessions to me. They saw the person, who would listen to their complaints... I exemplified a certain novelty, a certain exoticism, after the years of communism and timelessness. I became the darling of the media. I remember that during my first visits I had more than 100 meetings in only 10 days' (Saxe Coburg Gotha, 2014: 232). The strong and positive reaction, which the former tsar elicited in the public, could in part be related to his status of being 'outside' the events, 'untainted' by the painful experiences of the transition. The old-fashioned Bulgarian language of the ex-tsar, who had spent many years of forced exile abroad, only added to his appeal. This 'external' viewpoint also bestowed upon the mythical persona of the former king elements of a Bakhtinian trickster – a character, who comes from the outside and disrupts the flow of events (Szakolczai, 2009: 141). The public longed for a disruption of the lawlessness, corruption and impoverishment brought about by the Bulgarian post-socialist transition trajectory. NDSV, the amorphous personalistic movement that brought the former tsar to power quickly gained a wide-ranging popularity.

Nostalgic monarchism was a key component of the ex-king's appeal. This nostalgia was widely shared across the

different parts of the political and socio-economic spectrum – for example, both the Bulgarian president and the leader of the Bulgarian Labour Unions alike addressed the former monarch and now candidate prime minister with 'Your Majesty.' In the eyes of the Bulgarian public the former tsar was not just another politician – Simeon's royal origin was the defining element of his allure. The 'royal welcome', which the Bulgarian public gave to the former king, increased the confidence of the ex-tsar in his pursuit of political leadership: 'I was surprised. That means that the political layers are not as impenetrable, as I had previously imagined them' (Saxe Coburg Gotha, 2014: 233).

The close personal connections between Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and the Spanish king Juan Carlos, who has been called 'the midwife of the Spanish democracy,' gave the former monarch an additional public appeal. In what was characterized as a 'parliamentary revolution,' during the 2001 parliamentary elections the Bulgarian voters withdrew support for the highly-praised center-right government with premier Ivan Kostov. The king's movement - which did not even exist until just 90 days before the elections - took half of the 240 seats in the unicameral National Assembly. The wide-ranging public appeal of the NDSV ensured its dominance in 28 of the 31 regions of the country.

Clearly, the former tsar represented a Weberian charismatic authority figure, 'resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him' (Weber, 2015). But Simeon also actively participated in creating his own myth. 'Morality' was given the key role amongst the qualities of the 'saviour-king's' mythological figure. Simeon explicitly promised 'higher morality in national politics' in his numerous electoral political speeches and public announcements. Yet, at the same time, the speeches of the ex-monarch did not outline any practical

judicial and political reforms needed to ensure this 'higher morality'. Instead, the invocation of 'morality in politics' in the public rhetoric of the former monarch resembled 'magical incantations.' Simeon claimed to be the moral arbiter in this new kind of politics and the saviour-king's mythology invited blind faith in the actions of the former tsar. 'Trust me!,' asked the ex-king of his compatriots, 'when the time comes I will tell you (what to do).' In this request for blind, unquestioning trust, Simeon was no longer the politician, who serves the public and is accountable to it, but the tsar, in possession of royal authority.

Another important component of the saviour-king's myth was the mythological chronotope of '800 days,' in which the country will be 'turned around'. The chronotope had a particularly strong messianic appeal, as it promised an improvement of the country's economy and the standard of living of the ordinary Bulgarians in a relatively short period. In order to achieve this ambitious goal Simeon envisioned a 'special time' of 800 days; a time outside the ordinary and formerly existing time-flow, in which a disruption of the existing development trajectory would be possible. The utopian goals of socio-economic advancement would be achieved by the magical transformation of the existing reality, via the application of the 'renowned Bulgarian industriousness and entrepreneurship'. Like a messiah, Simeon positioned himself as a keeper and interpreter of this new world. No opposition or negotiation of the interpretive perspective of the saviour-king was anticipated: 'I rely on the unquestioning support of everyone, who has believed in me so far,' stated Simeon (Saxe Coburg Gotha, 2001).

The most important mythological 'bundle of relations' (Levi-Strauss, 1955: 431), which the ex-king referred to in his speeches, was the one between him and his 'compatriots' (Saxe Coburg Gotha, 2001). The former monarch stated that he saw this relationship as a service to his compatriots,

which he felt it was his duty to offer – 'for decades I have lived with my duty to serve you.' The former king emphasized, 'I am firmly convinced that I ought to fulfil my historic duty to serve you.' At the same time the Bulgarian people, whom Simeon wanted to serve, were portrayed as a poor, unhappy, and desperate 'flock,' apparently in need of a competent and benevolent shepherd. For the ex-king these 'royal subjects' were clearly in need of leadership and moral guidance – 'for me there has been nothing more painful than the desperate cries of hundreds of my compatriots'. Thus, while talking about service, Simeon did not imply the service that a 'mere' politicians offers to his electorate. Rather, the former monarch's entry into the Bulgarian politics was 'the return of the king', loosely covered by the politician's garb.

Yet the quick rise of the myth of the 'saviour-king' was followed by an equally quick fall. Only a year after the sweeping electoral victory, the public trust in the NDSV government had dramatically fallen. The country's economy and the standard of living had not markedly improved. The public judged harshly the former royal: 'He is a king-liar'. The press concluded that: 'in 12 months the Bulgarians were transformed from optimists to pessimists.' The 'cult phrase of the former king, "Trust me!" actually should mean: "Trust in yourselves!"' was the public verdict. 'The myth of the good king imploded like a soap bubble,' concluded the social media.

The Bulgarians wanted a hero saviour-king. However, they received a politician. The attempts of the Bulgarian public to transcend the divisions between left and right by resorting to the pre-modern authority of divine rule by a king did not live up to the expectations. 'If I would have been satisfied by just playing the role of a 'tsar', without any power, role in which the people wanted to see me, I am sure that my popularity today would have been as high as before,' admitted Simeon (Saxe Coburg Gotha, 2014: 232). A 'roi ex

machina' could not provide quick solutions to the social, political and economic problems of capitalist Bulgaria of the early 2000s. In spite of the over-optimistic expectations of the Bulgarian people, expectations heightened by Simeon's demagogic promise to rebuild the economy and improve the abysmal living standards of Bulgarians in 800 days, his government failed to ease the deep economic and social crisis gripping the country (Vassilev, 2003: 170). Widespread public discontent eroded Simeon's mass appeal, confirming the Weberian conclusion that personal charisma is a tenuous and fleeting source of power. The Bulgarian ex-king was not naked. Rather, the richness of his clothing contrasted too sharply with the poverty of his subjects.

Conclusion Democracy in Bulgaria is predominantly conceived in its 'formal' dimensions – the existing democratization studies have mainly focused on certain aspects of the formal institutionalization of political authority via the top-down setting of institutions, rules and procedures. Little attention has been given to the models, rationalities and representations that provide the intellectual and emotional sources on which the social realities are built up as well as to the need to explain democratization holistically. At the normative level, the link between institutions and democracy has been perceived as an unquestionable ethical imaginary, in a way that has reified both categories and has silenced their alternative conceptions.

The discussion aimed to aid in establishing new parameters for reflecting on democracy that go beyond the limits of the prevailing institutionally-centered theoretical frameworks, especially within Eastern European context. Thereby the analysis introduced aspects and nuances that have been neglected and marginalized in the current research of the post-socialist Eastern European democracies. The essay sought to move beyond the most frequently accessed episte-

mological paradigms by exploring an overlooked analytic dimension, which emphasises the importance of social myths and their power to mobilize the public imagination and lead to socio-political action.

The study focused on one major Bulgarian salvific myth – the one of the good (ex-)king. Rising quickly to prominence, the myth just as quickly lost its utopian appeal. The public persona of the former royal underwent a complex process of mythologization, followed by an even quicker de-mythologization. The ex-tsar actively participated in the creation of his own myth, portraying himself as bearer of superior morality and trustworthiness. Acting as a Bakhtinian trickster he sought to disrupt the flow of time by introducing a special chronotope ('800 days') that would allow the achievement of his ambitious development goal. Yet, Simeon, the politician, could not fulfil the promises of Simeon, the former king. At the twilight of his governing mandate, the social imaginary was no longer associating his image with that of a heroic king-saviour, but with the one of a 'sly fox'.

The exploration of the Bulgarian political myth of the good 'saviour-king' suggests two major conclusions. First, re-conceptualizing the socio-political imaginaries of democracy within a wider framework of social relations requires taking into consideration the strong moral judgement that society bestows upon the symbolic figures, central to the constitution of the political myths. Second, the dynamic development of the symbolic figure of the former tsar and the attendant political myth point at the continued presence of an active and responsive 'civic imaginary,' which is frequently passing an ethical judgement and acting as a social critique. Thus, the discussion presents an argument for the recognition of the saliency of an active model of citizenship in Bulgaria, rather than the passive 'Orientalized' one, which currently still prevails in much of the analytic discourse.

Bibliography Anderson, Benedict (2006). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, London.

Barany, Zoltan D. (2002). Bulgaria's Royal Elections. *Journal of Democracy* **13 (2)**, 141-155.

Bottici, Chiara (2007). *A Philosophy of Political Myth*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Butler, Judith (1990). *Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity,*: Routledge, New York.

Clark, Terry Dee (2002). *Beyond post-communist studies: political science and the new democracies of Europe*, M. E. Sharpe. Inc, New York.

Delanty G. and Rumford C. (2005). *Rethinking Europe: Social theory and implications of Europeanization*. Routledge.

Dnevnik, (2009). *Nedovolnite balgari*. <04.11.2009>, accessed on <25.10.2015>, accessed at: <http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2009/11/04/810563_nedovolnite_bulgari/>

EBRD, (2007). *EBRD Transition Report 2007: people in transition, WB World Development Indicators.* London.

Eder K., (2009). A Theory of Collective Identity: Making Sense of the Debate on a 'European Identity'. *European Journal of Social Theory*. **12 (4)**, 427-447.

Flood, Christopher G. (1996). *Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction*, Garland Publishing, New York.

Gati, Charles (1996). If not democracy, what? Leaders, laggards and losers in the post-communist world. In: Mandelbaum, Michael (Eds). *Post-Communism: Four Perspectives*. Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York, 168–98.

Ganev, Venelin (2001). Bulgaria: the (ir)relevance of post-communist constitutionalism. In: Jan Zielonka (Eds). *Democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe, vol I*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Goldstein, Judith and Robert Keohane (1996). *Ideas and foreign policy, Beliefs, institutions and political change*. Cornell University Press.

Gurov, Boris and Emilia Zankina (2013). Populism and the Construction of Political Charisma, Post-Transition Politics in Bulgaria, *Problems of Post Communism* **60 (1)**, 3-17.

Lechner, Norbert (2004). On the imaginary of the citizenry. In: O'Donnell, Guillermo, Cullell, Jorge, and Iazzetta, Osvaldo (Eds).

The quality of democracy. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 203-210.

Ledeneva, Alena (2006). *How Russia really works.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Levi-Strauss, Claude (1955). The structural study of myth. *Journal of American Folklore* **68**: 428-44.

Levi-Strauss, Claude (1978). *Myth and Meaning.* University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

Levitt, Barry, and Tatiana Kostadinova (2014). Personalist Parties in the Third Wave of Democratization: A Comparative Analysis of Peru and Bulgaria, *Politics & Policy* **42 (4)**, 513–547.

Mateev, Geogi (2000). *Jivot mejdu dve sistemi.* GoreksPress, Sofia.

Munz, Peter (1956). History and Myth. *Philosophical Quarterly* **6 (22)**, 1-16.

Novinite, (2009). *Financial Times: Bulgaria Populists Overtake Ruling Socialists.* Accessed on 25.10.2015, Accessed at: <http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=104513>

Peeva, Ralitsa (2001). Electing a Czar: The 2001 Elections and Bulgarian Democracy. *E. Eur. Const. Rev.* **10**, 51-61.

Petkov, Krastiu (2005). *Zavrashtaneto na monarcha, Vazhod and padenie na carizma.* IK Christo Botev, Sofia.

Ryabchuk, Anastasiya (2007). Nostalgia and Solidarity, Social Suffering in post-communist societies. In: Fischer, Sabine, Pleines, Heiko, and Schroder, Hans-Henning, (Eds). *Movements, migrants, marginalization.* Ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, 213-221.

Sakwa, Richard (2004). *Putin: Russia's Choice.* Routledge, London and New York.

Saxe Coburg Gotha, Simeon (2001). Obrashtenieto na Simeon Saxe Coburg Gotha. 06.04.2006, accessed on 25.10.2015, accessed at: http://cao.bg/обръщението-на-симеон-сакскобургготс/

Saxe Coburg Gotha, Simeon (2014). *Simeon II, Edna neobiknovena sadba, Autobiography.* Ciela, Sofia.

Shcherbinina, N. G. (2011). *Mifo-Geroicheskoe Konstruirovanie Politicheskoi Real'nosti Rossii.* ROSSPEN, Moscow.

Sorel, Georges (1950). *Reflections on Violence.* Free Press, Glencoe, IL.

Szakolczai, Arpad (2009). Liminality and Experience: Structuring transitory situations and transformative events, *International Political Anthropology* **2 (1)**, 141-172.

Todorov, Antony (2007). The Evolution of the Post-Communist Party System. In: Getova M. and Uste A. N. (Eds). *The Impact of European Union: Case of Bulgaria, Case of Turkey*. New Bulgarian University Press, Dokuz Eylül University, Sofia, 115-131.

Tudor, H. (1972). *Political myth*. Pall Mall, London.

Wydra, Harald (2000). *Continuities in Poland's permanent transition*. St. Martin's Press, New York.

Wydra, Harald (2006). *Communism and the emergence of democracy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Wöll, Alexander and ***Wydra,*** Harald (Eds.) (2008). *Democracy and Myth in Russia and Eastern Europe*. Routledge, London.

Vassilev Rossen (2003). Will Bulgaria Become Monarchy Again? *Southeast European Politics* **IV (2-3)**, 157-174.

Vassilev Rossen (2010). Why Was the Monarchy Not Restored in Post-Communist Bulgaria? *East European Politics & Societies* **24**, 503-519.

Chapter 5

Title   **The Impact of the EU Membership on the Situation of Hungarian Minorities living in Neighbouring Countries: The Example of Slovakia**

Author   **Balázs Brucker**

University of Pécs, Political Science Doctoral Program

The Impact of the EU Membership on the Situation of Hungarian Minorities living in Neighbouring Countries: The Example of Slovakia

Balázs Brucker

In Europe, especially since the end of World War I, minority questions have always determinated interstate relations within Europe and have therefore played a determinant role in the democratic stability of the continent. The completion of the enlargement to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) in 2004 and 2007 surfaced, however, not only challenges for the stability of the continent but also policy challenges for the EU. One of the most important security-related challenges with regard to Central and Eastern European enlargement was the protection of national and ethnic minorities living in this region, since minority questions have always determined interstate relations among Central and Eastern European states and have therefore been regarded as a possible threat for the political stability and the democratic consolidation of the continent.

In this region one of the most affected states by minority issues is Hungary since, as result of the Treaty of Trianon, this country lost 72% of its territory and one third of the ethnic Hungarian population was forced under foreign rule.

The aim of my study is to analyse how the enlargement (and the accession negotiations) of the European Union have changed the approach of the EU towards national minorities in Europe and, especially, in CEECs, and how this new "EU

minority policy"[1] influenced the situation of Hungarian ethnic minorities living in neighbouring countries. In my study I will take the example of the Slovak Republic to illustrate the "EU minority policy" towards CEECs countries.

The first chapter of my study will give the definition of the controversial term "minorities", while the second will present the framework of the European minority protection system before and after 1990, with particular regard to the role of the regime change in the mutation of the "EU minority policy". The third chapter, after a short introduction about the situation of aspirations of Hungarian ethnic minorities living in neighbouring countries, will analyse the impact of the EU membership of Hungary on the Hungarian minorities living in Slovakia.

Theoretical framework: the problem of the definition of minorities

The concept of "national minority" entered the discourse of the European institutions after the collapse of the communist regime in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). However, 25 years after the fall of the communism the term of "national minority" is still ambiguously defined in the scientific literature as well as in the political debate. Hence, even today there is no general definition agreed upon by the European states and the main European organisations active in the field of minority protection. The absence of a definition arises partly from two sources. Firstly, the attitude of European states towards minority is very different: there are several states (Finland, Hungary etc.) which provide a wide range of rights for national minorities, while some other states, especially France and Greece, refuse to acknowledge the existence of the minorities in its territory; secondly, the definition of "minority" is a highly sensitive issue since the inclusion or the exclusion of specific groups

---

1 In my study, I use the expression "EU minority policy" in quotations since the EU have no adequate minority policy, but mainly deals with minority issues in the framework of its Justice and Home Affairs policy, cultural policy and foreign policy (for the third countries' minority issues).

from the definition is a crucial point, as it clearly delimits the addressees of a specific policy or legal instruments, and it can determine the attitude and the policy of a state towards a specific minority group. These factors make particularly difficult to find a generally accepted definition for "national minorities", even if since the First World War, several attempts have been made.

The result of one of these attempts was the definition offered in 1977 by the Italian Professor of International Law and Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capotorti. The definition of Capotorti *"has emerged as the most widely cited by the international lawyers and policymakers"* (Abebe, 2014: 22.). This definition is also accepted and commonly used by the Council of Europe and the European Union. According to this definition of Capotorti, a minority is "*a group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State and in a non-dominant position, whose members posses ethnics, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the population and who, if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religions or language*".

Not only the ONU, but European organisations have also tried to define the concept of "national minorities". According to one of the definition commonly used by the Council of Europe, for the purposes of the European Convention on Human Rights, the expression "national minority" refers to a group of persons who:

1. *"reside on a territory of that state and are citizens thereof;*
2. *maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with the state;*
3. *display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics;*

4. *are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state or of a region of that state;*
5. *are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion or their language".* (Recommendation 1255 of CoE, 1995)

Further complications arise when one differentiates between national and ethnic minorities. A "national minority" is a group who lives on the territory of one state (host-state), but is simultaneously an ethnic kin of a titular nation of another, often neighbouring state (kin-state) (ex. Hungarians in Romania, Romanians in Hungary, Germans in Denmark, Danes in Germany). The term of "ethnic minority" refers to persons belonging to those ethnic communities which do not make up the majority of the population in any state and do not have a kin-state (ex. Catalans in South-Western Europe, Roma in several European countries) (Wolff, 2002).

In some European states the term "linguistic minority" is also in use referring to minorities. The term of "linguistic minority" refers to people who are a minority in their society to speak a minority language. According to the definition of the *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* "regional or minority languages" are *"i. traditionally used within given territory of a State by nationals of the State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population, and ii. different from the official language(s) of the State".* The definition does not include either dialects of the official language(s) of the state or the languages of migrants.

The term "minorities" as used in my study refers to national (and linguistic) minorities, namely Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries, and hence does not include, for example, immigrant, Roma or gender and sexual minorities.

The minority policy of the European Union The European Union is the home of almost 500 million people. About 45 millions of them (9%) belong to one of the many national minorities. The rights granted to these minorities differ from one state to another. The Member States have not even found a common position with regard to the recognition of the existence of national minorities either.

In fact, it is not possible to speak about a special EU minority protection system. The main reason of this fact is that minority-related questions are considered by the Member States as internal affairs and for that reason they would not accept the interference of the European Union in such questions. Although the "old" Member States had to face minority-related issues (ex. Corsican, Basque, Alsatian, Breton ethnic minorities in France, the Catalan question in Spain, the autonomy of Scotland in the United Kingdom etc.), until the beginning of the enlargement process in the Central and Eastern European region, the European Community – on the basis of the subsidiarity principle – avoided the treatment of minority questions (Csáky, 2009: 277-278). It was only gradually developed as the European Union has become active in this field. Hence, the "minority policy" of the European Community (from 1st November 1993: European Union) can be divided in two distinct periods: the first period until 1989 and the second period from 1989, the regime change in the Central and Eastern European Countries and the perspective of the accession of the CEECs to the European Community.

The "minority policy" of the European Community: the minority questions considered as the internal affairs of the Member States (1958-1989)

In this first period the European Community avoided the treatment of all minority-related issues. This is probably because of the failure of the different projects aimed at the creation of a political union (especially the Fouchet Plan in 1961), and also because of the political approach taken by the French President Charles De Gaulle who boycotted participation in Community institutions for a period of half a year with his "empty chair" policy, because he did not agree with the proposal related to the introduction of the new decision-making system based on voting by majority. After these two regrettable events the Community tried to avoid all the politically sensitive questions. However, the question of the protection of minorities was and is still this kind of issue mainly for France which would not acknowledge the existence of national minorities in the Constitution.

Despite the fact that the European Community tried to avoid the treatment of minority-related questions, one of its institutions, the European Parliament have expressed a clear interest toward minority issues. It was the first (and the most active) EU institution which faced initiatives in the field of minority rights. This interest of the EP appears to be twofold: on the one hand, the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage improves the democratic legitimacy of this institution; on the other hand, the federal commitment of the EP tends to find a solution to problems that the Member States are not able to deal with.

In 1981, the European Parliament was the first institution of the European Communities to recognize the importance of minority-related issues. In this framework, the European Parliament adopted a resolution about minorities. Subsequently, until the enlargement of the EU in 2004, this institution had addressed issues on questions related to ethnic groups – mainly touching upon minority languages (Vizi, 2013: 24-31).

Among all the European institutions the European Parliament is the organ which has shown the most intensive interest in minority issues. It was the first EU institution which faced initiatives in the field of minority rights[2].

The "minority policy" of the European Community/ European Union after 1989: emerging "minority policy" at EU level

With the regime change in the Central and Eastern European Countries and with the expansion of the European Community from an economic entity to a large political union in the 90's, the minority issues have become more and more unavoidable. In this field, the biggest change came with the enlargement of the Community across Central and Eastern Europe.

However, at the beginning of the 1990s, the European Community made use exclusively of the minority protection system of other European organizations, first of all the human right framework of the Council of Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, Organization since 1994 – OSCE). Within the framework of these organizations important documents were born. In order to illustrate this, it is enough to mention the Copenhagen Document of the CSCE of 1990, and especially the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995). The aim of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages is to protect and promote historical regional and minority languages in Europe. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is the most comprehensive multilateral official document devoted to national minority rights in Europe. The EU has also used

---

[2] A range of resolutions dealing with ethnic and linguistic minorities have been approved by the European Parliament: Resolution on a "Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures" (1981), "Resolution on Measures in favour of Linguistic and Cultural Minorities" (1983), "Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of the Regional and Ethnic Groups I the European Community" (1987), "Resolution on Linguistic Minorities in the European Community" (1994).

its political power in order to ensure that Central and Eastern European candidate countries and "old" Member States ratify the abovementioned documents of the EU. However, several countries have not yet signed or ratified those treaties (Vizi, 2013: 20).

The treatment of human rights, and especially minority protection, became inevitable by the 1990s within the European Union as well.

The Copenhagen criteria (1993), which defined the membership conditions for Central and Eastern European candidate countries (CEECs), beyond the political criteria of the existence of democratic institutions, constitutionality and the protection of human rights, have also included the *"respect for and the protection of minorities"* (Copenhagen criteria, 1993). This provision in practice meant that candidate countries were required to prove the respect for and the protection of minorities; thus the teaching of minority languages, the use of minority languages in the public sector, in court and in other official procedures was officially granted. Consequently, almost in theory, the protection of minorities is one of the fundamental conditions without which the accession cannot be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, as practice has revealed, it is not the question of minorities which is the most important criteria of the accession for the European institutions. In other words, if a candidate country met the rest of the political and economical conditions, the criterion of the protection of minorities is not judged so strictly. The European Union takes mainly into consideration to what extent minority issues endanger the political stability of Europe (Vizi, 2002).

Since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty (1993), every EU citizen has had the right to submit a petition to the European Parliament, in a form of request or a complaint, on an issue that falls within the EU's field of activity. It means, that the EU membership allows EU citizens to submit

petitions concerning the non-respect of their fundamental rights, minority-related questions included also (Petitions: 2015). The entry into force of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights as part of the Lisbon Treaty, by rising the protection of minorities at EU level, has broaden the framework of the protection of minority rights in the EU and has facilitated the use of the petitions in case of minority issues.

However, with the progress of the European integration and with the perspective of the accession of CEECs, minority issues became more and more important on the EU level. The most notable document of the EU, containing not only the fundamental rights but a reference to national minorities is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, solemnly proclaimed on 7 December 2000. Although no separate article concerning minorities was included in this document, Article 21 (1) of the abovementioned document explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of membership of a national minority[3]. In the same way, Article 22 declares that *"the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity."*

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) was inaugurated on 1 March 2007. The Vienna-based agency is an EU body which is responsible for collecting and analysing data on fundamental rights. This agency is also responsible for monitoring experiences concerning national minorities. However, the FRA is not a minority protection institution. It deals with a number of issues related to fundamental rights. The FRA does not have the mandate to investigate any individual complains and the conclusions of the FRA are not bindings (Vizi, 2013: 43-44).

In the context of the enlargement in 2004 and 2007 and taking also into account the future enlargement into the Bal-

---

[3] *"Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited."*

kans, the Treaty of Lisbon, entered into force on 1 December 2009, includes also the matter of the protection of minorities. This treaty is the first document in EU primary law to explicitly mention persons belonging to minorities. Article 2 of the Treaty states that "*the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.*" However, article 2 is of very general nature and speaks about minorities without any specification: it does not add "national", "ethnic", "linguistic", "religious" or "sexual" as qualifications. Therefore, the Treaty of Lisbon continues to avoid, as any other official documents of the EU, the definition of minorities. This general term is flexible and open for interpretation of the different Member States having different approach toward national minorities (Barten, 2011: 7.). The Treaty of Lisbon, by raising the matter of the protection of minorities in the official treaty of the European Union, put an end to double standards existing for more than one and a half decade. (Treaty of Lisbon 2007)

The impact of the EU membership of Hungary on Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries

In the Central and Eastern European region one of the most affected states by minority issues is Hungary. The existence of more than three million Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin is the consequence of history. These Hungarian minorities are not immigrants; their ancestors lived in the Kingdom of Hungary for over a thousand years. They were detached from Hungary by the Peace Treaty of Trianon, signed in 1920.

The Treaty of Trianon closing World War I regulated the status of the independent Hungarian state and defined its borders. The victorious allies of World War I imposed to punish Hungary and the Axis powers for their participation in the war. As result of this treaty, the post-war Hungary lost 72% of its former territory (325,411 to 92,916 km^2) and half of its population (20,880,487 to 8,522,230 people). The former Hungarian land was redistributed to Romania, Czechoslo-

vakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom and Austria. Nearly 33% of the ethnic Hungarian population was also attached to neighbouring countries.

During World War II Hungary regained some of its lost territories. These new borders reflected more accurately the geographical distribution of various ethnic groups in the region.

Nevertheless, after the end of World War II, the Treaty of Paris reimposed the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon upon Hungary. Hungary lost the territories it had regained during World War II.

As a result of the peace system in 1920 and 1947, a significant part of the Hungarian population was attached to Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Austria.

At present, because of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Hungarian minorities live in the territory of Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria (Győri Szabó, 2006: 83-88).

The Hungarians living in the territories detached from Hungary have been and are still subjected to discrimination due to the anti-discrimination policy applied especially by Slovakia, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine, where the right of national minorities to preserve their national identities, such as the education of minority languages and their use in the public sphere, is not or is only partially respected.

After 1990, the democratically elected Hungarian governments try to found a solution in order to ensure the future of Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries not by changing the present borders but by protecting and improving the minority rights of these Hungarian communities.

The enlargement process of the European Union with the Central and Eastern European Countries offered a new opportunity to Hungary to improve the situation of Hungar-

ian minorities living in Slovakia and in Romania and to the Hungarian minorities of the two abovementioned countries to use the fora of the European institutions in order to represent their interest in minority-related issues.

Hungarian minority in Slovakia The Hungarians of Slovakia became a minority in 1918 with the constitution of Czechoslovakia. Of the territory of Hungary 61,633 km^2 were attached to Czechoslovakia. The number of the ethnic Hungarians attached to Czechoslovakia was 884,000 people. The government of Czechoslovakia totally ignored its obligations assumed under the Treaty of Trianon in the field of the protection of national minorities. (multunk.hu) Following World War II, Czechoslovakia totally deprived the Hungarian population from their civic right. In 1947, under the so-called re-Slovakisation decree 327,000 Hungarians living in Slovakia were obliged to renounce their Hungarian nationality. New policies of assimilation included the progressive Slovakisation of the education system, the elimination of Hungarian place names from signs and the Slovakisation of Hungarian names, and also the ban of using Hungarian in public and in workplaces. However, Hungarians had a limited opportunity to progress their cultural life since Hungarian theatres, press and book publishing continues to flourish during this period. (Mar, 2006)

After the Velvet Revolution, nationalist sentiment surged in Slovakia. The Slovak nationalism, especially during the ultra-nationalist and strongly anti-Hungarian Vladimír Mečiar, resulted in a number of laws restricting the use of Hungarian language. The language law of 1995 imposed penalty for using minority languages in official communication without exception, regardless of the percentage of the minority group in the region. In 1995, Slovakia and Hungary signed a bilateral friendship treaty making special references to minority rights. In this treaty the contracting parties declared that they should respect the inviolability of their

common state border and each other's territorial integrity. They confirmed that they do not have territorial claim. This treaty declared that the parties feel responsibility for granting protection to minorities and to promote the preservation and the deepening of their national, ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identities. (Bilateral treaties, 1996)

In 1997, the traditional bilingual graduation certificates were replaced by Slovak certificates.

Since 1998, the replacement of Vladimir Mečiar the relations between Slovakia and Hungary, and also between the Slovak government and the Hungarian community, have strongly improved. In the period of 1998-2006, the Hungarian ethnic party named "Party of the Hungarian Coalition" was represented in the Slovak central government and consequently Hungarians did not face political discrimination. Pál Csáky, who belongs to the Hungarian Community Party, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, National Minorities and Regional Development. In 2001 Slovakia joined the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. Thanks to the lobbying activity of the Party of the Hungarian Coalition, the Slovak parliament adopted the law on the foundation of a Hungarian speaking university in Komárno. The creation of this university was a symbol of the Hungarian cultural self-determination. (Győri Szabó, 2006: 352-358)

In the 2007 election, a new government, led by the Smer-Social Democratic Party in coalition with the People's Party Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the extremely nationalist and anti-Hungarian Slovak National Party, was formed. The minority policy applied by the new government deteriorated seriously the situation of the Hungarian community. In 2009 the Slovak parliament adopted the Slovak language law, mandating preferential use of the state language, the Slovak. The use of non-state languages, Hungarian included, in public institutions (local government, police etc.) could carry a financial penalty.

Regarding the current situation of the Hungarian community, Hungarian education is and has been in poor situation state ever since World War II. The Hungarian primary and secondary schools are poorly funded, and 20% of the Hungarian speaking children are attending Slovakian-language schools. However, in this field the foundation of the Hungarian university is a really positive progress.

The accession negotiations of Slovakia Joining the European Union belonged to the priorities of the Slovak foreign policy since the establishment of the Slovak Republic as an independent state in 1993. Relations between the Slovak Republic and the European Union are based on the European Association Agreement, signed in 1993. Vladimír Mečiar, the Prime Minister of Slovakia submitted the application of the Slovak Republic into the EU on 27 June 1996 at the European Council of Cannes. (Joining the EU, 2015)

Accession negotiations started with the Slovak Republic on 13 October 1999, one and a half year after the beginning of the negotiations with Hungary and the two other Member States of the Visegrad Four, the Czech Republic and Poland.

The main condition of acquiring EU membership for all candidate countries is the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria. One of the four political criteria concerns the respect for and the protection of minorities.

Both Hungary and the Hungarian community living in Slovakia looked forward to the minority criterion in order to improve the situation of national and ethnic minorities living in Slovakia. The European Commission played a crucial role in the interpretation of the Copenhagen criteria. In the framework of yearly country reports, the European Commission evaluated the strengths, the weaknesses and the eventual progress of Slovakia in the field of minority protection.

The real enlargement started in 1997 with the conclusion of the Preliminary Country Report.

In its opinion on Slovakia's application for EU membership, the European Commission concluded that "*improvement is also required in the treatment of the Hungarian minority, which still does not benefit from the general law on the use of minority languages which the Slovak authorities have undertaken to introduce and for which there is provision in the Constitution*" (European Commission, Agenda 2000, 1997).

Between 1998 and 2002, the Commission issued every year a country report about candidate countries.

The Country Report in 1998 concerning the premiership period of Vladimír Mečiar was particularly critical on the situation of national minorities. The document noted that "*there [had] been no progress on the adoption of minority language legislation and no significant change in the protection of minorities*" (Regular report, 1998: 12). The Country Report emphasized that in spite of the criticism of the EU and the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, no significant progress had been made in the field of the law regulating the use of minority languages. The document pointed out also that concerning the Slovak-language certificates significant progress had been made since, from 1998, bilingual certificates could be issued if requested by parents. However, the bilingual documents have no official validity and will have to be paid for. The document emphasized that "*the inclusion of representatives of the Hungarian minority in the new Slovak government would give a positive signal to the Hungarian minority regarding their status in Slovakia*" (Regular report, 1998: 12-13).

The Country Report in 1999 pointed out that Slovak authorities made notable advancement in the area of minority protection. According to the European Commission, one of the most important progresses in this field was the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, National Minorities and Regional Development belonging to the Hungarian Coalition Party. However, this appointment and the

coalition with the Hungarian Coalition Party was mainly the consequence of the incapacity of the Slovak Democratic Coalition to form a government without a coalition with other parties, the Hungarian Coalition Party included. The documents emphasised also that the Law on Use of Minority Languages in Official Communications provided that persons belonging to minorities were able to use their language in official communications with public administrative organs (Regular report, 1999: 16-17).

The Country Report in 2000 emphasized that in many areas national minorities did not take use of their rights granted under the law due to lack of information. Concerning the situation of Hungarian minorities, the Country Report pointed out the implementation of the basic treaty with Hungary. The document noted that considerable progress had been made in introducing the appropriate legislation, but only limited progress was observed in implementation. However, apart from these references to national minorities (4 paragraphs), the document deals mainly with the Roma ethnic minority (9 paragraphs). This fact perfectly illustrates the way of an EU institution approaching the question of minorities: the European Commission brings the less sensitive Roma questions to the fore and tries to ignore the more controversial national minority-related issues (Regular report, 2000: 20-22).

The Country Report in 2001 noted that the Slovak government had made substantial further efforts concerning national minorities. According to the Commission, one of the most important legal progresses was the ratification of the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages. The European Commission emphasized that the "*Hungarian minority [would] benefit from the most generous provisions*" (Regular report, 2001:22-24).

The last Country Report of the European Commission in 2002 concluded that the minorities living in Slovakia have

continued to "*be comparatively well integrated in Slovak society, with the exception of Roma minority*" (Regular report, 2002: 30). The Commission welcomed the opening of the faculty for Hungarian teachers at the University in Nitra. The document quoted also the position of another European (but not EU) organisation, the Council of Europe, without any criticism. According the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, "*Slovakia had made valuable efforts to support national minorities and their cultures, and improvements had been achieved in recent years in inter-community relations in particular between the Hungarian minority and other parts of the population of Slovakia*" (Regular report, 2002: 32). The quotation of the report of the Council of Europe is another characteristic of the EU minority policy: in minority questions the EU institutions tend to refer to reports of other international/European institutions rather than sending real fact-finding missions to the candidate countries (Regular report, 2002: 30-32).

As we can see, the Commission's regular reports focused especially on the situation of Roma ethnic minority and tried to avoid the national minority-related issues, which can violate national interests.

Based on the Country Report on Slovakia from 1998 until 2002, we can observe some improvement in the field of the rights of Hungarian minorities. Despite the fact that the EU accession was only one of the external and internal factors shaping the minority policy of Slovakia, it is also evident that the impact of the EU accession was doubtless. This is not because of the regular monitoring of the minority situation by the European Commission, which was not really efficient, but mainly because of the economic and political attractiveness of the EU membership. This is so even if domestic political changes and social needs played a decisive role in the improvement of the minority policy of Slovakia.

However, the biggest problem is that after the accession of Slovakia and other CEECs, the European Commission stopped the monitoring of the minority rights in the new Member State(s).

Slovakia as a Member State of the European Union (case studies) The framework of a short study does not allow analyzing all the questions related to the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia. Therefore, this study will focus only on two of the most important questions. In this chapter, we will analyze the case of the Beneš decrees and that of the Language Law of Slovakia from the accession process until 2014.

The Beneš decrees The first most important question concerning minorities living in Slovakia on the agenda of the European Union was the issue related to the Beneš decrees.

The "Beneš decrees" refer to the decrees of the president and the ordinances of the Slovak National Council dealing with the status of ethic Hungarians and Germans in postwar Czechoslovakia. These decrees imposed collective guilt on the Hungarian and German population of Czechoslovakia and legitimised the removal of their Czechoslovak citizenship, rights and properties after 1945 without compensation.

The question of the Beneš decrees was a recurring theme not only during the accession negotiations but also after the enlargement.

Right-wing parties in Austria, Germany and Hungary – including the then Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – asserted that Slovakia, and also the Czech Republic, should be forced to repeal the decrees in order to obtain EU membership. The campaign of Hungary (and Austria and Germany) was conducted under the EU umbrella.

The question of the Beneš decrees was also discussed by the EU institutions in the framework of the accession negotiations. For the first time, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen debated this topic with the

Czech Prime Minister, Milos Zeman. According to Verheugen, *"the EU Treaty requires Member States and EU institutions to judge applicant States on their present, not on their past performance. Any part of a candidate country's legal order that is still capable of producing legal effects cannot escape the scrutiny of EU/EC law"* (Joint press statement, 2002). The Commission held that the Beneš decrees were not an obstacle to Slovak and Czech accession, although European Parliament views were more ambivalent. This question was debated by the EP at the request of Sudeten German MEPs in the framework of the parliamentary debate concerning the accession of the Czech Republic. However, the case of the Beneš decrees in Slovakia was not substantially debated in the European Parliament. The main reason for this was that the people concerned (ex. Hungarians in Slovakia) was not politically represented in the EP.

Three years after the accession, on 20 September 2007, the Slovak parliament adopted a legal resolution stating that these post-war legal documents relating to conditions in Slovakia after World War II were an unalienable part of the country's law. The resolution commemorated the victims of World War II, expressed the desire to stop the reopening of questions related to World War II in the context of the EU accession, declared the importance of a good relationship with neighbouring countries, and refused the revision of post-war laws, decrees and agreements which could modify the post-war order. The Slovak government declared also that post-war decisions were not the basis of minority dis-crimination and could not establish legal relationship. This resolution was adopted by the coalition government and the opposition, except for the Party of the Hungarian Coalition.

The Hungarian government, the Hungarian MEPs and Slovak MEPs of Hungarian ethnicity reacted immediately to the resolution of the Slovak parliament.

Even before its adoption, on 11 September 2007, the five Hungarian parties represented in the European Parliament (Fidesz-MPSZ, MSZP, SZDSZ, MDF, KDNP) issued a common declaration even before the adoption of the resolution by the Slovak parliament to protest against the draft legal resolution concerning the Beneš decrees. Furthermore, the Party of European Socialists in the European Parliament created the Slovakia Working Group which was responsible for the examination of the legal and political impact of the decrees. This working group also sent a fact-finding delegation to Bratislava (Csáky, 2009: 130).

On 24 September 2007, in the framework of one-minute speeches[4] at the European Parliament, the Hungarian MEP István Szent-Iványi (ALDE) characterized the Slovak Republic resolution as shameful, declaring, "*this was a shameful thing even at the time, but it is especially shameful that in the 21st century, 60 years after the events took place, a Member State of the European Union should have tabled this motion and reaffirmed it.*" Martin Ferber (EPP-ED) and Martin Schulz (PES), MEPs of Germany, the other country affected by the Beneš decrees, also criticized the act of Slovak parliament (One-minute speeches, 2007).

Kinga Gál, Hungarian MEP of the European People's Party and European Democrats, in her speech at the plenary session of the European Parliament, called the European Union to condemn the Beneš decrees, which contrasts with the fundamental values of the European Union.

Furthermore, not only the Hungarian but also the German MEPs proposed to the EP to debate the case of the Beneš decrees. This proposal was supported by two Hungarian MEPs of Slovakia, Árpád Duka-Zólyomi and Edit Bauer. However,

---

4   For a period not more than 30 minutes during the first sitting of each part-session, MEPs may speak for maximum one minute on a matter of political importance they wish to draw European Parliament's attention to.

Slovakia qualified the question of the Beneš decrees as an internal affair and refused the initiative (Csáky, 2009: 131).

In November, the question was also debated in the framework of the Committee of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Two Hungarian MEPs, Kinga Gál (EPP-ED) and Magda Kósáné Kovács (PES) drove the attention to the worsening situation of minorities in Slovakia and emphasized that the "ancestor" of the European Union, the European Coal and Steel Community was created in order to put an end to hostilities between France and the FRG securing lasting peace. The ethnic Hungarian Slovak MEP, Edit Bauer (EPP-ED) criticized the growing anti-Hungarian stance in Slovakia; however, from the Slovak side, Monika Benová (PES) judged the minority policy of the Hungarian government (Csáky, 2009: 131).

In this case, the cooperation between Hungarian MEPs of different factions was exemplary, and shows that in a matter of national importance the highly fragmented Hungarian politicians can go beyond differences.

During the 2009-2014 legislature period the MEPs of the European People's Party and the Party of European Socialists also joined force to keep the issue on the agenda of the EP (Politics.hu, 2012).

However, the Beneš decrees, despite EP debates, are still in force. This fact shows clearly that the European Parliament, in spite of the continuous expansion of its power, is not able to put pressure on national governments, while the European Commission tries to avoid political sensitive matters, such as national minority-related questions after the accession.

In 2012, Imre Juhász, Professor at the university ELTE submitted a petition to the European Parliament. In this document Juhász protested against the validity of the decrees in Slovakia. The petition was forwarded to the Committee of Legal Affairs (JURI). There is no still decision on the matter,

and the Committee can only adopt non-binding recommendations for the Slovak government (Hirek.sk, 2014).

The Language Law of Slovakia One of the most spectacular examples of how a law is modified under the pressure of the EU accession (followed by the Commission's monitoring system) and after the accession (without the monitoring of the Commission), is the Language Law of Slovakia.

According to the first law about language use, adopted after the regime change, in communities having at least 20% minority population, the minority language can be used in the public sphere. In 1995 the government of Vladimír Mečiar created a law in order to protect the Slovak language. The law made the use of Slovak language compulsory in public communication, regardless of the percentage of the minorities in the area. This law contained the possibility of punishment for not using state language in the official communication. In 1999, after a change of government and under the pressure of EU accession, the Slovak parliament had to accept a law on minority languages use which allows the use of minority languages in official communication in areas with at least 20% minority. (origo.hu, 1999) It was the precondition for starting accession negotiations (Orosz, 2009).

In June 2009 the Slovak parliament adopted a language law mandating the preferential use of Slovak language in official communication. Use of other languages, minority languages included, could carry a financial penalty between EUR 100-5000. Under this law, minority-language schools are obliged to run their administration and documentation in Slovak and the same applies for health services. The armed forces, the police and the fire services should be monolingual Slovak, even in Hungarian-speaking areas. Public inscriptions should also be in Slovak language, even if these may also be accompanied by the translation in other languages (origo.hu, 2009).

The controversy about the law is one of the key points in Hungarian-Slovakian relations. The language law provoked criticism not only from the Hungarian government but also from the international community including the EU institutions.

In July 2009 Jerzy Buzek said that this issue was not only an affair between Slovakia and the European Union, but also "*an issue of the whole the European Union because it harms the spirit of the European integration and the principles of democracy*" (EBLUL, 2009).

Michael Gahler, MEP and Vice-Chairman of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee also criticized the Slovak law on language use stating that Slovakia is violating "*commonly respected standards in the EU and is disregarding the recommendations of the Council of Europe which foresee the extended use of minority languages*" (euractiv.com, 2009).

On 17 and 19 November 2009, the president of the European Parliament, Jerzy Buzek visited Bratislava to participate in the 20th anniversary celebrations of the Velvet Revolution in Slovakia. At his meetings Buzek asked the Slovakian government to coordinate with the representatives of the Hungarian minorities on the implementation of the language law (Fidesz.eu, 2009).

Moreover, on 24 November 2009 MEPs debated the Slovak language law in a plenary session of the European Parliament, in the framework of agenda item "Use of minority languages within the framework of the European cultural heritage". This debate permitted the ethnic Hungarian MEP of Slovakia, Edit Bauer to criticise the situation. However, Leonard Orban, the European Commissioner for Multilingualism, who was present during the plenary debate, emphasized that the European Union had very limited powers to support all the languages used in the European Union (europarl.europa/Debates, 2009).

Although in 2010, in response to international – especially EU – pressure, Slovakia diminished the ceiling of the

punishment from EUR 5000 to EUR 2500, the possibility of a sanction in case of using other languages than Slovak in the official communication is still in force.

Conclusion After the fall of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe, the former satellites of the Soviet Union, all of them affected by minority-related problems, chose to join the European Union. The aim of my study was to analyze how EU enlargement into CEECs influenced the situation of the Hungarian minority living in neighbouring countries.

Based on the example of Slovakia, we can conclude that before the start of accession negotiations and during the accession process candidate countries tried to meet the EU expectations about the protection of minorities. In the country reports of the European Commission we can discover a lot of inconsistencies: in several cases a country report raises a problem, and the following year's country report forgets this issue completely, or considers the problem still existing solved without mentioning the solutions implemented. This approach of the Commission does not increase the credibility of EU institutions in minority questions. In addition, the country reports focused especially on the situation of the Roma ethnic minority and tried to avoid the more controversial and more sensitive national minority-related issues. After the enlargement, the European Parliament is the single EU institution that continues to try to focus on minority-related issues.

We can conclude that the enlargement of the EU into CEECs has partially influenced the situation of the Hungarian minority in neighbouring countries. During the enlargement process, EU institutions could influence the minority-related legislation of candidate countries in a more efficient way, while after the enlargement the Commission tends to neglect the minority issues of "new" Member States.

This means that the "minority policy" of the EU, in its present form, is not able to guarantee the respect of minority rights in the EU. When preparing the integration of the Western Balkans, another region highly affected by minority-related problems, the EU should elaborate a more consistent and credible minority policy or should implement the minority standards of other European or international institutions (e.g. the Council of Europe) more effectively. It would also be highly desirable to create, following the recommendation of FUEN[5] in 2009 (FUEN, 2009) and the proposal of the Party of European Socialists in 2014 (stop.hu, 2014), the position of an EU commissioner responsible for minority issues. It would also be necessary to form a special committee in the EP responsible for minority issues at EP level.

EU leaders have to understand that the respect of minority rights is one of the key elements of the stability of Europe.

References Abélès, Marc (1992): *La vie quotidienne au Parlement européenne*. Hachette, Paris.

Abebe, Semhagn, Gashu (2014): *The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation. Ethnicity, Ideology and Democracy in Ethiopia*, Ashgate, Surrey

Dutoit, Laurent (2001): *Les intergroupes au Parlement européen*, Eryopa, Genève

Fricz Tamás–Orosz Tímea (eds.) (2011): *Küzdelmes integráció. Az Európai Parlament és Magyarország.* L'Harmattan, Budapest.

Gál Kinga–Hicks, Davyth–Eplényi Kata (eds.) (2011): *Traditional Minorities, National Comunities and Languages. The issues raised in the European Parliament's Intergroup*. 2009 –2011, Brussels–Budapest.

Győri Szabó Róbert (2006): *Kisebbség, autonómia, regionalizmus*. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest.

---

[5] Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN): an umbrella organization representing the civil society of the autochthones, national minorities, and regional and minority languages in Europe. It was established in 1949 in conjunction with the formation of the Council of Europe. It is based in Flensburg (Germany).

Horváth Zoltán (2011): *Handbook on the European Union*, HVGOrac, Budapest.

Horváth Zoltán–Tar Gábor (2006): *Az Európai Parlament az európai demokráciában*. Országgyűlés Hivatala, Budapest.

Navracsics Tibor (1998): *Európai belpolitika*, Korona Kiadó, Budapest.

Tabajdi Csaba (ed.) (2009): *Pro minoritate Europae. Az európai kisebbségekért. Az Európai Parlamentben működő Nemzeti Kisebbségi Intergroup tanulmánykötete*. EU-Ground Kft., Pilisszentkereszt.

Tuka Ágnes (2004): *Európai Parlament. A meg-megújuló intézmény*. Dialóg–Campus, Pécs–Budapest.

Vizi Balázs (2013): *Európai kaleidoszkóp. Az Európai Unió és a kisebbségek*. L'Harmattan, Budapest.

Internet Barten, Ulrike (2011): The Lisbon Treaty evaluated: Impact and Consequences: http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1102/barten.pdf (last download: 2 October, 2015).

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf (last download: 2 October, 2015).

Copenhagen Criteria (2013): http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/enlargement/criteria/index_en.htm (last download: 18 September, 2015).

Csáky A. Zselyke (2009): Egy hajóban evezünk? Európai Parlamenti képviselőink: http://www.mtaki.hu/data/files/93.pdf (last download: 19 September, 2015).

EBLUL (2009): Opposition mounts to Slovakia's language law: http://eblul.eurolang.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=225&Itemid=37 (last download: 30 September, 2015).

Euractiv.com (2009): German MEP slams Slovak language law: http://www.euractiv.com/culture/german-mep-slams-slovak-language-news-222177 (last download: 2 October, 2015).

European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992): https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168007bf4b (last download: 2 October, 2015).

Europarl.europa/Debates (2009): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20091124+ITEM-016+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last download: 2 October, 2015).

FURN (2009): Foglalkozzon EU-biztos a kisebbségi ügyekkel: http://www.bumm.sk/archivum/2009/11/02/35196_fuen-foglalkozzon-eu-biztos-a-kisebbsegi-ugyekkel (last download: 4 October, 2015).

Hirek.sk: Beneš-dekrétumok - Remélhetőleg ajánlást fogalmaz meg a PETI: http://www.hirek.sk/belfold/20140212191619/Benes-dekretumok-Remelhetoleg-ajanlast-fogalmaz-meg-a-PETI.html (last download: 2 October, 2015).

Hungary's Bilaterai treaties with the Neighbours and the Issue of Minorities: http://www.hungarianhistory.com/lib/jeszenszky/jesz5.pdf (last download: 2 October, 2015).

Joining the EU (2015): http://www.slovak-republic.org/eu/ (last download: 30 September, 2015).

Joint Press Statement on Beneš decree (2002): europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-02-588_en.doc (last download: 30 September, 2015).

Mar (2006): Assessment for Hungarians in Slovakia: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=31701 last download: 30 September, 2015).

Múltunk. Trianoni Békeszerződés: http://www.multunk.x3.hu/html/elozmenyek_html/trianoni%20beke.html (last download: 30 September, 2015).

One-minute speeches, 24 September 2007 (2007): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20070924+ITEM-015+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=HR (last download: 30 September, 2015).

Origo.hu (1999): Szlovákia: ha nincs nyelvtörvény, nincs EU-csatlakozás: http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/19990622szlovakiaha.html (last download: 30 September, 2015).

Origo.hu (2009): Aggósik a Külügy a szlovák nyelvtörvény miatt: http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20090630-szigoritotta-a-nyelvtorvenyt-a-szlovak-parlament.html (last download: 30 September, 2015).

Orosz Andrea (2009): Nyelvtörvény és félelem – Ez nme lehet Európában: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_law_of_Slovakia#cite_note-Gonzalez-7 (last download: 30 September, 2015).

Petitions (2015): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/20150201PVL00037/Petitions (last download: 2 October, 2015).

Politics.hu: Hungarian MEPs pressing on Beneš decrees: http://www.politics.hu/20121029/hungarian-meps-pressing-on-benes-decrees/ (last download, 2 October, 2015).

Recommendation 1255 of the Council of Europe – Protection of rights of national minorities (1955): http://assembly.coe.int/

nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=15289&lang=en (last download: 20 September, 2015).

Regular report from the Commission on Slovakia's progress towards accession (1998): http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/slovakia_en.pdf (last download: 27 September, 2015).

Regular report from the Commission on Slovakia 's progress towards accession (1999): http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/slovakia_en.pdf (last download: 27 September, 2015)

Regular report from the Commission on Slovakia 's progress towards accession (2000): http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/sk_en.pdf (last download: 27 September, 2015).

Regular report from the Commission on Slovakia 's progress towards accession (2001): http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/sk_en.pdf (last download: 27 September, 2015).

Regular report from the Commission on Slovakia 's progress towards accession (2002): http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/sk_en.pdf (last download: 27 September, 2015).

Stop.hu (2014): Kisebbségügyi EU-biztost akarnak: http://www.stop.hu/kulfold/kisebbsegugyi-eu-biztost-akarnak/1230620/# (last download: 4 October, 2015).

Tabajdi Csaba-Korányi Dávid (2005): Az uniós nemzeti érdekérvényesítés három modellje. Másfél éves európai parlamenti érdekérvényesítés tapasztalatai: http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/ZPMDCR/tabajdi_koranyi-unios_nemzeti_erdekervenyesites.pdf (last download: 20 June, 2015).

The European Parliament national minority. Intergroup issues statement on Lisbon Treaty (2010): http://galkinga.hu/news_display/the_european_parliament_national_minority_intergroup_issues_statement_on_lisbon_treaty/ (last download: 20 June, 2015).

Treaty of Lisbon (2007): http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12007L/TXT (last download: 2 October, 2015).

Vizi, Balázs (2002): The European Union and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities: http://www.hhrf.org/kisebbsegkutatas/mr_04/cikk.php?id=1196 (last download: 2 October, 2015).

Wolff, Stefan (2002): Ethnic Minorities in Europe. The Basic Facts: http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/min-eu.pdf (last download: 29 September, 2015).

Chapter 6

Title
**Identity and Inter-ethnic Relations
in the Public Discourse**

Author
Gabriela Cretu

Independent Researcher

Identity and Inter-ethnic Relations in the Public Discourse[1]

Gabriela Cretu

Introduction The aim of this paper is to throw light on the main aspects of the relationship between the image of the Roma minority in Romania, as perceived by the majority of population, and its representation in the public discourse under the influence of racialization. In this regard, the paper is divided into two main parts. The first part inquires the position of the minority in the Romanian society through its longitudinal and transversal dimensions and points out the main conflictual situations between Roma and Romanians. The second part distinguishes the modalities of Roma portrayal in public discourse and the factors that have influenced the trans-ethnic interaction during the last decades.

Spokespersons, the media, as well as the domestic and international institutions (re)shape and strengthen the representation of Roma as an ethnic group. Immediately after 1989, mass media became an active source of stereotypes anti-Roma, the coverage of this minority issues focusing the attention mainly on elements with negative connotation

---

[1] This is a revised version of previous works, namely, the papers presented at the International Conference on Trans-ethnic Coalition-building within and across States (Uppsala University) and, respectively, at the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies Annual Conference (Södertörn University). These papers together with the article included in the journal "Sfera Politicii" ("Roma Minority in Romania and its Media Representation") present results of the research on identity and Roma minority in Romania.

such as violence, crime, illegal activities etc. But are the press and some political leaders indeed responsible for the negative image of Roma group or are they just reinforcing a "mirror image" created by ingroup-outgroup perceptions, an image that already exists in the public consciousness?

Roma representation is considered a cause and, in the same time, a consequence of the identity problem of this population as an ethnic group on one side, and of its social status on the other side. The ethnic identity is, in essence, a past-oriented form of identity, embedded in the cultural heritage of the individual or group. This form of identity contrasts with a sense of belonging linked with citizenship within a political state or present-oriented affiliations to specific groups demanding professional, occupational or class loyalties (De Vos and Ramanucci-Ross, 1982: 363). On the one hand, when discussing ethnic identity, the difference between the ethnicity claimed by the people themselves and that attributed to them by others is an important factor of subjective nature to be taken into account. On the other hand, an objective dimension of Roma image consists in their status as "problem people", due to economic and educational inequalities between them and the other groups (Romanians and Hungarians, in particular). The economic variables, associated with the cultural ones, determine an over-representation of Roma in certain socially prescribed roles, which make them "undesirable", and isolate and place them on the society's periphery (Brown, 1995: 84). These visible and objective indicators may be easily transformed into perceptions and, thus, become stereotypes. Stereotypes are rooted in the web of social relations between groups and "do not derive solely or even mostly from the workings of our cognitive system" (Brown, 1995: 86). The cognitive differentiation effects associated with categorization let space for "illusory correlation" and the exaggeration of descriptive attributes, still further to form stereotypes. Media represent one of the main sources of simplified and

penetrating messages, making characterizations and pointing out those groups that do not fit the dominant social model. Usually stereotypes are already embedded in the audience's assessment system and are easily accepted. They are often combined with prejudice and become a dangerous instrument for conflict outburst. In Milton M. Gordon's analysis on ethnic group relations, the element of stereotyping appears to be rather widespread due to cognitive inadequacies reinforced by affective tendencies and the lack of equal status between groups (Gordon, 1975: 97).

The situation of Roma in Romania

Brief historical evolution

It is difficult to find consensus on when Roma first entered Wallachia and Moldavia (the two Romanian historic provinces). A document dated 1385 and found in Tismana monastery's archives, was actually a receipt for forty families of Gypsy slaves presented as a gift. By the 1500s, the terms "rob" and "tigan" had become synonymous with "slave", although the latter was originally a neutral ethnonym applied by the Europeans to the first Roma. In fact, the issue of Roma slavery is very controversial. Nicolae Gheorghe, Roma sociologist, mentioned that the first Roma who reached the Romanian Principalities were free people. One possible explanation for their later status is that they accepted slavery in order to pay off debts (Centre for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe on Roma of Romania, 2001). Another explanation is that Roma from the Romanian Principalities were slaves from the very beginning, most of them captured on Southern Danube territories by Vlad the Impaler (ruler of Wallachia) in the 15th century (Fonseca, 1995: 174). In this case their position could be an explanation for that the Roma were collectively categorized as a social class: the slave caste without any legal rights. Thus, the terms "gypsy" and "slave" became interchangeable, and once Roma became a social group it was a matter of time before they would become a "social problem".

In the 19th century the condition of Roma as "liberated people" did not represent a real improvement of their situation. They were set free, but they were not given any land. This pushed them to specific occupations that maintained their condition of poverty and discrimination. They developed auxiliary occupations such as metalworking and carpeting. Having been dependent upon their "masters" for so long, they had no way of supporting themselves, and many ended up returning to where they had been enslaved and offering themselves for sale once more. This situation affected the demographic patterns of Roma in Romania up until the Second World War. A temporary change occurred during the inter-war period, when Roma organizations started to emerge. In 1934 the General Union of Roma in Romania was established, which worked to promote equal rights for Romanian Roma, but the growth of fascism and the outbreak of the war put an end to that. Together with the war started Roma's pogrom and thousands of Roma were deported into Southern Ukraine (in Transnistria). It is believed that the official policy was never to annihilate the Romanian Roma, but only to send them away.

After the establishment of the communist regime, especially in the 1960s, nationalism became an important ideological tool claiming the consolidation of national unity and the idea of a homogeneous Romanian society. Under the pretext of an equalized socialist society, the regime tried to complete the process of Roma assimilation. Roma culture was considered as one of poverty and underdevelopment and had to be integrated. Roma were settled forcibly and were integrated into agricultural activities, their problems were often ignored, and the practice of their traditional occupations (metalworking, carpentry, jewellery making) was forbidden. Unlike Hungarians and Saxons, Roma did not have the right to represent themselves as an ethnic minority, free to promote their own cultural traditions. Roma were

considered the underdeveloped class of the society. In this way the specific culture of Roma, their distinct pattern of living and thus their ethnic identity were negated and partly destroyed.

Roma after 1990   According to the 2002 population census in Romania, 535,250 (2.5%) people out of a total population of approximately 22 million identified themselves as Roma (for comparison, Romanians 89.5%, while Hungarians 6.6%). It is widely acknowledged, however, that this figure is inexact. Almost ten years later, in 2011, the official figure of Roma population in Romania was 619,000 people out of 19 million (3.2%) (Population and housing census, 2011). In the 1990s, the general situation of Roma population did not seem to improve much and in many cases became markedly worse. In Romania, as in other Central and East European countries, Roma had to face difficulties rising from unemployment, deteriorating living conditions, high levels of illiteracy, indirect and direct forms of discrimination, community "skinhead" and police violence, all of which continue to push Roma further to the margins of society (OSCE, 2000). Despite this general situation, among the Romanians become overspread the image of Roma enriched overnight, an image determined by the Roma's life style and their disputed trade activities. This phenomenon of comparison, determined by the discrepancy between the traditional image of Roma being "uneducated" and "undesirable" and the new image that draws them as enriched people, in a situation of rank disequilibrium, facilitated the propagation of dissatisfaction among the majority of the population. This perception, associated with the Roma's cultural and behavioural differences, represented an active source of conflict between Roma and Romanians in the early 1990s.

In Southeast European countries three types of violence against Roma were present: community violence, skinhead

and other racially motivated attacks and unwarranted police abuse. In Helsinki Watch reports two types of violence that characterize Roma-Romanians relationship during the 1990s can be identified: mob / community violence and police abuse. Mob violence was present in the early 1990s (1990-1995) and consisted in perpetration of violent events especially in villages or small towns (i.e. Bolintin Deal - 1991, Hadareni - 1993, Bacu - 1995) with significant number of Roma inhabitants. Helsinki Watch reported that violent attacks against the homes and persons of Gypsies, and the failure of Romanian authorities to provide protection against such violence, are a serious human rights concern (Human Rights Watch, 1991). As a result of Targu Mures clash (1990) between Romanians and Hungarians, many Roma were singled out for prosecution, even though it was acknowledged that they played a small role in the violence. The conclusions of Helsinki Watch investigations in this case describe how Roma had been made scapegoats and held responsible for the clashes. In the case of Targu Mures the police had totally failed in anticipating the violence and responding to calls for assistance once the violence was in progress.

Although mob violence against Roma decreased, especially after the year 2000, it was replaced by systematic police raids on Roma houses. The situation of the legal resolution of abuses remained unsolved: police officers or individuals accused of ill-treating Roma were rarely charged with a crime. The frequent raids of the police were often justified as necessary for preventing the possible Roma crimes, based on prejudices regarding Roma behaviour.

From discrimination to "politically correct"

The role of authorities in shaping Roma image

In the year 2000, in its regular Report on Romania's Progress towards Accession, the European Commission stated that "Roma remain subject to widespread discrimination throughout Romanian society. However, the government's commitment to addressing this situation remains low and there has been little substantial progress in this area since the last regular report" (European Commission, 2000). The then-Minister of Justice, Valeriu Stoica, declared that "...there are no serious human rights infringements in Romania [...] As for the Gypsy minority, the issue does not deal with discrimination on ethnic criteria, but with the necessity to integrate the minority socially, which assumes a specific economic effort" (National Press Agency – Rompress, 1999). Another government official, Peter Eckstein Kovacs of Hungarian ethnicity, the Head of the Department for Minorities of the Romanian Government at that time, stated at the European Conference against Racism held in Strasbourg, in October 2000, that Roma are the national minority most exposed to discrimination [...], and "we have established the existence of certain visible manifestations of exclusion of Roma from the various segments of social life" (European Roma Rights Centre on State of Impunity, 2001: 5).

The scapegoating role of Roma is obvious in ex-Foreign Minister Petre Roman's assertion made in 2000 that the government has an obligation "to protect [the] 23 million Romanians against the few thousand Gypsies", who are preventing the country from being removed from the visa blacklist and affect Romania's image abroad (Open Society Institute on Minority Protection in Romania, 2001). The political personality that pronounced the most acid discourses regarding Roma, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, obtained approximately 28% of the votes in the first round of elections in November 2000, exceeded only by Ion Iliescu. Mr. Tudor promised back then to eliminate the "Gypsy mafia".

In 2007, the former President Traian Basescu called a journalist, who insisted on interviewing him, a "stinking gypsy" and the Court accused him of discrimination. After 2007, the year when Romania joined the European Union, the "politically correct" approach of politicians towards minorities prevented further cases of obvious discrimination of Roma people in political discourse.

Together with the political elites, other state authorities such as the police, local officials and judicial institutions played an important role in shaping the Roma image. Helsinki Watch reported that the police and local authorities had a questionable role in many of the violent attacks against Roma in the early 1990s (Human Rights Watch on Human rights developments in Romania, 2001). Besides, there is no information regarding the prosecution or discipline measure against local officials or police officers who played a role in those violent attacks. The same source argues that the Romanian legal authorities have often refused to solve cases of abuse against Roma even when demonstrated by facts. Also, the source argues that Romanian authorities expected the Roma to withdraw charges due to delays in case-solving which determine the victims to lose interest in seeking a legal remedy for their suffering. This situation shows that stereotyped images are often used by the authorities to justify their actions towards the Roma community, and such stereotyping steered in many cases to an inability to address the roots of the problems faced by the Roma.

The statements of high-ranking government officials confirm the general trend regarding public opinion of Roma. Distrust and dislike of Roma pervade all the layers of state and society. A survey conducted by the Research Center on Inter-Ethnic Relations in Cluj-Napoca shows that if given the choice, 38.8% of the Romanian respondents and 40.8% of the Hungarians would not allow Roma live in Romania (Centre for Research on Interethnic Relations, 2000).

Roma image in the media The mythical image of Roma people continued to persist in the 1990s and it was reinforced by stereotypes and clichés based on an antithetical approach. The negative portrayal of Roma has become institutionalized in the majority's folklore and this left space for the manipulation of the Roma image. In this context, media have their greatest effect when they are used in a manner that reinforces and channels attitudes and opinions that are consistent with the psychological makeup of the person and the social structure of the groups that form the target audience. The influence of media is obvious when they reinforce rather then attempt to change the opinions of those in their audience.

The media's role does not consist only of reinforcing a image already existent about Roma, but it contributes significantly to shaping this image. The technique developed by the mass media in dealing with Roma and others outside the mainstream involve symbols and stereotypes. Because they deal with a wide audience, they have to rely on symbols and stereotypes as shorthand ways of communicating through headlines, characters and pictures (Wilson and Guitierez, 1995: 43). Symbol is the term calling up a whole set of characteristics ascribed to those associated with the term in the minds of the mass audience. In the 1990s part of the information proliferated by media was not originated in a Romani source, nor involved consultation with Roma themselves. Media did not accurately reflect the Roma reality until this community started to redefine its identity. The stereotypes, once created, remain active and make it difficult to convince media to broadcast well documented information regarding Roma. In case the media inform that one Roma family or one person belonging to this group is involved in a crime, the whole Roma community living in that area is suspected for crime.

The media are quite active in promoting anti-Roma stereotypes and, in the 1990s, Roma were mainly presented in violent contexts. In the period of May-July 1998, some titles

from national newspapers show this attitude: "A Bloody Settlement of Accounts between Two Gypsies" (Adevarul, May 20, 1998), "The Gypsies from Cazanesti Fight for the Stolen Aluminium" (Adevarul, July 13, 1998), "The Fights Between Gypsy Mafias take a Break. The Perpetrators of 'Assault from Straulesti' Were Arrested" (Ziua, July 14, 1998), "Two Groups of Gypsies, Armed with Baseball Bats, Fought in the Zone of Strandul Tineretului" (Ziua, July 29, 1998).

A study conducted by the Intercultural Institute in Timisoara, as part of a project on the role of the press in harmonizing interethnic relations, revealed the frequency of the key words in articles about Roma in main newspapers during the period starting from May 1995 until April 1996. The most frequent categories had to do with "color of skin", "infraction", "Romani ethnicity" and "group" (Project on ethnic relations, 1997). Another study, realized almost five years later by the Agency for Press Monitoring "Academia Catavencu" and the Foundation Romani CRISS, revealed the results of monitoring six newspapers (five national and one local), during the period February-August 2000. The number of articles, which have Roma as protagonists, represent 41.35% from a total of 343 articles analyzed. The major part of events described were conflictual, mainly of criminal nature, and almost all the stereotypes used have negative connotation: "Gypsy offender", "violent Gypsy", "Gypsy mafia", "dirty Gypsy", "illiterates", "Gypsy law". On the average, the percent of articles with negative approach on Roma was 31.78 % (The presence of Roma in Romanian media, 2000). The stereotype related to Roma' skin color is mentioned by the first study as one of the most frequent in newspaper's articles during 1995-1996, however, the second study does not point it out among the most frequent stereotypes in 2000. But from the results of both studies comes out the persistence of a dominant feature of the Roma image, as it is present in the newspapers: aggressiveness.

Part of Roma associations and Roma representantives considered that this image reflected by the press is mainly originated in the Romanian Police's practice of discriminatory recording and publishing of Roma criminal offenders. Is it true that Roma, as a group, are more inclined to commit crimes than non-Roma? The fact that a disproportionate amount of petty crime is committed by Roma does not mean that there is a cause-effect relationship between being a Roma and commiting a crime. And yet, this might be implied when it is mentioned that it was a Rom who robbed somebody. In this case the questions that arise are: Is it the Roma who are overrepresented in the crime statistics or is it the unemployed? Is it the case that Roma commit more crimes, or that the police are more likely to arrest someone being Rom? When the audience is informed that the suspect is a Rom, they are told not only what the perpetrator's ethnicity is, but also that the ethnicity is important to the account. This facilitates the connection between Roma and criminality in the minds of auditors.

The press coverage of Roma issues have evolved during years from emphasizing the deficiencies of the judicial system, which failed to punish the allegedly criminal behavior of Roma, to highlighting the unlawful behavior of Roma themselves, transforming them into scapegoats. A change is noticeable also in the sources of information. If in the 1990s the conflicts between Roma and Romanians brought forth a wide variety of press articles, many of which were largely speculative, later there was a greater use of official sources and local documentation. An increase in the journalists' use of police jargon is observed in that period. Sometimes media repeat the terms found in the police inspectorate's press releases: "Gypsy, without occupation", "with (or without) penal antecedents", "with (or without) legal domicile in locality", "known criminal", etc (Project on ethnic relations, 1997). After the year 2000 the outbreaks of violence between ethnic

groups, in general, and between Roma and Romanians, in particular, decreased. At the same time, the information on Roma population became better documented in the media that, especially after the year 2007, adopts the "politically correct" approach in writing about Roma minority.

Conclusions In this paper two main arguments are addressed: the role of ingroup-outgroup relations in shaping a certain perception of the Roma image and the importance of public discourse in forming interethnic relations, mainly between Roma and Romanians. The representation of Roma people influences the attitudes of the other ethnic groups towards Roma. In most of the cases misinformation is determined by the need of the others (the major part of the auditors) to have the confirmation of their believes (both as individuals and as a group), and this deepens the distance between reality and its perception. The dichotomization in terms of "we" and "they", "good" and "bad", proliferated by press feeds the social need for identity, and creates or strengthens stereotypes. In order to respond to this necessity, in many cases the truth about Roma is ignored and this helps the spreading of discriminatory views countrywide.

Roma identity is based traditionally on myths presenting them in a romantic manner, leaving space for speculations about their daily life, speculations, which became part of the ingroup-outgroup imagery. These false images, that cannot be easily removed as they are internalized and correspond to an "historical image" about Roma, make difficult the real communication between Roma and the Romanians. The Roma life style and the fact that in many cases they prefer non-integration, as well as their marginal social condition, represent some of the main reasons for this distorted image.

The discourse of media and the attitudes of authorities create subjective patterns that familiarize the major part of population with the negative attributes describing Roma

individuals and the Roma community. When informed about "Gypsy thieves" and "Gypsy millionaires", that contradict the traditional image of the Gypsy beggar, the majority of the population developed a strong sentiment of frustration, concretized in a negative feedback, which, in many cases, took the form of violence. The syndrome of finding the scapegoats in Roma for unpleasant situations comes out from the stereotyped image of Roma, combined with the prejudices about their "aggressive" character. The situation started to change after the year 2000 due to socialization with problem-solving rather than with conflict. Furthermore, during the recent years, important changes in the inter-ethnic dialogue have occured. International and European actors, state agencies and non-governmental organisations got involved in efforts to establish a legal and institutional framework that mitigate conflicts and promote intercultural dialogue and cooperation between Roma and the other ethnicities of Romania. After Romania became member of the European Union, the public discourse adopted a "politically correct" approach to Roma minority issues.

References Alt, B. and Folts, S. (1996). *Weeping Violins. The Gypsy Tragedy in Europe*. Thomas Jefferson University Press, Kirksville, Missouri

Brown, R. (1995). *Prejudice. Its Psychology*, Blackwell, Oxford & Cambridge

Centre for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe (2001). *Minorities in Southeast Europe. Roma of Romania.* Online http://www.edrc.ro/resurse/rapoarte/Roma_of_Romania.pdf, viewed September 2015

Centre for Research of Interethnic Relations and the Ethnocultural Diversity Centre (2000). *Ethnobarometer: May-June 2000*. Cluj-Napoca

European Commission (2000). *Romania: Regular Report from the Commission on the Progress towards Accession*. Brussels

European Roma Rights Centre (2001). State of Impunity: Human Rights Abuse of Roma in Romania, http://www.errc.org/

article/state-of-impunity-human-rights-abuse-of-roma-in-romania/3671, viewed September 2015

De Vos, G. Ramanucci-Ross, L. (Eds). (1982). *Ethnic Identity. Cultural Continuities and Change*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London

Fonseca, I. (1995). *Bury me standing. The Gypsies and their journey*. Alfred A. Knopf, New York

Fraser, A. (1993). *The Gypsies*. Blackwel, Oxford UK and Cambridge USA

Gordon, M. M. (1975). Theory of Racial and Ethnic Group Relations. In: Glazer, N. and Moynihan, D. P. (Eds). *Ethnicity. Theory and Experience*. Harvard University Press

Guiberman, M. and Rex, J. (Eds). (1997). *The Ethnicity Reader. Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration*. Polity Press

Gurr, T. R. (1995). *Minorities at Risk. A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. United States Institute of PeacePress, Washington DC

Hancock, I. (1989). La function du mythe tsigane. In: Williams, P. (Ed) *Tsiganes: Identite, Evolution*. Syros Alternative

Heraclides, A. (1980). Socialization to conflict. A case study of the national historical ingroup-outgroup images in the educational system of Greece. *The Greek Review of Social Research* **38**, 16 – 42

Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic groups in conflict*. University of California Press

Human Rights Watch (1991). *Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Persecution of Gypsies in Romania*. New York

Human Rights Watch (2001). *Romania. Human Rights Developments*. Online https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/europe/romania.html, viewed September 2015

Isaac, H. R. (1994). *Idols of the Tribe. Group Identity and Political Change*. Harvard University Press

Martinez, N. (1986). *Les Tsiganes*. Press Universitaires de France, Paris

McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B. (1993). *The Politics of ethnic conflict regulation*. Routledge, London & New York

National Press Agency – Rompress (1999), *Romanian Justice Minister: No Human Rights Infringements*, November 19

Open Society Institute (2001). *Minority protection in Romania*. Online http://miris.eurac.edu/mugs2/do/blob.pdf?type=pdf&serial=1004694910825, viewed September 2015

OSCE (2000). *Report on the situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE Area*. Online http://www.osce.org/hcnm/42063?download=true, viewed September 2015

Prezenta populatiei Roma in presa romaneasca (The presence of Roma in Romanian media). (2000). http://miris.eurac.edu/mugs2/do/blob.html?type=html&serial=1043338511183, viewed September 2015

Project on ethnic relations (1997). *Images and Issues: Coverage of the Roma in the mass media in Romania*. Online http://www.per-usa.org/1997-2007/imgs_iss.htm, viewed September 2015

Puente, E. C. (1989). Les Tsiganes et les medias. In: Williams, P. (Ed). *Tsiganes: Identite, Evolution.* Syros Alternative

Sibely, D. (1981). *Outsiders in urban societies*. Oxford, Basil Blackwell

Taras, R. (Ed). (1995). *National Identities and Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Europe*. In selected papers from the fifth World Congress of central and East European Studies, Warsaw

Wilson, C. C. and Gutierez, F. R. (1995). *Multiculturalism and the Media. From mass to class communication.* Sage Publications

Chapter 7

Title **Ukraine's Geopolitical Position: Between East and West**

Author **Enis H. Rexhepi**

Faculty of Public Administration and Political Science in SEEU - Macedonia

Ukraine's Geopolitical Position: Between East and West

Enis H. Rexhepi

Introduction Examining the current geopolitical positioning of Ukraine, we see that the country is divided between two centrifugal forces; at one side, we have Russia representing the East, at the other side, we have the EU and NATO representing the West. Both parts are trying to have Ukraine in their influence zone. Ukraine's political destiny will depend on cleavages since the opposing centrifugal pullout between East and West. One thing is for sure; Ukraine will not be neutral and it will not be integrated in Russia's influence zone (at least a part of Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia). Russia is trying to suppress Ukraine's approximation to Western institutions and to rebalance - in favour of Russia's geopolitical influence. This last is impossible to happen since Ukraine accepted to be part of Euro-Atlantic institutions. This paper unveils documents and agreements that Ukraine signed as a partner of the EU and NATO. The question of Ukraine's geopolitical position is important for the academic world, for the fact that this research question is relatively new; and the ongoing conflict is volatile. The problem of Ukraine's geopolitical position is evolving in an unknown direction; no one can predict what kind of future is engraved and what could happen. The Russian annexation of Crimea and its intervention in Ukraine have relativized legal norms protected by the UN system. Even though theoretically the UN has influence on state relations at the international level, it still lacks the

ability to solve political and security problems of the 21st century. It is obvious that the Ukrainian conflict will remain the biggest geopolitical challenge of the 21st century in Europe. My hypothesis argues that Ukraine will aspire (with the possibility of a future membership) towards the EU and NATO, as its primary strategy to become a Euro-Atlantic country, and simultaneously repel Russian dominance over the country. This last will be hard to achieve considering the current conflicts and separatism movements that can easily destruct the government's political orientation. Nevertheless, there is no turning back at this point. Ukraine will not be under Russian political control anymore; the Russian goal of changing the Crimean's status will not be recognized by the international community either, and Ukraine's efforts to fight separatists groups will gain increasing Euro-Atlantic support. By researching this conflict, we as scientists are entering the 'new era of international relations', which are left to evolve independently (and lacking structure) without the legitimacy of the United Nations to prevent conflicts or build peace. The UN will need substantial reforms to meet the 21st century's geopolitical challenges, while member states have to cede additional sovereignty when it comes to preventing wars. Until this reform happens, superpowers will pursue their geopolitical projects, and conflicts will occur when these projects clash each other.

The Russian Annexation of Crimea and the International Response

Moscow's rapid decision to occupy Crimea stressed the foundations of the international political and legal system. By conducting this act, Russia has violated the United Nations Charter, a principal mechanism to protect the sovereignty of states. It was NATO Secretary Rasmussen who reacted against this invasion, in his speech after the meeting of the defence ministers of NATO, Rasmussen said that Russia was in flagrant violation of the basic principles of the Founding Act NATO-Russia of 1997, including the violation of the sov-

ereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine (NATO, 2014). Rasmussen's stand was welcomed by the westerns allies of NATO, but this was not enough. Moscow's decision was not an 'ad-hoc' one as the invasion plan was prepared previously. On 1 March 2014, Russia's parliament unanimously approved a request by Putin to authorize Moscow's forces to intervene in Ukraine until "the normalization of the political situation there" (Neuman, 2015). Previously, Russia refused to recognize the new Ukrainian government elected during the February 2014 voting. In his statement made on the Russian channel 'Rossiya 1', broadcasted by the BBC, Putin accepts for the very first time that the annexation plan for the Crimean was commissioned earlier than the date seen on the referendum. Putin acknowledged that he ordered the "return of Crimea" on 22 February at a meeting with the heads of the secret services and the Ministry of Defence. The order came after the "initial positive results" of the survey among the people of Crimea showing that 80% would support joining Russia after Yanukovych fled the country (BBC- News, 2015). A day before the Crimean referendum, the UN Security Council (UNSC) gathered in New York to discuss the situation there. Due to the negative vote of one of its permanent members (13 of the 15 members of the SC voted in favour of the draft text, Russia voted against, China abstained), the UNSC failed to adopt a resolution calling on countries to reaffirm the "sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and declare that Sunday's referendum which could lead to the secession of the Crimea from Ukraine, and its joining with Russia it's not valid." Speaking before the voting, the Russian Permanent Representative to the UN, Vitaly Churkin said that it was not secret that Russia was planning to vote against the draft. He added that Moscow would respect the decision of Crimean, but could not accept the basic assumption of the draft resolution, which was intended to declare the planned

referendum of 16 March, in which the inhabitants of the Republic of Crimea should decide on their future, illegal (UN News Centre, 2014). Despite all, the Crimean referendum was held on 16 March 2014. Organized by Russia for the selection between the political scenarios for the Peninsula, the referendum was expected to ratify the decision of the leaders of the regional parliament to politically withdraw from Ukraine and to become part of Russia. The referendum offered two questions with a choice:

a. Are you in favour of the reunification of Crimea with Russia as part of the Russian Federation?

b. Are you in favour of the restoration of the Constitution of 1992 and the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine?

From the majority of 83% of the present residents, 96.77% of them voted for restoring the status of Crimea within the Russian Federation, and against the option of the restoration of the Ukrainian Constitution of 1992 (Rettman, 2014). The text of the referendum questions was written in a way to eliminate the possibility of neutral voting, which meant that voters should definitely mark one option; for example, they could not vote for the status quo. Fears that the Ukrainian crisis could spread to the Balkans were present at international level during 2015, these concerns were legit since the Russian occupation of Georgia in 2008 and the invasion of Crimea, the continuing support for pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, and finally, the comparison of Kosovo case's with that of Crimea by the Russian political elite. Using Kosovo as a comparison, Moscow claimed that Kosovo (on 17 February 2008) declared its independence without any referendum in opposition to international law and UNSCR 1244, while Crimea held a referendum to join Russia. They also claimed that the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia breached international law and the sovereignty of states governed by the UN, which, to my understanding is not true. First of all,

Kosovo held its referendum for independence in October 1991, as Bajrami argues in his presentation at the Academy of Science of Kosovo (ASK), regarding Legal and Constitutional Argumentation of Independence of Kosovo and the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ); and secondly NATO had positive approach to the Kosovo crisis which was acknowledged by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 (UNSCR, 1998), thirdly the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia was backed up by resolution UNSCR 1244 (Council, 1999), to stop genocide and prevent further violations of human rights.

Russians also forgot the fact that they were the first to enter Yugoslavia, and Russians were the first to enter with ground forces Pristina/Kosovo on 11 June 1999 (CNN, 1999) – just before NATO troops did; thus, Russia cannot claim that NATO breached international laws. Also in the Kosovo case the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion stating that "the declaration of the independence on 17 February did not violate international law" (Justice(ICJ), 2010). At the GA's plenary meeting on 27 March 2014, the UN's commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders was reaffirmed, underlining the invalidation of the referendum of 16 March held in Crimea. With a recorded vote of 100 in favor, 11 against and 58 abstentions, the GA adopted a resolution entitled "The territorial integrity of Ukraine" calling on states, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes in the status of Crimea or the city of Sevastopol, the Black Sea port city (United Nations - GA/11493, 2014). By adopting this resolution, the GA retorted Russia's propaganda of considering Crimea and Kosovo similar cases, and Moscow's claim that it was acting as NATO used to act in Kosovo in 1999. Crimea and Kosovo are not the same; as observed from historical and legal circumstances, these two cases are totally different.

In Kosovo's case the international community intervened to stop genocide and the further violation of human rights; while in the Crimean case we have only one actor (Russia) who invaded Ukraine for its geopolitical interest. Russia has violated the Budapest Treaty of 1994 guaranteeing the sovereignty of Ukraine as well (Reka, 2015).

Ukraine's Geopolitical Position: Between East and West

Currently, the Ukrainian conflict is continuing without any sign of de-escalation or peace. Despite loses in Crimea, President Poroshenko is struggling to protect state unity destroyed by separatist movements in Donetsk and Lugansk. Reports from credible media show that Moscow increasingly helps separatist leaders' attempts to gain territory and expel Ukrainian institutions. The talks at Minsk summit (5 September 2014), followed by an agreement, (OSCE, 2014) have brought little light to the escalating problem, the agreement was violated many times, and parties accuse each other for not complying with the text of the agreement. As far as I observed, it is Putin's doctrine of "protecting all Russian-speaking population" (Menkiszak, 2014) that dismantles geopolitical balance in Europe. Putin invented this rhetoric to have an easy political access to Russian-speaking countries and play his politico-military game for the sake of internal power and dominance in ex-Soviet territories. It looks like cold war crisis is coming back. One may ask why. The answer is simple - there is not enough geopolitical space that could divide East and West anymore. Ukraine's geographical position is acting as a buffer zone between these superpowers. By losing his man (Yanukovych), Putin lost the primary control over Ukraine, so he created this conflict to administer the eastern part of the country until he gains time and space to materialize the 'Novorossiya' project. According to my assumptions (and other experts' opinions like that of (Lendman, 2015)), Putin will continue to invade more deeply into central Ukraine. Recently, President Poroshenko informed

the public opinion that he received intelligence information of such attempts. Maybe Ukrainian rivers will act as a new 'Berlin Wall' - dividing East and West. My impression is in favor of the rivers as historically rivers served as dividers between opposing parts (see the battle of Dnieper 1943), thus, this scenario may happen again. If we examine the geographical map of the Dnieper, we can see that it divides the country in half. But let us focus on current events. The Ukrainian conflict is expanding unpredictably, as we said earlier, Putin needs military games to supply internal czarist demands and suppress economic disappointment (GEP, 2015). On the other side, western allies are incapable to stop Moscow's aggression (even though they tried it through EU sanctions and with some military help to Ukraine) since it deals with nuclear power; besides, Russia is not Yugoslavia, so they need to be meticulous. Russia has enormous military power and geopolitical influence. If we recall the latest military exercise SREM-2014 conducted between Serbia and Russia in Serbia's territory—just 100 kilometres from the Kosovo border where NATO troops station, we may start to guess Putin's strategy on his geopolitical chessboard. SREM 2014 unveiled how far the Red Army is capable to displace, and who may its allies be, as the Serbian journalist (Glavonjic, 2014) argues it is a "message of power" that Russia wants to show to the West. The status of Ukraine and its geopolitical positioning is of vital importance for Moscow. One may presume that Ukraine is a small fraction of the European economy and somewhat unimportant in global security matters being a peripheral concern for the US; but is a crucial matter for Russia. Having borders with Russia hampers the possibilities of Western military help; in fact, Kiev can expect limited financial assistance together with financial sanctions against Russia, at least for now. On the other side, Putin has acknowledged loss (financial one, economic isolation, human victims and political hostility) just to keep its mili-

tary presence along its geopolitical borders, and he stated that; "Moscow is not aggressive, but will pursue its interest persistently." Putin knows that after Yanukovych's expel, Poroshenko will jeopardize his expansionist plans. Poroshenko is a tough opponent and a dedicated Westerner. Recently, the US has sent troops to Baltic States and Eastern Europe in response of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. When the crisis began, the US had a quandary how to react, and some of Obama's advisors argued that sending lethal military help would make things even worse. But after the conflict escalated, military help was unquestioned. Nowadays the US is sending advanced counter-battery radars to repel Russian missiles destructing the Ukrainian Army. For the moment, there are no sustainable assumptions of Ukraine's geopolitical future, we may only presuppose a positive scenario (the end of the conflict and peace restoration), then Ukraine may continue to progress towards the membership in the EU or NATO, but presently it is far away.

Ukraine-EU Relations As my hypothesis argues, Ukraine has done some progress in the approximation to the EU and NATO framework. Relations between the EU and Ukraine are currently under the "Agreement of the Partnership and Cooperation (PCA)" which entered into force in 1998. At the Paris summit in 2008, leaders of the EU and Ukraine agreed that an association should be the successor of the agreement of "Partnership and Cooperation". An Association Agreement (AA) between the EU and Ukraine is the first of a new generation of agreements within the Eastern Partnership Countries; negotiations started in March 2007. In February 2008, after the confirmation of Ukraine's membership in the WTO, the EU and Ukraine launched negotiations on a Deep Area and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) as an essential element of the AA. At the fifteenth Ukraine-EU Summit on 19 December 19 2011, EU leaders and President Yanukovych noted that a

common understanding on the text of the AA was reached. On 30 March, 2012 the main negotiators of the European Union and Ukraine initialled the text of the AA, which included provisions for the establishment of a DCFTA as an integral part. In this context, the main trade negotiators from the two sides ratified the DCFTA agreement on 19 July 2012. In order to boost the economic development of Ukraine, the EU stipulated export free quotas (Sushko, Zelinska, Khorolskyy, Movcham, Gumeniuk, & Triukhan, 2012, pp. 24-25) as an approximation tool. Putin's pressure on Yanukovych not to sign the AA between the EU and Ukraine caused mass demonstrations and intense political crisis in the country, triggering one of the deepest political crises in Ukraine, associated with bloody demonstrations and the death of more than 100 civilians. After this decision, Yanukovych declined his presidency and escaped to Russia. The AA foresees focus on supporting essential reforms, economic recovery and growth, and the government's and the various sectors' cooperation in areas such as: energy, transport, environmental protection, industrial cooperation, social development and protection, equal rights, consumer protection, education, youth and cultural cooperation. The agreement also puts a strong emphasis on the values and the principles of democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, market economy and sustainable development. It includes a DCFTA that would go further than the classic areas of free trade, as it will not only open up markets but also address competition issues and the steps necessary to meet EU standards and trade in EU markets. The agreement also highlights justice, freedom and security issues including provisions for mobility (European Union External Action, 2015). Later on, at the EU-Ukraine Summit on 21 March 2014 both sides agreed on the EU-Ukraine AA (Annex 3) and the remaining sections - including DCFTA - on the sidelines of the EU summit on 27 June 2014. The

implementation of the AA is a challenge on its own; however, Russia's policy towards Ukraine increases the challenge immensely. Russia endeavors to build the Eurasian Economic Union (ECU) by 2015 and create a single Eurasian market. From its launch in 2010 Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, in 2015 Armenia and Kyrkyz Republic joined the ECU as new members, covering big part of Eurasia's economy. This development presents that Ukraine is more and more excluded from this market. Russia is and will remain an important trading partner as it attracts 20.7% of the Ukrainian exports (just below that of the EU, 21.8%). As international help is provided to Ukraine, a substantial "supporting package" is foreseen by the EU, the IMF and the World Bank to help in transition, encourage political and economic reforms, and to support comprehensive development for the benefit of all Ukrainians. These combined measures anticipate a support of at least € 11,000,000,000 in coming years from the EU budget and the EU-based international institutions; in addition to the significant funding being provided by the IMF and the World Bank. This EU package will possibly contain €3,000,000,000 from the EU budget on macro financial and €1,600,000,000 on assistance loans (MFA), and a grant aid package of 1.4 billion up to 8 billion euro from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). What is more, potentially also €3,500,000,000 will be leveraged through the Neighborhood Investment Facility to establish a platform for donor coordination, the implementation of the Deep Area and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with autonomous frontloading of trade measures; the organization of a high-level investment forum/task force; the modernization of Ukraine's gas transit system to reverse trends especially by Slovakia - who could be potential gateway for gas flows from Europe to Ukraine; an action plan for visa liberalization within the framework established; mobility partnership,

and technical assistance in several areas of the constitutional and judicial reform (Support Package for Ukraine), are some crucial aids that EU and partners have foreseen to invest in Ukraine's strategic sectors. Mentioning the EU standards of good government, we must not forget another mechanism of approximation between the EU and Ukraine called 'Black Sea Synergy'. A conference between the EU and the Black Sea Foreign Affairs Ministers in Kiev (Ukraine) in 2008, led to a 14 points' joint statement initiating mutual synergies and presenting the EU as an actor enhancing co-operation between the countries surrounding the Black Sea. Closer regional ties will stimulate democratic and economic reforms, support stability and promote development, facilitate practical projects in areas of mutual interest, open up opportunities and challenges through coordinated action in a regional framework, and encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the region. The EU has also increased its support for the work of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Ukraine. The EU is currently considering additional support measures, following the agreement of the Minsk package on 12 February. To help the most vulnerable of those affected by the conflict, the European Union and its Member States have contributed over €139.5 million in humanitarian and early recovery aid since the beginning of the crisis, including €47.85 million provided by the Commission. In 2014, the European Commission has allocated €17 million in development aid for urgent preparations for the winter and early recovery. A further €4.5 million has been provided by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace to meet the recovery and integration needs of the internally displaced persons, host communities, and promote confidence building. Since the beginning of the crisis, the European Commission has provided over €26 million for funding humanitarian assistance. About 55% of these funds address the basic needs of the population in the

non-government controlled areas directly affected by the conflict. On the ground, assistance is delivered by partner organizations such as the UNICEF, the UNHCR, the WHO, the IOM, Save the Children, Danish Refugee Council, People In Need, the WFP and the ICRC (European Union External Action, 2015). All this inter-institutional cooperation proves the EU's tremendous support for Ukraine's development and integration to the Western.

Ukraine – NATO Relations NATO partnership with Ukraine dates back from 1997 based on a Distinctive Partnership Charter in 1997, since then the partnership has increased by time. As a product of the formal basis for NATO-Ukraine cooperative relations, namely the product of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership in 1997, the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) was established later on. The NUC directs cooperative activities and provides a forum for consultation between the allies and Ukraine on security issues of various themes and mutual interest. In response to the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea by Russia, and violence and insecurity in eastern Ukraine caused by pro-Russian separatists, NATO allies have expressed their full support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders (NATO, 2015). At the Wales Summit in September 2014, heads of state and governments of NATO met Ukrainian President Poroshenko in the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and they adopted a joint declaration, which condemned Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of eastern Ukraine and the violation of international law. Through this statement, the allies requested the protection of principles and norms of international law, the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. From the 113 points of the summit declaration 31 (NATO - Wales Summit, 2014) speak about NATO's support to Ukraine. Two NATO offices in Kiev, known as the Center of Information and Documentation of

NATO established in 1997, support cooperation in key areas, and inform the public about NATO activities and the benefits of the NATO-Ukraine cooperation. While the Liaison Office of NATO founded in 1999 facilitates the participation of Ukraine in the NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, and supports its reform efforts linked to the Ministry of Defense and other Ukrainian agencies. In 2009, the Annual National Program (ANP) replaces previous annual plans to implement long-term objectives set out in the Action Plan NATO-Ukraine 2002. The plan of 2009 consists of five chapters focusing on political and economic issues, defense and military issues, resources, security issues, and legal issues. The NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) under the umbrella of the Annual National Program (ANP) measures the achievements of these programs each year. On 23 April 2015, President Petro Poroshenko signed a decree № 238/2015 "On approval of the Annual National Program of NATO-Ukraine cooperation for 2015", which foresees a set of measures aimed at introducing NATO standards in Ukraine (Mission of Ukraine to the NATO, 2015). According to the decree, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is to coordinate the activities of the central executive bodies aimed at implementing the ANP. All ministries involved in the process of implementation of the ANP have to report to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine by 10 January 2016. Regarding technical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO in the field of defense, it focuses on enhancing the interoperability between the defense systems of the two countries and facilitating Ukrainian contributions to peace support operations of common interest. Cooperation in this area started when Ukraine joined the PFP program and began participating in an increasing number of groups, which meet under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) - a senior body of NATO responsible for promoting cooperation between allies in fielding weapons. Recently, the Ukrainian parliament took

a step further towards seeking NATO membership, as the country's parliament passed a law abolishing Keiv's neutral, non-aligned status, and President Petro Poroshenko openly called for integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic space. We know that NATO supports US interests having Ukraine a geopolitical partner in Eastern Europe; and since Ukrainian borders are shared with Russia, the country will act as a "grey zone" (Fish, McCraw, & Reddish, 2004) in case of the further deterioration of relations. In his answer to the media regarding the current Ukrainian conflict, NATO Secretary Stoltenberg assured public opinion that NATO is committed to an independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, as a key to security in the Euro-Atlantic area" (Stoltenberg, 2015). With given trainings, logistics and expertise, NATO has become a primary guide for Ukrainian military doctrines; these have transformed the Ukrainian Army into a solid partner with, to my understanding, the political-military orientation of the country towards the Euro-Atlantic pole is cemented. However, Ukraine's membership to NATO will depend on its ability to protect its territorial unity from Russian aggression. For the moment, it is impossible to imagine a NATO membership, but, in the long run, I predict a possible membership – at least for the part of Ukraine without Russian occupation.

Ukraine-Russia Relations The relations between the two countries have never been worse, officially or unofficially these two countries are in war—it depends on how you see it. Moscow sees Ukrainian approximation to the EU and NATO as a geopolitical threat to its national and international interests, especially after it lost Yanukovych. According to Russian diplomats, NATO is crossing its mandate in the Ukrainian case, "NATO military displacement near Russian borders is bringing instability", Lavrov sees. Now we clearly know that Putin is material-

izing Moscow's plan of "expanding Russian influence outside the ex-Soviet borders", which will be partly jeopardized if Ukraine is able to avoid Moscow's territorial influence. The general assumptions are that Putin will initiate conflict in other regions as well, the rising socioeconomic stress with dwindling oil prices may push Putin to seek foreign distractions (Newton, 2015, pp. 7-9). The most vulnerable are the Baltic states (Evans-Pritchard, 2015). Russia with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in mind will urge economic expansion; even though in some circumstances it has to adjust energy policy to the new realities in order to gain western revenue, the EEU provides Putin additional profits and confidence to pursue nationalistic interests. The US, NATO and the EU expect that Putin will act as a 'partner' when it comes to international relations, they praised him many times, and now they are confused on how to treat him. The West is struggling to understand Putin's manoeuvres (Roxburgh, 2013, pp. 253-272), they refer him as a partner, and as the biggest threat at same time; some even argue that the West has lost Putin's partnership (Neil Buckley, 2015). My question is: did they ever have one? Putin was always ready to suppress neighboring countries on behalf of Russia's interest; he promised that he will restore Russia as a key player in the international political scene, and to tell you the truth—he did it! Putin is pulling additional threads in Ukraine; recently Moscow (quoting Aleksandr Mazu) announced that it has suspended its participation in the Joint Consultative Group of the Treaty on the Convention of the Armed Forces in Europe on 11 March 2014 - using NATO expansion as a justification for this. Ukrainians recently reported a buildup of Russia's military forces in Ukraine; armory (T-64 and T-72 tanks and armored vehicles), artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) as Grad, and sophisticated air defense systems were spotted. Ukrainian reports estimate more than 250 tanks, 800 armored personnel carriers, while

some unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance and targeting purposes were reported as well. The situation is not improving; reports show that Russian troops are continuously increasing in size, meaning that Putin is not backing down. Putin provides material to researchers (especially those examining political science), which scientifically is 'appreciated', but at the same time questions any hypothesis and results one may have; in Ukraine's case we will wait and see what future bring to us. Apparently, we cannot predict Putin's moves as his strategic plans (Nedeli, 2013) will not match the strategic plans that the West has for Ukraine (NATO, Strategic Concepts, 2014) (EU, 2015).

Conclusions Analyzing the Ukrainian conflict so far, we notice that the Ukrainian Army lacks time and expertise to upgrade its military capacity, and repeal separatist attacks. Currently the US has an advantage in the geopolitical battle between East and West, simply for the fact that geographically it is far from Ukraine (making the US less vulnerable in case of conflict expansion) and has resources to help Ukraine to counterbalance Russia. The US interest is to have Ukraine as a stable European country out of Russian geopolitical influence. However, that is easier to say than to achieve. The US supports the "closeout" of the 'Atlantic Circle[1]', which means Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO, and the completion of the Atlantic influence within Eastern European borders. In this context, Ukraine has done a great job by adopting the law on "The Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy", emphasizing Ukraine's EU integration as a key element. As the partnership has to be reciprocal, if Ukraine has a geopolitical importance for the West, this applies to Europe firstly. Europe should move further and open a new chapter for Ukraine's accession. I know, this is almost impossible since Europe does not accept states with neighborhood problems; but Europeans

---

[1] Term introduced by the author.

need to be rational and practical, sooner or later the Ukrainian membership issue will pop out. They need to find a path to structure Ukraine's membership request without going through traditional Acquis Communitare principles, at least just for this case. By delaying Ukraine's membership in the EU, this last is risking of losing this opportunity at all; and to make this even harder, Putin is planning totally the opposite, and his plans are running smoothly. Putin is always one step ahead since he bypasses bureaucracy of international community and international law; he only cares of Russia's interest, and that is what the EU should do as well in Ukraine's case, it should act pragmatically, leaving aside its bureaucracies. The EU must strengthen sanctions towards Russia and increase financial help to Ukraine; Member States need closer cooperation. Europe will have to be more proactive and expand its scope of pressure (on economic and diplomatic sanctions), and they need to stand firmly by the US and its policies to 'act rationally'. EU countries must send additional troops to join US ones in Ukraine's neighboring countries. The United States and NATO must engage proactively in the process and provide specific recommendations to the Ukrainian Army to strengthen the physical and the border protection of Ukraine. The Western commitment towards Ukraine will raise red flags in Moscow; Moscow must feel the pressure of the Western involvement in Ukraine's protection. We are aware that Russia wants Donbass to have an effective veto power over Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO; something similar to Republika Srpska has over Bosnia's important decisions paralyzing Bosnia. The western alliance should avoid endorsing any arrangement likely to produce a Bosnia-style paralysis (Grant & Bond, 2015) since it can lead to an 'entity' that can jeopardize future plans. There is no obvious way of preserving a unitary state wanted by most Ukrainians, while giving the rebel entities the blocking power desired by Russia. The "help package" for President Poroshenko must be constructed

in the long run; and as time acts against Russia by its military activities draining the public budget, an economic breaking point will come. I am confident that Ukraine will align with the US, the EU and NATO, and its geopolitical position will be on the Western sphere of interest; however, I am also aware of that this process will face tough opposition in Moscow.

By researching the Ukrainian conflict, we as scientists are entering the new era of international relations; when I say 'new', I mean unstructured international ties not established by traditional UN bodies. The Ukrainian conflict gives us a glance of what may happen in the future; by the annexation of Crimea, Moscow has violated international law and Ukraine's sovereignty, and the UN system was powerless to prevent this breach. Recently, President Poroshenko stressed the necessity of calling UN peacekeepers to the Ukrainian border with Russia to prevent further aggression, but Russia rejected this as contrary to Minsk II agreement. Even though actors involved in the Ukrainian/Crimean[2] conflict are UN members and have accepted the UN Charter explicitly protecting the sovereignty of member states; there is no UN body that can act as an arbitrator to solve conflict or to prevent it. There are only UN bodies to facilitate post-conflict recovery. The question remains: what should the international community do in cases like Ukraine? Or, what the UN does to protect world peace? The problem of the UN originates in the 'lack of evolution' and the unwillingness of states to delegate more sovereignty to the UN when it comes to war and peace issues; until this evolution happens we will not have a governing body for world peace. Maybe an International Arbitrage Group, or International States' Court under a UN umbrella would work to deal with these war/peace cases?

---

[2] The author refers to two units, since there are two problems present at same time; regarding Ukraine there is an internal problem, while with respect to Crimea there are both – internal and international.

References Bajrami, P. D. (n.d.). *Kosovo Academy of Science and Arts.* Legal and Constitutional Argumentation of Independence of Kosovo and decision of ICJ) Retrieved July 10, 2015, from www.ashak.org: http://www.ashak.org/repository/docs/Ligjerata_Inaguruese_-_Arsim_Bajrami_36843.pdf

BBC- News. (2015, March 9). Retrieved July 15, 2015, from bbc.com: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226

CNN. (1999, June 11). Retrieved July 14, 2015, from cnn.com: http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9906/11/kosovo.08/

Council, U. N. (1999, June 10). Retrieved July 14, 2015, from daccess-dds-un.org: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement

EU. (2015). European External Action Service. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu_ukraine/chronology/index_en.htm

European Union External Action. (2015, Aprill 27). Retrieved July 21, 2015, from eeas.europa.eu: http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2012/140912_ukraine_en.htm

European Union External Action. (2015, April 24). Retrieved July 16 2015, from www.eeas.europa.eu: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140514_02_en.pdf

Evans-Pritchard, A. (2015, February 05). Putin could attack Baltic states warns former Nato chief. Retrieved 2015, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11393707/Putin-could-attack-Baltic-states-warns-former-Nato-chief.html

Fish, J. M., McCraw, S. J., & Reddish, C. J. (2004). *FIGHTING IN THE GRAY ZONE:A STRATEGY TO CLOSE THE PREEMPTION GAP.* Strategic Studies Institute Home.

GEP. (2015, January). *Global Economic Prospect.* Retrieved July 16, 2015, from worldbank.org: https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEP2015a/pdfs/Chapter%201%20Highlights.pdf

Glavonjic, Z. (2014, Novemebr 14). *Radio Free Europe.* Retrieved July 15, 2015, from rferl: http://www.rferl.org/content/serbia-plays-down-russia-military-exercise/26692231.html

Grant, C., & Bond, I. (2015). *Two Cheers for Ukraine.* Center for European Reform.

Justice(ICJ), I. C. (2010, July 22). Retrieved July 15, 2015, from icj-cij.org: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16010.pdf

Lendman, S. (2015, January 23). *www. globalresearch.ca*. Retrieved July 20, 2015, from Global Research: http://www.global-research.ca/nato-commander-lied-claiming-possible-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-coming/5426437

Menkiszak, M. (2014). "The Putin doctrine:The formation of a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area". *Centre for Eastern Studies*, 1-7.

Mission of Ukraine to the NATO. (2015, April 24). Retrieved June 21, 2015, from nato.mfa.gov: http://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/35683-prezident-ukrajini-zatverdiv-richnu-nacionalynu-programu-spivrobitnictva-ukrajina--nato-na-2015-rik

NATO - Wales Summit. (2014, September 05). Retrieved July 22, 2015, from www.nato.int: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/na-tohq/official_texts_112964.htm

NATO. (2014, Jun 19). Retrieved July 15, 2015, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_111132.htm

NATO. (2014, Nov 11). Strategic Concepts. Retrieved July 27, 2105, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_56626.htm

NATO. (2015, May 06). Retrieved July 22, 2015, from www.nato.int: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm?

Nedeli, Z. (2013, Aug 16). On the complex of measures to involve Ukraine in the Eurasian integration process. Retrieved 2015, from http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/o-komplekse-mer-po-vo-vlecheniyu-ukrainy-v-evraziyskiy-integracionnyy-process-_.html

Neil Buckley, S. W. (2015, february 2). Battle for Ukraine: How the west lost Putin. Financial Times.

Neuman, S. (2015). *npr*. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/03/01/284345466/russias-parliament-prepared-to-authorize-crimea-intervention;%20 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26400035

Newton, A. (2015). *Politics and markets in 2015: A changed context.* NOMURA.

OSCE. (2014, September 5). *Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.* Retrieved July 14, 2015, from osce.org: http://www.osce.org/home/123257

Reka, B. (2015). Defence: Threats emerge of new Balkans Cold War. *Geopolitical Information Service.*

Rettman, A. (2014, March 17). *euobserver*. Retrieved July 15, 2015, from euobserver.com: https://euobserver.com/foreign/123495

Roxburgh, A. (2013). *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia* . I.B.TAURIS.

Stoltenberg, N. S. (2015, Jan 26). *NATO*. Retrieved 2015, from nato. int: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_116862. htm

Support Package for Ukraine. (n.d.). Retrieved July 21, 2015, from ec.europa.eu: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2014/03/ pdf/20140306-ukraine-package_en.pdf

Sushko, O., Zelinska, O., Khorolskyy, R., Movcham, V., Gumeniuk, V., & Triukhan, V. (2012). *EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Guideline for Reforms.* Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

UN News Centre. (2014, March 15). Retrieved July 15, 2015, from un.org: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story. asp?NewsID=47362#.VaYplPmx7UB

United Nations - GA/11493. (2014, March 27). Retrieved July 13, 2015, from un.org: http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ ga11493.doc.htm

UNSCR. (1998, September 23). *Security Council Resolutions.* Retrieved July 13, 2015, from unscr.com: http://unscr.com/en/ resolutions/1199

Chapter 8

Title   **Grey is not a colour
and Chişinău's central square isn't Maidan**

Why there is not going to be a Second Euromaidan
in Moldova, but potentially a Third Foreign Policy Coup
for Vladimir Putin

Author   **Iris Rehklau**

Associate SeminarsSimulationsConsulting (SSC) Europe

Sebastian Schäffer

*Founder and CEO SeminarsSimulationsConsulting (SSC) Europe/ Research
Associate Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe*

Grey is not a Colour and Chişinău's Central Square isn't Maidan

Why there is not going to be a Second Euromaidan in Moldova, but potentially a Third Foreign Policy Coup for Vladimir Putin

Iris Rehklau – Sebastian Schäffer

Recently, especially when it comes to the news involving the EU and the Russian Federation, we observe a return of bipolarity. The Russian president is portrayed either as the last politician to be able to act in the interest of the people or the biggest danger to world peace. Vice versa, the US is blamed to be behind all major conflicts in recent history. Besides, the European Union is seen as unable to act; and if a decision is made, it is already too late because the situation has changed. The German Chancellor's attempt to prove readiness and willingness in the current refugee crisis creates realities that again split the population into two camps. The one who does see Germany responsible for acting, and the one that is concerned about the dangers arising from mass migration. But the main question here is not who is more dangerous – Vladimir Putin, Barack Obama, Jean-Claude Juncker or Angela Merkel – the real danger is experts taking one side and forcing their audience to do the same. Additionally, with all the major crises involving the European Union, respectively its member states, the Kremlin in Ukraine and Syria, as well as the challenges arising from the highly increased number of asylum seekers, smaller events such as the demonstrations in Chişinău tend to get almost no attention, although these also have relevance for the EU-Russia relations. With this article we want to illustrate this relevance, and also try to provide an overview with possible

scenarios and further sources to enable our readers to look at the broader picture of this impact on certain events in the shared neighbourhood.

15 years ago, the Serbian population demonstrated against dictator Milošević, which eventually led to his ousting and started a wave of democratization attempts in former socialist countries that soon would be called colour revolutions. Before those events happened, Mark Thompson described democratic revolutions as "spontaneous popular uprisings – peaceful, urban-based, and cross-class in composition – which topple unyielding dictators and begin a transition process which leads to the consolidation of democracy" (Thompson 2000). As it can be seen below, the use of nonviolent or civil resistance was a main characteristic of the colour revolutions. Demonstrations, strikes and interventions were the means to advocate democracy against governments seen as corrupt and/or authoritarian, creating a strong pressure for change. Creative, non-violent resistance, mostly implemented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and student activists – also across countries – included the adoption of a specific colour or flower as their symbol, hence coining the term colour revolutions. This has also already been used elsewhere, for instance in Portugal in 1974 or the Philippines

Tents in front of the Government House in Chişinău

Source: Iris Rehklau

in 1986. Comparatively new was the export of knowledge from one country to another, the increased role of the media and, in the later cases, also the use of the internet/social media. In this context, several countries have experienced more or less successful transitions to democracy (and also a return to autocratic tendencies, amongst them Serbia). While there have been several studies (Thompson, 2004; Herd, 2005; Franklin, 2014) about the success and failure of those democratic revolutions identifying several determinants that led to transition (or not), two main factors could always be identified. If the security forces of the state (military, police, private) are not siding with the demonstrators or at least remain neutral, failure is almost always inevitable (Katz, 2004). A second characteristic was the united opposition, even if the smallest common denominator was getting rid of the old regime. Another pattern that could be observed related to this was a triggering event that led to mass mobilisation. In the cases mentioned before a "stolen election" brought people to the street. The opposition was able to rally various groups behind a candidate that had a real chance to win against the incumbent, who manipulated the results in order to secure his[1] power.

When we look at the Euromaidan 2014, we can already see a shift in the composition that does not fit the definition of democratic revolutions anymore and also has a different pattern. For one, Yanukovych undoubtedly reversed the democratisation of Ukraine, but he was democratically elected into office. However, more importantly, the protests were not non-violent and they did also not lead to a process of consolidation of democracy, but to a violent conflict in Eastern Ukraine and subsequently also to the annexation of Crimea. The triggering event was not a stolen election but the deci-

---

[1] In all cases for instance in Serbia 2000, Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004, the dictator/authoritarian leader was male and we therefore use only the masculine form.

sion of the president not to sign the Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union.

The situation in Moldova again is different and therefore we will not see a second Euromaidan. However, we might see a third status quo ante, in which Moscow restores its influence on Chişinău respectively widening its direct involvement in the region. There is no stolen election and the question is also not whether Moldova is aiming for closer ties with Russia. Besides, both the Association Agreement and visa liberalisation with the EU have been agreed upon. The reason people are gathering – the triggering event – is the vanished 1 billion dollar. In April 2015, the central bank in Moldova discovered that three banks – Banca de Economii, Banca Socială and Unibank – granted loans that were not covered in the amount of 15% of the GDP (Deutsche Welle, 2015). The circumstances are still unclear, and therefore, distinction between the groups of protesters cannot be easily made. The crowd on the central square is diverse and there is no evident common goal as in Kiev – the signing of the AA – or in the colour revolutions – to do away with the ancien régime. The protesters in Chişinău could all agree upon getting rid of the oligarchs and the demand on the government to resign, but there is no common vision for the means how to achieve this.

Protests in the capital of Moldova are not the exception but nevertheless still something special. Therefore, the demonstrations with significant numbers that have been ongoing for days and weeks since 6 September 2015 are not to be neglected[2]. As stated, this will not lead to a second Euromaidan and the tragic aftermath Ukraine had to experience, however, the protests in Chişinău could again lead to unforeseen outcomes. The European Union was caught relatively by surprise by the events that followed the East-

---

[2]   The BBC reports tens of thousands making it the biggest protest ever in the former Soviet Republic (BBC News, 2015).

ern Partnership summit in Vilnius (and therefore also has to share some of the responsibility for them); it is likely that given the enormous challenges from the refugee numbers, the small country between Romania and Ukraine will not be in the centre of attention of Brussels. There are only a handful of journalistic and even fewer academic articles written on the protests. The observations we present are based on the personal experience of Iris Rehklau, who has been in Chișinău from the beginning of October.

We emphasize two of the reflections from this participation in the demonstrations on 4 October 2015, four weeks after their start: the protest is dominantly grey. Not blue with pro-European protesters, not red with pro-Russian supporters, but grey with mainly grey-haired old people. Still, there has also been an attempt to create a relation to the

Protester´s "most wanted"

Source: Iris Rehklau

other colour revolutions – especially in the former CIS – by demonstrators distributing chrysanthemums to the police. Nevertheless, numbers of participants are declining, even though none of the demands have been met. The vanishing of the 1 billion dollar remains unresolved; and there is no sign of willingness of the government to step down. Apart from the question why it should do so, the answer to what would happen then is unclear, not only among the political parties. The special situation distinguishing the protests on the Piaţa

Public call for protest

Source: Iris Rehklau

Marii Adunări Naţionale in Chişinău from other (successful) democratic revolutions is that they are not primarily targeted at the government, but rather at the corrupt system. Former demonstrations, for instance in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine were aimed at the regime with ousting the dictator being the smallest common denominator of the opposition, which, after the goal achieved, fractured into their different interest groups. One of the uniting factors especially in Kiev was the pro-European intention of the protesters. In the case of Moldova, the governing coalition can already be considered to be oriented towards Brussels. The intentions of the protesters on the street are therefore split along political lines. Even though new elections will most likely benefit the pro-Russian parties being currently in opposition and they would also contribute to a prolonging of the uncertainty in the country, the pro-European mayor of Chişinău, Dorin Chirtoacă, won his election at the end of June 2015, long after the banking scandal was known to the public. During the municipal elections, entrepreneur Renato Usatîi has been elected as mayor in Bălţi replacing the former incumbent from the communist party. Usatîi is a member of the Patria party, which was suspended from the parliamentary elections in November 2014 due to receiving financing from Russia (Deutschlandfunk, 2014). But is this actually the goal of the protesters, to elect a new parliament and/or president? One can also ask the question why it actually took so long for the Moldovans to become outraged about the stolen billion and in conjunction with this: who is financing the protest?

There are pro-Russian protesters that are visibly younger than the other groups, especially in their "security" forces. They have placed themselves in front of the Parliament, an estimated 300 meters away from the rest of the demonstrations. The tents in their camp are bigger and better equipped than the ones of other groups also in terms of infrastructure such as toilets and Styrofoam boards for isolation, both

examples for equipment that is most likely not brought from the participants' households. During the protest there was also a food distribution to the Usatîi supporters from a field kitchen, making protesters not necessarily only join for the cause. This could be a sign that the equipment has rather been bought for the protest instead of brought by individuals, but of course there is no proof for this assumption. Although Usatîi did not publicly speak at the demonstrations, he was present with his bodyguards. There is also the Youth Party, which supports the unification with Romania and makes their demands by throwing darts on boards with faces of the oligarchs on them. And the group with the highest number of tents is located in front of the Government House. They have the biggest stage, the speeches are displayed on a screen and the participants are a conglomerate of various groups from different regions and political affiliations. The main protesters belong to the civil platform "dignity and truth" (Romanian: Demnitate şi Adevăr) headed amongst others by the lawyer Andrei Năstase. There are a lot of rumours floating around and name-dropping among the population of Chişinău; for instance former Prime Minister Vlad Filat, oligarchs Vladimir Plahotniuc and Ilan Shor or the Țopa brothers, who had to flee the country due to a sentence of ten years for fraud and live today in Frankfurt a.M., Germany. The absence of young people – and young in this case means under 40 – is the result of this situation. Nobody wants to stand on the street without the knowledge for whom and what. Another difference to Kiev is the lack of creativity in the way the protest is held. Apart from speeches every Sunday, starting on September 6th, with more than 40,000 people on the streets, nothing much is happening. Additionally, there is certainly also the experience from 2009 playing a role, when two young participants were killed. The demonstrations started after the elections mainly by young people accusing the communist party government of committing election

fraud in order to secure their power. After months of being unable to agree upon a new government, a pro-European coalition was formed (Slavkovic, 2009). Nevertheless, in the eyes of the protesters of five years ago, nothing changed at all in the country and their efforts have been in vain.

But not only the situation on the central square is different than in Kiev. We must not forget that 1,500 Russian soldiers are standing in Transnistria including also arsenal and equipment, so there is not even a need to send "green men" on holiday. Tiraspol, the capital, is less than a 1.5 hours' drive

Policemen with chrysanthemums

Source: Iris Rehklau

from Chișinău. In the southern part of Moldova there is the autonomous region Gagauzia, which has already held a referendum to secede from Moldova in the case of a reunification with Romania. While this might seem unlikely, as mentioned previously, there are groups present at the demonstrations that advocate for it. Also in this case, a staged referendum would not even be necessary as in the case of Crimea. Furthermore, there are connections between Transnistria and Gagauzia. For example, Avdarma, 20 kilometres southeast from the Gagauzian capital Comrat, no longer looks like a typical Moldovan village. Now the inhabitants can visit a museum about their history, send their children to a well-equipped school, and later have the possibility to study in Tiraspol, get microfinancing to start businesses, and last but not least, are protected by a local security person. Avdarma-born Ignat Cazmalî, whose brother is a Transnistrian oligarch, made all this possible. Even if he has altruistic motives to renew his home village, and an official investment is potentially in danger of not reaching the intended aims due to the high level of corruption in the political system, this contributes to further destabilisation and social inequality. The village still has a mayor, but the city hall from where he governs was renovated by Cazmalî. Approximation between the two autonomous regions in Moldova is not only happening on the political level.

Moldova, the small country at the European border, is in a tension test. Belief in the political system has not been strong in recent years and is yet declining, making the state therefore a potentially easy "victim" for Russian expansion of its sphere of influence. On the positive side, while the EU is busy coping with the refugee crisis at its borders, the Kremlin is getting involved in Syria and might have its resources bound. Nevertheless, Vladimir Putin has proven that he is capable to exercise politics as if Machiavelli had written "The Prince" for him and not for Lorenzo II de' Medici. Due

to the situation described in Transnistria and Gagauzia, even with Russian troops now being engaged in Syria, the Russian president will have little to no effort to create realities in Moldova and force the West to accept the new status quo – maybe even for the third time after the annexation of Crimea and the support of the Assad regime in Syria in around two years. The fact is, Putin is ready to move fast. Like almost no other politician in the world, he has the ability to make decisions based on opportunity – and the power to implement them. His ambition and possibility to create a new status quo can currently not be matched by any other global actor. Not the US with Obama having the Congress against him, and also not the EU that remains a divided and slow foreign policy actor. The annexation of Crimea and the set-up of a military base in Latakia, Syria, did not and will not face consequences. A potential destabilization of the Baltic states and speculations about attempts to challenge the NATO's commitment to Article 5 (Tilghman and Pawlyk, 2015) – the attack on one member country is seen as an attack on all NATO countries and consequently would lead to a mutual counterattack – as the next move in Putin's foreign policy completely disregards the following: The Russian military is already present in Moldova with 1,500 troops in Transnistria, 500 of them being peacekeepers. Although the break-away region is landlocked between Moldova and Ukraine, the Tiraspol airport might be ready to operate military cargo (Kucera 2015). Although Moldova prevents troop movements through its territory, Russian soldiers could easily fly into the country via Chişinău unofficially. The airport is expanding and some parts are currently under construction; the owner is the Russian private company Avia Invest.

More for more is a useful approach in the European Neighbourhood Policy, but Brussels needs to keep their part as well. What more has the EU to offer to bring about reform in Moldova? The judicial system is one of the most corrupt

in the world, and corruption generally remains the main obstacle for development in Moldova – to a similar extent as in Ukraine. But apart from offering a membership perspective – something that currently nobody in the EU would support openly – there is no "more" to offer from Brussels. The visa regime has been abolished but the benefits arising from it have been marginal, since Moldovans, who wanted to travel to the EU and, more importantly, work there, could already bypass this by getting a Romanian passport. The benefits from the AA will help the country's economic development, but this will not have an immediate effect visible to the population, especially due to the export ban for several agricultural products imposed by Moscow as a direct consequence to the closer ties between Chişinău and Brussels.

Renato Usatîi and Igor Dodon on a "dart board"

Source: Iris Rehklau

So on paper we have a situation that is fundamentally different from that of Kiev. The opposition is fragmented; Russian troops are already in the country; what is more, reinforcements could be transferred through Tiraspol (cargo) and Chişinău (soldiers). Gagauzia has already held a referendum clearly voting in favour of joining the Eurasian Economic Union. Transnistria is a de facto independent state since 1992, although not even the Russian Federation has recognized it. Ties between Tiraspol and Comrat are not only politically, but also socially and economically evolving, but the demonstrators do not have a clear vision for what is going to happen next. None of the different groups are emerging as an alternative and this could be the exact reason why Putin is not going to be able to make a move. Without a triggering event, there is no possibility to justify an "invasion" of Moldova or stage a reunification with Russia under the pretence of protecting Russian passport holders. A crucial event will be the upcoming presidential election in March. After struggling to elect a new prime minister, Pavel Filip was appointed on 20 January 2016, bringing a new impetus to the demonstrations due to his alleged close ties to oligarch Plahotniuc. Rumours about Plahotniuc running for president are already going around and his election could be the final spark needed to bring even more people to the street creating a potential window of opportunity for Putin.

In conclusion, what is going to happen? We honestly do not know. And we also do not want to engage in speculations or historic comparisons. The reason is not that we do not want to make assumptions that later are disproved by history – and we do believe that gambling of making bold assumptions to become famous is something to be criticized. We, of course, would not want to publish statements that are later proven wrong. Nobody does. But the main reason for not making any predictions is that we want our readers – as indicated in the introduction – to draw conclusions for

themselves by reading different opinions and then formulate their own.

In this sense, we are convinced that the DRC Summer School offers an ideal surrounding. Experts, academics and practitioners with different backgrounds provide insight into various topics, and students coming from various disciplines and countries of the Danube River Basin enrich these insights. Especially this year's edition had participants from countries ranging from the source in Baden-Württemberg to the delta in Ukraine. The publication represents written proof of the diversity and contributes to the debate we described. Formats like the DRC Summer School are more necessary than ever and we are very glad that the next edition has moved already from the planning stage into development.

Bibliography BBC News (2015). *Moldova protest camp in Chisinau over $1bn bank fraud.* 7. September 2015. [Online] Available at: http://www. bbc.com/news/world-europe-34174028 [Accessed: October 7, 2015]

Deutsche Welle (2015). *Bankenskandal sorgt für Proteste in der Republik Moldau.* [Online] Available at: http://www.dw.com/de/ bankenskandal-sorgt-f%C3%BCr-proteste-in-der-republik-moldau/a-18426270 [Accessed: October 8, 2015]

Deutschlandfunk (2014). *Wahl zwischen Ost oder West.* [Online] Available at: http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/republik-mol-dau-wahl-zwischen-ost-oder-west.724.de.html?dram:article_id=304724 [Accessed: October 9, 2015]

Franklin, J. C. (2014). *Democratic Revolutions and Those That Might Have Been: Comparing the Outcomes of Protest Waves under Authoritarian Rule,* Prepared for delivery at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. [Online] Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2453671 [Accessed: September 27, 2015]

Herd, G. P. (2005). Colorful Revolutions and the CIS : "Manufactured" Versus "Managed" Democracy? *Problems of Post-Communism*, Volume 52, Issue **2**, p. 3-18.

Katz, M. N. (2004). Democratic Revolutions: Why Some Succeed, Why Others Fail. *World Affairs*, Vol. 166, No. **3**, 163-170.

Kucera, J. (2015). *Russian Troops In Transnistria Squeezed By Ukraine And Moldova.* Eurasianet.org, 25. May 2015. [Online] Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73586 [Accessed: October 4, 2015]

Slavkovic, F. (2009). *Neuauszählung der Stimmen läuft.* Deutsche Welle. [Online] Available at: http://www.dw.com/de/neu-auszählung-der-stimmen-läuft/a-4185917 [Accessed: October 5, 2015]

Tilghman, A./Pawlyk, O. (2015). *U.S. vs. Russia: What a war would look like between the world's most fearsome militaries.* [Online] Available at: http://www.militarytimes.com/longform/military/2015/10/04/us-russia-vladimir-putin-syria-ukraine-american-military-plans/73147344/ [Accessed: October 7, 2015]

Thompson, M. R. (2004). *Democratic Revolutions. Asia and Eastern Europe*. Routledge, London and New York.

Thompson, M. R. (2000). Whatever happened to democratic revolutions? *Democratization*, Volume 7, Issue **4**, 1-20.

Chapter 9

Title **The Ukrainian Crisis and the Aggravation of EU-Russia Relations: Consequences for Energy Geopolitics in the Danube Region**

Author **Plamen Petrov**

Bulgarian Geopolitical Society

The Ukrainian Crisis and the Aggravation of EU-Russia Relations: Consequences for Energy Geopolitics in the Danube Region

Plamen Petrov

Introduction. Ukrainian Shadow Over EU-Russia Relations The Ukrainian crisis in 2014 has been a turning point for the EU-Russia relations. After the annexation of Crimea and the active Russian involvement in the separatist revolt in Eastern Ukraine, the EU (together with the USA) imposed mild economic sanctions on Russia. As a response, Moscow put a one-year ban on the import of certain agricultural products, food and raw materials from countries that had sanctioned Russia.

The Russian export of energy resources have not been touched by the sanctions. Two years after the annexation of Crimea, the EU is still taking the lion's share of the Russian oil and natural gas export. Nevertheless, the deterioration of the EU-Russia relations has already influenced the Gazprom's plans for future market expansion in South-Eastern Europe and Central Europe, respectively in the Danube Region.

This paper focuses on the geopolitics of gas deliveries in the Danube Region in the light of the Ukrainian crisis. The reasons for the failure of the South Stream project are going to be explained, as well as the prospects of the new pipeline proposed by Russia, the Turkish Stream, to become a new route for Russian gas deliveries to the countries in the Danube Region.

The Danube Region is the zone where the Russian ambitions to strengthen the Gazprom's positions on the European gas market collide with the intensions of the EU to diversify

its gas supplies. The main pipelines through which Russia exports gas to Europe were built as early as the time of the Cold War. After the dissolution of the USSR, a considerable part of the Soviet gas-transporting network remained on the territories of Ukraine and Belarus, which made the Russian gas export dependent on the fluctuation of Moscow's relations with Kiev and Minsk.

In order to guarantee the secure deliveries to the EU, Russia decided to build two new undersea routes for the Russian gas to go around Ukraine, Byelorussia and Poland. These are the North Stream (operational since 2011) and the South Stream.

The South Stream story - geopolitics as a creator and destroyer of a gas pipeline The South Stream project was announced in 2006. The provisioned capacity of this pipeline was 63 bcm/y. The company, in which Gazprom and the Italian ENI participated with equal shares, meant to build the underwater part of the South Stream pipeline was registered in January 2008. In 2011 Gazprom succeeded to introduce new shareholders, the German company Wintershall Holding and the French EDF, to the project with 15% each, so the ENI share decreased to 20%. In the countries through which territories the South Stream was planned to pass, joint ventures between Gazprom and local companies were established, where Gazprom usually holds 50% of the shares (Stern, 2015).

Initially the pipeline was intended to start from Russia and cross the Black Sea to get out to land in Bulgaria, where it was to branch in two destinations: to North-West toward Austria and Southward to Greece, and to reach South Italy via the Adriatic Sea. Later on, the southern branch of South Stream (Bulgaria-Greece-Italy) disappeared from the official website of the project.

The serious problems with South Stream began after March 2011 when the EU's so-called Third Energy Package came into force. It consists of two directives and three regulations, and

is based on the idea of the demonopolization of the gas and electric energy markets of the EU states. The Third Energy Package made obligatory the separation between the owners of the gas and the owners of the gas-transporting network, it also strictly required the gas pipelines' operators to secure third parties a free access to them.

However, the Gazprom's project did not comply with those requirements. The Russian company had intention to reserve the whole planned South Stream capacity of 63 bcm a year for itself, and thus, to have the long-term dominating position on the South-East and Central European markets guaranteed.

One of the results of the Ukrainian crisis was the European Commission's full freezing of the negotiations on the South Stream project. This freezing came as part of the economic sanctions against Russia as South Stream officially was not on the list of the sanction measures against Moscow.

Russia was desperately but comparatively successful in trying to secure the support of the governments of the states through which territories South Stream is meant to pass, i.e. Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Austria. The big business in the Balkan countries also supported this pipeline because the realization of the project means that private companies can receive good contracts for construction works and material supply.

But the reality was that in 2014 the fate of the project was in the hands of the European Commission. At the beginning of December 2014 during his official state visit to Turkey, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would stop the construction of the South Stream gas pipeline. "If Europe does not want to carry out [South Stream], then it will not be carried out," Putin said. "It would be ridiculous for us to invest hundreds of millions of dollars constructing a project, bringing it to Bulgaria's borders and having to drop it from there on" (Financial Times, 2014).

Why has South Stream failed? First, the South Stream project proved to be unworkable because it did not meet the requirements of the EU energy legislation.

The second factor to contribute to the project failure is closely related to the first one – the Ukrainian crisis aggravated the relations between Moscow and Brussels and was decisive in strengthening the Commission's firm intention not to exempt the South Stream project from the energy regulation of the EU. Moreover, without such exemption, the gas pipeline could not have been profitable, as it would have operated with half of its capacity.

Putin's rejection of South Stream meant that the Russian president did not believe that the Ukrainian crisis would be settled soon, and therefore, in the near future the relations between Russia and the EU were expected to remain strained. Hence, Brussels' barrier put in front of the South Stream project would not be removed.

Certain economic factors also worked for the abandonment of South Stream. The constant increase of the prognosticated price of South Stream was one of them. That price was originally meant to be $10 billion but increased to reach $30-40 billion. Part of it was to cover the corruption component, always present in all major projects of Gazprom.

As for Gazprom, as well as for the remaining participants in the different sections of South Stream, a serious problem impeded obtaining the finances necessary for the realization of the project. One of the main objectives of the Western sanctions against Moscow was to bar the Russian companies from cheap financing coming from the European capital markets. Besides, after 2015 Gazprom had to spend tens of billions of dollars for the fulfillment of the already concluded contract with China for the development of new gas fields in East Siberia and the building of a trunk gas pipeline to China.

In the circumstances of severe credit shortage, internal struggle between the economic lobbies in the Kremlin flared

up. It is known that the interests of the two state energy gi-
ants Rosneft and Gazprom are in opposition to each other.
Both Rosneft and Gazprom aspire for state financing and in
order to get it they offer different visions for the economic
expansion of their country. By the end of 2015, it was visible
that Rosneft's lobby prevailed. That cannot be a surprise if
we keep in mind the fact that Russia earns four times more
money from the export of oil and oil products than from the
export of gas.

A serious shadow of doubt over the economic feasibility
of the South Stream project was thrown also by the world's
oil and energy market trend that started in the second half
of 2014 and is still going on. The oil price went sharply down,
and the export prices of the Russian gas were bound to those
of the oil. For Gazprom the decreasing gas consumption in
the European Union countries has been even more alarming.
Between 2010 and 2014 it fell by 23% - from 502 bcm to 387
bcm.

Table 1. Production and consumption of natural gas in the EU,
2007-2014 (in bcm)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Production	190,2	192,1	174,7	178	157	148	146,6	132,3
Consumption	486,9	496,2	464,6	502	451,8	445	437,9	386,9

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy; http://www.bp.com/content/
dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2015/bp-statistical-
review-of-world-energy-2015-full-report.pdf

South Stream was a project prompted by a geopolitical
reason, which was Russia's desire to export its gas without
passing through Ukraine. At the end of 2014 that project
failed because of another geopolitical reason, the aggravated
relations between the EU and Russia after the annexation of
Crimea in 2014.

Turkish Stream – Gazprom's subsequent attempt to seize the European gas stronghold On the same day Russian President Putin renounced the South Stream project, he concurrently announced another big project – the Turkish Stream. This is a gas pipeline meant to replace the South Stream and to connect Russia directly with the European part of Turkey via the Black Sea. According to the initial plan, Turkish Stream capacity was to be the same as that of South Stream - 63 bcm per year.

According to the Turkish Stream execution timetable, the intergovernmental agreement had to be signed in the second trimester of 2015, and by December 2016 the pipeline should be operational. There was an important point here: this was the term for laying only the first of the lines of the pipeline network which is meant to transport 16 bcm annually, destined not for the EU but for the Turkish market.

From December 2014, one of the main question which analyzers have tried to answer is whether the construction of Turkish Stream is realistic. The reply depends on the answer to the question that who is going to buy this 63 bcm gas which Russia intends to deliver via Turkish Stream. In 2014 Turkey received about 27 bcm Russian gas; the forecast for 2015 was that the delivery volume would increase to reach 30 bcm. Presently, about half of these deliveries coming from Gazprom pass through the Blue Stream pipeline (a direct pipeline connection between Russia and the Asian part of Turkey), and the other half follows the route through Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria. This means that the quantity planned to go through the first line of Turkish Stream can, in fact, be taken by the Turkish market. Another point to consider is that the bigger part of the Russian supplier's contract for gas transit through Bulgaria expires by 2030, and in case of suspending its term, the "ship or pay" clause comes into force. However, as Turkish Stream, like South Stream, is also a geopolitical project, the necessity to pay penalties would hardly stop Russia from redirecting its deliveries to Turkey via the new route.

The main problem is what Gazprom will do with the remaining 47 bcm gas which will be stranded at the Turkish-Greek border if Turkish Stream would become fully operational. Building a new transportation infrastructure toward the countries in direct proximity to the Turkish-Greek border will not be too expensive. But even put together, Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania use less than 6 bcm Russian gas yearly. Obviously, they cannot take in the enormous quantities supplied by Turkish Stream. That is why Gazprom's goal will be to direct the Turkish Stream gas through Greece, Macedonia and Serbia toward Central Europe (the so-called Tesla pipeline), or through Greece and the Adriatic Sea toward Italy. However, having learned its lesson from the failure of South Stream, Gazprom would not take upon itself the construction of new pipelines passing through EU states. That has to be undertaken by local companies not interested in geopolitics but only in making profits. In the course of the next few years, though, the construction of major gas pipelines will become more and more insecure as investment in the gradual liberalization of the European energy market will direct more and more customers toward the spot market of natural gas.

In June 2015, Russia and Greece signed a deal to create a joint enterprise for the construction of the extension of the Turkish Stream pipeline across Greek territory. This new pipeline will have a capacity of 47 bcm/y and should be financed by Russians (RT, 2015).

Still, for the time being, Russia does not have an intergovernmental agreement about Turkish Stream with Turkey. The construction of the pipeline did not start. Moreover, several operations related to the construction were cancelled. Gazprom broke the contracts with contractors, cancelled the tenders, and changed the work plans to expand infrastructure by wasting money and time. (Trend.az, 2015)

In the autumn of 2015, after Russian bombings of the Syrian opposition's forces had begun, relations between Moscow and Ankara aggravated. In October, Turkish state-owned pipeline company Botash filed a case for international arbitration to seek a price discount for Russian gas supplies (Farchy, 2015). This step will delay Russia and Turkey reaching agreement with regard of Turkish Stream even more.

So, without an agreement with Turkey, the Greek extension of Turkish Stream is impossible. But even if this extension is going to be build, it will be a pipeline to nowhere because the Macedonian prime minister has already declared that Macedonia can participate in this gas pipeline project only if the European Commission is not against it (Novinite.com, 2015).

It is important to point out that all West Balkan countries are members of the (European) Energy Community – an organization created in 2006, which includes the EU states as well as the West Balkan states, Moldova and Ukraine. This organization's objective is to extend the single European gas and electricity market out of the EU's borders. With their recent accession to the European Energy Community, the West Balkan states undertook the obligation to introduce completely the regulations of the Third Energy Package, though with some delay, by the middle of 2017 (Energy Community website, 2015). In addition, Serbia has started negotiations for accession to the EU and the Republic of Macedonia has a status of candidate for membership. The influence of Brussels over the Western Balkan countries' energy policy is obvious. For example, in September 2014 the European Commission sent letters to Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia in order to remind that "South Stream, as any other major infrastructure project in Europe, may only be developed and operated fully in line with EU law" (Rettman, 2014).

If Turkish Stream is built, it will be with one pipeline only, i.e., it will only have a quarter of its originally planned capac-

ity. Thus, Gazprom will be able to justify, at least to some extent, the $4.7 billion expenses made for South Stream, which was spent for conductive pipelines and compressor stations on Russian territory, as well as for ordered and paid pipes meant for the undersea part of the pipeline. These investments in the infrastructure on Russian territory can be used for Turkish Stream. Besides, the new project will save face for Putin as well as to reduce the impression made by the unquestionable defeat suffered in the geopolitical struggle for South Stream.

Nord Stream-2, OPAL and the gas market in Central Europe After the South Stream project failed, and the negotiations on Turkish Stream reached a dead-end, Gazprom decided to have a change of approach for achieving its strategic goal: going around Ukraine. In June 2015, a new project, Nord Stream-2, was announced . It is meant to transport 55 bcm of gas per year directly from Russia to Germany. Nord Stream-2 is planned to run in parallel with the already existing Nord Stream-1. As partners in this project, Gazprom drew well-established European companies of good reputation from Germany, France, the UK and Austria.

On the 5th of September 2015, Gazprom and its partners, namely, E.ON, BASF/Wintershall, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell andEngie agreed on percentages for each one for this route. Thus, Gazprom will lead the project with a 51% share, whilst the rest of the participants will get 10%, andFrench Engie receives 9% (Natural Gas Europe, 2015).

Nord Stream-2 provoked strong negative reaction from Ukraine, Poland and Slovakia. These countries could lose substantial part of the Russian transit gas. Most probably, the European Commission is going to be the main ally of Ukraine and the Central European countries in their desire to prevent the construction of the Nord Stream-2 pipeline.

In the beginning of November 2015, the European Commission's Vice-President, Maros Sefcovic spoke with German

Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel to voice the Commission's concerns about whether the Nord Stream-2 project breaches EU rules. Sefcovic noted that as only about half of the existing pipeline capacity between Russia and Europe was being utilised, there were questions about why more was needed. "As we showed for previous projects like South Stream, for the European Commission it's very clear that such projects must respect European law," told Sefcovic (Jancarikova, 2015).

All in all, it looks most likely that the European Commission will offer strong resistance to the Nord Stream-2 project. If Brussels fails to prevent the construction of this gas pipeline, it could make difficult making use of the Nord Stream land extensions, so that a bigger part of the new transport system would remain empty. An example of a similar scenario is the OPAL gas pipeline, which is a land extension of Nord Stream-1.

The OPAL gas pipeline has an annual capacity of 36 bcm per year and runs along Germany's eastern border, linking the Nord Stream pipeline to the Czech Republic. At present, Gazprom is permitted to use only 50% of the existing capacity as, under the rules of the Third Energy Package, the Russian company is required by the European Commission to reserve up to 50% of the OPAL gas pipeline's capacities for gas transportation by independent suppliers. Despite the approval by Germany, Gazprom failed to get the European Commission's blessing to increase the exemption for OPAL to 100 percent.

At the beginning of 2014 the European Commission and Gazprom agreed to a deal where Gazprom would auction OPAL's unreserved capacity under Europe's natural gas capacity auction mechanism and be allowed to bid for the capacity itself, effectively granting Gazprom 100 percent of the capacity. The European Commission had a deadline of 10 March 2014 to finalize the decision. Then, after Rus-

sia annexed Crimea, the European Commission delayed its decision, and on 23 December 2014, halted proceedings altogether (Stratfor, 2015).

In the course of the last several years, many gas interconnectors were built in the Central European countries, making possible for the gas to flow freely from one country to another, as well as in west-east direction. Since Ukraine came into a serious confrontation with Russia, it began importing gas through the pipeline interconnectors with its Western neighbours: Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. No doubt, the bigger part of that gas is of Russian origin, but Russia has no control over it anymore as the interconnectors have made reverse supplies to Ukraine possible.

By the end of 2015, Poland and Lithuania already had LNG terminals at their disposal and so the whole East-European region has turned less dependent on Gazprom.

The Hungarian transmission company FGSZ has likewise been constructing new pipelines and reverse flows to Croatia, Romania, Ukraine and Slovakia. In June 2011, a 6.9 bcm/year capacity pipeline between Hungary and Croatia was completed; in April 2013, Hungary completed the reverse flow on a pipeline to Ukraine (with a capacity of 6.1 bcm/year); in February 2014, the first stage of a bidirectional pipeline between Arad and Szeged in Romania was completed; while in July 2015, a new pipeline connecting Slovakia and Hungary was also completed – this pipeline has a capacity of 4.5 bcm/year from Slovakia to Hungary and 1.8 bcm/year in reverse. The FGSZ is also planning new connections to Slovenia and Austria, both of which will be bidirectional and should be completed by 2017 (Harrison, 2015). All these developments mean radical transformation in gas geopolitics in the Danube region.

Conclusions. The European Commission as the new key player in energy geopolitics in the Danube region Major international gas pipelines are built for three main reasons: financial, geopolitical and for corruption. The first case is clear – profits from a gas pipeline are expected to exceed its construction and exploitation costs in 10-15 or no more than 20 years, meaning that it is built to be profitable. It is more difficult to evaluate the geopolitical motivation for building major gas pipelines. When talking, in particular, of South Stream and Turkish Stream, it becomes visible that Russia wants to safeguard its geoeconomic and geopolitical positions in South-East Europe, regardless of the fact that from financial point of view both projects may turn loss making. The most difficult to make out is the corruption motive for building gas pipelines. It can be observed predominantly in the projects of state companies, like those of Gazprom. Apparently, when building activities at large scale are under way, the top management of state companies and controlled political leadership can obtain big commissions. The combination of geopolitical and corruption motives is an answer to the question why sometimes economically illogical major gas transporting networks are built.

In conclusion, as positive steps to decrease the dependence on Russian gas (building of new interconnectors, LNG terminals, storage facilities, shale gas exploration, etc.) are difficult, expensive and time consuming, in the light of the Ukrainian crisis, the EU has chosen to prevent Russian ambitions to dominate the European gas market through freezing the South Stream project.

The most significant tendency in European energy geopolitics in the second decade of the 21st century has been the appearance and recognition of the European Commission as a new key player. The EU supports and encourages the projects of the South Corridor, but it has also blocked South Stream. The EU's Third Energy Package took its first steps through two main cases: the OPAL gas pipeline in Germany

and South Stream in the Balkans. In both cases the EU was a winner in arguments with Gazprom.

Until March 2014, the main goal of Russia was to sell as much energy resources to the European market as possible. After the annexation of Crimea, Russia has had a broader geopolitical agenda in the Danube Region. Moscow is looking for the weak points of the European Union in order to break the consensus over the sanctions that the EU has imposed on Russia. Gas geopolitics is a part of a bigger confrontation that arose from the Ukrainian crisis. In addition, while in the struggle against the sanctions Russia has some chances to obtain the support of one or more European countries, in the field of gas geopolitics Moscow has no chances, because it faces the European Commission itself and not separate countries in the region.

Maps

Map 1. Turkish Stream pipeline

Map 2. Tesla pipeline

Map 3. Nord Stream-2 pipeline

Map 4. OPAL pipeline

References Energy Community website. Obligations. Gas. https://www. energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/AR-EAS_OF_WORK/Obligations/Gas (accessed 15.11.2015)

Farchy, J. Turkey initiates legal action against Russia's Gazprom. Financial Times, Oct. 25, 2015; http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/11665996-7cc6-11e5-a1fe-567b37f80b64.html#axzz3rCHMibTi (accessed 15.11.2015)

Harrison, C. and Z. Princova. A quiet gas revolution in Central and Eastern Europe. Energy Post, October 29, 2015; http://www.energypost.eu/quiet-revolution-central-eastern-european-gas-market/ (accessed 15.11.2015)

Jancarikova, T. Europe's Nord Stream-2 risks strangling Ukraine -U.S. official**.** Reuters, Nov. 5, 2015; http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/11/05/eu-gas-russia-idUKL8N1303G720151105 (accessed 15.11.2015)

Macedonia Will Only Join Turkish Stream amid Agreement between Russia, EU on it – Gruevski. Novinite.com, May 27, 2015; http://www.novinite.com/articles/168827/Macedonia+Will+Only+Join+Turkish+Stream+amid+Agreement+between+Russia,+EU+on+it+-+Gruevski (accessed 15.11.2015)

Nord Stream II: Gazprom Promotes a New Pipeline. Stratfor; Sept. 24., 2015; https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/nord-stream-ii-gazprom-promotes-new-pipeline (accessed 15.11.2015)

Northern route outpace Southern route. Natural Gas Europe, September 21, 2015; http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/northern-route-outpaces-southern-25399 (accessed 15.11.2015)

Rettman, A. Putin's pipeline drives wedge between EU and Balkan hopefuls. EUobserver, Oct. 24, 2014; https://euobserver.com/foreign/126222 (accessed 15.11.2015)

Russia, Greece sign €2bn deal on Turkish Stream gas pipeline; RT, Jun. 19, 2015; https://www.rt.com/business/268279-russia-greece-turkish-stream/ (accessed 15.11.2015)

Russia to abandon South Stream pipeline, says Putin. Financial Times, December 1, 2014; http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/10f5bb96-795c-11e4-a57d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3rCHMibTi (accessed 15.11.2015)

Stern, J., S. Pirani and K. Yafimava. Does the cancellation of South Stream signal a fundamental reorientation of Russian gas export policy? Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Energy Comment, January 2015; http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Does-cancellation-of-South-Stream-signal-a-fundamental-reorientation-of-Russian-gas-export-policy-GPC-5.pdf (accessed 15.11.2015)

Will Turkish Stream move off dead center? Trend, August 30, 2015; http://en.trend.az/business/energy/2428194.html (accessed 15.11.2015)

Chapter 10

Title

Development of Strategic Programs During External Aggression

Author

Victoriia Liepkova

Shipping Register of Ukraine

Development of Strategic Programs During External Aggression

Victoriia Liepkova

Today the future of Ukraine poses many rhetorical questions. The crisis that Ukraine faced at the end of 2013, became a kind of epicenter of political, legal, geopolitical and geoeconomic principles, and even that of the confrontation of values, not only in the post-soviet space but also within the Greater Europe and even in a global world. According to French researcher Jean Jeronimo[1], the Ukrainian crisis was the continuation of the struggle for influence between the two historical enemies, Russia and the US, with any rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU that could be considered a preparatory stage of its integration into NATO, which is the hidden purpose of the new US diplomacy.

However, political crisis triggered an economic crisis. Beside the external aggression and military operations in the eastern part, Ukraine faced internal socio-economic problems as well:

- Political crisis meant a high level of political dissent in society. Struggles of politicians' blocks continued, and as a consequence, internal disagreement hindered a successful economic recovery of the country under Russian aggression.

---

[1] Geronimo, J, Ukraine: Entre "Révolution" et déstabilisation, l'erreur occidentale. Accessible at: http://www.humanite.fr/entre-revolution-et-destabilisation-lerreur-occidentale-548975.

- Economic crisis meant a budget deficit and the indebtedness of Ukraine. The Russian annexation of Crimea deprived Ukraine of not only almost 4% of its GDP, but also of all the investments in the development of the Crimean economy and the shelf. The next reason is the armed conflict in the Donbas; who knows when will it end? Since the fighting occurs in the East, in many towns infrastructure has been destroyed, businesses have been forced to cut production or even temporarily stopped working. After the termination of the war with the militants, Ukraine will have to spend money on the restoration of the region, strengthening the army, the navy, the border guard service, the fight against terrorism and information warfare. Production has decreased by 4.6%, in particular, regarding the products of the processing industry by 7.2%. Active military operations are a cause of a further drop in economic indicators[2].

The situation in Ukraine has forced many leaders of the neighboring states of Ukraine to think not only about the issue of peace in Europe, but also to take concrete steps to strengthen the security of their countries. The increase in defense budgets, active military cooperation and military exercises of NATO member countries compared to the anti-Russian sanctions were not able to keep the Russian military aggression in Ukraine. European countries have witnessed the transition from policy statements to a policy of decisive actions.

---

[2] Kovbatyuk M. (2012). Rationale for the restoration work at GSH "Danube -Black Sea".

Poland-Romania-Ukraine: a triangle of strategic cooperation Until 2014 it was difficult to imagine a powerful strategic alliance between Poland and Romania, and even more so their union regarding the Ukrainian question. However, one and a half years is the geopolitical reality directly related to the events in Ukraine.

The occupation of Crimea and the Russian aggression against Ukraine rallied those who have never been close partners. Russia was able to do it much better than any conference, meeting and summit.

Bilateral relations between Poland and Romania were not very active until 2014, and it is not surprising because they had different priorities. Bucharest focused primarily on domestic affairs and relations with Moldova, while Poland engaged mainly in a regional alliance, the Visegrad 4 Eastern Partnership, of which Romania is not a member. However, after the start of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the situation changed rapidly. Poland faced unexpected threats in the new geopolitical reality. It soon became clear that Romania is the only country in the region that shares the concerns and views of Poland. Therefore, priorities began to change. For Romania, the strategic direction was clear: it takes 230 km from the Romanian border to Crimea, while Transnistria is just 100 km from the Romanian border. The events destabilizing the region and the expansion of Russia take place very close to Romania, as well as an increase in the Russian military activity in the Black Sea is now the main threat to Bucharest.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Romania had serious disputes over the borders in the Black Sea, the Romanian minority in Ukraine, as well as the navigation channel at the mouth of the Danube. Due to the favorable geographical position of the Ukrainian section of the Danube Delta, this is the intersection of transport corridors owning an extensive network of railways and roads, a building of a powerful maritime complex, the modern ports of Izmail,

Reni, Ust-Danube, and a ship repair and shipbuilding base in Izmail and Kealia - all this, of course, raises the attractiveness of the Ukrainian deep-water fairway. It provides convenient, safe and non-stop navigation throughout the year. However, the existence of the Ukrainian ship canal, from the beginning of the construction, underlines the problem: the route goes through the Danube Biosphere Reserve, and it is a trump card in the hands of the officials of Bucharest wishing to maintain a monopoly position in the navigation of the Danube Delta. Of course, Romania faces challenges to maintain dominance in the western part of the Black Sea, still, in the government program of Romania, one of the main objectives was the promotion of the state to become a regional leader in this space. Romania does not need a strong competitor who will control 40% of the traffic flow on the Lower Danube[3].

Paradoxically, the ongoing events in Ukraine open favorable conditions for the realization of some common plans with the countries of the Danube Region. Because of the crisis, qualitatively new prospects for cooperation were possible within the Danube basin, particularly with Romania, with which the relations until recently have been quite problematic. Ukraine and Romania are still competitors in many areas, but the two countries have more common interests than differences. The Romanian side, by the way, makes extensive use of European mechanisms and funds for the development of its infrastructure. It should be understood that it is not about regional or narrow issues, but it is one of the strategic directions of the European integration.

It turned out that Romania and Ukraine have more in common than they might expect, mainly, a common threat from Russia, and their overall objectives and strategic interests. The request to restart the relationship was observed both in Kyiv and in Bucharest. Romania became the first country to ratify the Association Agreement between the EU

---

[3] Ovsyannikov B. The fight for the Danube.

and Ukraine. On 17 March 2015, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis visited Kyiv to meet President Petro Poroshenko. Anyway, it was the first visit of the Romanian president in Ukraine for the last seven years[4].

Romania has no direct border with Russia. Therefore, Romania feels relatively safe, compared to the Baltic states. However, Moscow's Donbas separatism and the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014 affected the internal and foreign policy of Bucharest. The first event in the Ukrainian front affected the course of events in Moldova in varying degrees. Chisinau is a leader in the reform process within the current European programs. However, this does not eliminate the problems of Moldova or the frozen conflict in Transnistria, and none of the risks of escalation in Gagauzia. Prospects of the foreign policy of the state's pro-communist political blocks, who consider a pro-Russian and Eurasian direction of integration beneficial, are no less problematic. Nevertheless, the fate of Moldova concerns Bucharest even more.

Since Moldova geographically lies between Romania and Ukraine, it is obvious that the cooperation of Kyiv and Bucharest is the key influencing factor of the development of events in the region, the intensification of the process of the Transnistrian settlement, contributing to the positive dynamics of economic development.

In addition, the natural interests of Ukraine are the reflections of the Russian military aggression to maintain control over the southern regions. In this case, stability in South Ukraine is in the interests of Bucharest. It is unlikely that for Romania it will be easier to do business in the Black Sea, if Putin's Russia will be able to "hack" a land corridor in Transnistria and grab the entire Ukrainian Black Sea coast. Quite the contrary, the Russian control or lack of control of the Transnistrian section of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border

---

[4] Bendarjevskiy A. (2014), Poland-Romania-Ukraine: Triangle strategic partnership created by Putin.

will lead to the fact that not only Transnistria but also the whole Moldova would be trapped in a "Russian world". Romania seeks to strengthen its position in the international structures, primarily in the EU and NATO.

NATO's expansion in Central and Eastern Europe Back in 2002, the deployment of the European missile defense system appeared on the agenda of the NATO, but then the process stalled due to the ambiguous reaction of European countries and the "reset" of the US-Russian relations in 2008.

However, the actions of Russia in Crimea and eastern Ukraine have significantly influenced the willingness of member countries of the alliance to cooperate.

Until recently, the expansion of NATO, which is actively lobbied by Washington, has a very strong position in opposition, which has been represented by Russia. Moscow has lost confidence in the alliance and legitimized his defensive actions over the past year. Only a chance for Moscow to strengthen its influence would break the unity of the allies of European countries.

In the second phase of the missile defense system Aegis Ashore, which will cover the entire Southern Europe, was launched in Romania in 2015, and during the third phase, which will cover Northern Europe, it will be placed in Poland as well until the year 2018. The revitalization of the United States' presence in the region is an additional lever in cooperation in the framework of the "triangle". In recent months, the US has repeatedly stressed that Romania and Poland are their most important allies in the region.

Already, NATO is ready to create an additional rapid reaction force within the Baltic countries, Poland and Romania. Bucharest would obviously welcome the international headquarters of NATO in Eastern Europe, the elements of which will be stationed in the Baltic states, Poland and Romania. In addition, the alliance decided to bring Ukraine to a special

program, which will set up four of the trust funds to facilitate the solution of the problems of logistics, communications, cybercrime and the social rehabilitation of the wounded, while Romania has already indicated its willingness to coordinate the activities of one of these trusts. Besides, for Bucharest a niche has opened, which cannot claim other states of the alliance but the flagship of the EU and NATO in the wider Black Sea region. In addition to reputational achievements and strengthening the role of Bucharest in decisions relating to the region, it would also benefit businesses.

Ukraine-Romania: unrealized potential for cooperation The energy sector can simultaneously be a sphere of both cooperation and competition. After all, its own energy security is a key issue for each country. Ukraine is in talks with Romania on gas reverse supply. They have also discussed the possibility of filing through the border gas metering station Orlovka. However, energy cooperation is not limited to the current moment. Firstly, both countries are actively working on the production of hydrocarbons on the Black Sea shelf. Secondly, Romania is interested in the production of hydrocarbons from unconventional sources, in particular, from shale gas. In addition, according to certain estimates, the most significant deposits of gas hydrates (molecular compounds of gas and water), from which natural gas is extracted, are owned by Romania and Ukraine. Although this industry fosters cooperation in the field of science and technology, this step should be regarded as promising.

Romania produces oil and gas resources in the Black Sea shelf. They have enough to cover more than 70% of the energy consumption of the country. More recently, in the summer of 2014, the company OMV Petrom announced the discovery of new deposits of hydrocarbons in the Black Sea. Explorations of the field have begun, and investments of about 100 million euros for three or four years will make it possible to start commercial production. To attract such investments in the

unstable region would be difficult; therefore, Romania is extremely interested in stabilizing the situation in the Black Sea region.

The northwestern sector of the Black Sea contains deposits of gas hydrates. In general, geological explorations conducted at different times in different countries of the Black Sea estimated that 45-75 trillion cubic meters of natural gas resources are there in the form of gas hydrates. Due to the "shale gas revolution" we can observe a growing interest in the subject of gas hydrates - both in some EU countries and in Ukraine. Back in 1993, the Ukrainian government approved the program "Gas hydrates in the Black Sea", providing funds for the exploration equipment and the development of production technologies. In addition, seismic studies were carried out by several scientific expeditions. However, the economic crises of the 1990s, the lack of investment resources and the inability of governments to implement long-term programs have inhibited the development of gas hydrate issues in Ukraine. Now, against the backdrop of the Japanese success in 2013—the first experimental production of natural gas from offshore methane hydrates has meant an intensifying attention to this subject in the leading countries of the world. A significant amount of gas hydrates (up to 7 bn cubic meters) is in the Ukrainian sector of the Black Sea, which was confirmed during a joint German-Ukrainian expedition in 2010. Thus, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria have significant potential reserves of gas in the form of methane hydrates in the Black Sea.

This could be the basis for multilateral cooperation funded by relevant EU programs in a region with a promising gas hydrate reservoir. The possibility of reverse gas supplies from the Caspian region to Romania in transit through Ukraine should also be taken into account. However, it is most likely that gas from the Caspian Sea will remain topical for Ukraine. This will be a benefit to Moldova too,

which depends on Russian gas supplies more than Ukraine and Romania. Furthermore, do not exclude that Russia will do everything to prevent the gas flow from the Caspian Sea route via the South Caucasus and Turkey to the EU. This gas is competitive on the EU market, thus, there is a high probability of Russia destabilizing the situation in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea in order to make it impossible to realize powerful investment projects to expand gas production and the construction of transmission infrastructure. Russia's aggression against Ukraine, on which territory and shores large-scale investment projects developing deposits of conventional and unconventional gas were launched, confirmed the likelihood of such a scenario.

All this motivates Romania to deepen and expand cooperation with Ukraine. Bucharest should be aware that its initiatives in the region would have greater weight if Romania continues the policy of supporting Kyiv. In turn, Kyiv must understand that occasional rapprochement between Ukraine and Romania should be used for the establishment of a full-fledged strategic partnership. Both states have partly brought their differences (for example, regarding the history of Zmiinyi Island, dual citizenship, the Danube canal, support for minorities, etc.) on the agenda that hindered the development of bilateral relations. Now, despite the background of common challenges, disputes should be postponed to focus on the initiatives of common interest.

The comprehensive renewal of the dialogue of Kyiv and Bucharest will strengthen political trust, the establishment and development of business and interpersonal contacts, cooperation in the sphere of production, trade, cross-border cooperation, energy and regional security as a whole. Things like the excessive sharpness of the tone of political statements, pretentiousness in diplomacy, the negative comments and rash decisions of the parties should remain in the past. It is necessary to actively introduce the practice of regular

diplomatic consultations and guarding against the intrigues of third parties aimed at the destruction of the atmosphere.

This time it is important to build regular contacts between politicians of both countries, enhance the theme of the Ukrainian information space in the Romanian one and vice versa. To realize the abovementioned plans and work out a compromise in the "traditionally complex" pattern of the Ukrainian-Romanian dispute and recriminations, it is inevitable to intensify the activities of the Ukrainian-Romanian Presidential Commission. This step is appropriate in the context of promoting political stability in Moldova. Deployment activities of this commission could give extraordinary impetus to the settlement of disputes, and would create the preconditions for accelerated economic development and safe humanitarian cooperation between the states, uniting their efforts in the Black Sea region and in the promotion of Ukraine's European integration.

Regarding potential cooperation, from a European historical perspective, the two countries would have to seek for a sustainable level of strategic partnership. It should be one of the priorities of the foreign policy of Kyiv and Bucharest, and this would lead to the development of a concrete plan with drastic measures to change the paradigm of complementary relations, cultivating public opinion in their countries to enhance mutual loyalty. Obviously, primacy belongs to the safest initiatives.

An important area of bilateral cooperation can be the dialogue on the future development of the institutional model of regional security and cooperation in the Black Sea region with the capacity of existing regional initiatives and organizations (BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR, initiative for economic cooperation in South-Eastern Europe, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, etc). Ukraine and Romania together would double the capacity of their influence. Firstly, by taking measures to counter Russia's neo-imperial policy;

secondly, via the strengthening measures against the militarization of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea basins, and the return of the idea of demilitarization. Lastly—in the short run—it would be essential to freeze the subregion's action to strengthen military capabilities[5].

In this regard, both sides should attach equal importance to consolidate positions and coordination on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Strategic affairs and safety in the Black Sea region are in the interests of all parties, e.g., the EU, NATO and the United States, especially in the prospects of the realization of the Russian Federation's doctrine, the "Russian world".

Joint action will lead to the strengthening of political stability and regional security, democracy and the development of the whole region. In the field of business cooperation between Ukraine and Romania, both countries should permanently promote their enterprises to establish direct contacts with potential partners, and to encourage them to participate in exhibitions and presentations organized in the partner country. They also need to take full advantage of the potential, the result of the ratification of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU.

Cross-border Cooperation Programme between Romania and Ukraine for the period of 2014-2020 Although nowadays the international political agenda is radically transformed due to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, in the context of the Ukrainian-Romanian bilateral relations the question of uttermost importance is still cross-border cooperation. In this context, it means many efforts from Kyiv to support Bucharest in improving cross-border programs. Among the priorities, taking into account the regional political context, the first things to pay attention should be the followings. First, an agreement on borders and

---

[5] Studennikov I. (2009), Cross-border cooperation as a means of fostering Ukraine's move towards the European Integration and the European Neighborhood Policy, Center for Regional Studies, Odessa, Ukraine.

border security is needed, with special emphasis on opening new border crossings (firstly in the Chernivtsi and the Transcarpathian region) and ensuring the development of customs infrastructure of border crossing points. Second, the principles of environmental protection and the adaptation to climate change should be also taken into account. Undoubtedly, the main transboundary problem is flood control. Joint efforts in this area would ensure greater impact on the ecological situation in the region. It is an important area in the framework of this priority—sustainable water supply, efficient drainage and sewerage. This will be a useful experience in Romania, in particular, in the Suchavskogo district of Romania.

Among other things, Kyiv and Bucharest should develop coordinated approaches in the field of ecology and environmental protection to address transboundary environmental issues in accordance with the applicable international agreements. What is important in this context is the implementation of the initiative to introduce a system of joint monitoring of the environment in the Danube basin.

The issue that requires attention is combating poverty. Border regions in Ukraine and Romania, of course, suffer from a lack of investment, relatively high unemployment rates, and the presence of vulnerable groups. Therefore, it would be appropriate to form and implement common strategies to tackle these problems, the exchange of experiences on the social inclusion of vulnerable groups, and their employment providing them an adequate level of social services. Another important issue is to support education, science, research and innovation in this region via established contacts with Romanian scientific institutions and universities. At the same time, the Transcarpathian region has had positive experiences of effective innovation, the creation of technology parks, etc. Therefore, cooperation in this field

with Romanian partners could have a transboundary effect and a direct impact on the welfare of the regions[6].

No less important area of cooperation is the joint action in the infrastructure development of border regions, in particular, the development of transport infrastructure and the mobility of persons and goods, and granting access to these areas. Finally, the development of small and medium-sized businesses is the element inherently associated with all of these priorities, while the support for entrepreneurs in areas such as agriculture and green tourism, and the formation of joint tourist routes could become a factor of deepening cross-border contacts, especially in the already mentioned prospect of revitalizing cross-border traffic. With regard to the large-scale joint initiatives, appropriate efforts to establish air links between the countries can be observed. Moreover, of course, a significant benefit of the initiative of Ukraine and Romania would be the creation of road infrastructure that would provide communication between the Ukrainian-Romanian border next to the Siret and the Kyiv-Chop highway near Stryi. Although this initiative requires outstanding investments, its implementation would facilitate the execution of requirements applied to shippers who are limited in Romania, in accordance with the prerequisites of the Carpathian Convention (The Framework Convention on the Protection and Sustainable Development of the Carpathians was adopted and signed by the seven Parties—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine—in May 2003 in Kyiv, Ukraine, and entered into force in January 2006). Concerning Ukraine, this initiative includes the establishment of adequate transport routes, which makes investing additional funds in the transportation of goods from the port of Constanta.

---

[6] "Report of Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation" (2000), "Development of small and medium-sized enterprises in the Black Sea Region" (report, recommendation 42/2000).

Thus, Ukraine and Romania have to make a joint effort if they want to prevent and neutralize the negative scenario of Russia's relations with the EU and the United States. Finally, despite the current dominance of the realist discourse, both countries should remain optimistic and not forget the role of civil society.

References   Aries Shipping Agency. Accessible at: http://www.ariesshipping.ro//sulina-canal.php.

Bendarjevskiy A. (2014), Poland-Romania-Ukraine: Triangle strategic partnership created by Putin. Institute of World Politics (PAGEO, Hungary).

Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 11 November, 2009 №1346-r "On pro-statements adjusted the structure of the title "Creating a deep waterway district. Danube - Black Sea in the Ukrainian part of the delta. Full development - Accessible at: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1346-2009-p

Constitution of Romania (1991), at: http://www.ccr.ro

Danube Navigation Convention - Accessible at: zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_175.

Filipenko A. (10.08.2013), EU: the untapped potential of co-operation. Odesskie izvestiya, http://izvestiya.odessa.ua/ru/2013/08/10/ukraina-rumyniya-nerealizovannyy-potencial-sotrudnichestva.

Geronimo, J (2014). Ukraine: Entre «Révolution » et déstabilisation, l'erreur occidentale. Accessible at: http://www.humanite.fr/entre-revolution-et-destabilisation-lerreur-occidentale-548975

Kovbatyuk M. (2012). Rationale for the restoration work at GSH "Danube -Black Sea" / MV Kovbatyuk M., Zakharchenko L. // Problems systematic approach to economic power. 2012 - №40. - P. 76-82.

Melenevskiy M. (2012). Report of the Ukrainian Presidency of ICPDR 2011, May 2012. Accessible at: http://crs.org.ua/ru/5/current.html.

Public debate, *EU Strategy for the Danube Region and Ukraine: Opportunities, challenges and status of implementation*, 29 September 2014, Accessible at: http://www.crs.org.ua/ru/events/current/195.html

Ovsyannikov B. The fight for the Danube / V.Ovsyannikov // Centre of transport strategies -08.11.2011. [Electronic resource]. - Accessible at: http://cfts.org.ua/articles/39788.

Report of Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (2000), Development of small and medium-sized enterprises in the Black Sea Region" (report, recommendation 42/2000). Accessible at: http://www.pabsec.org/Documents.asp?id=3&hl=ru

Studennikov I. (2009), Cross-border cooperation as a means of fostering Ukraine's move towards the European Integration and the European Neighborhood Policy, *Center for Regional Studies, Odessa, Ukraine*.

Chapter 11

Title   **The European Union's Role in the Institution Building Process within the South Caucasus States: The Interesting Case of Armenia**

Author   **Mihai-Bogdan Popescu**

National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest

The European Union's Role
in the Institution Building Process
within the South Caucasus States:
The Interesting Case of Armenia

Mihai-Bogdan Popescu[1]

Introduction Reading the European Union's key documents, it could be noticed that Brussels has a deep interest in stabilizing its southern and eastern neighborhood, an area associated with several dangers, such as organized crime, illegal migration, terrorism, state failure or the proliferation of nuclear weapons (European Council 2003). The export of European Union's core norms, such as democracy, rule of law, human rights, and market economy is a tool for stabilizing the neighborhood and thus enhancing the EU's security. In order to do this the EU's policy towards its neighborhood is built on the principle of *conditionality*. Through its programs addressed to the neighborhood Brussels offers several benefits such as financial aid, visa free regime or the integration into the European market, in exchange for reform implementation. The first step in this direction was the launch of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. In 2009, the eastern dimension of the ENP received an "upgrade" - the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which is more complex and more ambitious offering more important rewards. The EaP was addressed to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. However, the EU's Eastern Neighborhood is also Russia's "near abroad", an area of great geopolitical importance for Moscow. Obviously, Russia tries to keep this

---

area under its control, and by doing so it developed "counter conditionality" (Hagemann 2013) based on both soft power and hard power elements.

Sedelmeier (2011:12-14) identifies several international and domestic factors that might facilitate the EU's conditionality towards a certain area. While external factors such as the *clarity* of the EU's demand – which means that a (candidate) state knows what it needs to do if it decides to comply with the EU conditions, and the *credibility* – which means that the candidate state must be certain that it will receive the promised rewards after meeting the EU's demands, and it must believe that it will receive the reward only if it fully meets the requirements, are important, domestic factors should not be neglected. As Fukuyama highlights, in order to be successful, external conditionality has to be backed by the desire of the internal elites to change institutions (2004:39). Thus, there are also domestic facilitating factors such as the types of political elites, the quality of political life (liberal/illiberal regime, existence of a political opposition), legacies from the past or the administrative capacity of the state. In order to be successful, the costs of Europeanization must not be regarded as being very high by the domestic decision makers (Sedelmeier, 2011:14-15). Every new institutional arrangement creates a winner and a loser, and the latter will try to defend its relative roles (Fukuyama, 2004:40).

The following article highlights the institutional transformations within Armenia, after the launch of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Armenia, a small country with a fascinating history represents maybe the most interesting case from all the six EaP member states. After successfully negotiating a future membership in the EU's Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), the decision makers from Yerevan decided to join Russia's Custom Union. Many scholars in the West blamed the skillful manipulation of the Nagorno Karabakh

conflict for this choice, but the situation is much more complex. Using a historical institutionalist (HI) approach, the article presents the degree of Armenia's institutional approximation in the field of democratization, human rights and market economy with the European standards. The main hypothesis is that the modest degree of approximation is due to the internal institutional structure and the local elites' strategic interests. The first part of the article will briefly highlight the HI's main advantages; the second part will describe the EU's and Russia's policy towards the shared neighborhood, the third part presents a short evolution of Armenia's institutions, and the forth part highlights Armenia's progress according to the EU's requirements and explains the limits of those reforms.

Theoretical approach Historical institutionalism (HI) defines institutions as *"the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structures of the polity or political economy"* (Hall and Taylor, 2011:18). HI starts with the assumption that the process of institutional creation is a competition for power among certain actors. Moreover, many actors both inside and outside the organization have a big stake in whether that organization adopts new institutional practices, and reform initiatives often give birth to power struggles among those actors (Hall and Taylor 2011:20). One of HI's core assumptions is the fact that historical institutionalism highlights the power relations among actors, arguing that power relations at the formative moment of a certain institutional template offer a set of subsequent advantages to certain actors (Hall and Taylor 2011:21), which is connected with the HI's core concept of *path dependency*, which means that *"when a government program or organization embarks upon a path there is an inertial tendency for those initial policy choices to persist. That may be altered but it requires a good deal of political pressure to produce such a*

change" (Peters 1999: 63). While borrowing from both the *logic of consequences* and the *logic of appropriateness[2]*, when it comes to strategic calculation or norms and values, HI has its own assumptions. From a rational choice institutionalist perspective (RCI) an actor's preference changes when a feasible prospective alternative appears (it has to be less costly and more efficient). On the contrary, the HI sees action as a function of preferences informed by point to point comparisons, meaning that individuals are thought to balance the evaluation of the costs and benefits of maintaining or losing their investment in past arrangements (Fioretos 2011:373). When speaking about norms and values, the HI reverses the sociological institutionalism's (SI) approach of the logic of appropriateness considering that shared understandings are the source of new institutions to the one in which the presence of particular institutions is key to whether new ideas matter (Fioretos, 2011:374). For example, it is much hard to implement democratic/liberal reforms in a country with a long autocratic tradition.

However, a weak point of the theory is the fact that it lacks "agency", which means that it focuses too much on the institutional structure (structure) and its impact on politics, lacking a proper way of explaining the actions of political actors. This is why it often turns to assumptions about agency from RCI (actors are motivated by strategic calculus) or SI (norms and beliefs motivate political actions) in order to explain political actors' conduct (Schmidt 2010:10).

---

[2] According to March and Olsen the logic of consequences refers to the fact that human actors choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise. The logic of appropriateness refers to the idea that human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas, and the more general concept of self and institutions (1998: 949 – 951).

To sum up, the chosen theory is useful because it highlights power relations among different domestic elites, the pressures from external actors, the type of political elites, the quality of political life (liberal/illiberal regime, existence of a political opposition), and the impact of the legacies from the past or the relation between ruling elites and civil society. Due to the theory's lack of agency, a HI explanation in the RCI tradition will be used[3], meaning that we will use HI's assumptions about structure (power relations, legacy of the past, type of political regime) and RCI's assumptions about agents (strategic calculation towards a certain political option).

The EU's policy towards the Eastern Neighborhood In order to manage the security threats associated with the Eastern Neighborhood, the EU developed the European Neighborhood Policy as a framework for stabilizing the area, the main philosophy of this policy being to export the EU's core set of norms towards the neighborhood. Thus, the document Wider Europe Neighborhood adopted by the European Commission in 2003 mentions that the EU has a duty not only towards its citizens but also towards its present and future neighbors (European Commission 2003). Moreover, the document identified several measures in order to enhance security in the neighborhood and to develop new types of relations with the EU's eastern (and southern) neighbors; measures such as the extension of the internal market and its regulatory structures, preferential trading relations,

---

[3] Other significant works who used a similar theoretical approach were: Karl Magnus Johansson, Tapio Raunio, "Regulating Europarties: Cross-Party Coalitions Capitalizing on Incomplete Contracts", *Party Politics, Vol. 5, Nr.1*, 2005, pp. 518 – 521 ; Milada Anna Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy. Leverage, and Integration after Communism*, Oxford University Press or Petar Hall, David Soskice, ",Introduction", în *Varieties of Capitalism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 9-13, available at http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/HALL-_A_Peter_and_SOS-KICE_David-_An_introduction_to_varieties_of_capitalism-2.pdf

perspective for legal migration, greater EU involvement in conflict resolution, intensified cooperation for preventing and combating security threats, support for integration in the global system, inclusion in the EU network of transport, energy, telecommunications and European Research Area (European Commission 2003).

As a consequence, all the countries included in the ENP have signed ENP Action Plans with the EU, which was a long term reform agenda in areas such as democracy, rule of law and market economy (European Commission 2006). First of all, it is important to mention that this mechanism was built on the principle of positive conditionality, meaning that it "*entails the promise of a benefit, in return for the fulfillment of a predetermined condition*". And both the promise and the obligation are outlined in the contract (Tocci 2007:11). This type of conditionality is most frequently used in the delivery of economic assistance, as well as within the context of EU accession. However, there was a qualitative difference between the policy towards the Central and Eastern European states. The ENP does not mention anything about any further integration perspective into the EU. Simply, Brussels offers a new type of relation with its neighbors, different from the possibilities stipulated in article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU Art. 49), or to put it in Romano's Prodi's words, the EU is ready to share everything but institutions (Prodi in Emerson, 2004:6).

In May 2009, almost one year after the "5 days war" between Georgia and Russia, the eastern dimension of the ENP received a new initiative, the Eastern Partnership. This was a joint Polish–Swedish project addressed to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. *"The main goal of the Eastern Partnership is to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries"* (European Council 2009:6). The EaP is

built on the ENP framework, thus keeping the principle of positive conditionality and also the exclusion of the possibility of future integration in the EU. On the other hand, the EaP has stronger incentives such as the possibility of signing a new Association Agreement with the EU, including also a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) among the EU and the EaP members, and it would also allow for easier travelling to the EU through the visa liberalization process. Moreover, it has a multilateral track (EEAS 2015) aiming at facilitating cooperation and socialization among member states and boosts the popularity of the EU and EaP not only within the decision makers from the area but also within the civil society (European Council 2009:1-15).

Russia Russia is a different type of actor with a different set of "values". When speaking about path dependency in Russia's case, one should be aware of three main aspects and on the fact that there is a certain legacy of the past that has perpetuated from the imperial era to Vladimir Putin's presidency. This is a product of a vast historical experience, and also, as some authors consider, a consequence of Russia's specific geography (Kaplan, 2014). First of all, there is a fear of external threat. Although today's Russian leaders do not fear any state invasion, there is a fear of a color revolution against the Putin regime similar to what happened in Georgia and Ukraine (Surkov in Tsygancov 2010:224). Secondly, there is the preference for a strong centralized state, the only capable of tackling both internal and external threats (Fukuyama 2012:386-387). This explains Putin's idea of issuing the vertical of power (local governors were named by the president and only validated by local parliaments) or the growing influence of his United Russia Party (Gaman Glotuvina 2008:1034-1044). The third aspect refers to the idea that in Russia there is a preference for a *predominant leader* (Hermann and Hermann 1989: 362) in both domestic

and external affairs. Putin opted for a presidential foreign policy which means that he has control over third actors that might influence foreign policy (Secrieru 2008: 159). Russia's present foreign policy strategy seems to be a *via media* between two classical school of thoughts, a combination between the *statist* approach emphasizing the *state's ability to govern and preserve the social and political order*, thus choosing values such as power and stability to freedom and democracy (Tsygancov 2010, Secrieru 2008) and the *civilizationist* approach emphasizing a more aggressive approach towards the West, and arguing that Russia has a different and unique system of values that has to be exported beyond Russian borders (Tsygancov 2010, Secrieru 2008).

Russia's policy in the near abroad In its effort to keep the near abroad under control, Russia used both soft power and hard power elements. First of all, Russia has developed several regional organizations such as Collective Security Treaty Organization – CSTO, a military alliance composed of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (left the organization in 2012)[4], or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, dedicated to economic cooperation in the Eurasian area, and the Eurasian Economic Community, founded in 2000. However the last and the most important organization is the Eurasian Union, based on the former 2010 Custom Union Russia–Belarus–Kazakhstan. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) emulates the EU to some extent having similar institutions such as the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Economic Council, the Eurasian Economic Commission, and a Court[5]. The idea of a Eurasian Union was put forward by Putin in a 2011 article (Putin 2011) and it was a counter reaction to the launch of the EU's

---

[4] CSTO Basic Facts, in http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_aengl.htm

[5] Eurasian Economic Union, *General Information*, in http://eaeunion.org/#about-info

EaP and to the emergence of China as an important player in Eurasia (Dietl 2013). Russia is using other "carrots" such as its strong economic ties with the post-Soviet states or cheap gas prices (Armenian Ministry of Economy 2007; 2012). But there is another political aspect which can be used as a soft power tool, namely the institutional resemblances between Russia and the former post-Soviet states.

On the other hand, Russia did not hesitate to use hard power elements such as economic sanctions used against Moldova (2005), Georgia (2006) and Ukraine (2007 and 2013), or the threat with energy shortage as it was in the cases of gas disputes with Ukraine (2006, 2009) and Belarus (2006), or the reduction of gas and electricity flow to Azerbaijan (2007). Russia has leverage over the area due to the existence of several frozen conflicts. The Kremlin openly supports the secessionist entities from Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (Transnistria) and indirectly Nagorno Karabakh due to its support for Armenia (Manhoff 2014). Moreover, Russia did not hesitate to use its military force against Georgia in August 2008. It is important to remember the fact that Georgia expressed its desire to join the EU and the NATO. However, while this is an important event that accelerated the tensions between parties, it is not the only one.

Armenia between the EU and Russia Being part of the ENP/EaP initiatives, Armenia had to fulfill the requirements stipulated in the ENP Action Plans from 2006 in order to receive benefits such as the integration into the European market, visa free regime or financial aid from the EU.

Aspects of statehood in Armenia Armenia's first experience as an independent state occurred in 1918, after the fall of the Russian Empire. This was a critical juncture which offered the opportunity for the creation of new institutions. But Armenia had to face serious problems such as the lack of knowledge about governance, economic and social problems, and even engaged in a conflict with

Azerbaijan. However, at the beginning of the 1920s both Armenia and the other two South Caucasus countries were conquered by the Bolsheviks and integrated in the USSR. During the Soviet times, the South Caucasus was a very poor region and it was dominated by informal networks, the shadow economy being the region's greatest problem (de Waal 2010:94). Moreover, in the Caucasus, kinship was more important than the state, while helping the relatives was a matter of honor. This system also perpetuated in the political field, where Communist party posts were sold and bought (de Waal 2010:95). After the fall of the USSR, weak and ineffective state institutions, social problems and informal networks were Armenia's legacy from the past.

After Communism After 1991 Armenia emerged as a state where several groups of political elites representative for certain segments of population were competing for power through informal networks (Grzymalla Busse and Luong 2002: 540). The first democratic elections in Armenia were considered as being purely democratic. Levon Ter Petrosyan from the Armenian National Movement, a person who was not part of the former Communist apparatus, was elected as president in 1991 with a strong majority. Despite this the 1990s were hard years for Armenia. The country was almost isolated from the world due to the war with Azerbaijan and due to its relations with Turkey. The domestic political life was characterized by several clashes such as the one between Ter Petrosian's ANM and Dashnaktsutyun – a political organization very popular in the diaspora –, the resignation of president Ter Petrosian due to his approach towards the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and the assassination of two opposition members, Karen Demirchyan and Vasgen Sargsyan in 1999 (Zolyan 2011:54-55). It has to be mentioned that since 1998, the Republican Party, also called the "Karabakh clan" (Freie 2013:6) holds the power in Armenia. Robert Kockarian (war hero and for-

mer PM of the Nagorno Karabakh entity) was elected president twice, between 1998 and 2008. The same happened with his Prime Minister Sersh Sargsyan who is Armenia's president from 2008 until present. It is important to mention that the incumbent power always won the elections in Armenia. The losing side always contested the elections, and they were accompanied by massive street protests. On the other hand, this lack of legitimacy forced the political elites in power to rely on bureaucrats, high level military, police officers and oligarchs (Zolyan 2011:55). Other key actors in the Armenian political life are the Armenian "oligarchs". Most of them had key positions in the former Communist administration, and after 1990 they occupied high positions in key ministries such as Defense, Internal Affairs or Transport. First of all, they managed to develop informal electoral networks through which they support a certain politician in exchange for political positions or economic gains (Zolyan 2011: 58). As local experts suggest, there is an alliance between oligarchs and politicians as long as the interests of the former group are protected (Navasardian 2011:95).

In terms of power relations it can be said that there is a monopoly of a certain political force over the domestic landscape. Moreover, the civil society is active but unable to put real pressures on the decision makers (Borshchevskaya 2014). Due to those aspects, it is hard to implement reforms according to the EU standards. This trend is also confirmed by the Freedom House. According to the publication, Armenia is a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime. This type of regime attempts to mask authoritarianism or rely on external power structures with limited respect for the institutions and practices of democracy. They typically fail to meet even the minimum standards of self-governing and electoral democracy (Freedom House 2013).

Armenia's Constitution – Russia as a role model

Armenia's Constitution tells a lot about the power relations inside the society and about the political actors' preferences. As it can be noticed, the president has a privileged role and is the main figure of political life. According to the country's fundamental law the president and the government represents the executive power, the national assembly the legislative power, and the courts and tribunals the judicial power. The president has a five years' term and cannot have more than two consecutive terms (Constitution of Armenia, Art. 51). He has important attributes in the realm of foreign policy representing the country abroad, he appoints the prime minister according to the power configuration within the NA, he can appoint and dismiss government members according to the PM's recommendation, he can veto a decision of the NA to adopt a law, he can dissolve the national assembly upon the recommendation of the chairman of the national assembly or the prime minister, he can appoint four members of the constitutional court, he recommends to the national assembly the candidacy of the prosecutor general, the chairman of the Central Bank (Constitution of Armenia, Art. 52-61). This indicates the preference for a strong leader, similar to the Russian style, and, on the other hand, a dysfunctional separation of powers. After the two presidential terms have come to an end, he can hypothetically rule the political life as a prime minister, and later he can run for the presidency.

The Nagorno Karabakh conflict

There is no doubt about the fact that Armenia's biggest security issue is the frozen conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh (NK) area. Frozen conflicts are deeply rooted into the past and the Communist regime only managed to put them on hold, without finding a proper way to solve them (Cioroianu 2008:212). This is also the case of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh, an Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan. The first major clash between

Armenia and Azerbaijan happened during the interwar period when Armenia and Azerbaijani nationalism, each with its own political agenda, collided. In the context of "perestroika", tensions between the Armenians and Azerbaijani reemerged in 1988, and two years later on 18th January 1990, the tensions escalated into a war between the two former Soviet republics. The war ended with a Russian-backed ceasefire in May 1994. Presently the conflict is mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group, but there is no progress towards a peaceful settlement. The NK region has an unclear status, and had an impact on the state-building process for both countries. In the case of Armenia, several political elites held key positions in both the NK's and Armenia's political organs. Moreover, the discourse about the conflict might be used for political gains.

Security strategies In Armenia's Security Strategy, the *"insufficiently competitive economic environment, an inadequate regulation of natural monopolies, and an underground or shadow economy, and a large cash flow"* are highlighted as security threats (Government of Armenia 2007). Moreover, the document speaks about the liberalization of the economy as a goal in order to reach sustainable economic growth and the adoption of a European model of development, but alongside with the strategic partnership with Russia, and cooperation with Iran and the US, it contributes to the consolidation of Armenia's policy of complementarity (Government of Armenia, 2007). Other threats are connected with the situation from Nagorno Karabakh, and two states are identified as potential threats: Azerbaijan and Turkey, the first one being considered as a strategic partner (Government of Armenia, 2007). Other threats are related to Armenia's isolation from projects such as TRACECA and INNOGATE, but also to domestic problems such as unemployment or the polarization of society between the poor and the rich (Government of

Armenia, 2007). However, while the European Union and the accession into the DCFTA have been described by Armenia's officials as being Armenia's economic choice, Russia seems to be Armenia's security choice. Nevertheless, the document says nothing about Armenia's intention for a possible future integration into the EU. The country is a CSTO member, and the Russian-led alliance is described as a framework capable of assuring Armenia's security (Government of Armenia, 2007).

The EU's conditionality When speaking about the EU's conditionality towards the area, one should firstly look at the ENP Action Plans signed between the EU and Armenia, a document with eight priority areas. According to the document, Armenia should strengthen the democratic structures, rule of law and the combat of fraud and corruption; should strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; should encourage further economic development, improve investment climate, and further converge economic legislation and administrative practices; should develop an energy strategy; and should contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and enhance efforts in the field of regional cooperation (European Commission 2006).

Progress made so far Lecturing the European Union's Progress Reports from 2007–2014 dedicated to Armenia's approximation to the EU's standards, a gradual decrease of norm implementation can be noticed. As expected, few of the above reforms were addressed by the decision makers from Yerevan.

Democratization According to the Progress Reports issued by the European Commission, the parliamentary elections from 2007 and 2011 and the presidential elections from 2008 and 2013 were conducted according to the OSCE standards to some extent, but there were several problems such as unfair me-

dia access to offices of incumbentss, unfair ballot counting or unbalanced representation (for party representations) in the electoral commissions (European Commission 2007, 2008). Moreover, the last two presidential elections were followed by street protests, and even led to a political crisis (European Commission 2008, 2013). Other problems are related to the freedom of the media which is under political pressure or controlled by political power (European Commission 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013). A positive aspect is the foundation of a new institution called the Defender of the Human Rights (European Commission 2009), but its competences are limited.

Rule of Law While Armenia has adopted many laws according to EU standards in areas such as the independence of judiciary or the fight against corruption, the implementation remains very limited. The positive aspects include the fact that the Ministry of Justice adopted a special body designed for the supervision of party funding (European Commission 2007). Moreover, a new Judicial Code and a New Administrative Code according to EU standards were adopted, but there is a lot of concern regarding the successful implementation of the abovementioned measures (European Commission 2008). The judiciary process has become more transparent but its independence is limited. Despite the fact that a school of justice has been created with the purpose of training judges, judges are still appointed by the president (European Commission 2008, 2009).

Economy Armenia's investment and trade policy is relatively open, and apparently there is no legal discrimination between foreign and national companies. The fiscal consolidation which happened due to expenditure restraint and revenue collection should also be mentioned as an advantage. In fact, real challenges comes from the fact that foreign businesses

must frequently contend with tax and customs processes that lack transparency thus increasing the costs; the court system lacks independence and it is not reliable when it comes to the resolution of disputes; what is more, major sectors of Armenia's economy are controlled by well-connected businessmen who also benefit from political protection or are high-ranked officials (European Commission 2013, 2014, US Department of State 2013).

Armenia between the EU and Russia The European Union remains Armenia's main trading partner, accounting for around 29.7% of Armenia's total trade, being its biggest export and import market with a respective share of 39.4 % and 26.5 % in total in Armenian exports and imports (Europa.eu 2015). Moreover, for the 2014-2017 period the country will receive around 140-170 million euros. As mentioned above, Armenia successfully negotiated a DCFTA with the EU in July 2013. According to an EU study, the country's inclusion in a future DCFTA will bring several advantages. By removing non-tariff measures, the Armenian economy could gain an extra €146 million a year, representing a 2.3% increase in GDP. For its part, the EU is expected to gain some €74 million. The DCFTA will have significant impacts on Armenia's trade. Moreover, Armenian exports towards the EU might increase to 15.2% (European Commission 2013).

Despite negotiating the DCFTA, Armenia decided to join Russia's Custom Union instead. Many scholars in the West described Yerevan's decision to accept Russia's offer as a "U-turn", a radical change due to the sensitive issue of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict (Popescu 2013, Giragosian 2013). However, things are much more complex than that, being connected with and old Armenian foreign policy tradition. First of all, Russia has a massive presence in Armenia's economy. For example, Russia owns two power stations, one hydro and one nuclear; Gazprom also owns 80 percent of

Armenia's energy infrastructure; Russian airline Sibir owns 70 percent of Armenia's airline Armavia; Vneshtorbank, a Russian state-owned bank owns 70 percent of Armenia's Savings bank; and Russia also bought the Armenian national railway network (Roberts et al 2013).

But most importantly, Russia is Armenia's most reliable security option. Starting with the 19th century, Russia was Armenia's only protection against the Ottoman Empire, and after 1990, against Azerbaijan. While the EU's economy was much more attractive, altering this institutional framework might be catastrophic for Armenia in the long run (Manoukian 2014). In the case of Armenia security comes first, and this is also highlighted by the fact that while there were several concerns and dissatisfactions, there were no street protests against this decision (Manoukian 2014). Nevertheless, the Nagorno Karabakh issue is a sensitive topic.

Nonetheless, the NK conflict represents a sensitive topic. In August 2013, Vladimir Putin decided to visit Baku, for the first time in six years. More than that, Russia and Azerbaijan signed a contract for weapon delivering. This episode has been seen as a Russian decision to abandon Armenia. Thus, Armenia would remain more vulnerable in face of an Azerbaijan with a defense budget equal with Armenia's entire GDP. Moreover, Armenia has a rocky relation with Turkey too, due to the 1915 Armenian genocide question. Regarding this aspect, in April 2015, Russia officially recognized the Ottoman Empire genocide against the Armenian population (Tetrault – Farber, 2015).

Moreover, one should also take into account the fact that around 2 million Armenians leave and work in Russia, and some Armenians hold key positions in Russian business life, especially in areas such as small and medium enterprises. Unlike the Armenian communities from the West, whose activities are mostly limited to philanthropic acts, those leaving to Russia lobby for the promotion of their own eco-

nomic interest, and their connection with the motherland is limited only to economic activities (Oussatcheva 2009:13). Additionally, several Armenian traditional products such as the famous Armenian brandy are more popular in the former USSR markets than in the Western ones. Moreover, being part of the EU's DCFTA requires a great amount of time in order to implement the necessary reforms (Manoukian 2014).

The Riga Summit and beyond Despite joining the customs union, at the Vilnius summit it was mentioned that the EU and Armenia reconfirmed their commitment to further develop and strengthen their cooperation in all areas of mutual interest within the Eastern Partnership framework; however, the declaration also mentions that the *"summit participants reaffirm the sovereign right of each partner freely to choose the level of ambition and the goals to which it aspires in its relations with the European Union"* (European Council 2013:8). The next EaP summit was of critical importance for the future of the EU-Armenia relations. The Riga summit brought a new vision about the EaP. The final declaration of the summit has two key words, namely inclusiveness and differentiation. On the one hand, this means that the EU is willing to support the countries that are committed to the European path such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and on the other hand, that the EU does not want to abandon the other three members of the EaP. However, this last group will have a different relation with the EU, probably with fewer requirements for reforms and fewer rewards. Another important aspect is the fact that the EU has softened its discourse about Russia and Russia's actions in Ukraine (European Council 2015), rather having an appeasing attitude. It might want to remain in the area but without upsetting Russia or losing any EaP country.

While countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, and even Azerbaijan were dissatisfied with the Riga Summit, surprisingly Armenia was one of the summit's biggest winners. The

summit's declaration mentions that the participants *"welcome the common understanding reached on the scope for a future agreement between the EU and Armenia aimed at further developing and strengthening their comprehensive cooperation in all areas of mutual interest"*(European Council 2015). This suggests that the EU is preparing a new type of agreement different from the AA, and the fact that now Armenia as a Eurasian Union member, will be taken into account. Moreover, Armenian Prime Minister Edward Nalbandian declared, *"Today we have what we expected. … Armenia and the EU are going to continue comprehensive cooperation in all the spheres and directions possible, considering Armenia's commitments in other integration processes"* (News.Am, 2015). This approach fits well into Armenia's foreign policy paradigm. On the one hand, the relationship with Russia remains undamaged, and on the other, ties with Brussels are not lost, on the contrary, are reinterpreted. Moreover, this type of political discourse brings benefits for the Armenian political elites in power. This is a form of protection against criticism from civil society and future protests from those who might accuse them of increasing the country's dependence on Russia.

The negotiations for a new EU-Armenia agreement officially started in December 2015, and this might have implications for the future. This indicates a changing paradigm for the ENP, one that is more flexible. On the other hand, it might lay the foundation for a new way of dealing with other key members of the EAEU such as Kazakhstan or even Belarus.

Conclusion Historical institutionalism proved to be an adequate tool in providing answers about Armenia's low standard of approximation to EU standards and its decision to abandon the DCFTA for the custom union (later becoming part of the Eurasian Union). As it has been shown, Armenian decision makers selectively implemented the required EU reforms. The judicial system is not fully independent; the parliamen-

tary and presidential elections were not conducted according to EU standards; and the economy is still dominated by monopolies in certain areas.

Armenia's institutional structure and the power relations among institutions explain this type of policy. Armenian political life seems, at least for the moment, monopolized by the Republican Party. The opposition is weak and divided and with no clear political agenda. One proof of RP's political monopoly lies in the fact that the incumbent power has always won the elections. Due to this aspect it is hard to implement new and liberal reforms. Besides, the article showed that the political actors have a strategic approach towards both the EU and Russia, and they prefer the present political status quo, with limited liberal reforms in order to keep their benefits. By entering the EU market, many Armenian businessmen might lose their profit. Moreover, accepting the EU's offer Armenia will damage its relation with Russia. As Armenia's security is connected with Russia, there is an asymmetrical economic connection between the parties and Russia is also a "role model" for the Armenian political elites. Damaging this present institutional framework might have a very high cost for Armenia in the future.

However, after the Riga summit it seems that the EU is willing to offer a new type of relation to Armenia, taking into account the fact that Armenia is now a Eurasian Union member. This new type of agreement will be different from the AA, most probably with fewer rewards, but with an Armenia having kept its foreign policy vector.

Bibliography Borshchevskaya Anna,"A Plan to Tame Civil Society in Armenia". Available at https://freedomhouse.org/blog/plan-tame-civil-society-armenia#.VOyWBS6PX_s.

Cioroianu Adrian (2009). *Geopolitica Matrioșkăi*, București, Curtea Veche

Constitution of Armenia, Article 51, available at http://www.parliament.am/parliament.php?id=constitution&lang=eng

de Waal Thomas (2010). *The Caucasus: An Introduction*, Oxford, Oxford University Press,

Dietl Gulshan (2013) "Eurasian Union: Substance and the Subtext", *Journal of Eurasian Affairs*, Vol.1, No.1, available at http://www.eurasianaffairs.net/eurasian-union-substance-and-the-subtext/

Emerson Michael (2004). *The Wider Europe Matrix*, Center for European Policy, Brussels.

Euractiv, "Ukraine wants roadmap to EU accession at Riga summit", 21 May 2015 available at http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/ukraine-wants-roadmap-eu-accession-riga-summit-314753

Eurasian Economic Union (2015), *General Information*, available at http://eaeunion.org/#about-info

European Commission (2006), *EU – Armenia Action Plan. Brussels*, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf

European Commission (2008), *Implementation of the European Union Neighborhood Policy in 2007: Progress Report Armenia*. Brussels, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/progress2008/sec08_392_en.pdf

European Commission (2009), *Implementation of the European Union Neighborhood Policy in 2008: Progress Report Armenia*. Brussels, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/progress2009/sec09_511_en.pdf

European Commission (2010), *Implementation of the European Union Neighborhood Policy in 2009: Progress Report Armenia*. Brussels, 2010, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/progress2010/sec10_516_en.pdf

European Commission (2014), *EU – Armenia Relations*, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/armenia/

European Commission (2014*), Implementation of the European Union Neighborhood Policy in 2013: Progress Report Armenia*, Brussels, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2015/armenia-enp-report-2015_en.pdf

European Commission (2015), *Implementation of the European Union Neighborhood Policy in 2014: Progress Report Armenia*. Brussels, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2015/armenia-enp-report-2015_en.pdf

European Council (2003), *A Secure Europe in a better world*. Brussels, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC7809568ENC.pdf

European Council (2013), Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit: Eastern Partnership the way ahead, Vilnius, available at http://static.eu2013.lt/uploads/documents/Programos_12/131129%20Vilnius%20Summit%20Declaration.pdf

European Council (2015), *Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Riga 21-22 May)*. Riga, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/05/21-22/

Fioretos, Orfeo, "Historical Institutionalism in International Relations", *International Organizations*, Vol. 65, No.2,

Freie M.F.,-Simao L. (2013), "From Words to Deeds: European Union Democracy Promotion in Armenia", *East European Politics*,

Fukuyama Francis (2004), *Construcția statelor: Ordinea Mondială în Secolul XXI*, trad. Mihnea Columbeanu, Antet Prahova

Fukuyama Francis (2012). *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*, Profile Books.

Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, "Moscow's Armenian Community Marks 100th Anniversary of Genocide", *The Moscow Times*, 25 April 2015, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=519671

Government of Armenia (2007), *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia*, available at http://www.mfa.am/u_files/file/doctrine/Doctrineeng.pdf

Grzymalla-Busse Ana, Luong Pauline Jones,(2002), "Reconceptualizing the State: Leesons from Post-Communism", *Politics&Society, Vol. 30, No. 4*.

Hagemann, Christian (2013), External Governance on the Terms of Partners? The EU, Russia and the Republic of Moldova in the

European Neighborhood Policy, *European Integration* Vol 35, No 7

Hall Peter A., Taylor Rosemary (1996)., " Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism", *MPIFG Discussion Paper* 96/6

Interview of Vasken Manoukian, Titulescu Foundation, March 4 2014 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dk-CackLeJs

Mankoff Jeffrey (2014), "Russia's Latest Land Grab How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine", *Foreign Affairs, May/June* 2014

March, James, Olson, Johan (1998), The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, *International Organizations*, Vol. 52, No. 4

Ministry of Economy, Foreign Trade Relations of Armenia (2013), *Foreign Trade of the Republic of Armenia 2009-2012*, available at http://www.armstat.am/file/article/ft_2nish_12_3.pdf,

Newz.az,Azerbaijan, EU replace Association Agreement with new strategic partnership", 29 January 2014, available at http://www.news.az/articles/politics/86169

Oussatcheva, Marina (2009) "Institutions in Diaspora: The Case of Armenian Community in Russia", Institute of Social & Cultural Anthropology, University of Oxford.

Peters B Guy (1999). *Institutional theory in Political Science: the New Institutionalism"* , Pinter, London and New York,

Putin Vladimir, "A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the making", Izvestia, October 3 2011, available at http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3-#sthash.4Mt8KtJ9.dpuf

Roberts James, et al, (2013) "The Eurasian Union: Undermining Economic Freedom and Prosperity in the South Caucasus", *Heritage Foundation*, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/11/the-eurasian-union-undermining-economic-freedom-and-prosperity-in-the-south-caucasu

Schmidt Viviane (2010). , "Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the forth new institutionalism", *European Political Science Review, Vol.2, Nr. 1*

Secrieru Stanislav (2008), *Rusia după Imperiu*:între *putere regională şi custode global*, Institutul European Publishing House, Iaşi

Sedelmeier Ulrich (2011), "Europeanisation in new member and candidate states", *Living Reviews in European Governance,* 6(1).

Tsygankov Andrei (2010), *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in the National Identity*, 2nd edition, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers.

Zolyan, Mikayel (2011), "Armenia's Velvel Revolution: Success and Failures", *South Caucasus – 20 years of independence,* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Chapter 12

Organizers – Content of Previous Volumes

Organizers

Institut für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa (IDM)

Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM)
A-1090 Vienna, Hahngasse 6/1/24
Tel.: + 43 1 319 72 58
Fax: + 43 1 319 72 58-4
E-mail: idm@idm.at, www.idm.at

More than 60 Years of Research for the Danube Region

The IDM was founded in 1953 as the "Research Institute for Issues of the Danube Region". As an Austrian scientific institution, it was dedicated specifically to research on the Danube region.

In 1993 the Institute was renamed as the "Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe" (IDM).

Today the IDM is an extramural research institution based on an association – constituted by individual and corporate members – with its head office in Vienna.

As of April 1, 2011, IDM started a strategic cooperation with the University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences (BOKU), Vienna.

The Institute is funded by the Austrian Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministries of Science, Research and Economy, of Education and Women's Affairs, of Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs as well as by individual provinces, cities, the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, the Austrian Central Bank and private sponsors.

Facilitator and clearinghouse As a gateway and a facilitator institution the IDM makes an important contribution to co-operation in the fields of research, culture, politics, economics and administration. At the same time the IDM sees itself as a clearinghouse for concerns of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe, supporting the work of embassies, trade missions, cultural institutes and national tourist offices of the countries of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe in Austria, as well as the work of Austrian missions to these countries.

Since 1995 the chairman of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) is the former Austrian vice-chancellor Dr. Erhard Busek.

Groundwork As a think tank the IDM performs basic groundwork for government agencies and institutions in the fields of politics, education, research, culture and business and supports efforts in the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe.

PR work The IDM performs PR work and serves as a lobbyist for the region.

Research The IDM carries out research projects dealing with current political, sociological, social, economic, cultural and ethnic issues of the countries of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe. The results are publicised by means of events and publications.

Next generation support The IDM supports recent graduates and young professionals in research and practice.

Educational activities and events In seminars, symposiums, summer schools and the postgraduate course "Interdisciplinary Balkan Studies" in co-operation with the University of Vienna, all with international participation, the IDM also serves as an institute of learning

and training. In addition, the IDM organises expert meetings, conferences, workshops and lectures. In this context, cooperation with institutions that share the IDM's goals is of particular significance.

Corporate services On request the IDM will organise custom-tailored introductory and advanced seminars for companies (executive briefings).

Publications
- "Der Donauraum" ("The Danube Region") – scientific journal of the Institute (quarterly/price per copy: € 9.60/ subscription: € 34.50) – Böhlau publishing house, Sachsenplatz 4-6, A-1201 Vienna)
- "Buchreihe des Instituts für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa" ("Book Series of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe") – Böhlau publishing house
- "Das Magazin für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa" ("The Magazine for the Danube Region and Central Europe") – issues on individual countries
- "IDM-Studien" ("IDM Studies") – on topical issues
- "Info Europa" – journal on the enlarged EU (5 issues per year, subscription: € 40, reduced price € 15)
- "IDM-Info" – newsletter of the Institute including the programme of events (5 issues per year/subscription: € 15/free of charge for members of the Institute)

Documentation The IDM maintains a documentation centre and a magazine reading room with specialised publications on current developments in the countries of the Danube Region, Central and Southeast Europe. Documentation is supplemented by regular reports provided by country correspondents working for the Institute on a voluntary basis.

IDResearch Ltd.

IDResearch Ltd.
H-7624 Pécs, Jakabhegyi út 8/E
Office and postal address
H-7633 Pécs, Esztergár L. u. 8/2 IV/10.
Tel./Fax: +36 72 522-624, +36 72 522-625
Mobile: +36 30 4086-360
E-mail: tarrosy@idresearch.hu, Internet: www.idresearch.hu

ID in the name of our enterprise indicates first the significance of possible research and co-operation between different disciplines (InterDisciplinary) in today's globalising world; second, refers to the ability of developing creative ideas (Idea+Development) and third, covers Innovative power and Dedicated aspect of the enterprise.

Since 1997, a team of young researchers, students and Ph.D. aspirants from the University of Pécs have been organising various national and international symposia, conferences, seminars and summer schools about different aspects of social and political changes in Central and Eastern Europe (ranging from regional co-operation, the place and role of the V4 countries to security dilemmas of our global world). IDResearch is a young company based on the experiences and achievements of the past years, with a special intention of generating and shaping collaborations among young researchers in Central Europe. The aim of the company is to become a well-known generator of co-operations between national and international actors in the field of human sciences and research, project development and training. IDResearch Ltd. is interested in strengthening a new generation of social scientists who can search for and interpret affects of global processes appearing on the local level, and contribute to expressing social demand by estab-

lishing a new co-operation culture. For this aim the company plans to develop accredited trainings for young scientists to help them obtain complementary and pragmatic skills useful for their future work.

Current projects include

- the DRC (Danube Rectors' Conference) Summer School series on Regional Co-operation (www.d-r-c.org; www.drcsummerschool.eu);
- the Publikon project (portal for social science research and publishing house (www.publikon.hu);
- think tank and project leader on migration-related issues in the form of the European Integration Fund-supported scheme 'Black and white - Here we are!' and 'Immigropoly' (www.ittvagyunk.eu);
- publisher of the Hungarian African Studies (Afrika Tanulmányok) periodical and initiator of several researches, conferences and workshops on African issues (www.afrikatanulmanyok.hu);
- publisher of the journals of Modern Geográfia (Modern Geography; www.moderngeografia.eu) and the Central European African Studies Review (CEASR);
- collaborator in the International Cultural Week in Pécs international studies summer school series (www.icwip.hu);

We offer complex services

Scientific Research, Market Research
Conference Organisation
Project Management
Publishing Books and Journals
Grant-writing and Fundraising
International Partnership (network) Building
Media Analyses, Promotion Campaigns, Campaign Communication Trainings
Webpage Design and Content Development

publikon
books

Content of Previous Volumes

**2nd DRC Social, Economic and Political Cohesion
in the Danube Region in Light of EU Enlargement**

3ʳᵈ DRC The Future of Europe: A View from the Danube Region

**4th DRC European Higher Education in a Changing World –
A View from the Danube Region**

**5ᵗʰ DRC Changing Dynamics of the Danubian Region –
New Neighbourhood Policy in the EU**

**9ᵗʰ DRC Challenges for the European Union in the Next Decade –
A View from the Danube Region**

10ᵗʰ DRC Old Neighbours – New Policies in the Countries along the Danube and the Black Sea Region

11ᵗʰ DRC Chances and Challenges for the Danube Region
A 100 Years After the First World War